Naim Ahamed v. State (Nct of Delhi)
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 85; [2023] 1 S.C.R. 1061
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Ajay Rastogi, Justice Bela M. Trivedi Penal Code, Justice 1860 – Ss.375, Justice 376 – Conviction U/S.376, Justice The Prosecutrix Who Herself Was A Married Woman Having Three Children
- Decided
- 30 Jan 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 257/2023
- Sections
- 376, 375, 114A, 90, 277, 313, 276, 275
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:27 am. Original source ↗
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A B C D E F G H 1061[2023] 1 S.C.R. 1061
NAIM AHAMED
v.
STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
(Criminal Appeal No. 257 of 2023)
JANUARY 30, 2023
[AJAY RASTOGI AND BELA M. TRIVEDI, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860 – ss.375, 376 – Conviction u/s.376, when not justified – Plea of the respondents was that the prosecutrix gave her consent for sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry her but subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of law and the case fell under the Clause- Secondly of s.375 – Held: In the present case, the prosecutrix who herself was a married woman having three children, could not be said to have acted under the alleged false promise given by the appellantaccused or under the misconception of fact while giving the consent to have sexual relationship with the appellant – She continued to have such relationship with him at least for about five years till she gave complaint in the year 2015 – Prosecutrix was matured and intelligent enough to understand the significance and the consequences of the moral or immoral quality of act she was consenting to – Till the time she was impregnated by the appellant in the year 2011 and she gave birth to a male child, she did not have any complaint against the appellant of him having given false promise to marry her or having cheated her – She continued to live with the accused even after she came to know in 2012 that he was married and had children also – She even obtained divorce from her husband by mutual consent in 2014, leaving her three children with her husband – It was only in the year 2015 when some disputes must have taken place between them, that she filed the complaint – On facts, it could not be said by any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix gave her consent for the sexual relationship with the appellant under the misconception of fact, so as to hold him guilty of having committed rape within the meaning of s.375 – Appellant acquitted – Impugned judgments and orders passed by the High Court and Sessions Court are set aside – However, the direction for A B C D E F G H 1062 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.
payment of compensation to the prosecutrix remains unchanged – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.114A.
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.90, 375 – Held: The expression “misconception of fact” contained in s.90 is required to be appreciated in the light of the Clauses contained in s.375, more particularly the Clauses- Thirdly, Fourthly and Fifthly thereof, when the accused is charged for the offence of ‘rape’ – Circumstances described in the said three Clauses are wider than the expression “misconception of fact”, as contemplated in s.90.
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.375, 376 – False Promise and Committing Breach of Promise – Difference between – Held: In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited her by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust – However, in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfill his promise – Thus, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence u/s.376 – Each case would depend upon its proved facts before the court.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.276, 277 – Held: The evidence of the witness has to be recorded in the language of the court or in the language of the witness as may be practicable and then get it translated in the language of the court for forming part of the record – However, recording of evidence of the witness in the translated form in English language only, though the witness gives evidence in the language of the court, or in his/her own vernacular language, is not permissible – Text and tenor of the evidence and the demeanor of a witness in the court could be appreciated in the best manner only when the evidence is recorded in the language of the witness – Even otherwise, when a question arises as to what exactly the witness had stated in his/her evidence, it is the original deposition of the witness which has to be taken into account and not the translated memorandum in English prepared by the Presiding Judge – All courts while recording the evidence of the witnesses, shall duly comply with the provisions of s.277.
A B C D E F G H Deelip Singh alias Dilip Kumar vs. State of Bihar (2005)
1 SCC 88; Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. State of Maharashtra and Others (2019) 18 SCC 191; Uday vs. State of Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC 46; Deepak Gulati vs. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 675 – relied on.
Prashant Bharti vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 9 SCC 293 – referred to.
Case Law Reference (2005) 1 SCC 88 relied on Para 15 (2019) 18 SCC 191 relied on Para 17 (2003) 4 SCC 46 relied on Para 14 (2013) 7 SCC 675 relied on Para 16 (2013) 9 SCC 293 referred to Para 6 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.257 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.09.2016 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLA No.46 of 2016.
Ms. Indira Jaisingh, Sr. Adv. (AC), Parasnath Singh, Srisatya Mohanty, Ravinder Singh, Ms. Raveesha Gupta, Ms. Mantika Haryani, Sanjeev Kaushik, Shreyas Awasthi, Devvrat Singh, Rohin Bhatt, Ms. Muskan Surana, Ms. Astha Sharma, Advs.
Raj Kishor Choudhary, Shakeel Ahmed, Anupam Bhati, Rizwan Ahmed, Amir Kaleem, Vikramjeet Singh Ranga, Nakul Chaudhary, Waseem Akhatar Khan, Advs. for the Appellant.
