K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 997; [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1997
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra
- Decided
- 19 Aug 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 6599/2025
- Sections
- 123, 342, 313, 537, 465(1), 465, 162
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[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1997 : 2025 INSC 997 K. Prabhakar Hegde v.
Bank of Baroda (Civil Appeal No. 6599 of 2025)
19 August 2025 [Dipankar Datta* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.] Issue for Consideration
(i) Whether denial of the report of preliminary inquiry prepared by the officer entrusted by Vijaya Bank (which merged with the respondent in the year 2019) to conduct such inquiry, who happened to be the sole management witness, was sufficient to vitiate the regular inquiry that followed against the appellant; (ii) whether the failure/omission of the Inquiry Officer to generally question the appellant on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence, as per Regulation 6(17) of the Vijaya Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1981, vitiated the inquiry; (iii) whether continuation of disciplinary proceedings against the appellant beyond superannuation was a permissible course of action under the 1981 Regulations.
Headnotes† Vijaya Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1981 – Appellant dismissed from service – Whether denial of the report of preliminary inquiry prepared by the officer entrusted by Vijaya Bank to conduct such inquiry, who happened to be the sole management witness, was sufficient to vitiate the regular inquiry that followed against the appellant:
Held: In the instant case, a perusal of the inquiry report reveals that no reliance upon the preliminary inquiry report has been placed by the inquiry officer – Therefore, non-furnishing of the inquiry report to the appellant is inconsequential – However, an argument that has been made is that the non-furnishing of the preliminary inquiry report has caused prejudice to the appellant because such nonfurnishing of the report disabled him to effectively cross-examine the witness – Argument cannot be accepted – Since the appellant * Author 1998 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports was duly provided with the deposition of the witness as per the rules, was allowed to cross-examine the witness on the basis of the statements made by him and the inquiry officer placed no reliance upon the preliminary inquiry report, but only upon the statements of such witness recorded during chief examination and cross-examination – Therefore, there is no violation of the principles of natural justice – Also, no prejudice has been caused to the charged officer for non-furnishing of the preliminary inquiry report. [Paras 27-29] Vijaya Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1981 Regn. 6(17) – Appellant dismissed from service – Whether the failure/omission of the Inquiry Officer to generally question the appellant on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence, as per Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations, vitiated the inquiry; whether continuation of disciplinary proceedings against the appellant beyond superannuation was a permissible course of action under the 1981 Regulations:
Held: The Inquiry Officer by not generally questioning the appellant on the circumstances available in the evidence, which were unfavourable or adverse to such officer, failed to perform a mandatory duty – In the present case, the appellant did not raise any objection in this behalf before the disciplinary authority but raised the point, generally, of non-adherence to Regulation 6 before the appellate authority – Be that as it may, the appellant is justified in voicing a grievance that he had not been extended fair, reasonable and adequate opportunity to defend himself in terms of Regulation 6 which, in turn, infringed his right protected by Article 14 of the Constitution – In normal circumstances, the obvious direction that could follow the foregoing discussions is a remand to the disciplinary authority to re-start the inquiry from the stage the same stood vitiated, i.e., requiring the Inquiry Officer to scrupulously follow Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations – However, there are circumstances that impede an order for remand – The foremost being the lack of accessibility to the records because of the merger of Vijaya Bank with the respondent and the distance of time since the disciplinary proceedings came to a close – It is also to be noted that the disciplinary proceedings were continued beyond the date on which the appellant attained the age of superannuation – Because of the ultimate order this [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1999K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda Court propose to make, this Court has not dealt with the third question in the three broad issues framed and such question is kept open – No useful purpose, therefore, would be served in ordering a remand. [Paras 55, 58, 72] Vijaya Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1981 Regn. 6(17) – Appellant dismissed from service – Whether the proposed punishment of compulsory retirement could have been altered to dismissal from service based on the Central Vigilance Commission recommendation: Held: The proposed punishment of compulsory retirement could not have been altered to dismissal from service based on the CVC recommendation without furnishing the same to the appellant – To this extent, the appellate order is legally flawed and cannot be sustained. [Para 71] Vijaya Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1981 Regn. 6(17) – Appellant dismissed from service – Directions issued by the Supreme Court:
