Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 267; [2025] 2 S.C.R. 918
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice Satish Chandra Sharma
- Decided
- 24 Feb 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 975/2025
- Sections
- 482, 164, 197, 161, 166A, 166B, 354, 354A, 354B, 354C, 354D, 370
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 2 S.C.R. 918 : 2025 INSC 267 Suneeti Toteja v.
State of U.P. & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 975 of 2025)
25 February 2025 [B.V. Nagarathna* and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether, in light of the facts and circumstances of this case and the position of law apropos to the sanction for prosecution, the High Court ought to have exercised its powers u/s.482 of the CrPC to quash the charge-sheet and the summoning with respect to the appellant herein.
Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.197, 482 – Complainant alleged sexual harassment during her tenure at FSSAI – Enquiry report of ICC found accused-SSG guilty of the charges – SSG challenged the report before CAT – Meanwhile, appellant herein got posted at FSSAI and she was appointed PO of ICC – Before the Tribunal, the appellant filed a counter-affidavit on behalf of respondent nos. 3, 6, 7 (including complainant) defending the enquiry report – However, complainant asserted that she had not authorised the appellant to file affidavit on her behalf – In response, the FSSAI filed a Misc. application and sought amendment in the counter-affidavit since the complainant was willing to defend herself independently – In the interregnum, FIR was already filed by the complainant against the SSG, though appellant was not named in FIR her name surfaced during statement recorded u/s. 164 of CrPC – Complainant alleged that appellant threatened and pressurized her to withdraw case – In charge-sheet appellant was arrayed as accused no.4 – Sanction u/s.197 CrPC was not granted within stipulated time period and it was deemed to be have been received – Special Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance and summons were issued – Appellant sought quashing of charges against her – Her petition was dismissed by the High Court – Correctness:
* Author [2025] 2 S.C.R. 919Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another Held: The counter affidavit reproduces the conclusions and recommendations of the ICC and has therefore sought dismissal of the Original Application filed by SSG – Thus, the said counter affidavit does not reveal any aspersions made by the appellant or the Authority against the complainant, or any averment to defend the actions of the accused-SSG – The counter affidavit has been filed by the appellant in her official capacity as the Director, FSSAI and the Presiding Officer, ICC – The appellant respected the desire of the complainant to represent her case independently and therefore filed Misc. application before the Tribunal, seeking to amend the counter affidavit filed earlier – Thus, there is no criminal intent on the part of the appellant to cheat the complainant or wrongfully represent her in the proceedings before the Tribunal – As far as issue of sanction for prosecution arising in the present case is concerned, it is only to be seen if the accused public servant was acting in the performance of his/ her official duties, and if the answer is in the affirmative, then prior sanction for their prosecution is a condition precedent to the cognizance of the cases against them by the courts – In the instant case, the appellant had filed the counter affidavit and interacted with the complainant in her capacity of a Presiding Officer, ICC – The correctness of the allegations with regard to the conduct of the appellant need not be ascertained herein by this Court but the fact that she was acting in her official duty is sufficient to hold that a prior sanction from the department was in fact necessary before the Magistrate taking cognizance against her – The Magistrate therefore erred in proceeding to take cognizance against the appellant without the sanction for prosecution being received from BIS – Since, BIS has eventually refused to grant sanction for the prosecution of the appellant, the prosecution against the appellant could not have been sustained – The High Court erred in not considering the fact that the sanction for prosecution was not granted by the competent authority u/s. 197 of the CrPC and eventually the sanction was expressly denied by the competent authority with respect to the allegations against the appellant – Consequently, the chargesheet, the summoning order and the consequent steps, if any, taken by the trial court pursuant to the same are liable to be quashed qua the appellant. [Paras 21, 22, 23, 29, 32] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.197 – Prosecution of Judges and public servants – Deemed sanction – In the 920 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports instant case, the charge-sheet stated that the sanction for the prosecution of accused no.4 and others was sought u/s. 197 of the CrPC, but since the sanction was not granted within the stipulated time period, the sanction for prosecution was deemed to have been received – The Special Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the charge-sheet and issued summons – Propriety:
Held: Section 197 of CrPC does not envisage a concept of deemed sanction – The Magistrate was not right in taking cognizance of the offence against the appellant herein without there being a sanction for prosecution granted by the competent authority. [Paras 30, 32] Case Law Cited Gurmeet Kaur v. Devender Gupta, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3761; Amod Kumar Kanth v. Association of Victim of Uphaar Tragedy [2023] 6 SCR 669 : 2023 SCC Online SC 578; Amrik Singh v. The State of PEPSU [1955] 1 SCR 1302 : AIR 1955 SC 309 – relied on. Vineet Narain v. Union of India [1997] Supp. 6 SCR 595 : AIR 1998 SC 889; Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh [2012] 3 SCR 52 : (2012) 3 SCC 64 – referred to.
