P. Anjanappa (D) By LRs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1286; [2025] 11 S.C.R. 423
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 3 Judges: Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Sandeep Mehta
- Decided
- 6 Nov 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 3934/2006
- Sections
- 90, 89, 23, 17(1), 17, 17(2), 6
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:21 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 11 S.C.R. 423 : 2025 INSC 1286 P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v.
A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 3934 of 2006)
06 November 2025 [Vikram Nath,* Sandeep Mehta and N.V. Anjaria, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the registered release deeds are valid and binding, and if so, what is their legal effect on the membership and share entitlements of plaintiff no. 2 and defendant no. 3; whether the document styled as the palupatti-partition deed can be relied upon for collateral purposes to establish severance of status as well as the nature of subsequent possession and enjoyment; and what constitutes the partitionable estate and how the shares are to be worked out inter se the parties, including the treatment of Schedule “B” property and item no. 17 of “C” schedule and the extent to which the co-ownership of defendant no. 6 is to be preserved. Headnotes† Family settlement – Joint family property – Registered release deeds document styled as the palupatti- partition deed – Reliance – Suit for partition and separate possession – Suit schedule properties comprised of three parts:
Schedule A-immovable properties belong to one, (now deceased), continued as joint family properties; Schedule B immovable properties purchased under a registered sale deed; Schedule C-movables, including, inter alia, an item representing amounts realised by way of rent from the Schedule B properties – Parties trace lineage to one-common ancester – Dispute regarding partition of Schedule B properties – Suit for partition and separate possession of their alleged shares in the suit schedules, together with consequential accounts including mesne profits by the plaintiff no. 1 and 2 – Plaintiff contended that the said properties blended with the income of the joint family and were also subject to partition whereas the defendant contended that during the lifetime of deceased registered release deed has been executed and after deceased’s death partition was recorded in a palupatti- * Author 424 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports partition deed, pursuant to which they had been in separate possession and enjoyment – Trial Court decreed the suit by a preliminary decree – In appeal thereagainst, the High Court dismissed the appeal – Correctness:
Held: Under Hindu law, severance of joint status can be brought about by an unequivocal declaration reduced to writing or otherwise, and a writing evidencing such disruption is admissible to prove the fact of disruption, the arrangement, and the character of subsequent possession – Family arrangement recorded in writing, when relied upon only to explain how the parties thereafter held and enjoyed the properties, does not require registration for that limited collateral use – Having perused the original records, including the registered instruments, deposition of the parties, and the contemporaneous revenue extracts, both the registered release deed are duly proved and carry legal effect – One registered release deed severed plaintiff no. 2 from the coparcenary in 1956 and bars any claim by him to the joint family estate, and the other severed defendant no. 3 from the coparcenary in 1967 and bars any claim by him to the joint family estate – In consequence, as on the death of the propositus in 1969, the subsisting coparcenary comprised only plaintiff no. 1 and defendant no. 5 – Unregistered partition deed, including the palupatti may be relied upon for the limited collateral purposes of proving severance of the joint family status and title, explaining the nature of possession, recording the arrangement made thereunder, and evidencing the parties’ subsequent conduct – Document styled as palupatti, is admissible and reliable for the collateral purposes of proving that, on and from 11.02.1972, there was severance of joint status between plaintiff no. 1 and defendant no. 5 and that each thereafter held and enjoyed separately the properties allotted under the partition deed and shall not be treated as a conveyance that creates or extinguishes rights by itself – Partitionable pool shall consist of Schedule A and items 1 to 16 of Schedule C – Shares over this pool fixed for plaintiff no. 1, defendant no. 5, each of the five daughters, predeceased daughter to be given effect in favour of defendant no. 2 as representing her estate – Plaintiff no. 2 and defendant no. 3 take no share – Schedule B and item 17 of Schedule C are excluded from the hotchpot – Defendant no. 5 and defendant no. 6 shall hold these in equal halves – Judgment and decree and the preliminary decree set aside – Fresh preliminary decree substituted in the stated terms. [Paras 7.9, 8.2, 8.4, 8.5, 8.9, 10, 11] [2025] 11 S.C.R. 425P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors. Case Law Cited Prem Singh v. Birbal [2006] Supp. 1 SCR 692 : (2006) 5 SCC 353; Elumalai v. M. Kamala [2023] 1 SCR 261 : (2023) 13 SCC 27; Sita Ram Bhama v. Ramvatar Bhama [2018] 10 SCR 503 : (2018) 15 SCC 130 at Para 13; Yellapu Uma Maheswari v. Buddha Jagadheeswararao (2015) 16 SCC 787; K.G. Shivalingappa v. G.S. Eswarappa (2004) 12 SCC 189; Thulasidhara v. Narayanappa [2019] 8 SCR 212 : (2019) 6 SCC 409; Kalyani v. Narayanan (1980) Supp. SCC 298; Amteshwar Anand v. Virender Mohan Singh (2006) 1 SCC 148 – referred to.