Held: Considering the age of the appellant (he is now an octogenarian) as well as the fact that there were other disciplinary proceedings pending against him which were not taken to its logical conclusion because he stood dismissed from service, in considered view of this Court, interest of justice would be sufficiently served if this Court makes the following directions: (i) the appellant shall not be entitled to any terminal benefits except to the extent indicated hereafter; (ii) he shall only be entitled to a lump-sum amount equal to the quantum of gratuity which would have been payable to him had he not been fastened with the order of dismissal; (iii) such lump-sum amount may be released in favour of the appellant within a period of eight weeks from date; (iv) no amount on account of interest shall be payable to the appellant on the said amount; (v) however, interest @ 9% p.a. shall be payable on such amount if not released within the period stipulated above; and (vi) the order of dismissal, in the circumstances, shall stand quashed. [Para 73] Vijaya Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1981 – Regn.6(17) – All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 – R. 8(19) – The use of ‘may’ and ‘shall’: Held: Regn.6(17) as well as r.8(19) refers to both ‘may’ and ‘shall’ – While the first part of reg.6(17) refers to ‘may’, the second 2000 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports part refers to ‘shall’ – To enable the charged officer to explain circumstances in the evidence appearing against him, the provision confers a discretion on the Inquiry Officer as well as imposes a mandatory duty on him – It is discretionary for the Inquiry Officer, to put questions to the charged officer if he is himself a witness for the defence, whereas, if the charged officer has not examined himself as a witness for the defence, the mandate of the law is that the Inquiry Officer shall generally question the charged officer on the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him – The use of ‘may’ and ‘shall’ in the same provision does imply that Regn. 6(17) means what it says – The words ‘may’ and ‘shall’ have been used to mean ‘may’ and ‘shall’, respectively, and we cannot possibly conceive of any rule of construction which would lead us to assume that the framers intended that ‘shall’ in the second part of Regn. 6(17) should also be read and understood as ‘may’ – Use of the word ‘shall’, is deliberate to denote that it is not interchangeable with ‘may’; if it were so, the framers would have straightaway used ‘may’ instead of ‘shall’ having known that ‘may’ has been used in the first part – Couching of the provision in such language with ‘may’ and ‘shall’ having distinct connotations and consequences and bringing about different outcomes in the course of one and the same inquiry unhesitatingly signals that while the first part of regn.6(17) is directory, the second part thereof is mandatory. [Paras 53, 54] Service Law – Departmental inquiry – Preliminary inquiry report – When it is to be provided to the delinquent employee: Held: i) A preliminary inquiry is conducted for the purposes of determining whether regular disciplinary proceedings are called for or not; ii) A preliminary inquiry report is an internal document; iii) A preliminary inquiry report or the findings therein cannot be used to come to conclusions recorded in the report of inquiry if such preliminary inquiry report/findings are based on oral and/ or documentary evidence which are obtained behind the back of the charged employee and such oral/documentary evidence are not presented in the inquiry in the presence of such employee; iv) If a preliminary inquiry report or the findings therein are sought to be relied on, the witnesses whose evidence was relied on in preparing the same ought to be brought before the inquiry officer and the charged officer afforded an opportunity to cross-examine [2025] 8 S.C.R. 2001K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda them; v) If a preliminary inquiry report is sought to be relied upon in the inquiry report, then such preliminary inquiry report must be provided to the delinquent employee; vi) Once a charge-sheet is drawn up and has been provided to the charged officer detailing the charges, the preliminary inquiry report is of no consequence and need not be provided to him. [Para 25] Service Law – Dismissal from service – Principle of Natural Justice – When CVC recommendation is considered by the disciplinary authority for the purpose of deciding punishment: Held: The CVC recommendation weighed heavily enough upon the disciplinary authority so as to convince him to alter the proposed punishment of compulsory retirement to dismissal of the appellant – Receipt of the CVC recommendation behind the back of the appellant and no opportunity having been provided to him to plead for a lesser punishment, the inquiry stood vitiated – The CVC recommendation constituted material which was considered by the disciplinary authority at least for the purpose of deciding on the punishment that needed to be imposed on the appellant – Once such recommendation fell for consideration of the disciplinary authority, a copy of the same could not have been denied to the appellant – Compliance with the principles of natural justice – A charged officer cannot be denied any material that the disciplinary authority looks into for imposing punishment. [Para 64] Service Law – Disciplinary proceedings – Non-disclosure of the CVC recommendation – Claim of privilege:
Held: In the instant case, the claim of privilege made by the appellate authority in defending non-disclosure of the CVC recommendation to the appellant – The claim of privilege was utterly misconceived – The claim of privilege cannot be invoked as a matter of reflexive recourse but must be limited to instances wherein an actual concern to public interest is envisaged – Each instance must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and the State must be wholly convinced that the disclosure of the documents would cause grave harm and injury to public interest – The recommendation of the CVC did not have anything to do with the “affairs of the State” or, if one were not to be guided by Section 123 of the Evidence Act, anything to do with national security. [Paras 66, 70] 2002 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Case Law Cited Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 51 : (1985) 3 SCC 545; Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 131 : (1985) 3 SCC 398; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [1988] Supp. 1 SCR 1 : (1988) 2 SCC 602; Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India [1964] 6 SCR 190 : 1963 SCC OnLine SC 42; ECIL v. B. Karunakar [1993] Supp. 2 SCR 576 : (1993) 4 SCC 727 – followed.
SBI v. D.C. Aggarwal [1992] Supp. 1 SCR 956 : (1993) 1 SCC 13; Mohd. Quaramuddin v. State of A.P. (1994) 5 SCC 118; State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh [1961] 2 SCR 371 : 1960 SCC OnLine SC 38; People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India [2004] 1 SCR 232 : (2004) 2 SCC 476 – relied on.
