Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1296; [2025] 11 S.C.R. 500
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Prasanna Bhalachandra Varale
- Decided
- 7 Nov 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 5454/2019
- Sections
- 35, 3(1), 2, 35(3), 35(1), 34A, 22A, 6, 34, 3, 3(2), 5
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:21 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 11 S.C.R. 500 : 2025 INSC 1296 Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors.
v.
The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 5454 of 2019)
07 November 2025 [Vikram Nath* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Matter pertains to sustainability of the order passed by the High Court in batch of writ petitions wherein the landholders questioned the legality of revenue annotations and mutation entries that described their lands as affected by forest proceedings and as having vested in the State.
Headnotes† Forest Act, 1927 – s.35 – Protection of forests for special purposes – Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 (MPFA) – 2(f)(iii) – Private forest – Writ petitions by the landholders challenging the legality of revenue annotations and mutation entries that described their lands as affected by forest proceedings and as having vested in the State – Petitioners sought quashing of those entries and a declaration that their lands were not private forests within the meaning of the MPFA, and directions to restore the record of rights in the names of the private owners and for consequential reliefs to protect title and possession – High Court declined to interfere with the revenue mutations and annotations that described the subject lands as affected by forest proceedings and as having vested in the State, it proceeded on the footing that notices said to have been issued around 1960 and published in the Official Gazette were sufficient foundation to treat the lands as private forest under the acquisition regime – High Court dismissed the writ petitions and refused the declaratory and consequential reliefs sought by the landholders – Sustainability:
Held: Not sustainable – For vesting to occur u/s.3(1) of the MPFA Act on the footing of s.2(f)(iii), a notice u/s.35(3) of the IFA must not only be issued but must also be served up-on the landholder * Author [2025] 11 S.C.R. 501Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. because service alone triggers the owner’s right to object, and obliges the State to consider such objection – Notice that grants time for objections cannot coexist with a final decision u/s.35(1) without rendering the statutory hearing illusory – Mutation entries are ministerial in nature and cannot perfect an acquisition that lacks the statutory predicates – They neither create title in the State nor divest title from the private owner – On facts, essential links in the statutory chain are missing – No proof of service of any s.35(3) notice of the IFA on the then owners, no final notification u/s.35(1) of the IFA – Actual possession has at all times remained with private owners which is reflected in the revenue records that describe them as occupants – No possession was taken, no schemes set in motion, no compensation exercise undertaken, and no inquiry held at a time proximate to the appointed day – Materials produced by the State include undated and unverified possession papers that do not inspire confidence when set against decades of undisturbed private possession, these features are wholly inconsistent with a completed vesting u/s.3(1) of the MPFA Act – Satellite imagery and panchnamas drawn in 2016 do not establish the character of the lands on the appointed day – Nineteenth century notification, invoked for the first time at the appellate stage to suggest linkage with a reserved forest, not the foundation of the impugned mutations and cannot be used to improve the case now – Administrative orders must stand or fall on the reasons originally given and the High Court could not sustain vesting on grounds that were never the basis of action – Absence of any notification u/s.34A of the IFA further weakens the State’s position – Restoration u/s.22A of the MPFA Act presupposes a lawful vesting – When the foundational vesting is unproven, any purported restoration cannot cure the defect, and in any event the limited window created by s.22A cannot be reopened decades later – Expropriatory legislation must be construed strictly and Art.300-A requires that no person is deprived of property save by authority of law – When a statute prescribes a manner of doing a thing, it must be done in that manner or not at all – Several mandatory steps are absent – Any one missing step would defeat vesting – Thus, the High Court erred in treating the case as if only a consequential mutation remained – Record shows that the revenue entries continued to carry the names of the private owners, which indicates that even the State did not treat these lands as vested forests – To hold that a subsequent purchaser is in a worse position than one who developed land 502 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports would invert the logic of the statute and would reward illegality while penalising restraint, said approach is rejected – Remand for an inquiry u/s.6 of the MPFA Act neither warranted nor efficacious – Impugned judgment rests on a misreading of the Gazette, an impermissible dilution of mandatory statutory steps, and reliance on materials that are extraneous to the original basis of action, thus, cannot be sustained and is set aside – All mutation orders and any declarations treating the subject lands as private forests quashed and set aside. [Paras 13, 16] Judicial discipline and precedent – Reliance on Godrej and Boyce’s case – High Court distinguished Godrej and Boyce’s case observing that owners there had an earlier consent decree, long-standing sanctioned development, and an evidentiary vacuum on service and follow-through, and of limited assistance to subsequent purchasers – Correctness: Held: Judicial discipline required faithful application of the law declared by this Court u/Art.141 of the Constitution – When a judgment minimizes a binding ratio, ignores missing statutory steps, and seeks to distinguish on immaterial facts, it creates an appearance of a reluctance to accept precedent – Such an approach conveys a measure of pettiness that is inconsistent with the detachment that judicial reasoning demands – This is an unfortunate departure from the discipline of stare decisis – Present appeals are indistinguishable in principle from Godrej and Boyce’s case – Distinctions on which the High Court sought to sidestep Godrej and Boyce’s case, not concurred with – Differences invoked by the High Court are insubstantial and cannot displace the binding ratio – High Court’s approach amounts to an attempt to avoid a binding precedent rather than to apply it – Impugned reasoning rests on a misreading of a Gazette publication that only reproduced a draft text and expressly invited objections – Coordinate Benches of the High Court have consistently followed Godrej and Boyce’s case in closely comparable situations – Impugned judgment nonetheless revives positions that Godrej and Boyce rejected – Record discloses the same jurisdictional defect of non-service of a notice u/s.35(3) of the IFA, the same absence of a final notification u/s.35(1) of the IFA, and the same want of contemporaneous steps u/ss.4, 5, 6 and 7 of the MPFA Act – In such circumstances the High Court could not, consistently with Art.141, avoid the binding ratio by treating immaterial differences as determinative – Fidelity [2025] 11 S.C.R. 503Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. to binding precedent and to the statutory scheme admits of no other conclusion than that the impugned order must be set aside – Constitution of India. [Para 14] Case Law Cited Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [2014] 2 SCR 203 : (2014) 3 SCC 430; Chintamani Gajanan Velkar v. State of Maharashtra [2000] 1 SCR 570 : (2000) 3 SCC 143 – referred to. Oberoi Constructions Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra, 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 311; Satellite Developers Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 66; Sinhagad Technical Education Society v. Deputy Conservator of Forests, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 293; Ozone Land Agro Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 5832; Arjun Sitaram Nitanwar (Dr.) v. Tahsildar, District Thane, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 295; Lalit A. Sangtani v. State of Maharashtra, 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 248; Bharat Chandulal Nanavati v. Union of India, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 3862; Global Estate Developers v. State of Maharashtra, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 8345; Indrajeet Kashinath Kaiswal v. State of Maharashtra, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 6743; Nana Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 340; Shree Maruti Sansthan Trust v. State of Maharashtra, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 7074; Vishram Vishwanath Kunte v. State of Maharashtra, WP No. 594 of 2022, decided on 16.09.2022 – referred to.
List of Acts Constitution of India; Forest Act, 1927; Maharashtra Private Forests Acquisition Act, 1975; Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980; Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966; Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966.
List of Keywords Landholders; Revenue annotations and mutation entries; Forest proceedings; Protection of forests for special purposes; Private forests; Record of rights in the names of the private owners; Protect title and possession; Expropriatory legislation; Judicial discipline; Precedent; Reliance on Godrej and Boyce’s case; Subsequent purchasers; Discipline of stare decisis.
