Vishnu Kumar Shukla & Anr v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 1026; [2023] 13 S.C.R. 1071
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Much Less Strong Or
- Decided
- 28 Nov 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 3618/2023
- Sections
- 482, 3402, 195, 448, 1446, 134, 4827, 340, 4638, 454, 380, 2451
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:28 am. Original source ↗
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[2023] 13 S.C.R. 1071 : 2023 INSC 1026
CASE DETAILS
VISHNU KUMAR SHUKLA & ANR.
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.
NOVEMBER 28, 2023
(Criminal Appeal No. 3618 of 2023)
[VIKRAM NATH AND AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Whether the order passed by the High Court refusing to discharge the accused in a criminal case and quashing an FIR calls for interference.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss. 239-240 – Trial of warrantcases by Magistrates – Application for discharge – Permissible extent of scrutiny – On facts, refusal of the High Court to discharge the accusedappellant in a criminal case and quash an FIR – Interference with: Held: Case for interference made out – There is no suspicion, much less strong or grave suspicion that the appellants are guilty of the offence alleged, u/ss. 448, 454 and 380 IPC – Criminal case against the appellants amounts to clear abuse of the process of the Court – It would be unjustified to make the appellants face a full-fledged criminal trial – Appellants are to be protected against vexatious and unwarranted criminal prosecution, and from unnecessarily being put through the rigours of an eventual trial, either through quashing a FIR/Complaint or by allowing an appeal against an order rejecting discharge or by any other legally permissible route, as the circumstances may be, in the deserving case, is a duty cast on the High Courts – High Court should have intervened and discharged the appellants – Thus, there not being sufficient material on record to proceed against the appellants, they are discharged – Impugned judgment of the High Court as well as the order of the trial court dismissing the prayer for discharge are are unreasoned and set aside. [Para 14, 23, 24] 1072 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss. 239-240 – Trial of warrantcases by magistrates – Discharging of accused – Framing of charges – Reliance on Minakshi Bala’s case which held that at the stage of framing of charges, the court cannot usurp functions of a trial court to delve into and decide upon respective merits:
Held: If Minakshi Bala’s case is accepted as it, the necessary concomitant would be that despite examining the matter in detail, a court would find its freedom restricted while considering the discharge application – This would amount to forcing a person to stand trial, even when ‘overwhelming’ material points to his/her innocence – Obviously, hands of a Court ought not to be tied down, and not against liberty – Thus, Minakshi Bala’s case is doubted on the limited aspect, however, not referred to the larger bench for reconsideration observing that the same would be done in a more appropriate case – Precedent. [Para 18, 25]
LISTS OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Minakshi Bala v Sudhir Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 142: [1994] 3 SCR 1008 – Doubted on limited aspect.
Ajoy Kumar Ghose v State of Jharkhand, (2009) 14 SCC 115: [2009] 4 SCR 515; Rumi Dhar v State of West Bengal, (2009) 6 SCC 364: [2009] 5 SCR 553; State of Tamil Nadu v N Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709: [2014] 1 SCR 135; State of Bihar v Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39: [1978] 1 SCR 257; Union of India v Prafulla K Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4: [1979] 2 SCR 229; Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v Dilip N Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715: [1989] 1 SCR 560; Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v Jitendra B Bijjaya, (1990) 4 SCC 76: [1990] 3 SCR 633; Dilawar B Kurane v State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135: [2002] 1 SCR 75; Chitresh K Chopra v State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 SCC 605: [2009] 13 SCR 230; Amit Kapoor v Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: [2012] 7 SCR 988; Dinesh Tiwari v State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 13 SCC 137: [2014] 8 SCR 207; Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547: [2019] 6 SCR 701; State (NCT of Delhi) v Shiv Charan Bansal, (2020) 2 SCC 290: [2019] 17 SCR 1155; K P Raghavan v M H Abbas, AIR 1967 SC 740: 1967 AIR 740; Almohan Das v State of West Bengal, (1969) 2 SCR 520: [1969] 2 SCR 520; Sajjan Kumar v Central Bureau of Investigation, (2010) 9 SCC 368: [2010] 9 SCC 368; State of Gujarat v Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 INSC 894 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.3618 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.08.2017 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in CN No.4929 of 2017. Appearances:
Alok Kumar Mishra, Ashutosh Lal, Pramod Tiwari, Vivek Tiwari, Ms. Priyanka Dubey, Dr. Vinod Kumar Tewari, Advs. for the Appellants. Adarsh Upadhyay, Ms. Pallavi Kumari, Advs. for the Respondents. JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the Final Judgment and Order dated 02.08.2017 (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned Judgment”) passed by the Lucknow Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”) in Case U/S 482/378/407 Cr.P.C. No.4929 of 2017, by which the Order dated 02.06.2017 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow rejecting the prayer for discharge of the appellants, who are husband and wife, respectively, has been upheld.
