Madhushree Datta v. The State of Karnataka & Anr.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 105; [2025] 2 S.C.R. 187
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra
- Decided
- 23 Jan 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 4884/2024
- Sections
- 504, 509, 511, 482, 173(2), 155(2), 323, 354, 506, 503, 34
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:21 am. Original source ↗
Preview: first 50% of the document.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 187 : 2025 INSC 105 Madhushree Datta v.
The State of Karnataka & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 4884 of 2024)
24 January 2025 [Dipankar Datta* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose as to whether, based on the materials on record, prima facie, ingredients of the offences u/ss.323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 IPC are made out; whether the chargesheet and the related criminal proceedings against the appellants, liable to be quashed; and whether the mere assertion of “filthy language” allegedly used by the appellants in scolding the complainant, sufficient to establish commission of offences u/s.504 and 509 IPC.
Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – ss.323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 – Mere assertion of “filthy language” or harassment, if criminal intimidation or outraging modesty – FIR lodged by the complainant-female employee accusing the company and the appellants of having committed offence punishable u/ss.323, 504, 506, 509, 511 – Filing of chargesheet arraigning the appellants as accused alleging that the appellants physically assaulted the complainant, confiscated the laptop provided by the Company, preventing her from retrieving the data, scolded the complainant in “filthy language”, forcibly terminated her employment, and was removed from the premises of the company by the security personnal who physically harassed and assaulted her – Petition seeking quashing of the chargesheet and the related criminal proceedings against the appellants – High Court dismissed the petition – Sustainability: Held: Not sustainable – On thorough examination the complaint, the FIR, and chargesheet, none of the ingredients of ss.323, 504, 506, and 509 present, even if taken at face value and accepted in their entirety – Complaint bereft of even the basic facts, absolutely necessary for making out an offence – Nowhere alleged that the act of using filthy language and insulting the complainant by the appellants, provoked the complainant to commit breach of public peace or to commit any other offence – Term “filthy language,” when * Author 188 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports examined in isolation, and without any contextual framework or accompanying words, indicating an intent to insult the complainant’s modesty, does not fall within the purview of s.509 – In considering the term “filthy language” objectively, in the overall conspectus of the case, the appellants’ actions do not demonstrate the requisite intent or knowledge that would reasonably lead to the conclusion that their conduct could provoke such a severe emotional response as to constitute an insult to woman’s modesty – In light of the employeremployee relationship between appellants and complainant; existing dispute between them relating to the employment; absence of any references to specific words used, contextual details, or accompanying gestures-whether preceding or succeeding the alleged words-failure to mention the use of any “filthy language” in the complaint; and the fact that this allegation is only found in the chargesheet, serious concerns regarding the claim of insulting modesty of the complainant by the appellants – Complaint also does not specifically attribute any threats or intimidation to the accused – Review of the alleged threat reveals that the complainant is primarily alleging illegal termination, which constitutes a civil dispute, rather than criminal intimidation – Charge u/s.511 also cannot stand – Furthermore, after the complainant filed the complaint, NCR was registered – No cognizable offence was initially believed to have been committed against the complainant – Subsequently, FIR was lodged almost two months after the initial complaint was filed, u/ss.323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 – Only s.509 constitutes a cognizable offence, whereas ss. 323, 504, and 506 are non-cognizable offences – FIR does not contain any allegations that would substantiate charge u/s.509 – Chargesheet is the sole document that alleges the use of “filthy language” by appellants in scolding the complainant – Discrepancies and variations outlined suggest deliberate attempt to reclassify the nature of the proceedings from non-cognizable to cognizable or to transform civil dispute into a criminal matter, potentially aimed at pressurizing the appellants into settling the dispute with the complainant – Allowing the criminal proceedings to proceed against the appellants would amount to abuse of the legal process and result in travesty of justice – Impugned order passed by the High Court set aside. [Paras 17-19, 24, 25, 27-32, 35, 37-45] Case Law Cited Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. [2013] 9 SCR 240 : AIR 2014 SC 2013; Ramkripal v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2007] 4 SCR 125 : (2007) 11 SCC 265; Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [1995] Supp. 4 SCR 237 : (1995) 6 SCC [2025] 2 S.C.R. 189Madhushree Datta v. The State of Karnataka & Anr. 194; Manik Taneja and Another v. State of Karnataka & Anr. [2015] 1 SCR 156 : (2015) 7 SCC 423 – referred to.