504 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5454 of 2019 From the Judgment and Order dated 27.09.2018 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in WP No. 6417 of 2015 With Civil Appeal No(s). 5501, 5511,9434, 5468, 5458, 5473, 5455, 5466, 5456, 5457, 5460, 5469, 5462, 5503, 5465, 5459, 5461, 5467, 5463, 5464, 5483, 5834, 5504, 5512, 5474, 5508, 5476, 5506, 5478, 5487, 5480, 5481, 5608, 5502, 5509, 5513, 5505, 5507, 6245, 5491, 5490, 5489, 5471, 5470, 5472, 5488, 5499, 5482, 5477, 5486, 5475, 5485, 5484, 5479, 5492, 5493, 5497, 5498, 5495, 5496, 5494, and 5500 of 2019, and Civil Appeal No(s). 1504, 574, 582, 576, 1538, 1721, and 3433 of 2020, Civil Appeal No(s). 1592, and 1594 of 2023, Civil Appeal Nos. 14074, 14075, 14076, 14077, 14087, 14078, 14083, 14079, 14080, 14081, 14105, 14086, 14098, 14088, 14089, 14106, 14094, 14097, 14082, 14085, 14073, 14070, 14103, and 14104 of 2024 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellants:
Ms. Madhavi Divan, Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Anil Kaushik, C.U. Singh, Prasenjit Keswani, Siddharth Bhatnagar, Ms. Shyel Trehan, Atul Y Chitale, Vineet Naik, Shekhar Naphade, Gaurav Agrawal, Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Vineet Naik, Shyam Mehta, Guru Krishna Kumar, Ms. Madhavi Divan, Vinay Navare, Abhimanyu Bhandari, Aniruddh Joshi, Mukul Rohatgi, Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, Ajit Kumar Sinha, Sr. Advs., Santosh Krishnan, Sameer Choudhary, Ms. Charu Sangwan, Avishkar Singhvi, Shubham S. Dayma, Ms. Harshita Tyagi, Dhaval Mehrotra, Rishi Kumar Singh Gautam, Rahul Garg, Ms. Aditi Desai, Rajat Rana, Nitin Mishra, Ms. Mitali Gupta, Ms. Vandana Anand, Rajat Sehgal, Surya Rajkapoor, Upmanyu Tewari, Devajyoti Bhattacharya, Satyajit Saha, Mrs. V. D. Khanna, Ms. Malvika Kapila, Ms. Monisha Mane Bhangale, Pranav Sarthi, Ms. Shivalika Rudrabatla, Ms. Vidhi Jain, Ms. Apoorva Singh, Ms. Harbani Shinh, Sidharth Das, Ms. Tatini Basu, Kumar Shashank, Kunal Vajani, Sukand Kulkarni, Shubhang Tandon, Ms. Shraddha Chirania, Kunal Mimani, Dharav Shah, [2025] 11 S.C.R. 505Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. Dhawal Desai, Ms. Tanesh Paranjape, Pranaya Goyal, Shardul Singh, Ms. Prerna Gandhi, C. George Thomas, Shivaji M. Jadhav, V.A. Gangal, Ms. Divya Parab, Sukand Kulkarni, Brij Kishor Sah, Adarsh Kumar Pandey, Vignesh Singh, Aditya S. Jadhav, Amit Kumar Gupta, Ankit Sahu, varad Kilor, Shivaji M. Jadhav, Amit Mehta, Ooril Panchal, Kush Chaturvedi, Saket Mone, Vishesh Kalra, Ms. Prerna Priyadarshini, Neel Kamal Mishra, Syed Faraz Alam, Atharva Gaur, Aayushman Agarwal, Shaurya Gupta, Satyajeet Kumar, Pravartak Pathak, Yashodhan Chandurkar, Ms. Manisha Jain, Mansi Jain, Ms. Roohe Hina Dua, Ms. Dhanakshi Gamdhi, Goutam Prasad, Arth Arora, Ms. Dhankshi Gandhi, Ms. Deeplaxmi S. Matwankar, Pravartak Pathak, Yashodhan Chandurkar, Ms. Manshi Jain, Ms. Abha R. Sharma, Shashibhushan P. Adgaonkar, Shreeyash Uday Lalit, Neelam Prasad, Archit Jain, Ms. Runjhun Garg, Dr. Rukma George, Himanshu Vats, Sumit Kumar Siddharth, Angad Pahal, Yudhvir Dalal, Lavam Tyagi, Kumar Arjun Toppo, Ishaan George, Anish R. Shah, Ashwarya Sinha, Ms. Mohini Priya, Ishaan George, Dr. Rukma George, Archit Jain, Sumit Kumar Siddharth, Yudhvir Dalal, Dr. Mrs. Vipin Gupta, Mrs. B. Sunita Rao, Chirag M. Shroff, Ms. Jaikriti S. Jadeja, Mayank Kshirsagar, Ameya Borwankar, Parth Sarathi, Aashit Kankariya, Mrs. Anumita Verma, Aman Varma, Vishesh Kalra, Ms. Smriti Churiwal, Ms. Riya Wasade, Ms. Anoushka