S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [1981] 1 SCR 746 : (1980) 4 SCC 379; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Prakash Singh [2025] 5 SCR 275 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 891; Sunil Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal & Ors. [1980] 3 SCR 179 : (1980) 3 SCC 304; Union of India v. Alok Kumar [2010] 5 SCR 35 : (2010) 5 SCC 349; Vijay Kumar Nigam v. State of MP [1996] Supp. 8 SCR 544 : (1996) 11 SCC 599; Syndicate Bank & Ors. v. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati [2006] 1 SCR 920 : (2006) 3 SCC 150; UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor [2007] 7 SCR 543 : (2007) 6 SCC 694; K.C. Mathew v. State of Travancore-Cochin [1955] 2 SCR 1057 : AIR 1956 SC 241; Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta v. State of W.B. [1969] 2 SCR 104 : AIR 1969 SC 381; Tara Singh v. State [1951] 1 SCR 729 : (1951) SCC 903; Krishna Chandra Tandon v. Union of India (1974) 4 SCC 374; Chandrama Tewari v. Union of India [1988] 1 SCR 1102 : (1987) Supp. SCC 518; Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v. State of Maharashtra [1996] Supp. 8 SCR 939 : (1997) 1 SCC 299; Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat [2013] 5 SCR 200 : (2013) 4 SCC 301; Manoj Kumar v. State of U.P. (2018) 13 SCC 161; Rama Shankar Singh v. State of West Bengal [1962] Supp. 1 SCR 49 : AIR 1962 SC 1239; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR 88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116; Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand [2020] 9 SCR 482 : (2020) 10 SCC 108; Haryana Financial Corporation v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja [2008] 10 SCR 222 : (2008) 9 SCC 31; Brij Nandan Kansal v. State of U.P. [1988] 3 SCR 79 : (1988) [2025] 8 S.C.R. 2003K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda Supp. SCC 761; Amar Chand Butail v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 1658; State of U.P. v. Raj Narain [1975] 3 SCR 333 : (1975) 4 SCC 428 – referred to.
List of Acts Vijaya Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1981; All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1955; All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Constitution of India; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Evidence Act, 1872. List of Keywords Disciplinary proceedings; Dismissal from service; Irregularities and lapses committed in approving temporary overdrafts; Punishment of compulsory retirement; Non-furnishing of the preliminary inquiry report; Report of preliminary inquiry; Sole management witness; Regular inquiry; Failure/omission of the Inquiry Officer to generally question the appellant on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence; Superannuation; Principles of natural justice; Failed to perform a mandatory duty; Non-adherence to regn.6(7) Vijaya Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1981; Not been extended fair, reasonable and adequate opportunity to defend; Recommendation of the CVC; Recommendation was denied by claiming privilege; s.123 of the Evidence Act, 1872; Discretion of the Inquiry Officer.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6599 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 14.12.2021 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in WA No. 975 of 2009 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, Sr. Adv., M/S. Nuli & Nuli.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Basava Prabhu Patil, Sr. Adv., Ms. Praveena Gautam, Pawan Shukla, Ms. Tissy Annie Thomas, Rohan Bansla, Arijeet Shukla. 2004 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Dipankar Datta, J.
Preface
1. S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan1 is a landmark decision of this Court, delivered more than half a century back, delineating the contours of the principles of natural justice, more particularly the right to be heard before one is condemned. The supersession of the New Delhi Municipal Committee was challenged on the ground that it was in violation of the principles of natural justice, since no show cause notice was issued before the order of supersession was passed. Linked with that question was the question whether the failure to observe the principles of natural justice matters at all, if such observance would have made no difference, the admitted or indisputable facts speaking for themselves. The golden words of Hon’ble O. Chinappa Reddy, J., speaking for the three-Judge Bench, rings in our ears:
“24. … In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. …”
(emphasis ours)
2. The above passage from S.L. Kapoor (supra) came to be noticed in the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation2 and met with an unconditional approval. Hon’ble Y.V. Chandrachud, CJI. speaking for the Bench (which incidentally included Hon’ble O. Chinappa Reddy, J.) ruled
1 (1980) 4 SCC 379
2 (1985) 3 SCC 545
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2005K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda that the said observations sum up the true legal position regarding the purport and implications of the right of hearing.
3. Close on the heels of Olga Tellis (supra), another Constitution Bench upon a survey of precedents on the point of fair and impartial hearing observed in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel3 as follows: “95. The principles of natural justice have thus come to be recognized as being a part of the guarantee contained in Article 14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation given by this Court to the concept of equality which is the subject-matter of that article. Shortly put, the syllogism runs thus: violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination; where discrimination is the result of State action, it is a violation of Article 14: therefore, a violation of a principle of natural justice by a State action is a violation of Article 14. Article 14, however, is not the sole repository of the principles of natural justice. What it does is to guarantee that any law or State action violating them will be struck down. The principles of natural justice, however, apply not only to legislation and State action but also where any tribunal, authority or body of men, not coming within the definition of State in Article 12, is charged with the duty of deciding a matter. In such a case, the principles of natural justice require that it must decide such matter fairly and impartially.” (emphasis ours)
4. In another seminal decision, i.e., A.R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak4, a seven-Judge Constitution Bench while acknowledging that it had committed an error earlier which needed rectification, went on to assert that:
“55. … No prejudice need be proved for enforcing the fundamental rights. Violation of a fundamental right itself renders the impugned action void. So also the violation of the principles of natural justice renders the act a nullity. …”
3 (1985) 3 SCC 398
4 (1988) 2 SCC 602
2006 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
5. It has recently been held by us in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Prakash Singh5 that just as Articles 14, 19 and 21 constitute a triumvirate of rights of citizens conceived as charters on equality, freedom and liberty, the trio of the Constitution Bench decisions in Olga Tellis (supra), Tulsiram Patel (supra) and A.R. Antulay (supra) form the bedrock of natural justice principles being regarded as part of Article 14 and, thereby, obviating the need to demonstrate prejudice if a challenge were thrown on the ground of violation of Article 14.