List of Acts Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords Mere assertion of “filthy language”; Criminal intimidation; Outraging modesty; Ongoing harassment; Confiscation of laptop containing proprietary intellectual data, codes; Non-Cognizable Report; “Filthy language”; Termination; Breach of public peace; Civil dispute; Criminal matter; Abuse of legal process; Travesty of justice. Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
4884 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 31.07.2019 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRLP Nos. 3961 and 3962 of 2015 With Criminal Appeal No. 4883 of 2024 Appearances for Parties Sidharth Luthra, Sr. Adv., Srijoy Das, Ms. Prerna Mehta, Anmol Kheta, Ritik Gupta, Advs. for the Appellant.
D. L. Chidananda, Dr. J. P. Dhanda, Ms. Raj Rani Dhanda, Dr. Ashok Vasishtha, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Dipankar Datta, J.
The A ppeAl
1. By a common impugned judgment and order dated 31 st July, 2019 1 , a learned Judge of the High Court of Karnataka2 dismissed 1 impugned order 2 High Court 190 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Criminal Petition No. 3961 of 2015 (Badrinarayana Jaganathan vs. State of Karnataka & Anr.) and Criminal Petition No. 3962 of 2015 (Madhushree Datta vs. State of Karnataka & Anr.), both filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 3 , seeking quashing of the chargesheet filed under Section 173(2), Cr. PC and the entire proceedings in Case Crime No. 53073 of 2014, on the file of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore 4 .
2. The accused appellants 5 - Madhushree Datta6 and Badrinarayana Jaganathan 7 - have taken exception to the impugned order by presenting these appeals.
FAcTs
3. The proceedings before the ACMM have, as its genesis, an incident of 25th October, 2013. The second respondent as complainant 8 lodged a complaint dated 26 th October, 2013 with the Sub-Inspector of Police, H.A.L. Police Station, Marathahalli, Bangalore, against M/s Juniper Networks India Private Limited 9 and the appellants. The complainant asserted that she was employed as a Technical System Analyst at the Company, where she was subjected to ongoing harassment by the management. She claimed that she was coerced into resigning under duress, with the threat of immediate termination if she did not comply. Specifically, the complainant alleged that on October 25, 2013, between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., the first accused, who held the position of Human Resources Manager at the Company, demanded that the complainant resign under threat of immediate dismissal. Furthermore, the first accused, allegedly instructed the complainant not to return to work and confiscated her personal belongings, including her laptop, bag, wallet, money, credit cards et cetera. The complainant further asserted that the laptop contained proprietary intellectual property, specifically codes and other work, that she had personally created. In addition, the complainant alleged 3 Cr. PC
4 ACMM
5 appellants 6 first accused 7 second accused 8 complainant 9 Company [2025] 2 S.C.R. 191Madhushree Datta v. The State of Karnataka & Anr. that the management ordered her removal from the premises, with security personnel escorting her out and reportedly engaging in behaviour amounting to physical harassment, assault and threatening with dire consequences.
4. Following the above complaint, a Non-Cognizable Report 10 was registered on 26 th October, 2013. The NCR states that the employees of the Company, namely the appellants, subjected the complainant to both mental and physical harassment by confiscating her laptop, which contained her data. The complainant subsequently filed a formal complaint seeking an inquiry and investigation into the matter, following her forcible termination from employment on October 25, 2013.
5. More than 2 (two) months later, a First Information Report 11 was lodged by the complainant accusing the Company and the appellants of having committed offences punishable under sections 323, 504, 506, 509, 511 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 12 . The FIR states that the Company, along with the first accused, subjected the complainant to both physical and mental torture. They allegedly confiscated the laptop issued to the complainant and forcibly evicted her from the Company.
6. Following the registration of the FIR, an investigation was conducted into the alleged offences under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of the IPC. A chargesheet was filed on 23 rd April 2014, arraigning the appellants as accused. The chargesheet alleges that the appellants physically assaulted the complainant and confiscated the laptop provided by the Company, preventing her from retrieving the data stored on it. Additionally, the appellants were accused of scolding the complainant in “filthy language” and forcibly terminating her employment. Furthermore, with the assistance of security personnel, the appellants are said to have had the complainant removed from the premises of the Company.
7. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants unsuccessfully approached the High Court as noted above.
10 NCR
11 FIR
12 IPC
192 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Impugned Order
8. A perusal of the impugned order reveals that the High Court primarily considered the allegations set forth in the complainant’s complaint and concluded that, prima facie, they meet the necessary elements to constitute the offences attributed to the appellants. The High Court rejected the appellants’ objection regarding the procedure followed by the police in registering FIR No. 823/2013, and observed that the materials on record suggest that the offences alleged against the appellants involve both cognizable and non-cognizable offences. The High Court further held that a mere lapse in the process of investigation, by itself, would not constitute a valid ground for quashing the proceedings. Moreover, the records indicate that the investigating officer had obtained the requisite authorization under Section 155(2) of the Cr. PC prior to registration of the FIR. Additionally, the High Court noted that the alleged offences were committed by employees of the Company, that is, the appellants, and not by the Company itself, without the Company’s consent. Consequently, non-inclusion of the Company as an accused in the chargesheet did not entitle the appellants to seek quashing of the chargesheet.