Deo, Ms. Sonia Sharma, Ms. Rajkumari Banju, Satyajit A Desai, Siddharth Gautam, Abhinav K. Mutyalwar, Sachin Singh, Ananya Thapliyal, Ms. Anagha S. Desai, Preetraj R. Dhok, Saurav Agarwal, Mrs. Sonali Jaitley Bakhshi, Jaiyesh Bakhshi, Ravi Tyagi, Mayank Mishra, Ms. Manmilan Sidhu, Ankit Tyagi, Atharva Koppal, Ms. Bhumika Bhatnagar, Ms. Sudiksha Saini, Shikhar Misra, Ms. Prachi Dubey, Kunal Cheema, Mr. Shubham Chandankhede, Raghav Deshpande, Ms. Kirti Shar-ma, Amol Chitale, Sarthak Sharma, Mrs. Pragya Baghel, R. P. Gupta, Ms. Rekha Agarwal, Pankaj Kumar Singh, Ms. Kanika, Raj Singh Rana, Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, Sagar N.pahune Patil, Yash Prashant Sonavane, Ms. Shruti Munjal, Anupam Raina, Ms. Chetna Verma, Karan Gaba, Joseph Pookkatt, Bhuvan Thakker, Nilesh Sharma, Ms. Awantika Manohar, Ms. Parul Dhurvey, Dhawesh Pahuja, M/s Ap & J Chambers, R. Chandrachud, Amey Nabar, Dhuli Venkata Krishna, Preetam Shah, K. Krishna Kumar, Gaganjyot Singh, Ms. Tanya Srivastava.
506 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Advs. for the Respondents:
Balbir Singh, K. Parameshwwar, Vinay Navare, Sr. Advs., Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Shrirang B. Varma, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Naman Tandon, Bharat Bagla, Karan Sachdev, Ms. Shivali Shah, Aditya Krishna, Dr. Ravindra Sadanand Chingale, Navneet R., Shreeyash Uday Lalit, Ms. Runjhun Garg, Himanshu Vats, Angad Pahal, Lavam Tyagi, Ishaan George, T. V. S. Raghavendra Sreyas, Satyajit A. Desai, Amit K. Pathak, Abhinav K. Mutyalwar, Siddharth Gautam, Sachin Singh, Ananya Thapliyal, Preetraj R. Dhok, Ms. Anagha S. Desai.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Vikram Nath, J.
1. The judiciary draws its strength from discipline and not dominion. The Constitution of India creates courts of record that are independent in their spheres and yet binds them together through a coherent hierarchy. The High Courts in India possess a wide jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court of India remains the final interpreter of law. Article 141 of the Constitution of India 1 declares that the law laid down by this Court binds every court in the country. Further, Article 144 of the Constitution obliges all authorities, civil and judicial, to act in aid of this Court. These are not ceremonial recitals. They are the structural guarantees that convert dispersed adjudication into a single system that speaks with one voice and commands public confidence.
2. Appellate jurisdiction exists to correct errors and to settle the law so that like cases receive like outcomes. When a superior court reverses, modifies, or remands, the court below must give full and faithful effect to that disposition. The authority to decide on appeal carries the authority to require compliance, for without obedience, the hierarchy would become an empty form. Resistance or evasion does not merely disserve a party before the court, it erodes predictability, multiplies litigation, and weakens faith in the rule of law. The maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” which literally 1 Hereinafter referred to as, “the Constitution”
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 507Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. means that it is in the public interest that litigation should come to an end, reminds us that the society has an interest in achieving finality, and finality from the apex court is the glue that holds a nationwide system of justice together.