6. Reference to these decisions has been made at the inception because of the particular view we propose to take on consideration of decisions of a three-Judge Bench in Sunil Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal & Ors.6 and a coordinate Bench in Union of India v. Alok Kumar7. Notably, these decisions were relied on by the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru8 while insisting on the requirement to demonstrate prejudice in a claim of breach of principles of natural justice notwithstanding that the employer before it had violated a statutory regulation by which it was bound. The aPPeal
7. The challenge in this civil appeal, by the appellant K. Prabhakar Hegde, is to the judgment and order dated 14th December, 2021 9 in Writ Appeal No. 975 of 2009 (S-DE). Vide the impugned order, the High Court allowed the writ appeal carried by the respondent here, Bank of Baroda. Consequently, the judgment and order of the Single Judge dated 24th February, 2009 in WP No. 27936/2003, which was under challenge, stood set aside with the result that the writ petition of the appellant was dismissed.
B rief facTs
8. The facts relevant for the purpose of deciding this appeal are these: i. In 1959, the appellant joined Vijaya Bank (which merged with the respondent in the year 2019) as a clerk.
5 2025 SCC OnLine SC 891
6 (1980) 3 SCC 304
7 (2010) 5 SCC 349
8 High Court 9 impugned order [2025] 8 S.C.R. 2007K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda ii. Between 1959 and 1998, the appellant was promoted several times. At the relevant time, the appellant was the ‘Zonal Head’ of the Delhi Zonal Office of Vijaya Bank.
iii. On 4th of January, 1999, the appellant was served with a notice issued by his disciplinary authority. It was alleged that the appellant was responsible for certain irregularities and lapses committed in approving temporary overdrafts (TOD) on the accounts of various parties involving substantial amounts. The notice also alleged that the appellant had instructed the Assistant General Manager at the Barakhamba Branch of Vijaya Bank to grant a TOD of Rs. 15,00,000/- to one M/s Kunal Travels Pvt. Ltd. via telephone. Another notice was sent on 22nd January, 1999 in respect of a separate incident containing more or less similar allegations.
iv. Appellant replied to the said notices through letters dated 1 st February, 1999 and 24th February, 1999.
v. On 30th January, 2001, disciplinary proceedings under Regulation 6 of the Vijaya Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 198110 were drawn up by issuing a charge sheet. Appellant replied to the said charge sheet vide letter dated 17 th February, 2001 denying the charges.
vi. The disciplinary authority of the appellant appointed an officer holding the post of General Manager of Vijaya Bank as the Inquiry Officer.
vii. The report of the inquiry officer dated 28 th November, 2001 was submitted to the Disciplinary Authority holding that the charges against the appellant stand proved.
viii. Vide an order dated 17 th May, 2002, the Disciplinary Authority held that though the appellant was due to retire upon superannuation on 30 th June, 2002, disciplinary proceedings initiated against him vide chargesheet dated 30 th January, 2001 would continue. It was further ordered that the appellant shall not be entitled to any retirement benefits till final orders are passed in the disciplinary proceedings.
10 1981 Regulations 2008 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports ix. Appellant superannuated from service on 30 th January, 2006. x. Vide an order dated 4th July, 2002, the Disciplinary Authority imposed on the appellant the punishment of ‘dismissal from service’.
xi. Aggrieved by the punishment imposed on him, the appellant approached the Appellate Authority by presenting an appeal. It was dismissed vide an appellate order dated 27 th March, 2003. xii. Appellant then challenged this order of the Appellate Authority before the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. A Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition vide judgment and order dated 24th February, 2009. The order of dismissal stood quashed and the appellant held entitled to “consequential benefits on his having attained the age of superannuation, to which he would have been entitled in the usual course and in law”.
xiii. Vijaya Bank, aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Single Judge, carried the same in a writ appeal before the Division Bench which, as noted above, succeeded. While the appellant’s writ petition stood dismissed, the order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority against the appellant was, thus, confirmed.
imPugned Order
9. The Division Bench of the High Court framed two issues for its determination: (i) whether the denial of the preliminary investigation report prejudiced the charged officer (appellant before us) and vitiated the proceedings and (ii) whether the stipulation of generally questioning the charged officer regarding the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence was a mandatory requirement under Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations.
10. While deciding issue (i), reliance was placed by the High Court on the decisions of this Court in Vijay Kumar Nigam v. State of MP11 and Syndicate Bank & Ors. v. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati12 to hold that the preliminary report is only to decide and assess whether it would
11 (1996) 11 SCC 599.
12 (2006) 3 SCC 150.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2009K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda be necessary to take any disciplinary action against the delinquent officer and it does not form any foundation for passing the order. The High Court further held that since all the documents relied upon by the Inquiry Officer had been made available to the appellant and the appellant’s representative having cross-examined the sole witness for the management in extenso, furnishing of the preliminary investigation report was not necessary; hence, no prejudice to the appellant was caused thereby.
11. Regarding issue (ii), the Division Bench held: first, Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations is pari materia Rule 8(19) of the All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1955; hence, the decision of this Court in Sunil Kumar Banerjee (supra), which has since been followed by this Court in the decision in Alok Kumar (supra) is squarely applicable and compliance with such a regulation is merely directory and not mandatory. Secondly, the High Court held, on facts, that the Inquiry Officer had asked the appellant if he wished to make any submission and in pursuance thereof, he did utilise the opportunity by making detailed submissions; hence, though the appellant was not generally questioned as required by Regulation 6(17), such provision had been substantially complied with.
