M/S Tomorrowland Limited v. Housing and Urban Development Corporation Limited and Another
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 207; [2025] 2 S.C.R. 998
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Surya Kant, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
- Decided
- 13 Feb 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 2531/2025
- Sections
- 34
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 2 S.C.R. 998 : 2025 INSC 207 M/s Tomorrowland Limited v.
Housing and Urban Development Corporation Limited and Another (Civil Appeal No. 2531 of 2025)
13 February 2025 [Surya Kant* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether HUDCO was in breach of its reciprocal contractual obligations under the allotment letter dated 31.10.1994, and whether the appellant was entitled to refund of the forfeited amount in terms of cl.5(vi) of the allotment letter; further, whether Appellant entitled to discretionary relief of interest on refund of forfeited amount u/s.34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
Headnotes† Appellant, highest bidder, allotted land by R1/HUDCO for construction of hotel – Appellant paid first instalment in terms of allotment letter – Dispute arose as Appellant claimed further instalments were due only after HUDCO obtained statutory clearances and executed sub-lease in its favour – Despite lacking perpetual lease, HUDCO insisted on instalments and threatened cancellation – Appellant filed First Suit seeking injunction to defer payments and restrain cancellation of allotment – HUDCO cancelled allotment, forfeited amount, and invited fresh bids, now disclosing perpetual lease was not yet executed – Second Suit filed seeking declaration that cancellation was illegal and for possession – First Suit dismissed as withdrawn unconditionally – R2/Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India impleaded in Second Suit, sought rejection u/Or.VII r.11 CPC for deficient court fee – Trial Court rejected, but High Court upheld objection and held fee payable on market value – Appellant then dropped relief of possession and confined suit to declaration – Civil Court decreed suit holding HUDCO guilty of breach entitling Appellant to declaration on account of concealment and gross misrepresentation of fact – Affirmed by First Appellate Court – High Court allowed second appeal holding suit suffered from * Author [2025] 2 S.C.R. 999M/s Tomorrowland Limited v.
Housing and Urban Development Corporation Limited. & Another fatal defect of not claiming possession as further relief in terms of proviso to s.34 Specific Relief Act – Further noting Appellant’s conduct was inequitable and aimed at prolonging litigation, thus disentitling discretionary relief – Hence, appeal before Supreme Court:
Held: Clause 5(vi) of Allotment Letter imposed mandatory obligation on HUDCO to obtain statutory approvals and to execute requisite documents – Had this not been obligatory, the clause would not have mandated refund in case of failure – There was also breach of clauses requiring execution of sub-lease – Without perpetual lease in its favour, HUDCO could not have executed sub-lease or handed over possession – Perpetual lease was obtained only after cancellation of appellant’s allotment – Failure to execute sub-lease owing to lack of title amounted to breach – HUDCO, being incapable of fulfilling its reciprocal obligations, was not entitled to demand further instalments – HUDCO also failed to secure revised layout plan approvals – Having found HUDCO in breach, Appellant liable to refund as provided for in allotment letter as it is imperative to maintain the sanctity of contractual terms – A commercial document ought not to be interpreted in a manner that defeats the parties’ original intention. [Paras 31-40, 42, 44-47, 60(i)] Appellant was not entitled to interest under the allotment letter – However, interest pendente lite or post-decree may be awarded under s.34 CPC, dehors the contract, as a discretionary relief based on equitable considerations – Ensuring neither undue enrichment nor unfair deprivation – Thus, court examined conduct of Appellant: failure to deposit Rs. 15 crores under a status quo order in First Suit, followed by unconditional withdrawal of the suit with an oblique motive to avoid proceedings before the very Court whose order had not been complied with amounted to forum shopping and abuse of process – In Second Suit, Appellant abandoned relief of possession to evade court fee, casting doubt on its bona fides – Material on record indicated appellant lacked clean hands and sought to prolong litigation to mask financial incapacity – A party seeking equity must come with clean hands – ‘Clean hands’ implies absence of concealment or attempt to secure illegitimate gains – Any contrary conduct disentitles a party from relief – Courts cannot abet inequity; he who seeks equity must do equity – Though as general rule in commercial disputes, interest pendente lite or post-decree is granted to compensate for time value of money that was due but withheld during legal process, present case warranted deviation. [Paras 48-59, 60(ii)] 1000 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Case Law Cited Central Bank of India v. Ravindra & Ors., 2001 INSC 520 : [2001] Supp. 4 SCR 323 : (2002) 1 SCC 367 – relied on.