K. L. Janjani, Ketan Paul, Mohd. Akhil, Ms. Deepabali Dutta, T. S. Sabarish, Gurmeet Singh Makker, Advs. for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appeal filed by the appellant-accused is directed against the judgment and order dated 30.09.2016 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Appeal No.46/2016, whereby the High Court while NAIM AHAMED v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
A B C D E F G H 1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.
disposing of the appeal has modified the judgment and order dated 27.11.2015 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Special Fast Track Court, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Sessions Court) in Sessions Case No. 67/2015.
3. The Sessions Court while holding the appellant-accused guilty for the offence under Section 376 of IPC had sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years and pay fine of Rs.50,000/-, in default thereof to suffer further imprisonment for a period of one year. The Sessions Court had also directed the appellant to pay compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- to the prosecutrix to enable her to maintain herself as well as the minor child. The High Court in the appeal filed by the appellant, modified the order of sentence passed by the Sessions Court, by reducing the substantive sentence to 7 years with fine of Rs.5,000/- and confirmed the direction with regard to the payment of compensation to the prosecutrix. It is stated that the appellant has paid the amount of compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- to the prosecutrix as directed by the High Court.
4. The case of the prosecution as laid before the Sessions Court was that the prosecutrix was residing in a tenanted premises at C-1/3/5, Sanjay Enclave, Uttam Nagar, Delhi with her husband and three children in the year 2009. The accused was also residing in a tenanted premises which was situated in front of her house. On 21.03.2015, the prosecutrix lodged a complaint against the accused alleging inter alia that the accused was persuading her by stating that her husband was not earning sufficient income and that he (the accused) had a good job and he would maintain her according to his status. The accused also assured her that he would solemnize marriage (nikah) with her. Thereafter, the accused with an intention to have illicit intercourse with her, used to call her at various places, as a result thereof, she was impregnated in the year 2011. She further alleged that the accused persuaded the prosecutrix that after the delivery of child, he would marry her. He also assured her that he was not a married man and after the marriage, he would take her to his native place. In the year 2012, the accused enticed her away in another rented premises at Kapashera Border Nathu Mal Building and continued to have illicit relationship with her. After sometime the accused vacated the said rented premises with a false excuse that his parents were severely ill and he had to visit his native place. He told the prosecutrix to take shelter in a shelter home along with the minor child Naman. He also A B C D E F G H forced her to take divorce from her husband. The prosecutrix had further alleged in the complaint that the accused had lied to her that he had gone to his native place, but in fact he had not gone, which she came to know when she visited the call center where the accused was working. When she made hue and cry at his place of working, he assured her that he would soon marry her. In the year 2012, she visited the native place of the accused and came to know that he was already married and had children also. The parents of the accused refused to keep her there. Thereafter, also the accused kept on assuring her to marry her but did not marry. Hence, the complaint was filed. The said complaint was registered as the FIR No.412/2015 at Police Station Bindapur, District South West, Delhi on 21.03.2015 against the accused for the offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code.
5. After the examination of eleven witnesses by the prosecution, the incriminating evidence was brought to the notice of the accused for the purpose of explanation under Section 313 of Cr.PC, however the accused denied the allegations levelled against him and further stated that he was having consensual physical relations with the prosecutrix and that she was aware that he was a married person having children, and that she had also met his wife at his house. He had also stated that he was providing financial help to the prosecutrix regularly, and when he refused to fulfil her demand of Rs.1.5 lakh to Rs.2 lakhs, she lodged a false case against him. The Sessions Court after appreciating the evidence on record convicted and sentenced the appellant-accused as stated hereinabove.
6. The Learned counsel appearing for the appellant vehemently submitted that the Sessions Court and the High Court had failed to appreciate the evidence in the right perspective, and convicted the appellant under Section 376 IPC, which has resulted into gross miscarriage of justice. Pressing into service Section 375 read with Section 90 of IPC, he submitted that the prosecutrix having admitted in her evidence that she was a consenting party to the sexual relationship with the appellant since 2009-2010, and that it continued even after the delivery of the child in 2011, till filing of the complaint in 2015, it could not be said by any stretch of imagination that the appellant-accused had committed rape within the meaning of Clause-Secondly of Section 375 read with Section 90 of IPC. According to him, the very fact that the prosecutrix had lodged the complaint in March 2015 after she gave birth to the child in November 2011, and after she visited his native place in 2012, reflected NAIM AHAMED v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
[BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.] A B C D E F G H 1066 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.
her intention to misuse the process of law by making false allegations against the accused and to grab money from him. He further submitted that even as per her own story, the appellant had not disowned the responsibility of the child born from his loin and she continued to have relationship with the accused for about four years after the birth of the child. It was only when the accused refused to fulfill her demand of paying huge amount to her, she filed the complaint. The learned counsel has relied upon the decisions of this Court in case of Deelip Singh alias Dilip Kumar vs. State of Bihar1; in case ofPrashant Bharti vs. State(NCT of Delhi)2, andin case of Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. State of Maharashtra and Others3 to buttress his submission that the consensual sexual relationship which if continued between the parties for quite a long time, in the instant case for about five years, could not be said to have continued under the ‘misconception of fact’ under Section 90 and could not be said to be ‘rape’ under Section 375 IPC.
