Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v. Software Technology Parks of India
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 574; [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1846
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
- Decided
- 28 Apr 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 5383/2024
- Sections
- 34, 37, 55, 73, 74, 75, 81, 33
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1846 : 2025 INSC 574 Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v.
Software Technology Parks of India (Civil Appeal No. 5383 of 2024)
28 April 2025 [Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose as regards the correctness of the order passed by the Division Bench of High Court upholding the arbitral award. Headnotes† Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – ss.34 and 37 – Application for setting aside arbitral awards – Dispute between the parties regarding delay in completion of the construction contract – Respondent-contracting authority deducted liquidated damages from the contractual dues of the appellant-contractor, along with other deduction and paid balance amount to appellant – Initiation of arbitral proceedings by the appellant challenging deduction of liquidated damages – Arbitral award by the arbitrator upholding the deduction of liquidated damages – Petition u/s.34 by the appellant to set aside the arbitral award – Allowed by the Single Judge of the High Court setting aside the award holding that the appellant had completed the work during the extended time granted by the respondent, thus there was no delay – However, the Division Bench set aside the judgment of the Single Judge – Correctness:
Held: An arbitral award is not liable to be interfered with only on the ground that the award is illegal or is erroneous in law which would require re-appraisal of the evidence adduced before the arbitral tribunal – If two views are possible, no scope for the court to re-appraise the evidence and to take the view other than the one taken by the arbitrator – View taken by the arbitral tribunal is ordinarily to be accepted and allowed to prevail – Scope of interference in arbitral matters is only confined to the extent * Author [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1847Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v. Software Technology P arks of India envisaged u/s.34 – Proceedings u/s.34 are summary in nature and not like a full-fledged civil suit or a civil appeal – Award cannot be touched unless it is contrary to the substantive provisions of law or s.34 or the terms of the agreement – Role of the court u/s.34 is a restrictive jurisdiction and has to be invoked in a conservative manner – Arbitral autonomy must be respected and judicial interference should remain minimal otherwise it will defeat the very object of the 1996 Act – There was an ex post facto approval on the part of the respondent – Appellant continued with the contract work even after the extended period had expired – All throughout respondent had put the appellant to notice that notwithstanding extension of time it reserved the right to levy liquidated damages – Single Judge went beyond the grounds provided in s.34 to set aside the arbitral award and exceeded jurisdiction – No justification for setting aside the arbitral award by taking a different view which is certainly a possible and plausible view – Different interpretation of the clause of the contract other than the one taken by the arbitral tribunal is possible but that will not bring the challenge to the arbitral award within the four corners of s.34 – Division Bench justified in reversing the order of Single Judge u/s.37 – Contract Act, 1872 – ss.55, 73, 74. [Paras 22-24, 28] List of Acts Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Contract Act, 1872. List of Keywords Arbitral award; Challenge to arbitral award; Delay in completion of construction project; Liquidated damages; Deduction of liquidated damages; Scope of interference u/s.37 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act; Scope of interference u/s.34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act; Extension of time; Ex post facto approval; Consequences of breach of contract; Appellate provision; Award illegal or erroneous in law; Restrictive jurisdiction; Invoked in conservative manner; Minimal judicial interference; Judge exceeded jurisdiction; Arbitral autonomy.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5383 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 08.08.2019 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in OSA No. 157 of 2019 1848 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
S.S. Rajesh, K.S. Mahadevan, Ms. Swati Bansal, Rangarajan R., Aravind Gopinathan, Rajesh Kumar.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Vinay Mohan Sharma, Ravinder Kumar Yadav, Mrs. Arti Anupriya, Kartikey, Paras Juneja, Vineet Yadav, Amir Yadav, Vinay Kumar Sharma, Ms. Bhawana Gadpandey.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Ujjal Bhuyan, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order dated 08.08.2019 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in O.S.A. No. 157 of 2019.