THE FACTUAL PRISM:
3. In brief, the allegations are that the Complainant/Respondent No.2 (hereinafter referred to as “R2”) was a tenant of a shop situated in the house of one Hari Narayan Shukla. On 29.06.2011, the appellants, along with others, locked the door of R2’s shop from inside, broke the wall and looted wheat (APL), sale money, about INR 21,000 worth of kerosene oil, goods in stock, all the registers of the shop, documents and a two-wheeler bearing VISHNU KUMAR SHUKLA & ANR. v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.
1074 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
Registration Number UP32BX2356 which led to R2 filing of the Hazratganj P.S. Case No.341 of 2011 dated 01.07.2011 (hereinafter referred to as the “FIR”) under Sections 448, 454 and 380 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”).
SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANTS:
4. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that FIR itself would show that the allegation(s) is/are frivolous in nature and levelled with a view only to frustrate the appellants from enjoying their property, as admittedly, Appellant No.2 (hereinafter referred to as “A2”) is the owner of the shop referred to supra, being the bona fide purchaser through a registered Sale Deed.
5. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that R2, who claimed to be the tenant of the property in question, had on 31.05.2011 filed Regular Suit No.104/2011 for permanent injunction before the Civil Judge (Senior Division) South, Lucknow which was based on a so-called ‘Memorandum of Agreement of Tenancy’ dated 24.11.2005, in which the present symbol of the Indian National Rupee i.e., ₹, has been shown but the said symbol came into being only in the year 20101 and thus, could not have been reflected in a ‘Memorandum’ of the year 2005, which clearly exposes the falsity of the claim. Moreover, it was submitted that this would also amount to perjury by filing of a forged document before a Court of Law, for which the appellant(s) had filed an application under Section 3402 of the Code of 1 To be precise, the symbol was officially approved on 26.08.2010 vide F.No.03/17/10- Cy., Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (Cy. Section).
2 340. Procedure in cases mentioned in Section 195.—(1) When, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause
(b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary,—
(a) record a finding to that effect;
(b) make a complaint thereof in writing;
(c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction;
(d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the “CrPC”) before the concerned Court.
6. It was further submitted that the FIR lodged by R2 on 01.07.2011 was for alleged offences under Sections 4483, 4544 and 3805 of the IPC. However, it was contended that though no case was made out, still the police in collusion with R2 submitted Charge Sheet No.189 of 2011 dated 07.08.2011 under Section 448, IPC against the appellants upon which the appellants were summoned and were put on trial. It was submitted that R2 also filed an application under Section 1446, CrPC before the Additional
(e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate.
(2) The power conferred on a Court by sub-section (1) in respect of an offence may, in any case where that Court has neither made a complaint under sub-section (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of sub-section (4) of Section 195.
(3) A complaint made under this section shall be signed,—
(a) where the Court making the complaint is a High Court, by such officer of the Court as the Court may appoint;
(b) in any other case, by the presiding officer of the Court or by such officer of the Court as the Court may authorise in writing in this behalf.
(4) In this section, “Court” has the same meaning as in Section 195. 3 448. Punishment for house-trespass.—Whoever commits house-trespass shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. 4 454. Lurking house-trespass or house-breaking in order to commit offence punishable with imprisonment.—Whoever commits lurking house-trespass or housebreaking, in order to the committing of any offence punishable with imprisonment, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if the offence intended to be committed is theft, the term of the imprisonment may be extended to ten years. 5 380. Theft in dwelling house, etc.—Whoever commits theft in any building, tent or vessel, which building, tent or vessel is used as a human dwelling, or used for the custody of property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. 6 144. Power to issue order in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger.—(1) In cases where, in the opinion of a District Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, there is sufficient ground for proceeding under this section and immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable, such Magistrate may, by a written order stating the material facts of the case and served in the manner provided by Section 134, direct any person to abstain from a certain act or to take certain order with respect to certain property in his possession or under his management, if such Magistrate VISHNU KUMAR SHUKLA & ANR. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.] 1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
City Magistrate (First), Lucknow, registered as Suit No.01 of 2012 against the appellants which, by Order dated 09.08.2012, was rejected as not maintainable. It was further submitted that A2 moved the High Court in Rent Control Case No.125 of 2012 and vide order dated 14.12.2012, the High Court directed the said Rent Control Case proceeding to remain in abeyance.
7. Learned counsel submitted that the Trial Court, upon the Charge Sheet submitted by the police in the FIR, took cognizance on 07.08.2011, against which the appellants moved the High Court under Section 4827, considers that such direction is likely to prevent, or tends to prevent, obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the public tranquillity, or a riot, or an affray.
(2) An order under this section may, in cases of emergency or in cases where the circumstances do not admit of the serving in due time of a notice upon the person against whom the order is directed, be passed ex parte.
(3) An order under this section may be directed to a particular individual, or to persons residing in a particular place or area, or to the public generally when frequenting or visiting a particular place or area.
(4) No order under this section shall remain in force for more than two months from the making thereof:
Provided that, if the State Government considers it necessary so to do for preventing danger to human life, health or safety or for preventing a riot or any affray, it may, by notification, direct that an order made by a Magistrate under this section shall remain in force for such further period not exceeding six months from the date on which the order made by the Magistrate would have, but for such order, expired, as it may specify in the said notification.