7. Sh. K.L Janjani, learned counsel appearing for the respondent- State however submitted that the Sessions Court and the High Court having concurrently recorded findings of facts against the appellantaccused, holding him guilty under Section 376 IPC, this Court should not interfere with the same. According to him, even otherwise, the prosecution had proved beyond doubt that the appellant-accused had lured the prosecutrix to have sexual relationship with him by giving her a false promise that he would marry her, however, he committed breach of the promise after she delivered the child, which clearly proved that her consent was obtained by the appellant under the misconception of fact.
8. Since the prosecutrix was not being represented by any lawyer, though served, the court had appointed Ms. Indira Jaising, Senior Advocate as an Amicus Curiae to assist the Court on her behalf. She in addition to her written submissions, further submitted that there was a clear distinction between ‘rape’ and ‘consensual sex’, and that the Court was required to carefully examine as to whether the accused had with malafide motives made false promise of marriage or it was a mere breach of promise by the accused. According to her, the courts below had rightly appreciated the evidence of the prosecutrix for arriving at
1 (2005) 1 SCC 88
2 (2013) 9 SCC 293
3 (2019) 18 SCC 191
A B C D E F G H 1067NAIM AHAMED v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
[BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.] the conclusion that the consent of the prosecutrix to have sexual relationship with the accused was under the misconception of fact under Section 90 of the IPC and therefore the case of the prosecutrix fell under the Clause - Secondly of Section 375 IPC. Ms. Indira Jaising has also relied upon various decisions of this Court in support of her submissions.
9. For the better appreciation of the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties, the relevant provisions contained in Section 90 and Section 375 of IPC, are reproduced below:- “90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.— A consent is not such a consent as it intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or Consent of insane person.—if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or Consent of child.—unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age.
375. Rape.- A man is said to commit “rape” if he-
(a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or
(b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or
(c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or
(d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person, under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions:- First- Against her will.
A B C D E F G H 1068 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.
Secondly- Without her consent.
Thirdly- With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt.
Fourthly- With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married.
Fifthly- With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent. Sixthly- With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age.
Seventhly- when she is unable to communicate consent.
Explanation 1- For the purposes of this section, “vagina” shall also include labia majora.
Explanation 2.- Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act:
Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity.
Exception1. A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape.
Exception 2.- Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.”
10. It would be germane to note that the basic principles of criminal jurisprudence warrant that the prosecution has to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt by leading cogent evidence, however, considering the ethos and culture of the Indian Society, and considering the rising graph of the commission of the social crime – ‘Rape’, the A B C D E F G H 1069NAIM AHAMED v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
[BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.] courts have been permitted to raise a legal presumption as contained in Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act. As per Section 114A, a presumption could be raised as to the absence of consent in certain cases pertaining to Rape. As per the said provision, if sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the question arises as to whether it was without the consent of the woman alleged to have been raped, and if she states in her evidence before the court that she did not consent, the court shall presume that she did not consent.
11. It cannot be gainsaid that a consent given by a person would not be a consent as intended by any Section of the Indian Penal Code, if such consent was given by the person under the fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact as contemplated in Section 90 IPC. Further, Section 375 also describes certain acts which if committed by the accused under the circumstances mentioned therein, as the commission of ‘Rape’, even though committed with the consent of the prosecutrix. In our opinion, the expression “misconception of fact” contained in Section 90 IPC is also required to be appreciated in the light of the Clauses – contained in Section 375 IPC, more particularly the Clauses - Thirdly, Fourthly and Fifthly thereof, when the accused is charged for the offence of ‘rape’. The circumstances described in the said three Clauses are wider than the expression “misconception of fact”, as contemplated in Section 90 of IPC. Section 375 describes seven circumstances under which the ‘rape’ could be said to have been committed. As per the Clause - Thirdly, a rape could be said to have been committed, even with her consent, when the consent of the prosecutrix is obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt. As per the Clause - Fourthly, with her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married; and as per the Clause - Fifthly, with her consent when at the time of giving the consent, the prosecutrix by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration of stupefying or unwholesome substance by the accused or through another, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent. Thus, apart from the prosecutrix being under the misconception of fact as contemplated in Section 90, her consent would be treated as ‘no consent’ if she had given her consent under any of the circumstances mentioned in Section 375 of IPC.
A B C D E F G H 1070 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.
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