List of Acts Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013; Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords Sanction for Prosecution; Internal Complaints Committee; Section 197 of CrPC; Public Servant; Cognizance; Issuance of summons; Public servant; Criminal intent; Cognizance; Deemed sanction; Sexual harassment; Enquiry report; Sanction u/s.197 CrPC; Action in performance of official duties; Prior sanction for prosecution. Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
975 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 16.11.2022 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in A482 No. 8057 of 2022 [2025] 2 S.C.R. 921Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Ms. Rebecca John, Ms. Meenakshi Kalra, Ms. Shobhana Takiar, S N Kalra, Ms. Gade Meghana, Ms. Anjali Chaudhary.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Shaurya Sahay, Aditya Kumar, Ruchil Ra, Vikas Bansal, Prashant Bhushan, Ms. Suroor Mandar.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Nagarathna, J.
Leave granted.
2. The present Criminal Appeal arises out of the order dated 16.11.2022 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, in Application u/s 482 No.8057/2022, wherein the High Court has dismissed the petition filed by the appellant herein for quashing of the summoning order dated 12.07.2022 and the chargesheet No.01/2022 dated 02.07.2022.
3. The appellant herein is stated to be an employee of the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS). Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present case are that Dr. Manisha Narayan, the respondent No.2 herein (hereinafter referred to as “complainant”) had filed FIR No.610/2018 dated 30.10.2018 at the Aliganj Police Station, District Lucknow. It was stated in the said FIR that during her tenure with the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (hereinafter “FSSAI” or “authority”) in New Delhi in the capacity of an Associate Director, she was sexually harassed on multiple occasions by Dr. S.S. Ghonkrorkta, the Enforcement Director therein. Being aggrieved, she disclosed the same to her mother who then filed a complaint before the FSSAI for action to be taken under the provisions of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (hereinafter “POSH Act”). An Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) was constituted to investigate the allegations of the complainant and the enquiry was referred to the ICC on 04.12.2014. The enquiry report of the ICC was submitted to 922 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the Chief Executive Officer of FSSAI on 22.06.2015, which found Dr. S.S. Ghonkrorkta to be guilty of the offences charged against him and thereby it was recommended to the Authority to register an FIR against him for offences under Sections 354, 509, 192, 197, 204, 218, 202 and 120B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter “IPC”), apart from taking appropriate disciplinary action against the other officers involved in the misconduct.
4. However, as per the complainant, since the Authority did not take any action against the persons involved in the offence and misconduct, she was compelled to file FIR No.610 of 2018 dated 30.10.2018, in respect of offences punishable under Sections 354, 509, 120B, 192, 197, 204, 218, 202, 468, 471 and 506 of IPC, against Dr. S.S. Ghonkrorkta and Mr. Sunil Kumar Bhadoria. It is pertinent to note that the appellant herein was neither part of the ICC proceedings, nor named in the FIR. Her name surfaced during the statement given by the complainant under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter “CrPC”) on 14.10.2020.
