Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 149; [2025] 2 S.C.R. 404
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.K. Maheshwari, Justice Sandeep Mehta
- Decided
- 3 Feb 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 8414/2017
- Sections
- 13(1), 34, 162
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:21 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 2 S.C.R. 404 : 2025 INSC 149 Airports Authority of India v.
Pradip Kumar Banerjee (Civil Appeal No. 8414 of 2017)
04 February 2025 [J.K. Maheshwari and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the Division Bench of the High Court was correct in setting aside the order of dismissal of the respondent.
Headnotes† Service law – Dismissal in service – Disciplinary proceedings – Scope of intra-court writ appeal – Respondent, working with the appellant, arrested on allegations of demanding and accepting illegal gratification – Order of conviction – During pendency, the Disciplinary Authority ordered dismissal of the respondent, upheld by the Appellate Court – Writ petition thereagainst, disposed of by the High Court, with direction that if the respondent is acquitted, he could approach the Authority to reconsider the dismissal order – High Court acquitted the respondent – Respondent then filed representation, the Appellate Authority set aside the order of dismissal, however, placed the respondent under deemed suspension – Writ petition thereagainst, seeking direction to restrain the Authority from initiating fresh departmental proceedings and quash the memorandum of charge issued against him, allowed by the Single Judge, and directed to re-instate him – Appellant authority then filed intra-court appeal, which was allowed by the Division Bench – SLP thereagainst also dismissed directing the disciplinary proceedings pending against the respondent be expedited – Disciplinary Authority then accepted the enquiry report and imposed penalty of dismissal which was affirmed by the sub-committee, and thereafter upheld by the Single Judge of the High Court – However, the Division Bench set aside the order – Sustainability:
* Author [2025] 2 S.C.R. 405Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee Held: Not sustainable – Division Bench in the impugned judgment overturned the findings recorded in the earlier round of litigation, despite such judgment having attained finality – Division Bench erred in holding that non-examination of the complainant was fatal to the disciplinary proceedings conducted by the appellant- Authority – Even in a criminal case pertaining to demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, the courts are empowered to record conviction, where the decoy turns hostile, and the prosecution case is based purely on the evidence of the Trap Laying Officer and the trap witness – Representation submitted by the respondent duly adverted to and objectively considered by Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority – In disciplinary proceedings, it is not necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to deal with each and every ground raised by the delinquent officer and detailed reasons are not required in the order imposing punishment – Disciplinary Authority should examine the evidence in the disciplinary proceedings and arrive at a reasoned conclusion that the material placed on record during the course of enquiry establishes the guilt of the delinquent employee on the principle of preponderance of probabilities – Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority precisely did the same – Division Bench also erred in substituting the standard of proof required in a criminal trial vis-a-vis the disciplinary enquiry conducted by the employer – In an intra-court writ appeal, the appellate court must restrain itself and the interference into the judgment passed by the Single Judge is permissible only if the judgment of the Single Judge is perverse or suffers from an error apparent in law – However, Division Bench failed to record any such finding and rather, proceeded to delve into extensive re-appreciation of evidence to overturn the judgment of the Single Judge – Thus, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority fully justified in imposing the penalty of dismissal from service upon the respondent, which was rightly affirmed by the Single Judge of the High Court – Judgment rendered by the Single Judge wellreasoned and unassailable – Division Bench while exercising the intra-court writ appellate jurisdiction clearly erred in interfering with the concurrent findings, thus the impugned judgment set aside. [Paras 27-34, 37-40] 406 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Case Law Cited G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat [2006] Supp. 2 SCR 253 : (2006) 5 SCC 446; Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Narender Singh [2006] 3 SCR 872 : (2006) 4 SCC 265; Bhanuprasad Hariprasad Dave v. State of Gujarat [1969] 1 SCR 22 : 1968 SCC OnLine SC 81; Boloram Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank [2021] 1 SCR 858 : (2021) 3 SCC 806; Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur [1972] 2 SCR 218 : (1972) 4 SCC 618; Management of Narendra & Company Private Limited v. Workmen of Narendra & Company [2016] 1 SCR 597 : (2016) 3 SCC 340 – referred to.
