Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav v. State of U.P. & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1386; [2025] 12 S.C.R. 295
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Sanjay Karol, Justice N Kotiswar Singh
- Decided
- 4 Dec 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 5229/2025
- Sections
- 319, 161, 32(1), 32, 307, 169, 319(1), 162, 161CR, 162(1), 145, 162CR
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:21 am. Original source ↗
Preview: first 50% of the document.
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 295 : 2025 INSC 1386 Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav v.
State of U.P. & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 5229 of 2025)
04 December 2025 [Sanjay Karol* and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the courts below, in the attending facts and circumstances, justified in dismissing the application for summoning additional accused.
Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.319 – Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence – Summoning of additional accused – FIR by the appellantbrother that his sister was shot by her husband based on the information received by him from his niece, aged nine years that her father shot her mother – Two statements of the victim recorded u/s.161 CrPC, where in the first statement she named her husband as the person who shot her, and in the subsequent one she named her in laws alleging that they had instigated her husband to shoot her – Thereafter, she succumbed to death – However, chargesheet filed only against the husband, exonerating the in-laws – During the trial, the prosecution moved application u/s.319 to summon the in-laws as additional accused on basis of the evidence recorded during the trial which clearly disclosed their role in the commission of the offence – Both trial court and High Court dismissed the application holding that no strong and cogent evidence to justify summoning u/s.319 – Justification: Held: High Court’s approach is erroneous – High Court concluded that victim’s daughter was not an eyewitness to the actual firing and relied on her cross-examination – Drawing such an inference amounts to conducting a mini-trial at the stage of summoning, which is impermissible – At the stage of deciding the application u/s.319, the Court is not required to test the credibility or weigh * Author 296 [2025] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the probative value of the evidence as would be done at the end of the trial for determining the conviction or otherwise of the accused – It has to consider whether the material on record reasonably indicates involvement of the proposed accused so as to exercise the extraordinary power – Thus, the reliance placed by the courts below on daughter’s cross-examination to discredit her testimony misplaced – Further, the minor daughter in her statement recorded u/s.161, categorically named the respondents as those who instigated the commission of the said crime – While a statement recorded u/s.161 CrPC is not substantive evidence in itself, it may be used to corroborate the evidence recorded by the Court to invoke the power u/s.319 – Thus, conjointly reading minor’s deposition along with her s.161 statement, a specific and overt act has been assigned to the respondents – Furthermore, the two statements of the deceased, clearly fall within the ambit of s.32(1) of the Evidence Act – Perusal of both the statements reveals that while the former primarily narrates the incident, the latter elaborates on the circumstances that culminated in the fatal act and brings forth the complicity of the respondents – High Court erred in holding that these statements cannot be treated as dying declaration merely because the death of the deceased occurred after a substantial lapse of time from their recordings – What is pertinent is that the statement relates either to the cause of death or the circumstances leading to it – Depositions of the brother and his niece, along with the statements of the deceased recorded during the investigation, prima facie suggests the complicity of the respondents in the commission of the said offence – Thus, sufficient ground to exercise the power u/s.319 and summon them to face trial – Objections raised by the respondents, including the alleged tutoring of the minor witness, omission of their names in the FIR, inconsistencies in the statements of the deceased and lack of contemporaneous medical certification, are all premature and cannot be conclusively decided at the stage of exercising power u/s.319 – Judgment and order of the High Court set aside – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.32. [Paras 11-18] Case Law Cited Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab [2014] 2 SCR 1 : (2014) 3 SCC 92; S. Mohammed Ispahani v. Yogendra Chandak [2017] 10 SCR 29 : (2017) 16 SCC 226; Omi v. State of M.P. [2025] 1 SCR 266 : (2025) 2 SCC 621; Shiv Baran v. State of U.P. [2025] [2025] 12 S.C.R. 297Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav v. State of U.P. & Ors. 8 SCR 229 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1457; CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh [2003] 3 SCR 485 : (2003) 6 SCC 175; Amish Devgan v. Union of India [2020] 14 SCR 198 : (2021) 1 SCC 1; State of Rajasthan v. Chatra [2025] 4 SCR 95 : (2025) 8 SCC 613; State of M.P. v. Balveer Singh [2025] 2 SCR 836 : (2025) 8 SCC 545; Dharmendra Kumar v. State of M.P. [2024] 7 SCR 218 : (2024) 8 SCC 60; Laxman v. State of Maharashtra [2002] Supp. 1 SCR 697 : (2002) 6 SCC 710; Bhagwan v. State of U.P. [2012] 12 SCR 774 : (2013) 12 SCC 137; Jagbir Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2019] 11 SCR 1137 : (2019) 8 SCC 779; Pradeep Bisoi v. State of Odisha [2018] 12 SCR 947 : (2019) 11 SCC 500; Manjunath v. State of Karnataka [2023] 14 SCR 727 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1421; Rattan Singh v. State of H.P. [1996] Supp. 9 SCR 938 : (1997) 4 SCC 161; Kulwant Singh v. State of Punjab [2004] 1 SCR 1018 : (2004) 9 SCC 257; Amar Singh v. State of Rajasthan [2010] 9 SCR 526 : (2010) 9 SCC 64 – referred to.