2. Be it stated that by the judgment and order dated 08.08.2019 (‘impugned judgment’ hereinafter), Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (briefly ‘the High Court’ hereinafter) allowed the appeal of the respondent filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (briefly ‘the 1996 Act’ hereinafter) by setting aside the judgment and order dated 02.01.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in O.P. No. 433 of 2010 which was filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the 1996 Act setting aside the arbitral award dated 05.01.2010.
3. Relevant facts may be briefly noted.
4. Software Technology Parks of India i.e. the respondent following a tender process had awarded a contract to M/s Consolidated Construction Consortium Ltd. i.e. the appellant for construction of office building, incubation centre etc. of the respondent. As per the Letter of Intent dated 09.03.2006 issued by the respondent, the total cost of the project was Rs. 16,48,69,970.00. The scheduled date for completion of construction was 15.01.2007. Appellant could complete the construction only by 30.11.2007. There was thus a delay of about 10 months.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1849Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v. Software Technology P arks of India
4.1. Appellant after handing over the project site to the respondent claimed a sum of Rs. 1,40,12,786.00 including retention money and interest thereon. However, because of the delay in completion, respondent levied and deducted liquidated damages to the tune of Rs. 82,43,499.00 by invoking clause 26 of the contract agreement entered into between the parties. Respondent also made other deductions. After such deductions, balance amount of Rs. 3,70,992.00 was paid to the appellant by the respondent.
4.2. Aggrieved appellant invoked the arbitration clause of the contract agreement and initiated arbitral proceedings challenging deduction of liquidated damages by the respondent and also lodged other claims. Respondent also lodged counter claims.
4.3. Learned arbitrator vide the award dated 10.05.2010 upheld the deduction of liquidated damages by the respondent. That apart, learned arbitrator dismissed the claims and counter claims of the parties. Learned arbitrator held that he did not find any of the claims or counter claims to have been established and, therefore, declared the award as nil against all the claims and counter claims.
5. Appellant filed a petition before the High Court under Section 34 of the 1996 Act to set aside the award which was registered as Original Petition (O.P.) No. 433 of 2010. A learned Single Judge of the High Court vide the judgment and order dated 02.01.2019 held that there was extension of the work period. Appellant had completed the work during the extended period of time. Therefore, deduction of liquidated damages was not justified. Consequently, the arbitral award dated 10.05.2010 was set aside.
6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order dated 02.01.2019, respondent preferred an appeal before the High Court under Section 37 of the 1996 Act which was registered as O.S.A. No. 157 of 2019. A Division Bench of the High Court vide the impugned judgment and order dated 08.08.2019 opined that learned Single Judge was not justified in setting aside the award. The award was set aside purely on assumptions and surmises. Grounds on which the award was set aside were beyond the scope of Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Accordingly, the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 02.01.2019 was set aside, thereby allowing the appeal of the respondent. 1850 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
7. Aggrieved thereby appellant had filed the related special leave petition on which notice was issued on 05.02.2021. When the matter was heard on 23.04.2024, leave was granted.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that Division Bench of the High Court was not at all justified in exercising power under Section 37 of the 1996 Act by reversing the decision of the learned Single Judge passed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. He submits that scope of interference under Section 37 is extremely limited and, therefore, the Division Bench committed a manifest error in setting aside the order passed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. In the process, the Division Bench committed a further error by restoring the award which had upheld deduction of liquidated damages by the respondent.
8.1. Learned Single Judge had rightly exercised power within the broad parameters of Section 34 of the 1996 Act while setting aside the award in question. It is the Division Bench which acted like an appellate court beyond the scope of Section 37 of the 1996 Act while setting aside the order passed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act and restoring the award.
8.2. Learned counsel submits that the respondent had extended the time for completion of the contractual work. Appellant had completed the construction within the extended period. Therefore, there was no delay in the contractual performance. Extension of time and levy of liquidated damages cannot go hand-in-hand. In the circumstances, respondent was not justified in deducting liquidated damages from the contractual dues of the appellant.