3. Judicial discipline is the ethic that turns hierarchy into harmony. It requires courtesy, restraint, and obedience to binding precedent even where a judge is personally unpersuaded. The lawful course is to apply the precedent and, if needed, record reasons for inviting a larger Bench to reconsider it. The unlawful and unjust course is to distinguish in name while disregarding in substance or to recast issues in order to sidestep a rule that binds. “Stare decisis et non quieta movere” which means to stand by decisions and not to disturb settled matters, is not a slogan but a safeguard of equality before the law. Judges do not sit to settle scores. The gavel is an instrument of reason and not a weapon of reprisal. A vindictive stance is incompatible with the oath to uphold the Constitution and the law.
4. Judges across our country must remember that collegiality is the companion virtue of independence and that a reversal on appeal is not a personal affront but the ordinary operation of a constitutional hierarchy that corrects error and settles law. Respect for the senior jurisdiction is not subservience. It is an acknowledgment that all courts pursue a common enterprise to do justice according to law. An Appellate Court reviews and, where necessary, sets right the decision of the lower court with restraint and measured language, and the courts below reciprocate through prompt, reasoned, and transparent compliance. Courts speak through reasons, and reasons that align with binding authority preserve both legality and legitimacy of the judiciary. Articles 141 and 144 of the Constitution make obedience a constitutional duty and not a matter of personal preference. A judgment that attempts to resist binding authority undermines the unity of law, burdens litigants with avoidable expense and delay, and invites the perception that outcomes depend on the identity of the judge. In a constitutional judiciary, it is the law, as declared, that brings the conversation to a close. We restate the simple duty of Courts: apply precedent as it stands and give effect to appellate directions as they are framed. In that discipline lies the confidence of litigants and the credibility of courts.
508 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
5. The present batch of 96 civil appeals arises from the judgment dated 27.09.2018 rendered by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in a group of writ petitions preferred by the appellants. The High Court declined to interfere with the revenue mutations and annotations that described the subject lands as affected by forest proceedings and as having vested in the State. The High Court proceeded on the footing that notices said to have been issued around 1960 and published in the Official Gazette were sufficient foundation to treat the lands as private forest under the acquisition regime. On this approach the High Court dismissed the writ petitions and refused the declaratory and consequential reliefs sought by the landholders. One of those petitions is Writ Petition No. 6417 of 2015 which has given rise to the civil appeal before us titled “Rohan Vijay Nahar and Others versus The State of Maharashtra and Others.”
6. Before proceeding to the specific facts of these appeals, it is necessary to set out the provisions central to the matters before us.
6.1. The Indian Forest Act, 1927 2 , as adapted and amended in the erstwhile State of Bombay and in the State of Maharashtra, contains Chapter V which deals with control over forests and lands not being the property of Government. By the Indian Forest Act as amended by Bombay Act 62 of 1948, Section 34-A was inserted to provide an inclusive definition of “forest” for the purposes of Chapter V. By the same amending law, “wastelands” were removed from the reach of certain parts of Chapter V with effect from 04.12.1948. Further amendments were carried out by Bombay Act 24 of 1955 and by Maharashtra Act 6 of 1961. Section 35 of this Act empowers the State Government to regulate or prohibit specified activities in any forest for stated public purposes. The aforementioned provisions have been reproduced hereunder:
“34A. Interpretation :- For the purposes of the Chapter “forest” includes any land containing trees and shrubs, pasture, lands and any other land whatsoever which the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a forest.
2 Hereinafter referred to as, “IFA”
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 509Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
35. Protection of forests for special purposes :-
(1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette-
(i) regulate or prohibit in any forest-
(a) the breaking up or clearing of the land for cultivation ;
(b) the pasturing of cattle;
(c) the firing or clearing of the vegetation;
(d) the girdling, tapping or burning of any tree or the stripping off the bark or leaves from any trees;
(e) the lopping and pollarding of trees;
(f) the cutting, sawing, conversion and removal of trees and timber; or
(g) the quarring of stone or the burning of lime or charcoal or the collection or removal of any forest produce or its subjection to any manufacturing process;
(ii) regulate in any forest the regeneration of forests and their protection from fire; when such regulation or prohibition appears necessary for any of the following purposes;
(a) for the conservation of trees and forests;
(b) for the preservation and improvement of soil or the reclamation of saline or water logged land, the prevention of landslips or of the formation of ravines and torrents, or the protection of land against erosion, or the deposit thereon of sand, stones or gravel;
(c) for the improvement of grazing;
(d) for the maintenance of a water supply in spring, river and tanks;
(e) for the maintenance, increase and distribution of the supply of fodder, leaf manure, timber or fuel; 510 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(f) for the maintenance of reservoirs or irrigation works and hydro-electric works;
(g) for protection against storms, winds, rolling stones, floods and drought;
(h) for the protection of roads, bridges, railways and other lines of communication ; and
(i) for the preservation of the public health.