List of Acts Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
List of Keywords Breach of contract; Refund of forfeited amount; Mandatory clause; Commercial document interpretation; Original intention of parties; Award of interest; Discretionary relief; S.34 CPC; Equity; Clean hands doctrine; Forum shopping.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2531 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 03.06.2016 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in RSA No. 362 of 2014 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Tejinder Singh Dhindhsa, M.C. Dhingra, Sr. Advs., Pawan Sachdeva, Ishan Sachdeva, Gaurav Dhingra, Ms. Niharika Dubey, Shashank Singh, Piyush Kant Roy, K K R Dass.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Mrs. Aishwarya Bhati, A.S.G., Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Adv., Sonal Kumar Singh, Obhirup Ghosh, Nikilesh Ramachandran, Mrs. Suhasini Sen, Saurabh Mishra, Mrs. Vanshaja Shukla, T.S. Sabarish, Ishaan Sharma, Amrish Kumar.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Surya Kant, J.
Leave granted.
2. The instant appeal preferred by M/s Tomorrowland Technologies Exports Limited (formerly M S Shoes East Ltd.) is directed against [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1001M/s Tomorrowland Limited v.
Housing and Urban Development Corporation Limited. & Another the judgment dated 03.06.2016 (Impugned Judgment) passed by the High Court of Delhi (High Court) in RSA No. 362/2014 whereby the concurrent findings returned by the courts below have been set aside. Consequently, the Appellant’s suit seeking declaratory relief has been dismissed for being not maintainable.
3. The fulcrum of the dispute herein lies in respect of the forfeiture of the Appellant’s payments by Respondent No. 1, namely the Housing and Urban Development Corporation Limited (HUDCO), on account of non-performance of contractual obligations by the Appellant. Before adverting to the respective contentions of the parties, we deem it appropriate to briefly narrate the factual background leading to the present appeal.
A. FActuAl BAckground
4. The sequence of events in the instant appeal commenced with the Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India (MUD), i.e., Respondent No. 2 herein, having decided in 1990 to develop an area of 71 acres of land located at Andrew’s Ganj, New Delhi, through Respondent No. 1. Bids were thus invited by Respondent No. 1 for properties at Andrew’s Ganj inter alia offering:
(i) Land, which was to be leased for 99 years, in order to establish a 5-star Hotel, along with an already-built Car Park;
(ii) Nine Guest House blocks, nine Restaurants, and 25 Shops already constructed by Respondent No. 1;
(iii) A Shopping Arcade and;
(iv) A Cultural Centre to be built by the successful bidder(s). We must underscore that the scope of the present appeal is restricted only to Item No. (i) specified hereinabove, i.e. ‘land, which was to be leased for 99 years, in order to establish a 5-star Hotel, along with an already-built Car Park’ (Subject Property). We further clarify that the conclusions drawn in the instant appeal will have no bearing on the ongoing disputes in respect to the other bids.
5. Reverting to the facts, the Appellant seems to have emerged as the highest bidder for the Subject Property after the conclusion of the bidding process. As a result, Respondent No. 1 issued the allotment letter dated 31.10.1994 (Allotment Letter), on such terms and conditions as specified therein, including the following: 1002 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
5. “The broad terms and conditions for the allotment are as follows:- The 5-star hotel building shall be constructed within the parameters of the approved overall Urban Design Form after obtaining required approvals from the concerned local authority and the Delhi Urban Arts Commission. The height coverage in basement and such related development controls shall be as per the operative norms of the statutory authorities.