List of Acts Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872.
List of Keywords Summoning as additional accused; Summon in-laws as additional accused; Mini-trial at the stage of summoning; Medical certification; Preliminary stage of summoning; Dying declaration; Minor witness; Omission of names in the FIR; Inconsistencies in the statements. Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
5229 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 22.04.2024 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in CRLR No. 4729 of 2023 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Abhishek Vikas, Shivam Sharma, Utkarsh Bhushan, Ms. Kritika. Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Ms. Rajdipa Behura, Sr. Adv., Dr. Vijendra Singh, Aniket Tiwari, Dhruv Joshi.
298 [2025] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Sanjay Karol J.
Leave Granted.
2. The present appeal arises out of the impugned judgment and order dated 22 nd April 2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Revision No. 4729 of 2023, which affirmed the order dated 3 rd August 2023 passed by the Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bulandshahar 1 whereby the application filed by the prosecution under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19732 , praying for summoning additional accused (Respondent Nos.2 to 4 herein) 3 in Sessions Trial No.1151 of 2021 arising out of Case Crime No.187 of 2021, was dismissed.
3. The facts in brief, shorn of unnecessary details, are as under:
3.1. On 25th March 2021, the appellant Neeraj Kumar lodged FIR No. 187 of 2021 at PS Sikandrabad under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 18604 alleging that his sister Smt. Nishi5 had been shot by her husband, Rahul, at her matrimonial home. The said FIR was registered based on the information received by him from his niece Shristi, aged about nine years, who informed the appellant that ‘Papa has shot Mummy at home’.
3.2. The deceased was first taken to Government Hospital, Bulandshahar, and thereafter to Kailash Hospital, Noida, where she underwent treatment for the firearm injury sustained by her. During the course of treatment, her statements were recorded under Section 161 CrPC on two occasions – firstly on 25 th March 2021 and then again on 18 th April 2021. In her first statement, she named her husband Rahul as the person who shot her; in 1 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’.
2 Hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’ 3 Collectively referred to as ‘the respondents’.
4 Hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’ 5 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the deceased’.
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 299Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav v. State of U.P. & Ors. the subsequent one, she further alleged that he had done so at the instigation of his mother Rajo @Rajwati (Respondent No.2 herein), brother Satan @Vineet (Respondent No.3 herein) and brother-in-law Gabbar (Respondent No.4 herein). Both the statements were video recorded.
3.3. On 15 th May 2021, the deceased succumbed to the injuries sustained. Following her death, the appellant, on 20 th May 2021, made another complaint before the SHO PS Sikandrabad, requesting that appropriate legal action be taken against the respondents (relatives of the husband), since the deceased had categorically named them and mentioned their role in the statement(s) recorded by the police.
3.4. Upon completion of the investigation, a chargesheet was filed on 16th July 2021 only against Rahul, the husband of the deceased, under Sections 302 and 316 IPC, while exonerating the private respondents herein.
3.5. The case thereafter proceeded to trial before the concerned Court. The charges were framed on 18 th October 2021 and the appellant was examined as PW-1 on 28th March 2022 and he deposed about the incident and the events immediately following it. The minor daughter of the deceased, Shristi, was examined as PW-2 on 12 th July 2022. In her testimony, she narrated the circumstances surrounding the said incident, stating that her father had shot her mother at the instigation of the private respondents herein.