12. As a sequitur, the High Court allowed the writ appeal and set aside the order of the Single Judge.
cOnTenTiOns Of The ParTies
13. The appellant has laid siege to the impugned order on, inter alia, the following grounds:
a. The High Court did not consider the decision rendered by this Court in ECIL v. B. Karunakar13 and UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor14.
b. The High Court erroneously interpreted the principles of law laid down in Venkatesh Gururao Kurati (supra).
c. The High Court did not consider that non-furnishing of the report of preliminary inquiry has itself caused prejudice to the appellant
13 (1993) 4 SCC 727.
14 (2007) 6 SCC 694.
2010 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports as the appellant was unable to defend himself in respect of the charges against him.
d. Reliance placed by the High Court on Sunil Kumar Banerjee (supra) was misplaced. The said decision, rendered by a three- Judge Bench referred to coordinate Bench decisions in K.C. Mathew v. State of Travancore-Cochin15 and Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta v. State of W.B.16 without, however, noticing an earlier decision of a four-Judge Bench in Tara Singh v. State17 where it was held to be important to faithfully and fairly observe Section 342 of the 1898 Code, the object whereof was to afford the accused a fair and proper opportunity of explaining the circumstances which appear against him. Though it was held that every error or omission would not vitiate a trial and that the question in each case would depend on the degree of the error and upon whether prejudice had been occasioned or likely to have been occasioned, in the present case, the degree of error was at its peak since the Inquiry Officer did not put a single question to the appellant in respect of the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him and the High Court failed to consider that calling upon the appellant to place his version does not in any manner amount to compliance of Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations, not to speak of substantial compliance.
e. The authorities could not have considered the appellant to be “deemed to be in service” post superannuation and ordering him to be dismissed from service in the absence of any regulation in the 1981 Regulations permitting such course of action is absolutely illegal.
f. The actions of the appellant of giving oral sanctions for the TOD was normal practice and was done in good faith.
14. Based on the aforesaid contentions, Mr. Nuli, learned senior counsel for the appellant ably assisted by Ms. Akhila Wali, learned counsel urged that the entire disciplinary proceedings including the order of
15 AIR 1956 SC 241
16 AIR 1969 SC 381
17 (1951) SCC 903
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2011K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda dismissal and the appellate order be set aside and the respondent be ordered to release to the appellant full benefits as if he had never been dismissed.
15. Per contra, Mr. Patil, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, defended the administrative actions challenged in the writ petition and the impugned order on, inter alia, the following grounds:
a. The High Court rightly decided that since the report of preliminary inquiry was only to assess and decide whether disciplinary proceedings should be initiated or not and had not formed the foundation for passing the order of dismissal from service, denial of the same to the appellant did not prejudice him.
b. The author of the preliminary inquiry report was the sole witness for the management in the inquiry and whatever was recorded by such witness in the preliminary inquiry report was spoken to by him in course of the inquiry; whereafter the appellant had cross-examined extensively. There was, thus, no question of the appellant to feel aggrieved by non-furnishing of the report of preliminary inquiry.
c. Qua Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations, the appellant has not demonstrated any prejudice; moreover, the appellant utilised the opportunity of making submissions when called upon by the Inquiry Officer and, therefore, the High Court was right in holding that the concerned regulation is not mandatory and requires only to be substantially complied with.
d. The appellant did not ever raise any grievance in course of the inquiry and even subsequently, in his representation against the inquiry report or the appeal petition that non-compliance with Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations had prejudiced him in his defence. For the first time, the appellant raised such a grievance in the writ petition which is nothing but an afterthought. e. The decision in Tara Singh (supra) and Sunil Kumar Banerjee (supra) operate in different legal domains and, therefore, Tara Singh (supra) being a decision rendered in the criminal appellate jurisdiction is not applicable in the present proceedings; on the contrary, Sunil Kumar Banerjee (supra) is pat on the point and propriety demands that we follow the same.
2012 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports f. Continuation of disciplinary proceedings even after the appellant had attained superannuation cannot be faulted because the appellant was continued in service till such time the final order of dismissal from service was passed and this is a permissible course of action, not warranting interdiction.
issues
16. Three broad issues emerge for decision:
(i) Whether denial of the report of preliminary inquiry prepared by the officer entrusted by Vijaya Bank to conduct such inquiry, who happened to be the sole management witness, was sufficient to vitiate the regular inquiry that followed against the appellant?
(ii) Whether the failure/omission of the Inquiry Officer to generally question the appellant on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence, as per Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations, vitiated the inquiry?
(iii) Whether continuation of disciplinary proceedings against the appellant beyond superannuation was a permissible course of action under the 1981 Regulations?
17. If indeed the answer to any or all the aforesaid issues is in favour of the appellant, the relief that he could be entitled would then fall for our consideration.
analysis
18. We begin with issue no.1. Unlike the extensive jurisprudence available on the furnishing of the final enquiry report, our research reveals that there is significantly less jurisprudence on the issue of furnishing a preliminary inquiry report. However, the decisions referred to below provide sufficient light for us to rule on the question before us.
