Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1021; [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1427
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice K.V. Viswanathan
- Decided
- 19 Aug 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 10970/2025
- Sections
- 34, 34(3), 33, 37, 29, 31, 33(1)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:18 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1427 : 2025 INSC 1021 Geojit Financial Services Ltd.
v.
Sandeep Gurav (Civil Appeal No. 10970 of 2025)
19 August 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant on the ground that the appellant had not filed the arbitration petition u/s.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 within the period of limitation prescribed therein. Headnotes† Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – ss.33, 34(3) – Computation of period of limitation – High Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appellant had not filed the arbitration petition u/s.34 within the period of limitation prescribed therein – Appellant contended that the impugned order is in direct conflict with Ved Prakash’s decision as the period of limitation for challenging an award would, in terms of s.34(3) of the 1996 Act, commence only from the date on which an application filed u/s.33 of the Act 1996 is disposed of: Held: 1. The impugned order of the High Court does not reflect the correct position of law. [Para 20]
2. Where an application u/s.33 of the 1996 Act has not been filed, the legislature was conscious enough to state that it would be the date of the receipt of the award which would earmark the commencement of limitation for an application for setting aside of an award in terms of s.34 of the 1996 Act – Whereas, in the case where an application u/s.33 of the 1996 Act has been filed, the legislature was conscious enough to lay down that it would be the date of disposal of such request or application, that would be the starting point for calculation of limitation – Where such an application u/s.33 of the 1996 Act is filed, irrespective of whether the arbitral tribunal upon considering such application, either makes or does not make any correction or modification or 1428 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports choose to render or to not render an additional award in terms of s.33 of the Act, 1996, the starting point for the period of limitation for challenging the same u/s.34(3) would be the date of disposal of such application u/s.33 by the arbitral tribunal as long as the application u/s.33 of the 1996 Act had been filed within the prescribed period of limitation – Any other interpretation to the contrary, would do violence to plain and unambiguous language used in s.34(3) of the Act, 1996 – What is of significance, u/s.34(3) of the Act, 1996 is the date on which the application or request u/s.33 came to be disposed by the arbitral tribunal – Where a request is made u/s.33 of the 1996 Act, it is immaterial for the purpose of computation of limitation u/s.34(3) whether such request fell within the purview of the said provision or not – What is material is only that such request was made in the manner delineated u/s.33 i.e., it fulfilled the twin conditions of being made; (I) “within thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral award” and (II) “with notice to the other party” stipulated therein – Thus, the impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. [Paras 35(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), 37] Case Law Cited State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Damani Construction Co. [2007] 3 SCR 416 : (2007) 10 SCC 742 – distinguished.
M/s. Ved Prakash Mithal and Sons v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3181; USS Alliance v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 778 – referred to.
List of Acts Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
List of Keywords Period of limitation; Computation of limitation u/s.34(3); Arbitration petition u/s.34 not within the period of limitation; Date of the receipt of the award; Commencement of limitation for an application for setting aside of an award; Application u/s.33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Starting point for calculation of limitation; Date of disposal of application u/s.33; Correction or modification; Additional award; Within thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral award; With notice to the other party.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1429Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 10970 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 12.02.2021 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in AN No. 67 of 2019 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Ms. Sanjana Saddy.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Order
1. Leave granted.
2. The respondent although served with the notice issued by this Court yet has chosen not to remain present before this Court either inperson or through an advocate and oppose this appeal.
3. This appeal arises from the order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated 12.02.2021 in Appeal No.67 of 2019 by which the appeal filed by the appellant herein under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short the “1996 Act”) came to be dismissed on the ground that the appellant had not filed the arbitration petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act within the period of limitation prescribed therein.
4. Heard Ms. Sanjana Saddy, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant.
5. The learned counsel would submit that the impugned order is in direct conflict with the decision of this Court in the M/s. Ved Prakash Mithal and Sons v. Union of India reported in (2018) SCC OnLine SC 3181. The counsel would argue that in Ved Prakash (supra) this Court held that the period of limitation for challenging an award would, in terms of Section 34 sub-section (3) of the 1996 Act, commence only from the date on which an application filed under Section 33 of the Act 1996 is disposed of.