3.6. On the strength of these testimonies and the statements of the deceased recorded under Section 161 CrPC, the prosecution moved an application under Section 319 CrPC, praying for summoning the private respondents as additional accused to face trial along with the husband of the deceased. It was contended that the evidence recorded during the trial clearly disclosed their role in the commission of the offence.
3.7. The Trial Court, vide its order dated 3 rd August 2023 dismissed the said application, holding that the material on record was insufficient or was not of such strength and cogency to exercise the extraordinary power provided under Section 319 CrPC. 300 [2025] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
3.8. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred Criminal Revision No.4729 of 2023 before the High Court, which was dismissed vide the impugned judgment for the following reasons:
(i) The statements of the deceased dated 25th March 2021 and 18 th April 2021 recorded before her death could not be treated as dying declarations under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 6 since her death had occurred on 15th May 2021, after the expiry of a substantial period from the date of recording such statements.
(ii) The statement of PW-1, the informant/brother of the deceased, was held to be of limited evidentiary value with respect to the actual occurrence, as he was not an eyewitness to the incident.
(iii) The testimony of PW-2, the minor daughter of the deceased, was also not sufficient to summon the respondents, since she had admitted in her cross-examination that she reached the place of occurrence only after hearing the sound of two gunshots, thereby indicating that she was also not an eyewitness to the said incident.
Relying on the above, the High Court concluded that no strong and cogent evidence emerged justifying exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC and accordingly affirmed the order passed by the Trial Court.
3.9. It is against this judgment of the High Court that the appellant is before us.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. The sole issue that arises for our consideration is whether the Courts below, in the attending facts and circumstances, were justified in dismissing the application for summoning the respondents as additional accused?
5. Section 319 CrPC contemplates that:
“(1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not 6 Hereinafter referred to as ‘Evidence Act’ [2025] 12 S.C.R. 301Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav v. State of U.P. & Ors. being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. …”
6. The law governing the summoning of an additional accused under Section 319 CrPC is now well settled. The provision is an enabling one, empowering the Court, during the course of an inquiry or trial, to proceed against any person not already arraigned as an accused, if, from the evidence adduced before it, such person appears to have committed an offence. Its object is to ensure that no guilty person escapes the process of law, thereby giving effect to the maxim judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur (Judge is condemned when guilty is acquitted). It casts a duty upon the Court to ensure that the real offender does not go unpunished, for only then can the concept of fair and complete trial be realised.
7. It is no longer res integra that the power conferred under this Section is extraordinary and discretionary in nature, intended to be exercised sparingly and with due circumspection. While invoking it, the Court must be satisfied that the evidence appearing against the person sought to be summoned is such that it prima facie necessitates bringing such person to face trial. The degree of satisfaction required is higher than that warranted at the stage of framing of charge, yet short of the satisfaction necessary to record a conviction. Such satisfaction must rest on cogent and credible material brought on record during the trial, and not based on conjectures or speculations. In this regard, reference to a few judicial pronouncements of this Court would be apposite.
7.1. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab7 extensively discussed the power conferred under Section 319 CrPC. Relevant part is extracted hereunder: “90. … all that is required for the exercise of the power under Section 319 CrPC is that, it must appear to the court that some other person also who is not facing the trial, may also have been involved in the offence. The
7 (2014) 3 SCC 92
302 [2025] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports prerequisite for the exercise of this power is similar to the prima facie view which the Magistrate must come to in order to take cognizance of the offence.
Therefore, no straitjacket formula can and should be laid with respect to conditions precedent for arriving at such an opinion and, if the Magistrate/court is convinced even on the basis of evidence appearing in examination-in-chief, it can exercise the power under Section 319 CrPC and can proceed against such other person(s). It is essential to note that the section also uses the words “such person could be tried” instead of should be tried. Hence, what is required is not to have a mini-trial at this stage by having examination and cross-examination and thereafter rendering a decision on the overt act of such person sought to be added. In fact, it is this mini-trial that would affect the right of the person sought to be arraigned as an accused rather than not having any cross-examination at all, for in light of sub-section (4) of Section 319 CrPC, the person would be entitled to a fresh trial where he would have all the rights including the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and examine defence witnesses and advance his arguments upon the same. Therefore, even on the basis of examination-in-chief, the court or the Magistrate can proceed against a person as long as the court is satisfied that the evidence appearing against such person is such that it prima facie necessitates bringing such person to face trial. In fact, examination-in-chief untested by cross-examination, undoubtedly in itself, is an evidence.