19. At the outset, we refer to the Constitution Bench decision in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India18 . The said decision succinctly delineates the purpose of a preliminary inquiry, albeit in the context of government employees. Hon’ble K.N. Wanchoo, J. (as the Chief Justice then was) speaking for the Bench observed as follows: 18 1963 SCC OnLine SC 42 [2025] 8 S.C.R. 2013K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda “13. Generally therefore a preliminary enquiry is usually held to determine whether a prima facie case for a formal departmental enquiry is made out, and it is very necessary that the two should not be confused. Even where government does not intend to take action by way of punishment against a temporary servant on a report of bad work or misconduct a preliminary enquiry is usually held to satisfy government that there is reason to dispense with the services of a temporary employee or to revert him to his substantive post, for as we have said already government does not usually take action of this kind without any reason. Therefore when a preliminary enquiry of this nature is held in the case of a temporary employee or a government servant holding a higher rank temporarily it must not be confused with the regular departmental enquiry (which usually follows such a preliminary enquiry) when the government decides to frame charges and get a departmental enquiry made in order that one of the three major punishments already indicated may be inflicted on the government servant. Therefore, so far as the preliminary enquiry is concerned there is no question of its being governed by Article 311(2) for that enquiry is really for the satisfaction of government to decide whether punitive action should be taken or action should be taken under the contract or the rules in the case of a temporary government servant or a servant holding higher rank temporarily to which he has no right. In short a preliminary enquiry is for the purpose of collection of facts in regard to the conduct and work of a government servant in which he may or may not be associated so that the authority concerned may decide whether or not to subject the servant concerned to the enquiry necessary under Article 311 for inflicting one of the three major punishments mentioned therein. Such a preliminary enquiry may even be held ex parte, for it is merely for the satisfaction of government, though usually for the sake of fairness, explanation is taken from the servant concerned even as such an enquiry. But at that stage he has no right to be heard for the enquiry is merely for the satisfaction of the government and it 2014 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports is only when the government decides to hold a regular departmental enquiry for the purpose of inflicting one of the three major punishments that the government servant gets the protection of Article 311 and all the rights that that protection implies as already indicated above. There must therefore be no confusion between the two enquiries and it is only when the government proceeds to hold a departmental enquiry for the purpose of inflicting on the government servant one of the three major punishments indicated in Article 311 that the government servant is entitled to the protection of that Article. That is why this Court emphasised in Parshotam Lal Dhingra case [(1958) SCR 828] and in Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1955) 1 SCR 26] that the ‘motive or the inducing factor which influences the government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule is irrelevant’.”
20. A coordinate Bench in Krishna Chandra Tandon v. Union of India19 incontrovertibly held that there is no requirement to furnish a preliminary inquiry report when the enquiry officer has not relied upon the same to reach the conclusions recorded in the inquiry report after a regular inquiry. The relevant passage reads as follows: “16. … It is very necessary for an authority which orders an enquiry to be satisfied that there are prima facie grounds for holding a disciplinary enquiry and, therefore, before he makes up his mind he will either himself investigate or direct his subordinates to investigate in the matter and it is only after he receives the result of these investigations that he can decide as to whether disciplinary action is called for or not. Therefore, these documents of the nature of inter-departmental communications between officers preliminary to the holding of enquiry have really no importance unless the Enquiry Officer wants to rely on them for his conclusions. In that case it would only be right that copies of the same should be given to the delinquent. It is not the case here that either the Enquiry Officer or
19 (1974) 4 SCC 374
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2015K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda the CIT relied on the report of Shri R.N. Srivastava or any other officer for his finding against the appellant. Therefore, there is no substance in this submission.”
21. The concept of a preliminary inquiry and its ramifications have been neatly summed up in Chandrama Tewari v. Union of India20. There, a coordinate Bench of this Court held that:
“4. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and we have further considered the aforesaid authorities referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant but we do not find any merit in the appellant’s submissions to justify interference with the High Court’s judgment. Article 311 of the Constitution requires that reasonable opportunity of defence must be afforded to a government servant before he is awarded major punishment of dismissal. It further contemplates that disciplinary enquiry must be held in accordance with the rules in a just and fair manner. The procedure at the enquiry must be consistent with the principles of natural justice. Principles of natural justice require that the copy of the document if any relied upon against the party charged should be given to him and he should be afforded opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and to produce his own witnesses in his defence. If findings are recorded against the government servant placing reliance on a document which may not have been disclosed to him or the copy whereof may not have been supplied to him during the enquiry when demanded, that would contravene principles of natural justice rendering the enquiry, and the consequential order of punishment illegal and void. These principles are well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. We need not refer to them. However, it is not necessary that each and every document must be supplied to the delinquent government servant facing the charges, instead only material and relevant documents are necessary to be supplied to him. If a document even though mentioned in the memo of charges is not relevant 20 (1987) Supp. SCC 518 2016 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports to the charges or if it is not referred to or relied upon by the enquiry officer or the punishing authority in holding the charges proved against the government servant, no exception can be taken to the validity of the proceedings or the order. If the document is not used against the party charged the ground of violation of principles of natural justice cannot successfully be raised. The violation of principles of natural justice arises only when a document, copy of which may not have been supplied to the party charged when demanded is used in recording finding of guilt against him. On a careful consideration of the authorities cited on behalf of the appellant we find that the obligation to supply copies of a document is confined only to material and relevant documents and the enquiry would be vitiated only if the non-supply of material and relevant documents when demanded may have caused prejudice to the delinquent officer.