You shall make the payment of premium, i.e., consideration of Rs. 64.10 Cores (Rs. Sixty Four Crores and ten lacs only) for the allotment of the Hotel site and Rs. 14.00 crores for the allotment of car parking space. The payment shall be made in the following manner/stages:
(A) Hotel Site (Rs. 64.10 Crores)
(i) Within 4 weeks of the date of this allotment letter (i.e. before 28.11.94) - 40% (Rs. 25,64,00,000)
(ii) Before the end of one year of the date of this allotment letter (i.e. before 31.10.95) - 30% (Rs 19,23, 00,000)
(iii) Before the end of two years of the date of this allotment letter (i.e. before 31.10.96) - 30% (Rs. 19, 23,00,000)
------------------ Rs. 64,10,00,000 ------------------ (B) Car Parking Space (Rs. 14.00 Crores)
(i) Within four weeks of the date of issue of allotment letter (i.e. before 28.11.94) - 10% (Rs.1,40,00,000)
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1003M/s Tomorrowland Limited v.
Housing and Urban Development Corporation Limited. & Another
(ii) Before the end of one year of the date of issue of the allotment letter (i.e. before 31.10.95) - 40% (Rs. 5,60,00,000)
(iii) Within four weeks of issue of letter by HUDCO intimating that the services were ready for being handing over - 50% (Rs.7,00,00,000)
------------------ Rs. 14,00,00,000 ------------------ The above payments shall be made through demand drafts drawn in favour of HUDCO payable at New Delhi.
(iii) No interest will be charged on payments made before the due dates stated above. In case of default, interest shall be charged @ 16% p.a. for three months if the payment is made after the due date. Additional penal interest @ 3% p.a.
shall also be charged on the interest for three months. Any delay beyond three months would entail cancellation of allotment and/or forfeiture of the total amount deposited to date.
(iv) You will be required to complete the construction of the Hotel Site within three years of the date of handing over possession of the Hotel Site on licence basis for construction of the Hotel building as per terms and conditions contained in the proforma of Agreement to Sub- lease, two copies of which are enclosed with this allotment letter. In the event of non-completion of construction within the stipulated time, HUDCO may consider granting extension if exceptional and unavoidable circumstances have prevented you to complete construction within the stipulated time. The decision of HUDCO regarding the existence of the exceptional and unavoidable circumstances will be final and binding upon you. In case the construction is not completed within the prescribed period or the extended period as decided by HUDCO, HUDCO 1004 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports will have the right to take over the land along with the unfinished building with materials, fixtures, if any, on the site without payment of any compensation to you. Since the underground car parking space will be made available to you in the adjacent building, you may provide underground linkage from the hotel with the parking space. However, cost of such linkages shall be borne by you.
(v) You shall not have any right to sell, transfer, assign or otherwise parting with the possession without the prior permission of Lessor/ HUDCO. You may also at the discretion of HUDCO, be permitted to raise loan only for construction of the building and equipment, to mortgage the premises subject to such terms and conditions including recovery of 50% unearned increase in the value of this land as will be laid down in the lease documents and subject to the first charge of HUDCO for the unpaid cost of land for the hotel as well as other dues payable hereunder.
(vi) Hudco will execute all required documents for obtaining approval of the competent authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
Act, 1976 and also of the Appropriate Authority in terms of Chapter XX C of the Income Tax Act.
If these approvals are not accorded Hudco will refund the amount paid without any interest and you shall not be entitled to claim any compensation for damages.
(vii) You shall pay annual ground rent at the rate of 2-1/2% of the premium for land for the Hotel site land the proportionate cost of land underneath the car parking space from the date of handing over of possession of the Hotel site and the car parking space to you. The ground rent shall be revised periodically in accordance with the terms and conditions of the sub lease deed.
(viii) Initially, the Hotel site will be on a licence under an Agreement to Sub-lease and upon fulfilment of [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1005M/s Tomorrowland Limited v.
Housing and Urban Development Corporation Limited. & Another the terms of the said agreement including payment of all dues, perpetual sub-lease will be executed.
The terms and conditions of the perpetual sub-lease shall be as per the proforma duly approved by the Govt. of India, a copy of which will be sent to you in due course.
(ix) Upon the receipt of the first instalment of the premium both for the Hotel site as well as the car parking space as indicated in para 5(ii)
and also after receipt of approvals as indicated in para 5(vi), the Agreement to Sub-lease will be made available to you for execution for the Hotel site and upon its execution, the possession of Hotel Site will be handed over to you for raising construction.