List of Acts Airport Authority of India Employees (CDA) Regulations, 2003. List of Keywords Dismissal; Illegal gratification; Deemed suspension; Memorandum of charge; Enquiry report; Sub-committee; Earlier round of litigation; Disciplinary proceedings; Departmental enquiry; Enquiry officer; Departmental appeal; Dismissal from service; Standard of Proof; Preponderance of probabilities; Rules of evidence; Admissibility of Confessional statements; Intra-court writ appeal; Illegal gratification; Acquittal on benefit of doubt; Acquittal not honorable; Trap Laying Officer; Trap witness.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8414 of 2017 From the Judgment and Order dated 01.03.2012 of the High Court of Calcutta in MAT No. 1311 of 2011 Appearances for Parties K. M. Nataraj, A.S.G., Ms. Neetica Sharma, Ms. Shrinkhla Tiwari, Tavinder Sidhu, M/s. M. V. Kini & Associates, Advs. for the Appellant. Anurag Pandey, Ms. Reena Pandey, Bijan Kumar Ghosh, Advs. for the Respondent.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 407Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Mehta, J.
1. Heard.
2. The instant appeal by special leave preferred by the appellant 1 takes exception to the judgment dated 1st March, 2012 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta 2 in an intra-court writ appeal 3 , whereby the Division Bench allowed the appeal filed by the respondent and set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge.
The learned Single Judge vide order4 dated 29th June, 2011, upheld the punishment of dismissal from service imposed upon the respondent by the Disciplinary Authority and subsequently confirmed by the subcommittee while acting as the Appellate Authority.
Brief Facts:-
3. The respondent, while working with the appellant-Authority as an Assistant Engineer (Civil), was arrested along with a co-employee, who was working as a Junior Engineer in the appellant-Authority, for the offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 5 and Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, on the allegations of demanding and accepting illegal gratification from the representative of a contractor. Pursuant to the aforesaid arrest, both of them were suspended and a CBI Case 6 was registered against them. The learned Special Judge, CBI Court, Alipore 7 , vide order dated 10 th December, 1999, found the respondent guilty for the above-mentioned offences. On the contrary, the co-accused(Junior Engineer) was acquitted by the 1 Hereinafter referred to as the “appellant-Authority”. 2 Hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”.
3 Tender of Mandamus Appeal (MAT) No. 1311 of 2011.
4 Writ Petition No. 9701(W) of 2010.
5 For short “PC Act”.
6 Special Case No. 8 of 1993.
7 For short “CBI Court”.
408 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports CBI Court. Aggrieved by his conviction, the respondent preferred a criminal appeal 8 before the High Court.
4. While the criminal appeal was pending before the High Court, the Disciplinary Authority, vide order dated 13 th July, 2000, dispensed with the enquiry and ordered dismissal of the respondent from service relying on the CBI Court’s order. Aggrieved by his dismissal, the respondent filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority, which came to be rejected. Thereupon, the respondent preferred a writ petition 9 before the High Court challenging the order of dismissal. The same was disposed of by the High Court vide order dated 5 th February, 2001, with a direction that if the respondent is acquitted in the pending criminal appeal, then it would be open for him to make an appropriate representation before the appellant-Authority to reconsider the dismissal order, which would, in turn, be decided in accordance with law.
5. Vide judgment dated 16 th July, 2004, the criminal appeal preferred by the respondent was ultimately allowed by the High Court, and his conviction and sentence was set aside. Based on his acquittal, the respondent filed a representation before the appellant-Authority seeking reinstatement in service, in terms of the order dated 5 th February, 2001 passed by the High Court in W.P. No. 22034(W) of 2000. However, the appellant-Authority rejected the respondent’s representation. Aggrieved, the respondent filed a writ petition 10 , which came to be disposed of by the High Court vide order dated 22 nd December, 2004, directing the Chairman of appellant-Authority to reconsider the grievances of the respondent by granting him an opportunity of hearing.
6. In compliance with the order dated 22 nd December, 2004, the Chairman of the appellant-Authority heard the respondent and vide order dated 24 th March, 2005, directed that a fresh disciplinary proceeding for major penalty of dismissal from service should be initiated against the respondent under the Airport Authority of India Employees (CDA) Regulations, 2003. The Chairman was of the opinion that the High Court had set aside the conviction of the 8 Criminal Appeal No. 393 of 1999.
