The State of Gujarat Etc. v. Choodamani Parmeshwaran Iyer & Anr. Etc.
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 972; [2023] 8 S.C.R. 1139
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra Central Goods and Services Tax Act, Justice 2017 – S.69 – Summons Issued Under – Invocation of S.438, Justice 2017 Act for the Purpose of Recording of His Statement, Justice The Provision of S.438, Justice The
- Decided
- 17 Jul 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1963/2023
- Sections
- 69, 438, 69(1), 145, 83, 70, 132, 108, 132(5), 67(10), 165, 69(3)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:25 am. Original source ↗
Preview: first 50% of the document.
A B C D E F G H
THE STATE OF GUJARAT ETC.
v.
CHOODAMANI PARMESHWARAN IYER & ANR. ETC.
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 1963-64 of 2023)
JULY 17, 2023
[J. B. PARDIWALA AND PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, JJ.] Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 – s.69 – Summons issued under – Invocation of s.438, CrPC by the person summoned – Impermissibility of – Held: If any person is summoned u/s.69, 2017 Act for the purpose of recording of his statement, the provision of s.438, Cr.PC cannot be invoked – The only way a person summoned can seek protection against the pre-trial arrest is to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court u/Art.226 – This is exactly what the respondents did in the present case – By filing criminal applications u/Art. 226 before the High Court, the respondents sought direction to the appellant not to arrest them in exercise of the power conferred by s.69(1), 2017 Act – This, in essence, was prayer for anticipatory bail – However, at the stage of summons, the person summoned cannot invoke s.438, CrPC – Power to arrest a person by an empowered authority under the GST Act is statutory in character and ordinarily the Writ Court should not interfere with exercise of such power – Impugned order directing the concerned authority to complete the adjudicatory process within 8 weeks and give two more weeks to the respondents for taking necessary steps if there was a need for any apprehension and if they were not ready to fulfill their obligation, set aside – However, one more opportunity given to both the respondents to appear before the authorities for recording their statements – On their failure to appear, authority to proceed in accordance with law – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.438 – Constitution of India – Article 226 – Central Excise Act, 1944 – s.145 – Finance Act, 1994 – s.83.
Constitution of India – Article 226 – Application for pre-arrest protection under – Held: There is no bar for the High Court to entertain an application for pre-arrest protection u/Art.226 however, such power should be exercised sparingly – There is a fundamental distinction between a petition for anticipatory bail and the writ of [2023] 8 S.C.R. 1139 A B C D E F G H 1140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 8 S.C.R.
mandamus directing an officer not to effect arrest – A writ of mandamus would lie only to compel the performance of the statutory or other duties – No writ of mandamus would lie to prevent an officer from performing his statutory function – When a writ application is filed before the High Court u/Art.226 , the writ court owes a duty to examine the fact of the case and ascertain whether the case of the writ applicant falls under the category of exceptional cases as indicated in Kartar Singh case.
Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569 :
[1994] 2 SCR 375 – followed.
Union of India vs. Padam Narain Aggarwal and Ors.
(2008) 13 SCC 305 : [2008] 14 SCR 179 – relied on.
P.V. Ramana Reddy vs. Union of India (2021) 2 SCC 784 – referred to.
Case Law Reference [2008] 14 SCR 179 relied on Para 13 [1994] 2 SCR 375 followed Para 17 (2021) 2 SCC 784 referred to Para 18 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos. 1963-1964 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 24.12.2018 of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in SCRA Nos. 11010 and 11076 of 2018. Kanu Agarwal, Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, Madhav Sinhal, Advs. for the Appellants.
K. M. Nataraj, ASG, R. P. Gupta, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Prashant Singh I, V. Balaji, Ms. Manjula Gupta, Shailesh Madiyal, Sharath Nambiar, Advs. for the Respondents.
The following Order of the Court was passed:
ORDER
1. Leave granted.
2. The learned counsel appearing for the private respondents (Assessees) submitted that he is not in a position to assist this Court as his clients are not in touch with him past almost six months. A B C D E F G H
3. In view of the aforesaid, we had no benefit of any assistance from the learned counsel appearing for the private respondents.
4. We have heard Mr. Kanu Agrawal, the learned counsel appearing for the State of Gujarat.
5. It appears from the materials on record that a summons came to be issued dated 31.10.2018 to the respondents under Section 145 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (for short “the Act 1944”) as made applicable to the service tax vide Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 and Section 70 of the Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 (for short “the CGST Act 2017”) calling upon them to remain present for the purpose of interrogation in connection with an inquiry against one M/s. Iyer Enterprise Mundra Kutch. The authority concerned wants to interrogate the respondents in regard to the alleged evasion of Goods and Service Tax Liability/Contravention of the Provision of the Finance Act 1994 and CGST Act 2017.
6. Upon receipt of the summons, the respondents apprehended arrest at the end of the concerned officials of the Department.