(x) All costs for the preparation of required documents, stamp duty, registration charges and other levies of any kind whatsoever will have to be borne by you.
Property taxes and other municipal levies shall borne by you from the date of possession of the site(s)”.
[Emphasis supplied]
6. The Appellant duly deposited the first instalment of Rs. 27.04 Crores along with interest at the rate of 16.48% for three months, amounting to Rs. 1,04,81,939, as per Clause 5(A) of the Allotment Letter. In addition, the Appellant also deposited a sum of Rs. 2.5 Lakhs towards the maintenance corpus. As such, the total amount paid by the Appellant was admittedly Rs. 28,11,31,939.
7. Subsequently, a dispute arose between the parties; purportedly on account of the Appellant’s assertion: that in terms of the Allotment Letter, Respondent No. 1 was obligated to execute certain documents after obtaining clearances under the Income Tax Act, 1961 (IT Act) and the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (ULCR Act). Respondent No. 1 was further obligated to execute an ‘agreement to sub-lease’ in favour of the Appellant. The Appellant thus claimed that as per the terms and conditions of allotment, the second and third instalments would have become due in favour of Respondent No. 1, only in the event that the abovementioned documents were duly executed by the latter.
1006 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
8. Thereafter, the Appellant sent letters to Respondent No. 1 requesting compliance with the reciprocal contractual obligations enshrined in the Allotment Letter. That being said, it is imperative to caveat at this juncture that Respondent No. 1 was bereft of a perpetual lease to be executed in its favour by MUD, and as such, was not in a position to execute the ‘agreement to sub-lease’ in favour of the Appellant. Regardless thereto, Respondent No. 1 insisted on payment of the second and third instalments, and further sought to threaten the Appellant that non-compliance with the payment schedule would result in cancellation of the allotment in its favour.
9. At this point, it is also relevant to bring on record that Ansal Properties & Industries Limited (Ansals), who being the successful bidders for the establishment of a Shopping Arcade (as enumerated in Item No.
(iii) of Paragraph 4), were allotted land in this regard as well as access to utilise certain portion of the aforementioned Car Parking, which indubitably would have to be shared with the Appellant. Pertinently, the Ansals also delayed the payment of further instalments on the similar ground that the Car Park was allegedly illegal/unauthorised. Pursuant thereto, the Ansals appear to have been granted an interestfree extension of instalment payments by Respondent No. 1.
10. In these circumstances, the Appellant filed Suit No. 275/1996 before the High Court (First Suit), seeking mandatory injunction against Respondent No. 1 to extend the dates for payment of the second and third instalments until Respondent No. 1 fulfilled its reciprocal obligations. The Appellant further sought a permanent injunction to restrain Respondent No. 1 from cancelling its allotment.
11. The High Court passed a conditional status quo order on 31.01.1996 in the First Suit, in terms whereof, the Appellant was directed to deposit Rs. 15 Crores by 08.04.1996, failing which such an order would stand automatically vacated. It is not in dispute that the Appellant failed to deposit the aforesaid amount even within the extended period. As a result, the status quo order stood vacated.
12. This followed an order by Respondent No. 1 issued on 02.05.1996, whereby the allotment was cancelled and the entire amount of Rs. 28,11,31,939 was forfeited.
13. Respondent No. 1 thereafter invited fresh bids in November, 1996 for the development of the Subject Property, this time disclosing [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1007M/s Tomorrowland Limited v.
Housing and Urban Development Corporation Limited. & Another in the bid that a lease in its favour for the said land was yet to be executed. Additionally, Respondent No. 1 also filed an application in the pending First Suit seeking its dismissal on the ground that the proceedings had become infructuous, owing to the cancellation of the allotment.
14. The Appellant being aggrieved by the cancellation of their allotment filed a fresh suit bearing Suit No. 1/1997 (Second Suit), changing the forum from the High Court to Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (Civil Court). In the Second Suit, the Appellant sought a declaration that the cancellation of allotment by Respondent No. 1 was illegal, null and void. They also consequently sought possession of the Subject Property.