9 Writ Petition No. 22034(W) of 2000.
10 Writ Petition No. 21324(W) of 2004.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 409Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt and hence, it was not an honourable acquittal. The Chairman, therefore, set aside the respondent’s order of dismissal dated 13 th July, 2000 and placed him under deemed suspension with effect from the said date. Aggrieved, the respondent preferred another writ petition 11 and prayed to set aside the aforesaid order passed by the Chairman and to restrain the appellant-Authority from initiating fresh disciplinary proceedings against him. During the pendency of this writ petition, a memorandum of charge dated 7 th September, 2005 was issued by the Disciplinary Authority proposing to hold an enquiry against the respondent. The High Court allowed the writ petition vide order dated 23 rd February, 2007, whereby it quashed and set aside the order of suspension as well as the memorandum of charge, and directed the appellant- Authority to reinstate the respondent.
7. The appellant-Authority challenged this order by filing an intra-court appeal12 , which was allowed by the Division Bench vide order dated 6th August, 2007, holding that it was imperative for the appellant-Authority to hold a departmental enquiry and, thus, the appellant-Authority was fully justified in issuing a fresh chargesheet against the respondent, since his acquittal was based on the benefit of doubt on account of insufficient evidence rather than being an honourable one.
8. Aggrieved by the order dated 6 th August, 2007, the respondent filed a special leave petition 13 before this Court, which came to be dismissed vide order dated 29 th February, 2008, with a direction that the disciplinary proceedings pending against the respondent be expedited.
9. Subsequently, the Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry and submitted an enquiry report, observing therein that the respondent had shown negligence in the performance of his duties, exhibited a lack of integrity, and acted in a manner unbecoming of an employee of the appellant-Authority. The Enquiry Officer’s report also concluded that the respondent had demanded a bribe of Rs.6000/- from the contractor who paid Rs. 3000/- as the first instalment, and the remaining sum of Rs. 3000/- as the second instalment.
11 Writ Petition No. 8256(W) of 2005.
12 Tender of Mandamus Appeal No. 1840 of 2007.
13 Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 496 of 2008.
410 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
10. The Disciplinary Authority accepted the enquiry report and imposed a major penalty of dismissal from service on the respondent. Aggrieved, the respondent filed an intra-departmental appeal before the Chairman, which was rejected vide order dated 3 rd August, 2009. In the aforesaid circumstances, the respondent instituted another writ petition 14 , asserting that the Chairman, in his capacity as the Appellate Authority, was not competent to take a decision as against the appellant, as he had also acted as the Disciplinary Authority in the past proceedings. The High Court, vide order dated 26 th October, 2009, allowed the writ petition and issued directions to the appellant- Authority to form a sub-committee from amongst the Board Members to act as the Appellate Authority and decide the appeal preferred by the respondent.
11. Accordingly, in terms of the order dated 26th October, 2009, a subcommittee was constituted which considered the appeal preferred by the respondent and affirmed the decision taken by the Disciplinary Authority concluding that there was no merit in the Departmental Appeal filed by the delinquent employee(respondent herein). Aggrieved by the order of sub-committee, the respondent filed a writ petition 15 before the High Court, which came to be dismissed by learned Single Judge vide order dated 29 th June, 2011. Aggrieved, the respondent preferred an intra-court writ appeal 16 , which was allowed by the Division Bench vide judgment dated 1st March, 2012 which is subjected to challenge by the appellant-Authority in this appeal by special leave.
12. While entertaining the SLP, this Court had granted a stay on the impugned judgment of the High Court vide order dated 16th March, 2012. Submission on behalf of the appellant-Authority:-
13. Shri KM Nataraj, learned ASG appearing on behalf of the appellant- Authority, submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court failed to appreciate the law with respect to appreciation of evidence and the standard of proof required for proving the charges against a delinquent employee in a departmental enquiry. He urged that the standard of 14 Writ Petition No. 17503(W) of 2009.
15 Writ Petition No. 9701(W) of 2010.
16 Tender of Mandamus(MAT) Appeal No. 1311 of 2011.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 411Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee proof required to bring home the charge in a disciplinary enquiry is entirely different from that required in a criminal proceeding. In a criminal proceeding, the prosecution is required to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, whereas, in a departmental enquiry, the standard of proof is that of preponderance of probabilities. He further urged that there are no strict rules of evidence that govern the departmental proceedings and thus, a major penalty can be imposed on the delinquent employee merely on a finding recorded on the basis of preponderance of probabilities.