(2) The State Government may, for any such purpose, construct at its own expense in any forest such work as it thinks fit.
(3) No notification shall be made under sub section
(1) nor shall any work be begun under sub section (2), until after the issue by an officer authorised by the State Government in that behalf of a notice to the owner of such forest calling on him to show cause within a reasonable period to be specified in such notice why such notification should not be made or work constructed as the case may be, and until his objection, if any, and any evidence he may produce in support of the same, have been heard by an officer duly appointed in that behalf and have been considered by the State Government.
(4) A notice to show cause why a notification under sub section (1) should not be made, may require that for any period not exceeding one year or till the date of the making of a notification, whichever is earlier the owner of such forest and all persons who are entitled or permitted to do therein any or all of the things specified in clause (i) of sub section (1), whether by reason of any right, title or interest or under any licence or contract or otherwise, shall not, after the date of the notice and for the period or until the date aforesaid, as the case may be, do any or all the things specified in clause (i) of sub section (1), to the extent specified in the notice.
(5) A notice issued under sub section (3) shall be served on the owner of such forest in the manner [2025] 11 S.C.R. 511Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the service of summons and shall also be published in the manner prescribed by rules.
(5A) Where a notice issued under sub section (3) has been served on the owner of a forest in accordance with sub section (5), any person acquiring thereafter the right of a ownership of that forest shall be bound by the notice as if it had been served on him as an owner and he shall accordingly comply with the notice, requisition and notification, if any, issued under this section.
(6) Any person contravening any requisition made under sub section (4) in a notice to show cause why a notification under sub section (1) should not be made shall, on conviction , be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine, or with both.
(7) Any person contravening any of the provision of a notification issued under sub section (1) shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.”
6.2. The Maharashtra Private Forests Acquisition Act, 1975, came into force on 30.08.1975. Section 2(c-i) of this Act defines “forest” for the purposes of that Act.
“Section 2(c-i)- “forest” means a tract of land covered with trees (whether standing, felled, found or otherwise), shrubs, bushes, or woody vegetation, whether of natural growth or planted by human agency and existing or being maintained with or without human effort, or such tract of land on which such growth is likely to have an effect on the supply of timber, fuel, forest produce, or grazing facilities, or on climate, stream flow, protection of land from erosion, or other such matters and includes- 512 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(i) land covered with stumps of trees of forest;
(ii) land which is part of a forest or lies within it or was part of a forest or was lying within a forest on the thirtieth day of August, nineteen seventy five;
(iii) such pasture land, water-logged or cultivable or non-cultivable land, lying within or linked to a forest, as may be declared to be forest by the State Government;
(iv) forest land held or let for purpose of agriculture or for any purposes ancillary thereto;
(v) all the forest produce therein, whether standing, felled, found or otherwise;”
Section 2(f) defines “private forest” as follows:
“Section 2(f) - “‘private forest’ means any forest which is not the property of Government and includes-
(i) any land declared before the appointed day to be a forest under Section 34-A of the Forest Act;
(ii) any forest in respect of which any notification issued under sub-section (1) of Section 35 of the Forest Act, is in force immediately before the appointed day;
(iii) any land in respect of which a notice has been issued under sub-section (3) of Section 35 of the Forest Act, but excluding an area not exceeding two hectares in extent as the Collector may specify in this behalf;
(iv) land in respect of which a notification has been issued under Section 35 of the Forest Act;
(v) in a case where the State Government and any other person are jointly interested in the forest, the interest of such person in such forest;
(vi) sites of dwelling houses constructed in such forest which are considered to be necessary for the [2025] 11 S.C.R. 513Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. convenient enjoyment or use of the forest and lands appurtenant thereto;”
Section 3 provides that with effect from the appointed day all private forests in the State shall stand acquired and shall vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances, subject to the limited saving provided in Section 3(2).