List of Acts Evidence Act, 1872; Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023; Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
List of Keywords Partition; Separate possession and enjoyment; Registered release deeds; Share entitlements; Palupatti; Partition deed; Collateral purpose; Severance of joint status; Subsequent possession and enjoyment; Partitionable estate; Joint family properties; Registered sale deed; Preliminary decree; Coparcenary; Joint family estate; Unregistered partition deed; Limited collateral use; Conveyance; Creates or extinguishes rights; Partition by metes and bounds. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3934 of 2006 From the Judgment and Order dated 30.08.2005 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in RFA No. 750 of 1994 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
G L Vishwanath, Sr. Adv., Ms. Hetu Arora Sethi, Ms. Lalit Mohini Bhat, Ms. Nayana Tara B G, Rahul Jain.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Shekhar Devasa, Sr. Adv, Radhakrishna S Hegde, Prakash Chandra Sharma, Rajeev Singh, T. Muthanna, Manish Tiwari, M/S. Devasa & Co.
426 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Vikram Nath, J.
1. The present civil appeal arises from the final judgment and decree dated 30 August 2005 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Regular First Appeal No. 750 of 1994 (hereinafter, “impugned judgment”), whereby the High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and preliminary decree dated 19 August 1994 rendered by the Principal Civil Judge, Bangalore Rural District, in Original Suit No. 146 of 1987 decreeing a suit for partition and separate possession of the suit schedule properties. The appellants before this Court are the legal heirs of late P. Anjanappa, who was arrayed as defendant no. 5 before the Trial Court, and for ease of reference the parties shall hereinafter be described by their status before the Trial Court, with the appellants being referred to as defendant no. 5.
2. The facts giving rise to the present case are set out hereafter.
2.1. The parties trace their lineage to one Pillappa, who is stated to be the common ancestor. His widow Muniyamma was arrayed as defendant no. 1 before the Trial Court. The plaintiffs pleaded that Pillappa had four sons, namely plaintiff no. 1 A. P. Nanjundappa, plaintiff no. 2 Venkataswamappa, defendant no. 3 Sreeramappa, and defendant no. 5 P. Anjanappa, and five daughters, namely plaintiff no. 3 Narayanamma, plaintiff no. 4 Sonnamma, plaintiff no. 5 Anjanamma, and defendant no. 4 Lakshmamma, besides one daughter who had predeceased and whose branch was represented in the suit as defendant no. 2. Defendant no. 6 Muniswamappa is the husband of plaintiff no. 3 and is not a member of the joint family. Defendant no. 7 is a lessee in respect of certain items of the suit properties. The other defendants are members of the wider family as reflected in the array of parties.
2.2. The suit schedule properties comprised of three parts. Schedule “A” described immovable properties said to have originally belonged to Pillappa and thereafter to have continued as joint family properties in the hands of the coparcenary comprising [2025] 11 S.C.R. 427P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors. the parties to the suit. Schedule “B” described immovable properties purchased under a registered sale deed dated 25 April 1974 in the joint names of defendant no. 5 and defendant no. 6. Schedule “C” described movables, including, inter alia, an item representing amounts realised by way of rent from the Schedule “B” properties.
2.3. The plaintiffs’ case, in brief, was that Schedule “A” properties were joint family properties liable to partition and that Schedule “B” properties, though standing in the joint names of defendant no. 5 and defendant no. 6, had been acquired from and blended with the income of the joint family and were therefore also subject to partition. It was further asserted that defendant no. 7 had been inducted as yearly lessee in respect of items comprised in Schedule “B” and that defendant no. 5 had collected the lease amounts, which were liable to be brought to account as part of Schedule “C”. The plaint also adverted to certain agricultural operations, including a casuarina plantation, and claimed accounting of the proceeds.