14. Learned counsel urged that in the instant case, the acquittal of the respondent in the criminal appeal 17 decided by the High Court was not an honourable and that of complete exoneration, i.e., one based on the finding of innocence, rather it was based on benefit of doubt and insufficient evidence. The High Court also reiterated the same in its judgment and order dated 6 th August 2007 passed in MAT No. 1840 of 2007, preferred by the appellant-Authority. Further, a Special Leave Petition 18 filed against the said order by the respondent, was also dismissed by this Court vide its order dated 29th February, 2008.
15. Learned counsel contended that the High Court grossly erred and acted in contravention of the limitations governing the exercise of the writ jurisdiction while re-appreciating the evidence and by delving into the evidentiary value of the report of the Enquiry Officer. He submitted that in an intra-court writ appeal, the High Court cannot delve into a detailed re-evaluation of evidence and, more significantly, there must exist an issue of law that calls for interference in the appellate jurisdiction. Once the learned Single Judge while exercising the writ jurisdiction concluded that the Enquiry Officer had conducted the enquiry as per the procedure prescribed by law by granting an opportunity of hearing to the respondent, it was not permissible for the Division Bench exercising the intra-court appellate jurisdiction to disturb or interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge by re-appreciating the facts and evidence.
16. He further submitted that the High Court was wholly unjustified in arriving at the finding of bias against the Disciplinary Authority, when the said Disciplinary Authority did not, in fact, acted as the Appellate 17 Supra note 8.
18 Supra note 13.
412 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Authority in view of the order dated 26th October, 2009 passed by the High Court in the earlier round of litigation. Pursuant to this order, a special sub-committee was constituted to hear the appeal preferred by the respondent, and the appeal was not heard individually by the Chairman of the appellant-Authority who had previously acted as the Disciplinary Authority.
17. He further submitted that the High Court erred in holding that while considering the charges levelled against the respondent, the Enquiry Officer ought to have relied upon the findings of the criminal Court with respect to the evidence of PW-2, i.e., DN Biswas (Trap Laying Officer) and PW-3, i.e., MK Bagchi (Executive Engineer). He urged that there is no legal bar against the Enquiry Officer to arrive at a finding different from that of the criminal Court even though the factual allegations, witnesses and documents in both the proceedings may be common.
18. Learned counsel further urged that the Division Bench fell in grave error in concluding that the proceedings before the Disciplinary Authority were vitiated due to the non-examination of the complainant from whom the respondent accepted the illegal gratification. He submitted that PW-2, i.e., DN Biswas (Trap Laying Officer), was examined before the Enquiry Officer, and his testimony was sufficient to prove the charges of bribery levelled against the respondent.
19. He further contended that the Division Bench relied upon the judgment of G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat19 to hold that the findings recorded in the judgment of the Criminal Appellate Court would be binding on the Disciplinary Authority. The observations in the impugned judgment as referred to by the learned counsel are reproduced hereinbelow: - “Going through the available records and specially scrutinising the enquiry report, we find that the Enquiry Officer mainly relying on the evidence of P.W.2 held the appellant guilty of the charges ignoring the judicial findings of the Criminal Court. The Enquiry Officer furthermore, did not properly appreciate the evidence adduced by P.W.3. It appears from the evidence on record that P.W. 3 instructed the appellant to withhold a sum of Rs. 2000/- from the
19 (2006) 5 SCC 446.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 413Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee first running bill of the Contractor due to slow progress of work. Therefore, it cannot be said that the appellant herein was responsible for non-payment of the bills of the Contractor in time. The conduct of the Contractor should also be taken into consideration specially when we find that the Superior Authority like P.W. 3 was compelled to issue instruction for withholding of the running bill of the said Contractor. In any event, the Enquiry Officer cannot overreach the judicial findings in respect of P.W.2. The Enquiry Officer relied on the evidence of P.W.2 (D. N.
Biswas) for the purpose of holding the appellant guilty of the charges, not remembering that the evidence of P.W. 2 has not been accepted by the Criminal Court. In the case of G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the findings of the Judicial Authority should prevail upon the findings of the Disciplinary Authority on any particular issue. In the instant case, the Enquiry Officer did not adhere to the aforesaid principle as specifically laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of G.M. Tank (supra).”
Learned Counsel submitted that the issue regarding the applicability of the judgment delivered by this Court in G.M. Tank (supra) to the case at hand was no longer res integra because in the earlier round of litigation, the Division Bench had already concluded that G.M. Tank’s case would not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
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