8.3. He submits that the instant contract between the appellant and the respondent was a contract relating to construction. In such a contract, time is never of the essence. Such a contract is governed by the principles laid down in Sections 55, 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In any view of the matter, the employer would be entitled to liquidated damages to compensate for the delay provided the delay had caused loss or damage to the employer. No such deduction can be made if the delay does not cause any loss or damage.
8.4. Division Bench had ignored the letter dated 26.09.2008 issued by the respondent to the appellant extending the time to complete the contract upto 30.11.2007. This letter of extension was written [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1851Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v. Software Technology P arks of India pursuant to the application of the appellant dated 14.12.2007 seeking such extension. Thus, appellant had completed the work within the extended time granted by the respondent. Therefore, there was no delay in executing the contract. Further, no loss ensued to the respondent which would justify any deduction on account of liquidated damages.
8.5. That being the position, there was no justification for invoking clause 26 of the contract agreement by the respondent.
8.6. Learned counsel submits that learned Single Judge had rightly noted that appellant could not complete the contract work within the initial time frame because of reasons which were beyond its control. When the respondent had extended the time frame, it was obvious that the delay could not be attributed to the appellant. Extension of time to complete the contract does not imply a delay in execution. No loss was suffered by the respondent.
8.7. Learned counsel submits that when the respondent recognized the difficulties faced by the appellant in executing the contract it extended the time limit for completion of the contract till 30.06.2007. When the appellant was still unable to complete the contract by 30.06.2007, respondent had allowed the appellant to carry on with the work and to complete the contract by 30.11.2007 which was accepted by the respondent, of course, reserving its right to levy liquidated damages. Learned counsel further submits that on the one hand respondent had allowed the appellant extended time to complete the construction work, but on the other hand levied liquidated damages on the appellant by invoking clause 26 of the contract agreement. However, no advance notice was issued to the appellant indicating any intention on the part of the respondent to levy liquidated damages.
8.8. Lastly, learned counsel submits that in any view of the matter, the impugned order is wholly unsustainable in law as well as on facts and, is, thus liable to be appropriately interfered with.
9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submits that liquidated damages were rightly levied by the respondent. Such liquidated damages are in conformity with Section 55 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (briefly ‘the Contract Act’ hereinafter). Respondent was presented with such a situation by the appellant that it had no 1852 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports other option but to grant extension of time on account of appellant’s admitted inability to complete the work within the stipulated time. In the review meeting held on 18.12.2006, just twenty eight days before the stipulated date for completion of the work i.e. 15.01.2007, appellant expressed its inability to complete the work within the stipulated date. Respondent was left with no option other than to fix a revised date for completion of the work and grant extension of time.
9.1. Pursuant to the review meeting dated 18.12.2006, respondent vide letter dated 12.01.2007 had granted the first extension of time for completion of the contract work upto 28.02.2007. However, appellant failed to complete the work within this extended period of time. As a result, respondent was compelled to grant further extensions of time to the appellant upto 30.06.2007 in order to have the contract work completed. This was because of appellant’s continued failure to meet even the revised timelines despite repeated requests and warnings from the respondent and its architect.
9.2. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that in the review meeting held on 18.12.2006, appellant was unequivocally forewarned that grant of extension of time for completion of the contract work would be without prejudice to the right of the respondent to recover liquidated damages. Each time extension was granted it was made clear to the appellant that such extension of time was without prejudice to the right of the respondent to recover liquidated damages. Therefore, appellant had full prior notice of the respondent’s intention to levy liquidated damages. In the circumstances, it is not open to the appellant to now contend that the respondent is not entitled to recover liquidated damages on the ground that time for performance of the contract was extended.