2.4. Defendant no. 5 contested the suit. His principal defences, as pleaded were: that plaintiff no. 2 had during the lifetime of Pillappa executed a registered release deed; that defendant no. 3 had, in the year 1967, executed a registered release deed relinquishing his rights in the joint family properties; and that after the death of Pillappa in the year 1969 there had been, on 11 February 1972, a partition between plaintiff no. 1 and defendant no. 5 in the presence of panchayatdars, recorded in a palupatti (‘Palupatti’ means partition deed or a family settlement agreement) pursuant to which they had been in separate possession and enjoyment and separate entries had been made in the revenue records. Defendant no. 5 further pleaded that Schedule “B” properties were his self-acquisitions, that defendant no. 6 was only a name lender, and that the plaintiffs’ sisters had been given in marriage with customary expenses and were not entitled to shares in the immovable properties.
2.5. Defendant no. 6, though not a member of the joint family, was a joint purchaser of Schedule “B” and was impleaded on that footing. Defendant no. 7, being the lessee in respect of Schedule “B”, was impleaded to answer the claim for rendition 428 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports of accounts of rent. The remaining defendants were added as necessary parties to an action for partition.
2.6. On 2 July 1987, plaintiff no. 1 and plaintiff no. 2 instituted Original Suit No. 146 of 1987 before the Court of the City Civil Judge, Bangalore Rural District, seeking partition and separate possession of their alleged shares in the suit schedules, together with consequential accounts including mesne profits.
2.7. Upon service of summons, defendant no. 5 entered appearance and contested the suit. Defendant no. 6, though he did not at first file a written statement, lodged a counter claim asserting half share in Schedule “B” properties as a joint purchaser and sought a corresponding share in the amounts described as item no. 17 in Schedule “C”. Defendant no. 7 filed a written statement admitting its status as lessee in respect of Schedule “B” and stating that rents had been paid to defendant no. 5 until disputes arose between defendant no. 5 and defendant no. 6, whereafter the lessee expressed willingness to deposit rents in court. Defendants nos. 1 to 4 did not contest the matter and remained absent.
3. The Trial Court, upon consideration of the pleadings and evidence, decreed the suit for partition and separate possession by a preliminary decree dated 19 August 1994. The Trial Court’s decision was based on the following reasons:
3.1. In relation to Schedule “A”, the Trial Court held that the properties were joint family properties. It rejected the defence of a concluded partition as of 11 February 1972 on the basis of an unregistered palupatti. The Trial Court recorded that the document, being unregistered, could not be received in evidence to prove either severance in status or the quantum of shares, and that the surrounding revenue materials did not demonstrate that the alleged partition had been acted upon. The Trial Court noted that entries in the revenue records reflected possession by inheritance and management rather than by partition, that there was no subdivision or demarcation in accordance with a partition, and that the conduct relied upon by defendant no. 5, including a subsequent alienation said to discharge family debts, was inconsistent with a complete earlier severance.
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 429P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.
3.2. In relation to Schedule “B”, the Trial Court found that the properties were purchased in the joint names of defendant no. 5 and defendant no. 6 under a registered sale deed dated 25 April 1974 and that the lease granted in favour of defendant no. 7 had been executed jointly by defendant no. 5 and defendant no. 6. On an appraisal of the oral and documentary evidence, including the admissions elicited from defendant no. 5, the Trial Court rejected the plea that defendant no. 6 was a mere name lender and negatived the contention that the entire of Schedule “B” was the self-acquisition of defendant no. 5. The Trial Court concluded that defendant no. 6 was entitled to a half share in Schedule “B” and to a half share in the moneys represented by item no. 17 of Schedule “C”, with the remaining half of those items forming part of the family pool for partition.
3.3. In relation to the release deeds set up by defendant no. 5, the Trial Court held that the registered release deed attributed to plaintiff no. 2 was not shown to have been acted upon, since the proponent did not lead convincing evidence to establish separation of plaintiff no. 2 from the joint family or exclusion of his claim to partition. As regards defendant no. 3, the Trial Court noticed the release deed and treated him as having separated for the purpose of survivorship, yet held that he would participate to the extent of a share in the notional accretion arising on the death of the father. On that footing, the Trial Court declined to exclude either plaintiff no. 2 or defendant no. 3 from the suit entirely.