6. She would further argue that High Court committed a serious error in holding that the application filed by the appellant herein did not fall within the parameters of Section 33 sub-section (1) of the 1996 Act. 1430 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
7. She would also argue that the High Court committed an error in holding that the limitation period of three-months would commence from the date of receipt of the arbitration award and not the date of the order dismissing or disposing the application under Section 33 sub-section (1) of the 1996 Act, that was filed by the appellant herein.
8. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed that there being merit in her appeal, the same may be allowed and the impugned order passed by the High Court be set aside and the matter be remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration of the Section 34 application.
RELEVANT PROVISIONS AT PLAY
9. We must first look into the Section 34 of the Act 1996, more particularly sub-section (3) which reads thus: - “34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.”
10. Section 34 sub-section (3) of the 1996 Act, prescribes the period of limitation within which an application for the setting aside of an arbitral award may be filed by a party aggrieved by the award so passed.
11. The 1996 Act being a special law, in view of Section 29 sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 the special period of limitation prescribed under Section 34 sub-section (3) for making an application for setting aside the arbitral award as well as for condonation of any delay therein as per the proviso thereto shall prevail.
12. A plain reading of Section 34 sub-section (3) reveals that a limitation period of three-months has been prescribed under the 1996 Act for [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1431Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav making such application, however, the manner in which this period has to be computed differs slightly. A careful reading of the provision makes it clear that the computation of the period of limitation for filing such an application is envisaged to operate in two distinct parts or scenarios.
13. The first part provides that, for an application for setting aside an award in terms of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, the period of limitation of three-months would be computed from the “date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award”. Whereas, the second part of the provision stipulates that where a request was made to the arbitral tribunal under Section 33 of the 1996 Act, the limitation prescribed under the said provision would commence from the date on which such “request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal”.
14. We shall now look into Section 33 of the 1996 Act which reads thus: - “33. Correction and interpretation of award; additional award.—
(1) Within thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral award, unless another period of time has been agreed upon by the parties—
(a) a party, with notice to the other party, may request the arbitral tribunal to correct any computation errors, any clerical or typographical errors or any other errors of a similar nature occurring in the award;
(b) if so agreed by the parties, a party, with notice to the other party, may request the arbitral tribunal to give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the award.
(2) If the arbitral tribunal considers the request made under sub-section (1) to be justified, it shall make the correction or give the interpretation within thirty days from the receipt of the request and the interpretation shall form part of the arbitral award.
(3) The arbitral tribunal may correct any error of the type referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1), on its own 1432 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports initiative, within thirty days from the date of the arbitral award.
(4) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party with notice to the other party, may request, within thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral award, the arbitral tribunal to make an additional arbitral award as to claims presented in the arbitral proceedings but omitted from the arbitral award.
(5) If the arbitral tribunal considers the request made under sub-section (4) to be justified, it shall make the additional arbitral award within sixty days from the receipt of such request.
(6) The arbitral tribunal may extend, if necessary, the period of time within which it shall make a correction, give an interpretation or make an additional arbitral award under sub-section (2) or sub-section (5).
(7) Section 31 shall apply to a correction or interpretation of the arbitral award or to an additional arbitral award made under this section.”
15. Section 33 deals with requests made to the arbitral tribunal for correction and/or interpretation of the award and also for rendering an additional award. The period provided under Section 33 of the 1996 Act for making a request for the purposes indicated above is thirty-days from the date of receipt of the arbitral award unless another timeframe is agreed upon by the parties. Under sub-section
(2) of Section 33 of the 1996 Act, the arbitral tribunal is vested with the power to consider such request made under sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the 1996 Act, and for this purpose, it has been accorded thirty-days from the date of receipt of such request. Under sub-section (3) of Section 33 of the 1996 Act, the arbitral tribunal has also been conferred suo motu powers for correcting errors of the type referred to in Section 33 sub-section (1) clause (a) of the 1996 Act qua which as well, the timeframe fixed is thirty-days, commencing from the date when the arbitral award is rendered.