“Section 3 - Vesting of private forests in State Government
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in any settlement, grant, agreement, usage, custom or any decree or order of any court, tribunal or authority or any other document, with effect on and from the appointed day, all private forests in the State shall stand acquired and vest, free from all encumbrances, in, and shall be deemed to be, with all rights in or over the same or appertaining thereto, the property of the State Government; and all rights, title and interest of the owner or any person other than Government subsisting in any such forest on the said day shall be deemed to have been extinguished.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to so much extent of land comprised in a private forest as is held by an occupant or tenant and is lawfully under cultivation on the appointed day and is not in excess of the ceiling area provided by Section 5 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto.
(3) All private forests vested in the State Government under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be reserved forests within the meaning of the Forest Act.”
Section 5 authorises State Government entry and taking over of possession of private forests which stand acquired and vested.
514 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports “Section 5 - Power to take over possession of private forests Where any private forest stands acquired and vested in the State Government under the provisions of this Act, the person authorised by the State Government or by the Collector in this behalf, shall enter into and take over possession thereof, and if any person resists the taking over of such possession, he shall without prejudice to any other action to which he may be liable, be liable to be removed by the use of such force as may be necessary.”
Section 24 repeals Sections 34-A, 35, 36, 36-A, 36-B, 36-C and 37 of the Indian Forest Act on and from the appointed day, with a later re-enactment mechanism for restored lands brought in by the Amending Act of 1978 operating through Section 22-A.
“Section 24 - Repeal of Sections 34-A to 37 of the Forest Act “(1) On and from the appointed day, Sections 34-A, 35, 36, 36-A, 36-B, 36-C and 37 of the Forest Act shall stand repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), on and from the date of commencement of the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition)
(Amendment) Act, 1978 (14 of 1978), Sections 34- A, 35, 36, 36-A, 36-B, 36-C and 37 of the Forest Act shall, in respect of the lands restored under Section 22-A, be deemed to have been re-enacted in the same form and be deemed always to have been in force and applicable in respect of such lands, as if they had not been repealed.”
6.3. The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, came into force on 25.10.1980. Section 2 of that Act restrains the use of forest land for non-forest purposes without the prior approval of the Central Government and also regulates de-reservation and assignment of forest land.
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 515Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
6.4. The Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 3 , provides the framework for preparation and maintenance of the record of rights and for mutation of entries upon changes in title or enjoyment. The MLRC also provides departmental remedies by way of appeal, revision and correction of entries. These provisions form the revenue backdrop against which the impugned mutations and annotations were made and challenged.
7. The essential factual backdrop common to this batch of appeals may be summarised as under:
7.1 The appellants are landowners in the State of Maharashtra. The factual background across these appeals and cognate matters that have reached the High Court and this Court over time is broadly similar with only minor variations. The Respondent State Authorities assert that during the early 1960s notices under Section 35(3) of the IFA were issued and published in the Official Gazette. The stated purpose of these notices was to call upon owners of lands described as forest to show cause why regulatory measures under Section 35(1) of the IFA should not be made and to afford them an opportunity of objection and hearing, including interim restraint as contemplated by Section 35(4) of the IFA. Such notices were said to have been addressed to the appellants and to other similarly placed private landholders in the concerned districts. The landowners allege that such notices were not personally served as contemplated by Section 35(5) of the IFA, that no inquiry on objections was ever held, and that no proceedings culminated in a final notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA. The landowners state that the proceedings then lay dormant for extended periods.
7.2 The Maharashtra Private Forests Acquisition Act, 1975 4 commenced on 30.08.1975. The landowners allege that even after its commencement the State Authorities did not take possession under Section 5 of the MPFA and for decades the lands continued to be dealt with as private holdings. Transfers were effected, permissions were granted by revenue and charity authorities, planning documents described the lands 3 Hereinafter referred to as, “MLRC”
4 Hereinafter referred to as, “MPFA”
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