3.4. The computation of shares was undertaken on the basis that, at the time of the death of Pillappa in the year 1969, the coparcenary consisted of the father and three sons, namely plaintiff no. 1, plaintiff no. 2, and defendant no. 5, with defendant no. 3 being treated as separated for the purpose of survivorship. A notional partition was therefore posited to the extent of 1/4 in favour of Pillappa. The Trial Court then proceeded on the footing that the notional 1/4th share of Pillappa devolved in equal measure among nine sharers represented in the suit, namely plaintiff no. 1, plaintiff no. 2, defendant no. 5, the four daughters, the branch of the predeceased daughter represented by defendant no. 2, and defendant no. 3. On that basis, each of the nine received an accretion of 1/36, and plaintiff no. 1, plaintiff 430 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports no. 2, and defendant no. 5 each took, in addition, 1/4 as their coparcenary share, yielding a total of 5/18 for each of plaintiff no. 1, plaintiff no. 2, and defendant no. 5, and 1/36 for each of plaintiff no. 3, plaintiff no. 4, plaintiff no. 5, defendant no. 4, defendant no. 3, and defendant no. 2. The share of defendant no. 6 was determined separately as 1/2 of Schedule “B” and 1/2 of item no. 17 of Schedule “C”, outside the family pool, in terms of the findings recorded in relation to those items.
3.5. The Trial Court directed an enquiry into mesne profits and consequential accounts, including in respect of the lease moneys pertaining to Schedule “B”, to be worked out in the final decree proceedings in accordance with the shares so declared.
4. Aggrieved by the preliminary decree dated 19 August 1994, defendant no. 5 preferred Regular First Appeal no. 750 of 1994 before the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru. By the impugned judgment dated 30 August 2005, the High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decree of the Trial Court with the following observations:
4.1. The High Court noted the defence of defendant no. 5 that there had been a partition on 11 February 1972 reduced into a palupatti and that the revenue entries thereafter reflected separate possession. Upon examining the document and the surrounding materials, the High Court held that the palupatti, being unregistered, was inadmissible to prove either severance of the joint family status or the quantification of shares. It further found, on an appraisal of the mutation extracts, record of rights, and other revenue papers, that the entries indicated possession by inheritance and management rather than pursuant to a partition; that there was no phodi or sub-division (‘Phodi’ means process of surveying and demarcating land) corresponding to a partition; and that a subsequent alienation reciting discharge of joint family debts was inconsistent with an earlier partition. The plea of an effective partition as on 11 February 1972 was therefore rejected.
4.2. In relation to the release attributed to plaintiff no. 2, the High Court concurred with the Trial Court that the document had not been shown to have been acted upon, and that there was no reliable evidence of plaintiff no. 2 having separated so as to forfeit a claim in partition or in the devolution of the notional share of [2025] 11 S.C.R. 431P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors. the father. As regards the release attributed to defendant no. 3, the High Court referred to the nature of the instrument and the applicable stamp requirements and held that the proponent had not established its efficacy to exclude defendant no. 3 entirely. The High Court supplemented the reasons recorded by the Trial Court and declined to disturb the inclusion of defendant no. 3 for purposes of computing shares.
4.3. On Schedule “B”, the High Court affirmed the findings that the properties were purchased jointly in the names of defendant no. 5 and defendant no. 6 and that the lease in favour of defendant no. 7 was executed by both of them. Having regard to the admissions in the evidence of defendant no. 5 and the tenor of the documents, the High Court rejected the contention that defendant no. 6 was a mere name lender and upheld his entitlement to a one half share in Schedule “B” and a one half share in the moneys represented by item no. 17 of Schedule “C”. It held that only the remaining one half of those items would enter the family pool for partition.
4.4. On the basis of the above conclusions, the High Court affirmed the computation adopted by the Trial Court, namely that plaintiff no. 1, plaintiff no. 2, and defendant no. 5 would each be entitled to 5/18 in the family pool and that plaintiff no. 3, plaintiff no. 4, plaintiff no. 5, defendant no. 4, defendant no. 3, and defendant no. 2 would each be entitled to 1/36, with defendant no. 6 holding 1/2 of Schedule “B” and 1/2 of item no. 17 of Schedule “C” outside the family pool.
4.5. Consequential directions were issued for disbursal of rents earlier deposited in respect of Schedule “B” in proportion to the shares as affirmed, and certain ministerial corrections in the cause title were permitted.
5. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the first appeal, the appellants, who are the legal heirs of defendant no. 5 before the Trial Court, have preferred the present civil appeal. Respondent nos. 1 to 5 herein are plaintiff nos. 1 to 5 before the Trial Court. Respondent no. 6 herein is defendant no. 1 before the Trial Court, respondent no. 7 is defendant no. 2, respondent no. 8 is defendant no. 3, respondent no. 9 is defendant no. 6, respondent no. 10 is defendant no. 4, and respondent no. 11 is defendant no. 7. As already stated, the parties 432 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports shall hereinafter be referred to by their descriptions as they stood before the Trial Court.
6. Having considered the pleadings, the evidence on record and the rival submissions of the respective parties, the questions that fall for our determination are as follows:
I. Whether the registered release deeds dated 09.11.1956 (Ex.D 15) and 14.09.1967 (Ex.D-16) are valid and binding, and if so, what is their legal effect on the membership and share entitlements of plaintiff no. 2 and defendant no. 3. II. Whether the document dated 11.02.1972 styled as the palupatti (Ex.D-17 with schedule Ex.D-17(a)) can be relied upon for collateral purposes to establish severance of status as well as the nature of subsequent possession and enjoyment.
III. Consequent upon the answers to the above, what constitutes the partitionable estate and how the shares are to be worked out inter se the parties, including the treatment of Schedule “B” property and item no. 17 of “C” schedule and the extent to which the co-ownership of defendant no. 6 is to be preserved.
7. Issue I - Validity and effect of the two release deeds.
7.1. The parties are at variance on whether plaintiff no. 2 and defendant no. 3 had, prior to the death of the propositus in 1969, effectively severed themselves from the joint family and abandoned all claim to its estate (and to the father’s share upon notional partition). The plaintiffs contend that the alleged releases were either not proved, or, if proved, were ineffectual for want of being “acted upon.” The appellant (defendant no. 5) maintains that both instruments are registered releases executed for consideration, as borne out by the parties’ subsequent conduct, and operate to exclude plaintiff no. 2 and defendant no. 3 from any share.
7.2. Having perused the original records, including the registered instruments, deposition of the parties, and the contemporaneous revenue extracts placed before us, we are satisfied that both Ex.D-15 and Ex.D-16 are duly proved and carry legal effect.
7.3. As regards Ex.D-15 (09.11.1956), it is a registered deed by which plaintiff no. 2 unequivocally released his right and [2025] 11 S.C.R. 433P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors. interest in the joint family and in the estate of his father in consideration of a cash payment. It recites, in clear terms, a complete severance of all claims save the bond of blood. The deed was produced and exhibited without objection; there was no cross-examination of defendant no. 5 on its execution or contents; and plaintiff no. 2 did not present himself for crossexamination to dislodge the document. In these circumstances, the statutory presumption that attaches to a registered instrument operates, and, in the case of Ex.D-15 which was more than thirty years old when tendered, the presumption under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872/Section 89 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 is also attracted. The burden to rebut the deed’s genuineness and effect lay squarely on those who impeached it. No credible rebuttal was led. This principle has been reiterated by this Court in Prem Singh v. Birbal 1 in the following terms:
“27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to rebut the said presumption.”
7.4. The Trial Court declined to give effect to Ex.D-15 on two grounds: first, that the deed was not mentioned in the later palupatti; and second, that it was not shown to have been “acted upon.” In our considered opinion, both reasons are misconceived. A release by a coparcener for consideration operates immediately to divest his subsisting coparcenary interest; it does not depend for its efficacy on any further act of implementation. Silence in a later, separate memorandum does not undo a concluded, registered relinquishment inter partes, particularly when the deed is produced from proper custody and stands unchallenged in cross-examination.
7.5. We accordingly hold Ex.D-15 to be valid and binding and to have the effect of removing plaintiff no. 2 from the coparcenary
1 (2006) 5 SCC 353.
434 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports from 1956 onwards. To the extent Ex.D-15 adverts to the father’s separate or future entitlement, we treat the covenant, consideration and long-standing conduct as creating an equitable estoppel against plaintiff no. 2 setting up a contrary claim now. The estoppel effect of similar release deeds was observed by this Court in Elumalai v. M. Kamala2 as follows:
“16. This Court went on to approve the view taken by the High Court of Allahabad in Latafat Husain v.
Hidayat Husain [Latafat Husain v. Hidayat Husain, 1936 SCC OnLine All 315 : AIR 1936 All 573] . The Court found as follows : (Gulam Abbas case [Gulam Abbas v. Haji Kayyum Ali, (1973) 1 SCC 1] , SCC pp. 4-5, paras 5 & 7)
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