***
9. It is now well settled that if copies of relevant and material documents including the statement of witnesses recorded in the preliminary enquiry or during investigation are not supplied to the delinquent officer facing the enquiry and if such documents are relied in holding the charges framed against the officer, the enquiry would be vitiated for the violation of principles of natural justice. Similarly, if the statement of witnesses recorded during the investigation of a criminal case or in the preliminary enquiry is not supplied to the delinquent officer that would amount to denial of opportunity of effective cross-examination. It is difficult to comprehend exhaustively the facts and circumstances which may lead to violation of principles of natural justice or denial of reasonable opportunity of defence. This question must be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. While considering this question it has to be borne in mind that a delinquent officer is entitled to have copies of material and relevant documents only which may include the copy of statement of witnesses recorded during the investigation or preliminary enquiry or the copy of any other document which may have been relied on in [2025] 8 S.C.R. 2017K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda support of the charges. If a document has no bearing on the charges or if it is not relied on by the enquiry officer to support the charges, or if such document or material was not necessary for the cross-examination of witnesses during the enquiry, the officer cannot insist upon the supply of copies of such documents, as the absence of copy of such document will not prejudice the delinquent officer. The decision of the question whether a document is material or not will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.”
22. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v. State of Maharashtra21 observed that: “3. … It is then contended that the preliminary enquiry was not properly conducted and, therefore, the enquiry is vitiated by principles of natural justice. The preliminary inquiry has nothing to do with the enquiry conducted after issue of charge-sheet. The former action would be to find whether disciplinary enquiry should be initiated against the delinquent. After full-fledged enquiry was held, the preliminary enquiry had lost its importance.”
23. Considering the aforesaid decisions as well as other decisions, a coordinate Bench in Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat22 held that: “45. In view of the above, it is evident that the evidence recorded in preliminary inquiry cannot be used in regular inquiry as the delinquent is not associated with it, and opportunity to cross-examine the persons examined in such inquiry is not given. Using such evidence would be violative of the principles of natural justice.”
24. We may also profitably refer to the decision in Manoj Kumar v. State of U.P.23 wherein it was held:
“6. …The order also states that a preliminary inquiry was held to determine if a full-fledged departmental enquiry was required after which the charge memo was served
21 (1997) 1 SCC 299
22 (2013) 4 SCC 301
23 (2018) 13 SCC 161
2018 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports with full opportunity of defence. The non-furnishing of the preliminary inquiry report has therefore not prejudiced the appellant in any manner or vitiated the departmental proceedings.”
25. The upshot of the aforesaid decisions is that:
i. A preliminary inquiry is conducted for the purposes of determining whether regular disciplinary proceedings are called for or not; ii. A preliminary inquiry report is an internal document; iii. A preliminary inquiry report or the findings therein cannot be used to come to conclusions recorded in the report of inquiry if such preliminary inquiry report/findings are based on oral and/or documentary evidence which are obtained behind the back of the charged employee and such oral/documentary evidence are not presented in the inquiry in the presence of such employee; iv. If a preliminary inquiry report or the findings therein are sought to be relied on, the witnesses whose evidence was relied on in preparing the same ought to be brought before the inquiry officer and the charged officer afforded an opportunity to crossexamine them;
v. If a preliminary inquiry report is sought to be relied upon in the inquiry report, then such preliminary inquiry report must be provided to the delinquent employee;
vi. Once a chargesheet is drawn up and has been provided to the charged officer detailing the charges, the preliminary inquiry report is of no consequence and need not be provided to him.
26. Having noted the purpose and reason for conducting a preliminary inquiry, we now proceed to answer the question as to whether non-furnishing of the report to the appellant led to the disciplinary proceedings being vitiated.
27. In the instant case, a perusal of the inquiry report reveals that no reliance upon the preliminary inquiry report has been placed by the inquiry officer. Therefore, non-furnishing of the inquiry report to the appellant is inconsequential.
28. However, an interesting argument that has been made is that the non-furnishing of the preliminary inquiry report has caused prejudice [2025] 8 S.C.R. 2019K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda to the appellant because such non-furnishing of the report disabled him to effectively cross-examine the witness. This argument, while novel, is not impressive. We come to this ineluctable conclusion since the appellant was duly provided with the deposition of the witness as per the rules, was allowed to cross-examine the witness on the basis of the statements made by him and the inquiry officer placed no reliance upon the preliminary inquiry report, but only upon the statements of such witness recorded during chief examination and cross-examination.
29. We, therefore, find no violation of the principles of natural justice; also, no prejudice has been caused to the charged officer for nonfurnishing of the preliminary inquiry report.
30. This conclusion, is however, premised on the caveat that no rule, statutory or otherwise, mandates the furnishing of the preliminary inquiry report in this particular case.
31. We now proceed to answer the next question which is central to the dispute, i.e., what is the nature of duty that Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations casts on an Inquiry Officer? Is the provision directory or mandatory, or is it both directory and mandatory depending on the fact situation in each case?