16. Besides this, as indicated above, the arbitral tribunal under Section 33 of the 1996 Act is also empowered to render an additional award concerning claims presented in arbitral proceedings that were not considered in the arbitral award, albeit, at the request of a party [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1433Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav made within thirty-days of receipt of the arbitral award. However, the party interested in the additional award being rendered is required to give notice to the opposite party. For the arbitral tribunal to make an additional award upon such request, a timeframe of sixty-days from the date when such request is made has been prescribed by Section 33 sub-section (4), as opposed to the period of thirty-days under sub-section (2) that has been prescribed for correction and/ or interpretation of the award, from the date when such request is made. Section 33 sub-section (6) of the 1996 Act gives power to the arbitral tribunal to extend, if necessary, the period of time within which it shall make a correction, give an interpretation or make an additional award under sub-section (2) or sub-section (5) of the said provision.
17. We may now proceed to look into the decision of this Court in Ved Prakash (supra). In the said decision, this Court observed as under: - “3. On 11.03.2016, objections and application objecting to the Award was filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) by the respondent. The only question that arises is whether the aforesaid Section 34 application could be said to be within the time mentioned in Section 34(3) of the Act.
4. The learned Additional District Judge, by order dated 30.05.2017, found that the application was time-barred, reasoning that the application should have been made on and from the first date as, in fact, there was no correction made to the Award.
5. The respondent preferred an appeal before the High Court, whereby the learned Single Judge of the High Court, by his judgment dated 10.07.2017, reversed the order of the Additional District Judge stating that as the Section 33 application had been disposed of only on 14.12.2015, the period mentioned in Section 34(3) would start running only from then, in which case, the Section 34 application could be said to be within time.
6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners before us has argued that the expression “disposed” which is mentioned in Section 34(3) would have to be read in 1434 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports consonance with and in harmony with Section 33. So read, this would only mean where some positive step has, in fact, taken place under Section 33 and the Award is either corrected or modified. This could not possibly refer to an Award which is not ultimately corrected or modified and the application under Section 33 is merely dismissed. For this, he relies upon the judgment of a Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of Amit Suryakant Lunavat v. Kotak Securities, Mumbai reported in 2010 (6) Mh.L.J.
764. The learned Single Judge held:
“13. There is no justification, as contended, to accept the submission in view of the mandate of section 34 and considering the scheme and purpose of the Arbitration Act that because the application under section 33 of the Act was filed and it was rejected subsequently, therefore, the limitation period commenced afresh from the date of such decision of the award. In my view, it is contemplated only on a situation where the Arbitrator corrects or interprets and/or add or decide to add any additional claims and modified the award as only in such cases the original award looses its originality and therefore an application for setting aside the award needs to be filed within three months from the date of receipt of such corrected or modified award. Therefore, the party who received the award after deciding the application under section 34(3) of the Act, may get the benefit of fresh commencement of limitation from the receipt of the modified and/or corrected award and not otherwise.”
7. We are of the view that the judgment of the Bombay High Court does not reflect the correct position in law. Section 34(3) specifically speaks of the date on which a request under Section 33 has been “disposed of” by the Arbitral Tribunal.
8. We are also of the view that a “disposal” of the application can be either by allowing it or dismissing it. On this short [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1435Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav ground, in our opinion, the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court is correct in law.”
(Emphasis supplied)
18. This Court in Ved Prakash (supra) after examining Section(s) 33 and 34 sub-section (3) of the 1996 Act, held that it is the date of disposal of the application under Section 33 of the 1996 Act that would earmark the starting point of limitation for filing an application for setting aside of an award in terms of Section 34 of the 1996 Act.
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