9.3. Learned counsel has refuted the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that time was not the essence of the contract. On the contrary, he asserts that time was very much of essence for performance of the contract. Because of admitted inability of the appellant to complete the contract work within time, respondent was compelled to grant multiple extensions of time but each time, appellant was forewarned that such extension of time was without prejudice to the right of the respondent to recover liquidated damages.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1853Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v. Software Technology P arks of India
9.4. Learned counsel has also denied the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that respondent could not furnish or show any loss or damage suffered by it because of the delay in execution of the contract. He submits that the arbitral tribunal had minutely examined this aspect of the matter and after considering the evidence on record rejected such contention of the appellant. Arbitral tribunal held that liquidated damages were validly deducted; the quantum was fair and reasonable.
9.5. Learned counsel for the respondent, therefore, submits that the appellate court i.e. Division Bench of the High Court had rightly set aside the order of the learned Single Judge thereby restoring the award. Learned Single Judge had set aside the award in complete disregard to Section 34 of the 1996 Act. He submits that there is no merit in the appeal. Consequently, the appeal should be dismissed.
10. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have received the due consideration of the Court.
11. Let us first deal with the award. In this case, the arbitral tribunal comprised of a sole arbitrator Shri K. Srinivasan. He was appointed as the arbitrator on 05.01.2009. In the arbitral proceedings, as many as five claims were made on behalf of the appellant. On the other hand, the respondent made three counter claims. In so far the appellant is concerned, the major claim was relating to refund of Rs. 82,43,499.00 deducted by the respondent as liquidated damages. This claim was framed as issue No. 3 by the arbitral tribunal. In so far respondent is concerned, it raised counter claims relating to reimbursement of rent paid by it for the period of delay in completion of the contract work as well as for loss of rent in the new complex due to delayed construction. As alluded to hereinabove, issue No. 3 pertains to claim of the appellant for refund of Rs. 82,43,499.00 deducted by the respondent as liquidated damages i.e. as compensation for the delay in execution of the contract. Both appellant and the respondent had submitted their relied upon documents and advanced their respective contentions. Arbitral tribunal had framed two questions:
(i) Whether the delay had occurred due to default on the part of the claimant(appellant)? and
(ii) Whether the respondent was entitled in terms of the contract to levy liquidated damages for the delay?
1854 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
11.1. After going through the materials on record, arbitral tribunal held that respondent had produced documents to show that the delay in moving to the new premises had caused them direct financial loss in two ways:
(i) in having to continue to pay rent for ten and half months in the old premises; and
(ii) in having lost ten and half months in letting out portions of the new premises on rent.
11.2. Such a loss was on account of the breach of contract by the appellant. Respondent had established that the loss suffered by it indeed occurred due to delay in handing over the new premises. Clause 26 of the contract agreement permitted the respondent to levy liquidated damages. It also provided as to how the quantum of liquidated damages should be arrived at. According to the arbitral tribunal, the quantum was at the rate of 0.5% per week of delay. Delay in this case was more than ten months. Bulk of the delay was for reasons within the control of the appellant. The figure of Rs. 82,43,499.00 was correctly quantified and deducted as liquidated damages by the respondent. Therefore, the arbitral tribunal held that the liquidated damages were legally and contractually valid. It was reasonable compared to the loss occasioned to the respondent due to default by the appellant. Therefore, arbitral tribunal held as under:
In view of all that has been stated above I conclude that recovery of LD was valid contractually and legally. It was levied by a competent authority and the levied amount was fair and reasonable. I therefore award Nil amount against this claim.
11.3. Thereafter, the arbitral tribunal rejected the other claims of the appellant as well as the counter claims of the respondent. Summary of the award dated 10.05.2010 reads as under:
In sum therefore I do not find that any of the claims by the claimant or counter claims by the respondents have been established and the award is NIL against all the claims and counter-claims.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1855Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v. Software Technology P arks of India
12. Clause 26 of the contract agreement deals with liquidated damages. Clause 26 reads thus:
26. Liquidated damages If the contractor fails to complete the work by the date stated in the Appendix or within any extended time under clause 28 hereof the contractor shall pay or allow the employer to deduct the sum named in the Appendix as “Liquidated Damages” for the period during which the said works shall remain incomplete and the employer may deduct such damages from any money due or that may become due to the contractor.
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