7. In such circumstances as referred to above, two writ applications came to be filed before the High Court being Special Criminal Application Nos. 11010 of 2018 and 11076 of 2018 resply. Both the writ applications came to be disposed by a common order dated 24.12.2018. The relevant part of the impugned order reads thus:- “7. Considering the voluntary nature of pleadings where the petitioners are desirous of getting themselves assisted by the adjudicatory process, let them represent their case before the concerned authority. The authority concerned shall complete the same in 8 weeks’ time and if there is a need for any apprehension after once the adjudicatory process is completed, if they are not ready to fulfill their obligation, they may be given an opportunity of two more weeks for taking necessary steps. Petitioners shall appear on or before 11/01/ 2019 before the concerned Police Station.
In view of the above, the present applications stand disposed of. Direct service is permitted.”
8. The State of Gujarat being dissatisfied with the aforesaid order passed by the High Court is here before this Court with the present appeal.
THE STATE OF GUJARAT ETC. v. CHOODAMANI
PARMESHWARAN IYER & ANR. ETC.
A B C D E F G H 1142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 8 S.C.R.
9. For the first time, this Court took up the matter on 29.04.2019 and issued notice. While issuing notice, this Court granted relief staying the directions issued by the High Court that the adjudicatory process must be completed within a period of eight weeks.
10. The learned counsel appearing for the State of Gujarat pointed out that as many as 14 summons have been issued to one of the respondents. Only once, one of the respondents appeared for the purpose of interrogation. Thereafter, none of the respondents appeared before the authority. It’s been now 5 years that the inquiry is still pending. He further submitted that it is only after the respondents are interrogated, that the department will be able to ascertain whether there is any evasion or not and on the basis of which the future course of action like filing of complaint etc., would be decided.
11. We are not convinced with the manner in which the High Court has disposed of both the writ applications filed by the respondents. It was expected of the respondents to honour the summons and appear before the authority for the purpose of interrogation.
12. It is well-settled position of law that power to arrest a person by an empowered authority under the GST Act and could be termed as statutory in character and ordinarily the writ court should not interfere with exercise of such power. We say so because such power of arrest can be exercised only in those cases where the Commissioner or his delegatee has reasons to believe that the person has committed any offence specified in Clause (a) or Clause (b) or Clause(c) or Clause (d) of sub-Section (1) of Section 132 which is punishable under clause (i) or
(ii) or sub-section (1) or sub-Section (2) of the said Section.
13. As observed by this Court in Union of India Vs. Padam Narain Aggarwal and Ors. (2008) 13 SCC 305, (which was in context with the powers of Custom Officers to arrest under the Customs Act) such statutory powers must be exercised on objective facts of commission of an offence enumerated and the officer concerned must have reason to believe that a person sought to be arrested has been guilty of such an offence.
14. This Court in Padam Narain Aggarwal (supra) made it very clear that ordinarily the Court should not impose any condition before effecting arrest. If any conditions are imposed before effecting arrest for instance giving prior intimation to the person concerned etc., the A B C D E F G H statutory provisions would be rendered ineffective, nugatory and meaningless.
15. What is important are the observations made in paragraphs 44 and 45 resply of the decision of this Court in the case of Padam Narain Aggarwal (supra), which read thus:- “44. In the case on hand, the respondents were only summoned under Section 108 of the Act for recording of their statements. The High Court was conscious and mindful of that fact. It, therefore, held that the applications for anticipatory bail, in the circumstances, were premature. They were, accordingly, disposed of by directing the respondents to appear before the Customs Authorities. The Court, however, did not stop there. It stated that even if the Customs Authorities find any non-bailable offence against the applicants (the respondents herein), they shall not be arrested without ten days’ prior notice to them.
45. In our judgment, on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, neither of the above directions can be said to be legal, valid or in consonance with law. Firstly, the order passed by the High Court is a blanket one as held by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Gurbaksh Singh and seeks to grant protection to the respondents in respect of any nonbailable offence. Secondly, it illegally obstructs, interferes and curtails the authority of the Customs Officers from exercising statutory power of arrest of a person said to have committed a non-bailable offence by imposing a condition of giving ten days’ prior notice, a condition not warranted by law. The order passed by the High Court to the extent of directions issued to the Customs Authorities is, therefore, liable to be set aside and is hereby set aside.” (Emphasis supplied)
16. Thus, the position of law is that if any person is summoned under Section 69 of the CGST Act, 2017 for the purpose of recording of his statement, the provisions of Section 438 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1908 cannot be invoked. We say so as no First Information Report gets registered before the power of arrest under Section 69(1) of the CGST Act, 2017 is invoked and in such circumstances, the person summoned cannot invoke Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for THE STATE OF GUJARAT ETC. v. CHOODAMANI
PARMESHWARAN IYER & ANR. ETC.
A B C D E F G H 1144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 8 S.C.R.
Continue reading
Sign in and become a member to continue reading this judgment and every other document in the library.
Members read the full text, download where permitted, and keep notes and bookmarks.