5. Meanwhile, Dr. S.S. Ghonkrorkta challenged the investigation report of the ICC before the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi (hereinafter “the Tribunal” for short) by filing O.A. No.1505 of 2016, and vide order dated 16.09.2016, the Tribunal directed the respondents therein not to act on the report of the ICC. In the said case before the Tribunal, the complainant was arrayed as respondent No. 6 and the FSSAI was represented by its officials who were arrayed as respondent Nos.3 and 7. The appellant was posted on deputation during the period from 27.04.2016 to 25.07.2019 at the FSSAI, New Delhi. On 12.05.2016, the appellant herein was appointed as the Presiding Officer (PO) of the ICC. In her capacity as the PO of the ICC, she filed a short counter affidavit dated 16.01.2017 on behalf of respondent Nos.3, 6 and 7 therein before the Tribunal. In the said affidavit, the appellant largely defended the findings of the enquiry report submitted by the ICC. However, the complainant later asserted that she had not authorized the appellant to file the counter affidavit on her behalf and that the said counter affidavit was filed without her knowledge and consent. In response, the FSSAI, represented by the respondent Nos.3 and 7 therein, filed a Misc. Application No.1658 of 2017 before the Tribunal, seeking the amendment of the counter affidavit filed by them in O.A. No.1505 of 2016, since [2025] 2 S.C.R. 923Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another the complainant was willing to represent herself independently in the case. Subsequently, the appellant was repatriated to her parent Department BIS on 25.07.2019.
6. In the interregnum, the FIR had already been filed by the complainant on 30.10.2018, though it did not name the appellant as an accused person. On 16.06.2020, the statement of the complainant under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (for short “CrPC”) was recorded but the appellant was not named therein as well. Thereafter, on 14.10.2020, the statement of the complainant was recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC and it is here that the allegations against the appellant were brought out. These allegations primarily pertained to the counter affidavit filed by the appellant herein before the Tribunal. It was alleged that the appellant was representing the complainant before the Tribunal without her knowledge and consent and that the appellant had wrongfully submitted the affidavit before Tribunal to the effect that the complainant had authorized the appellant to represent her in those proceedings.
7. It was further alleged by the complainant that she was transferred from Delhi to Chennai during the pendency of the proceedings before the Tribunal, and when she gave a representation to cancel her transfer, the appellant threatened her by saying that if she does not want to go to Chennai, then she can take a study leave and quit the place, or else, she would be harassed. The appellant was also allegedly involved in threatening and pressurising the complainant to withdraw the case.
8. In pursuance of these allegations, the chargesheet No.1 dated 02.07.2022 was filed in the matter and the appellant herein was arrayed as accused No. 4 thereunder. The chargesheet stated that the sanction for the prosecution of accused No.4 and others was sought under Section 197 of the CrPC, but since the sanction was not granted within the stipulated time period, the sanction for prosecution was deemed to have been received and therefore the chargesheet was filed against the accused persons for the offences punishable under Sections 509, 120B, 192, 354A, 506, 202, 218, 204 and 197 of the IPC. The Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow, vide order dated 06.10.2022, took cognizance of the chargesheet and offences stated thereunder and issued summons against the accused persons.
924 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
9. Being aggrieved, the appellant and two other co-accused persons filed a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC before the High Court, seeking quashing of the chargesheet No.1 dated 02.07.2022 and the summoning order dated 06.10.2022 passed by the Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow. However, by the impugned order dated 16.11.2022 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in Application u/s 482 No.8057/2022, the prayer of the appellant for the quashing of the chargesheet and the summoning order was dismissed. The High Court however reserved liberty to the appellant to approach the Magistrate in accordance with law and directed the trial court to release the appellant on bail.
10. It is this order of the High Court which has now been assailed by the appellant before this Court through the present Criminal Appeal.
11. We have heard learned senior counsel Ms. Rebecca John, appearing for the appellant herein; learned counsel appearing for the respondent- State; and learned counsel, Mr. Prashant Bhushan, appearing for complainant.
12. Learned senior counsel for the appellant has submitted that the High Court was not correct in refusing to quash the chargesheet and the summoning order with respect to the appellant, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. It was submitted that the appellant is a government servant who had acted in the course of her official duties and therefore, cognizance could not have been taken against the offences alleged against her in the absence of a valid sanction for prosecution granted by the concerned authority. That the competent authority to grant sanction for prosecution of the appellant herein is the BIS. However, the Investigating Officer failed to send the letter seeking sanction directly to the BIS and had sent it to FSSAI on 02.12.2021, as a result of which the letter was received by the BIS only on 29.07.2022, which was way beyond the stipulated period of four months for granting sanction.