xxx
106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of crossexamination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie [2025] 12 S.C.R. 303Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav v. State of U.P. & Ors. case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 CrPC. … xxx
110. In Lal Suraj [Lal Suraj v. State of Jharkhand, (2009) 2 SCC 696 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 844] , a two- Judge Bench held that there is no dispute with the legal proposition that even if a person had not been chargesheeted, he may come within the purview of the description of such a person as contained in Section 319 CrPC. A similar view had been taken in Lok Ram [Lok Ram v. Nihal Singh, (2006) 10 SCC 192 : (2006)
3 SCC (Cri) 532 : AIR 2006 SC 1892] , wherein it was held that a person, though had initially been named in the FIR as an accused, but not charge-sheeted, can also be added to face the trial.
xxx
117.6. A person not named in the FIR or a person though named in the FIR but has not been chargesheeted or a person who has been discharged can be summoned under Section 319 CrPC provided from the evidence it appears that such person can be tried along with the accused already facing trial…” (emphasis supplied)
7.2. In S. Mohammed Ispahani v. Yogendra Chandak8 , it reiterated that under this Section the Court possesses the power to summon the persons not named in the chargesheet to face trial, if the evidence on record so warrants. It further clarified that a statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC, though not an independent piece of evidence, sufficient in itself to invoke the power under this Section may, nevertheless, be relied upon for
8 (2017) 16 SCC 226
304 [2025] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports corroborative purposes when supported by evidence emerging during trial. It was observed as under:
“34. … No doubt, at one place the Constitution Bench observed in Hardeep Singh case [Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 : (2014)
2 SCC (Cri) 86] that the word “evidence” has to be understood in its wider sense, both at the stage of trial and even at the stage of inquiry. In para 105 of the judgment, however, it is observed that “only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner”. This sentence gives an impression that only that evidence which has been led before the Court is to be seen and not the evidence which was collected at the stage of inquiry. However there is no contradiction between the two observations as the Court also clarified that the “evidence”, on the basis of which an accused is to be summoned to face the trial in an ongoing case, has to be the material that is brought before the Court during trial. The material/evidence collected by the investigating officer at the stage of inquiry can only be utilised for corroboration and to support the evidence recorded by the Court to invoke the power under Section 319 CrPC.
35. It needs to be highlighted that when a person is named in the FIR by the complainant, but police, after investigation, finds no role of that particular person and files the chargesheet without implicating him, the Court is not powerless, and at the stage of summoning, if the trial court finds that a particular person should be summoned as accused, even though not named in the chargesheet, it can do so.
At that stage, chance is given to the complainant also to file a protest petition urging upon the trial court to summon other persons as well who were named in the FIR but not implicated in the chargesheet. Once [2025] 12 S.C.R. 305Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav v. State of U.P. & Ors. that stage has gone, the Court is still not powerless by virtue of Section 319 CrPC. However, this section gets triggered when during the trial some evidence surfaces against the proposed accused.”
(emphasis supplied)
7.3. In Omi v. State of M.P.9 , a coordinate bench of this Court laid the following principles of law with regard to Section 319 CrPC: “19. The principles of law as regards Section 319 CrPC may be summarised as under:
19.1. On a careful reading of Section 319 CrPC as well as the aforesaid two decisions, it becomes clear that the trial court has undoubted jurisdiction to add any person not being the accused before it to face the trial along with other accused persons, if the Court is satisfied at any stage of the proceedings on the evidence adduced that the persons who have not been arrayed as accused should face the trial. It is further evident that such person even though had initially been named in the FIR as an accused, but not charge-sheeted, can also be added to face the trial.
19.2. The trial court can take such a step to add such persons as accused only on the basis of evidence adduced before it and not on the basis of materials available in the chargesheet or the case diary, because such materials contained in the chargesheet or the case diary do not constitute evidence.
Continue reading
Sign in and become a member to continue reading this judgment and every other document in the library.
Members read the full text, download where permitted, and keep notes and bookmarks.