32. In Sunil Kumar Banerjee (supra), a three-Judge Bench of this Court had the occasion to consider Rule 8(19) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 196924, which is pari materia Rule 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations. A point having been taken before the Bench by the delinquent officer that Rule 8(19) was observed in the breach by the Inquiry Officer, it was ruled by Hon’ble O. Chinappa Reddy, J. as follows:
“3. … It may be noticed straightway that this provision is akin to Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 and Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973. It is now well established that mere non-examination or defective examination under Section 342 of the 1898 Code is not a ground for interference unless prejudice is established, vide, K.C. Mathew v. State of Travancore- Cochin (AIR 1956 SC 241); Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta 24 1969 Rules 2020 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports v. State of W.B. (AIR 1969 SC 381). We are similarly of the view that failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 8(19) of the 1969 Rules does not vitiate the enquiry unless the delinquent officer is able to establish prejudice. In this case the learned Single Judge of the High Court as well as the learned Judges of the Division Bench found that the appellant was in no way prejudiced by the failure to observe the requirement of Rule 8(19). The appellant cross-examined the witnesses himself, submitted his defence in writing in great detail and argued the case himself at all stages. The appellant was fully alive to the allegations against him and dealt with all aspects of the allegations in his written defence. We do not think that he was in the least prejudiced by the failure of the Enquiry Officer to question him in accordance with Rule 8(19).”
33. It follows from the above passage that the Bench in Sunil Kumar Banerjee (supra), while overruling the contention of the delinquent officer, held that (i) Rule 8(19) of the 1969 Rules was akin to Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 189825 and Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 26 ; and (ii) in terms of the law laid down in K.C. Mathew (supra) and Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta (supra), mere non-examination or defective examination under Section 342 of the 1898 Code is not a ground for interference unless prejudice is established. On facts, the Bench was of the opinion that though the Inquiry Officer had not examined the delinquent officer, he was not prejudiced at all thereby since he was alive to the allegations against him, had cross-examined the witnesses himself, submitted his defence in writing in great detail and argued the case himself at all stages.
34. Sections 342 and 313 of the 1898 and 1973 Codes, respectively, though bear close resemblance, are not exactly the same. We may, for ease of understanding, quote the same below:
342. (1) For the purpose of enabling the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, the court may, at any stage of any inquiring 25 1898 Code 26 1973 Code [2025] 8 S.C.R. 2021K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda or trial without previously warning the accused, put such questions to him as the court considers necessary, and shall, for the purpose aforesaid, question him generally on the case after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence.
(2) The accused shall not render himself liable to punishment by refusing to answer such questions, or by giving false answers to them; but the court and the jury (if any) may draw such inference from such refusal or answers as it thinks just.
(3) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed.
(4) No oath shall be administered to the accused when he is examined under sub-section (1).
313. Power to examine the accused.—
(1) In every inquiry or trial, for the purpose of enabling the accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, the Court—
(a) may at any stage, without previously warning the accused put such questions to him as the Court considers necessary;
(b) shall, after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence, question him generally on the case:
Provided that in a summons-case, where the Court has dispensed with the personal attendance of the accused, it may also dispense with his examination under clause (b).
(2) No oath shall be administered to the accused when he is examined under sub-section (1).
(3) The accused shall not render himself liable to punishment by refusing to answer such questions, or by giving false answers to them.
2022 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed.
(5) The Court may take help of Prosecutor and Defence Counsel in preparing relevant questions which are to be put to the accused and the Court may permit filing of written statement by the accused as sufficient compliance of this section.
35. In K.C. Mathew (supra), a three-Judge Bench while considering the impact of breach of Section 342 of the 1898 Code observed as follows: “7. The next argument was that the examination of each accused under Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code was defective and that that caused prejudice. We agree that the examination was not as full or as clear as it should have been but we are not satisfied that there was any prejudice.
8. It is to be noted that the question of prejudice was not raised in either of the courts below nor was it raised in the grounds of appeal to this Court. The point was taken for the first time in the arguments before us and even there counsel was unable to say that his clients had in fact been prejudiced; all he could urge was that there was a possibility of prejudice.
9. We agree that the omission to take the objection in the grounds of appeal is not necessarily fatal; everything must depend on the facts of the case; but the fact that the objection was not taken at an earlier stage, if it could and should have been taken, is a material circumstance that will necessarily weigh heavily against the accused particularly when he has been represented by counsel throughout. The Explanation to Section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code expressly requires the Court to ‘have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings’.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2023K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
10. Another strong circumstance is this : the petition for appeal does not set out the questions that, according to the appellants, they should have been asked nor does it indicate the answers that they would have given if they had been asked. Again, though that is not necessarily fatal ordinarily it will be very difficult to sustain a plea of prejudice unless the Court is told just where the shoe pinches. It is true that in certain exceptional cases prejudice, or a reasonable likelihood of prejudice, may be so patent on the face of the facts that nothing more is needed; but that class of case must be exceptional. After all, the only person who can really tell us whether he was in fact prejudiced is the accused; and if there is real prejudice he can at once state the facts and leave the Court to judge their worth. But if the attitude of the accused, whether in person or through the mouth of his counsel, is: ‘I don’t know what I would have said. I still have to think that up. But I might have said this, that or the other’, then there will ordinarily be little difficulty in concluding that there neither was, nor could have been, prejudice. Here, as elsewhere, the Court is entitled to conclude that a person who deliberately withholds facts within his special knowledge and refuses to give the Court that assistance which is its right and due, has nothing of value which he can disclose and that if he did disclose anything that would at once expose the hollowness of his cause.”
(emphasis ours)
36. Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta (supra) is also a decision of a three- Judge Bench. The question arising for decision is neatly summed up in paragraph 4, reading as follows:
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