13. The learned senior counsel drew our attention to the letter Ref. No.HRD/7:062545 dated 22.09.2022 sent by BIS to the Additional Chief Secretary, Department of Home, UP Police Division/4, Lucknow. In the said letter, the BIS had prima facie found the appellant to have not been involved in the aforesaid crime, but the BIS sought the copy of the FIR and other relevant documents to take an appropriate decision in the matter of grant of sanction for prosecution with respect [2025] 2 S.C.R. 925Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another to the appellant. It is further submitted that after perusal of the relevant FIR and chargesheet, BIS had sent another letter dated 14.11.2022, wherein BIS found that the appellant was in no way related to the allegations made in the chargesheet and thus it was not a fit case for grant of sanction for prosecution. Therefore, BIS had categorically denied the sanction for prosecution of the appellant in the said case vide its letter dated 14.11.2022.
14. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent-State have filed their counter affidavit, wherein they have defended the action of taking cognizance against the appellant and have sought the dismissal of this criminal appeal. It was contended that the Investigating Officer had sought the sanction for prosecution, but upon not receiving the sanction, the Investigating Officer had sought a legal opinion and on the basis of the same, the officer had proceeded to file the chargesheet against the appellant. Reliance has been placed by the counsel on the judgment of this Court in Vineet Narain vs. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 889 [“Vineet Narain”], to contend that the time limit of three months for grant of sanction for prosecution has to be strictly adhered to and therefore, in light of the fact that no sanction was granted by the competent authority within the stipulated time period, the State was correct in proceeding on the basis of deemed sanction. Therefore, it is submitted that enough material was available on record to proceed against the appellant, and once the cognizance has been taken and the trial has commenced, it is not open for the proceedings to be quashed on the ground of refusal of sanction for prosecution.
15. Learned counsel, Sri Prashant Bhushan, has supported the impugned order and has also sought the dismissal of the present criminal appeal, since the trial court and the High Court have already taken the argument of sanction for prosecution into consideration. It was submitted that the appellant has concealed material facts before this Court, including the fact that the appellant and the other co-accused have filed applications before the trial court for seeking discharge in the matter. That the appellant has annexed only the summoning order of the trial court to give an impression that the trial court had mechanically issued summons to the accused and not applied its mind, but in fact the trial court had also filed a separate detailed order dated 12.07.2022 while issuing process in the matter. It was also submitted that the appellant not only filed an affidavit before the 926 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Tribunal without the knowledge and consent of the complainant, but had also committed perjury by trying to protect the other accused persons of the Authority. That there has been dereliction of duty by the appellant insofar as the appellant in her capacity as the presiding officer of the ICC was duty-bound to keep the complainant informed about the proceedings in the case and to proceed in furtherance of the findings of the ICC in its investigation report.
16. With respect to the contention that the complainant did not name the appellant in the FIR and the statement under Section 161 of the CrPC is concerned, learned counsel has submitted that the police had initially refused to file the FIR against the appellant herein since her name was not mentioned in the ICC report and later during the stage of recording of her statement under Section 161 of the CrPC, the police forced the complainant to restrict her statement to the accused mentioned in the FIR. Thus, it was only later when statement was recorded by the Magistrate under Section 164 of the CrPC that the complainant felt it was safe to explain her stance with respect to the appellant herein.
17. Learned counsel for the complainant has reiterated the argument with respect to deemed sanction upon which the prosecution against the appellant was proceeded with and has submitted that the letter of BIS which expressly refused to grant sanction was issued beyond the stipulated period for granting sanction and therefore it does not amount to a denial of sanction for prosecution. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Subramanian Swamy vs. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 64 [“Subramanian Swamy”], to contend that if no decision is taken by the sanctioning authority, then at the end of the extended time limit, sanction will be deemed to have been granted to the proposal for prosecution. It was further submitted that the issue of sanction may be raised by the appellant either at the stage of cognizance or at any subsequent stage of the trial, so as to contend that since the cognizance has now been taken in the matter, the plea of sanction for prosecution may be taken by the appellant before the trial court when they appear in compliance with the summons or at the stage of discharge. Thus, there is no occasion to examine the issue of sanction for prosecution during the exercise of the powers under Section 482 of the CrPC.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 927Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another
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