(5) Any Magistrate may, either on his own motion or on the application of any person aggrieved, rescind or alter any order made under this section, by himself or any Magistrate subordinate to him or by his predecessor-in-office.
(6) The State Government may, either on its own motion or on the application of any person aggrieved, rescind or alter any order made by it under the proviso to sub-section (4).
(7) Where an application under sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) is received, the Magistrate, or the State Government, as the case may be, shall afford to the applicant an early opportunity of appearing before him or it, either in person or by pleader and showing cause against the order; and if the Magistrate or the State Government, as the case may be, rejects the application wholly or in part, he or it shall record in writing the reasons for so doing.
7 482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.—Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. CrPC, in Case No. U/S 482/378/407 No. - 2413 of 2012 which was disposed of vide order dated 10.04.2014 with the direction that the appellants may file application for discharge before the Court concerned.
8. It was submitted that on 18.12.2014, the Civil Judge (Junior Division), South, Lucknow in Miscellaneous Suit No.540031 C/2012, which was instituted on the application filed by the appellants under Section 340, CrPC, prima facie found that offence under Section 4638, IPC had been committed by R2 and directed initiation of proceedings against him.
9. Furthermore, it was pointed out that in terms of the High Court’s Order dated 10.04.2014, the appellants on 16.01.2016 filed application for discharge before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow, in Case Crime No.368 of 2011, wherein one of the grounds taken was the order dated 18.12.2014 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), South, Lucknow.
10. Learned counsel submitted that Order dated 18.12.2014 was a clear-cut finding by a Court of Law that the entire suit was premised on forged and fabricated document(s). He submitted that once the same has been established, the contention of R2 to be in possession of the property in question does not arise and clearly the FIR itself was a misuse and abuse of the process of law. Learned counsel submitted that despite there being sufficient material for discharge, the Trial Court by order dated 02.06.2017 rejected the application on vague grounds and thus, the appellants had to move the High Court under Section 482, CrPC in Case U/S 482/378/407 Cr.P.C. No.4929 of 2017, which was dismissed by the Impugned Judgment.
11. Learned counsel pointed out that innocence of the appellants would be further established by the fact that despite the initial FIR having been registered under Sections 448, 454 and 380, IPC, the police did not find any case under Sections 454 and 380, IPC, to which R2 neither objected nor 8 463. Forgery.—Whoever makes any false documents or false electronic record or part of a document or electronic record, with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery.
VISHNU KUMAR SHUKLA & ANR. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.] 1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
filed any protest. Thus, it was contended that the acceptance of the fact that there was no lurking house-trespass or housebreaking in order to commit offence punishable with imprisonment (Section 454, IPC) and no theft in dwelling house, etc. (Section 380, IPC) also make it amply clear that R2 was never in possession of the property in question and his entire case falls flat.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT-STATE:
12. Per contra, learned counsel for the State opposed the prayer by the appellants seeking discharge, and supported the Impugned Judgment. Learned counsel sought dismissal of the appeal.
NON-APPEARANCE OF THE RESPONDENT NO.2:
13. Despite service, nobody appeared on behalf of R2.
ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
14. Having examined the matter in detail, a case for interference has been made out. The fact is that the Indian National Rupee symbol i.e., ₹ was not in existence during the time the purported ‘Memorandum’ was signed. Furthermore, R2 has based his entire claim of tenancy on a document which has been, prima facie, found to be forged and fabricated, for which the Court concerned has directed lodging of a criminal case. There is no other claim by R2 to show that he was in possession. When coupled with the fact that the police did not find any offences having been made out against the appellants under Sections 454 and 380, IPC, the case against the appellants under Section 448, IPC finds itself on shaky ground. R2 never objected to the above nor took any further steps. R2, as noted above, has not entered appearance before this Court. Thus, the case against the appellants finds itself on shakier ground. We are of the firm view that A2 being the undisputed landlord, the criminal case filed by R2, in the facts and circumstances supra, amounts to clear abuse of the process of the Court. Moreover, we find that the Impugned Judgment and the judgment dated 02.06.2017 of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow are unreasoned as to why discharge is to be denied. Thus far on facts and merits. Now, on the law.
15. Although the instant case pertains to Trial of Warrant-Cases by Magistrates and is a case instituted on a police report, meaning Sections 239- 2409, CrPC are relevant, we also propose to glance at Section 24510, CrPC (concerning trial of warrant-cases by Magistrates apropos cases instituted otherwise than on police report), as also Sections 227-22811, CrPC, which pertain to Trial before a Court of Session.
9 239. When accused shall be discharged.—If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing.
240. Framing of charge.—(1) If, upon such consideration, examination, if any, and hearing, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter, which such Magistrate is competent to try and which, in his opinion, could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused.
(2) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried. 10 245. When accused shall be discharged.—(1) If, upon taking all the evidence referred to in Section 244, the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction, the Magistrate shall discharge him.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case if, for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate, he considers the charge to be groundless.
11 227. Discharge.—If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.
228. Framing of charge.—(1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which—
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