cOnTenTIOns
9. Mr. Luthra, learned senior counsel for the appellants argued that the High Court erred in failing to exercise its inherent power under Section 482 of the Cr. PC, and to quash the chargesheet filed against the appellants. He contended that the following points warrant consideration by this Court:
A. Firstly, the FIR and the chargesheet filed by the first respondent fail to disclose a prima facie case against the appellants. The chargesheet, according to the appellants, does not disclose any of the essential elements of the offences under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of the IPC even if accepted as true. B. Secondly, the offences alleged in the complaint are of a general nature and do not specify the appellants’ involvement in the commission of the alleged offences. Categorical assertion is that the second accused was not present in the office on the date of the alleged incident and, therefore, no specific role has been attributed to him in relation to the alleged offences. [2025] 2 S.C.R. 193Madhushree Datta v. The State of Karnataka & Anr. C. Thirdly, the issues pertaining to resignation and termination are civil in nature. Criminal proceedings have been initiated by the complainant solely to exert pressure on the Company and the appellants, with the intent of coercing them to settle the matter, and thereby enabling complainant to gain an undue monetary advantage.
D. Fourthly, the allegations levelled in the FIR are so absurd and inherently improbable that no reasonable person could, based on these allegations, conclude that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the appellants.
E. Fifthly, the allegations made in the FIR and reiterated in the chargesheet are inconsistent.
F. Sixthly, initially, a NCR was registered against the appellants, and despite the investigation, no new material has been placed on record to substantiate the commission of a punishable offence under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of the IPC.
G. Seventhly, in criminal proceedings, the appellants cannot be held liable for the actions of a third party. The complainant has alleged that it was the security guard who harassed and assaulted her, threatening her with dire consequences.
H. Eighthly, no medical examination was conducted by the first respondent on the complainant to ascertain any injury resulting from an alleged assault by the appellants, thereby leading to a serious miscarriage of justice.
I. Finally, it was contended that no FIR based on the complaint dated 26 th December, 2013 ought to have been registered on the face of the NCR.
10. Per contra, learned counsel for both sets of respondents supported the High Court’s order dismissing the appellants’ petitions under Section 482 of the Cr. PC. They vehemently refuted the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants and presented the following arguments:
A. Firstly, the allegations made in the complaint, prima facie, disclose the essential ingredients of criminal offences. A plain reading of the complaint, the FIR, and the chargesheet clearly establishes a case against the appellants under Sections 323, 504, 506, and 511 of the IPC.
194 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports B. Secondly, the Company and its employees, namely the appellants, subjected the complainant to harassment and humiliation. They issued life threats, engaged in criminal intimidation, committed physical assault, inflicted mental torture, insulted her, and unlawfully seized her intellectual property, including code, data, and other related materials. Furthermore, during the act of forcibly taking her laptop, she was inappropriately touched and handled, thereby subjecting her to physical harassment.
C. Thirdly, the complainant was coerced into tendering her resignation, and when she protested, force was used to compel her to return the laptop. Additionally, she was physically assaulted and threatened with severe consequences.
cOnsIderATIOn
11. We have heard learned senior counsel/counsel for all the parties at length and examined the materials on record.
12. The points for determination that emerge for decision are:
(i) Whether, based on the materials on record, prima facie, ingredients of the offences under Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of the IPC are made out, even if the allegations are taken at face value and accepted in their entirety?
(ii) Whether the chargesheet and the related criminal proceedings against the appellants, are liable to be quashed?
13. At the outset, we record that none of the two complaints lodged by the complainant - the first on 26 th October, 2013 and the next on 23 rd December, 2013 - does with any degree of clarity and certainty suggest the presence of the second accused at the time of the alleged occurrence in the office premises of the Company. In fact, when this was pointed out to learned counsel for the complainant, he had no answer. Even though it is admitted that the second accused was not present, we are minded to proceed on the premise as if the second accused too was present. What would be the effect of arraigning him as an accused though not present shall, however, be dealt with at a later stage of this judgment.
14. While considering the first point, we need to examine in brief the relevant provisions of the IPC.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 195Madhushree Datta v. The State of Karnataka & Anr. Section 323, iPc
15. To determine what are the ingredients of the offence under Section 323 of the IPC, it is important to read Sections 319, 321 and 323 together.
Continue reading
Sign in and become a member to continue reading this judgment and every other document in the library.
Members read the full text, download where permitted, and keep notes and bookmarks.