15. Interestingly, the Appellant moved an application before the High Court for the withdrawal of their First Suit, on the plea that the Second Suit had been filed before the Civil Court on the basis of a fresh cause of action. The High Court rejected the aforesaid application on 22.04.1997, citing that there were several factual aversions made by the Appellant. Eventually, the First Suit was dismissed as withdrawn unconditionally, upon the statement made by the Appellant’s counsel before the High Court.
16. In the meantime, Leela Hotels Limited (Leela) emerged as the highest bidder in the fresh bid invited for the Subject Property, followed by allotment. Leela’s allotment, however, was contingent on the outcome of the pending suit filed by the Appellant. It is also relevant to note that the Respondent No. 2/MUD executed the perpetual lease deed in favour of Respondent No. 1 on 04.07.1997.
17. The Appellant, meanwhile, impleaded Respondent No. 2 as one of the defendants in the Second Suit. The Respondent No. 2, in turn, filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), seeking rejection of the plaint based on the assertion that the Appellant had allegedly not paid the requisite court fee. Though the Civil Court rejected that application, the High Court thereafter, on revision, allowed the objection raised by Respondent No. 2, holding that the Appellant was liable to pay court fees based on the market value of the Subject Property.
18. The Appellant, mirroring the characteristics of a chronic defaulter, this time decided to evade the liability of paying the court fee by abandoning the relief of delivery of possession. Resultantly, the 1008 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Appellant restricted the relief in the Second Suit only to a declaration that the cancellation of the allotment by Respondent No. 1 was null and void.
19. The Civil Court eventually decreed the Second Suit vide judgment dated 03.07.2010, inter alia, holding that: (i) Respondent No. 1 was guilty of committing a breach of the terms of allotment; (ii) the Appellant was discriminated against and was denied parity with the Ansals; and (iii) a declaration under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (SR Act) to the effect that the cancellation letter was null, void, and inoperative is warranted on account of the concealment and gross misrepresentation of facts by Respondent No. 1.
20. Respondent No. 1 unsuccessfully laid challenge to the judgment and decree dated 03.07.2010, as the First Appellate Court dismissed the Regular First Appeal vide judgment dated 18.07.2014, reiterating the same grounds.
21. Still aggrieved, Respondent No. 1 preferred a Regular Second Appeal before the High Court, which was allowed vide the Impugned Judgment dated 03.06.2016. Notably, the High Court overturned the concurrent findings of the courts below, and has inter alia observed that the Appellant admittedly did not have sufficient funds and, thus, wanted to prolong the litigation. The High Court further held that: “39. … the suit filed by the Appellant suffered from a fatal defect of not claiming possession as a further relief in terms of proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, and therefore the decree seeking only declaration to the effect that the cancellation letter dated 02.05.1996 was bad in law could not have been passed by the courts below”.
Additionally, the High Court went on to observe that the grant of declaration under Section 34 of the SR Act, being a discretionary relief, cannot be bestowed upon a party who indulges in ‘sharp’ practices. Hence, this appeal.
B. contentions on BehAlF oF the A ppellAnt
22. Shri Tejinder Singh Dhindsa, learned Senior Counsel, representing the Appellant has painstakingly taken us through the voluminous material placed on record. He contended that the High Court has [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1009M/s Tomorrowland Limited v.
Housing and Urban Development Corporation Limited. & Another committed grave error in upsetting the concurrent finding of fact arrived at by the courts below.
23. Shri Dhindsa advanced the following submissions on behalf of the Appellant to challenge the Impugned Judgment:
a) At the time of allotment of the Subject Property, Respondent No. 1 failed to disclose that it had no subsisting lease in its favour to execute the sub-lease in favour of the Appellant. As such, it is a clear case of misrepresentation on the part of Respondent No. 1.
b) After payment of the first instalment by the Appellant, Respondent No. 1 was obligated to execute the ‘agreement to sub-lease’ in favour of the Appellant and further execute documents for obtaining statutory approvals under the ULCR Act and IT Act. However, Respondent No. 1 failed to execute these documents in the absence of a perpetual lease in its favour. There was, thus, no contractual obligation on the Appellant to pay further instalments.
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