Periyasamy v. The State Represented By the Inspector of Police
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 212; [2024] 3 S.C.R. 747
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Hrishikesh Roy, Justice Sanjay Karol
- Decided
- 18 Mar 2024
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 270/2019
- Sections
- 302, 307, 109, 161, 105
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:23 am. Original source ↗
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* Author [2024] 3 S.C.R. 747 : 2024 INSC 212 Periyasamy v.
The State Represented by the Inspector of Police (Criminal Appeal No. 270 of 2019)
18 March 2024 [Hrishikesh Roy and Sanjay Karol,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court justified in affirming the judgment of trial court convicting and sentencing the accused appellant, (A-1), for the offence punishable under sections 302 & 307 of Penal Code, 1860 and accused appellant (A-2) for the offence punishable under sections 302/109 & 307/109 of Penal Code, 1860.
Headnotes Penal Code, 1860 – s. 302 and s.307 – Trial Court convicted and sentenced appellants – Relying on ocular and medical evidence – High Court confirmed the sentence and conviction – Whether the sentence and conviction falls short of standard of beyond reasonable doubt:
Held: Trial court primarily relied on testimonies of PW-1 to PW-3 – PW-1 is an injured witness and a relative of D1 – PW-2 is also an injured witness and a neighbor of D1 – The evidence of an injured witness is considered to be on a higher pedestal than that of a witness simpliciter – PW-2 deposed that were about 50 persons at the scene of the crime – Then, how has the non-examination of independent witness been countenanced by the prosecution is something that escapes, or rather confounds this Court – The evidence of PW-3 appears to be fraught with contradictions – His actions not to be akin to that of a prudent man – When A-1 had allegedly broken a bottle on the head of D1, PW-3 took the injured D1 not to the hospital but to an STD booth located nearby – Why a person would “hold” a person with a grievous head injury near an STD booth and not take him to the hospital – Significant delay in recording statements of PW-1 and PW-2 – Various lapses such as these cumulatively affect the overall sanctity of the prosecution 748 [2024] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports case, making it fall short of the threshold of beyond reasonable doubt – Challenge on the grounds sustained, among others that,
(a) examined private persons were interested witnesses, with inconsistencies amongst them; (b) no independent witnesses were examined; (c) there was a delay in filing the FIR; (d) there were interpolations on record; (e) there were numerous lapses in the investigation; and (f) the medical and scientific evidence on record does not support the prosecution’s version of events. [Paras 31, 33, 36, 39, 41, 47,48] Penal Code, 1860 – s. 302 and s. 307– Role of an investigating officer is that of the backbone of the entire criminal proceeding in respect of the particular offence(s) he is charged with investigating – Faulty Investigation - Examined.
Held: The investigation officer of a case is the charioteer tasked with using the resources and personnel at his disposal to ensure law and order as also that a person who has committed a crime is brought to the book – Nowhere has it come on record as to how the investigating officer (PW-22) reached the bus stand from where A-2 was arrested – who informed the authorities about A-2’s movement by bus – PW-22 made two visits to the scene of the crime and that he also examined several witnesses - how is there a striking lack of independent witnesses to lend credence to the prosecution’s version of events – He also did not conduct any scientific investigation at the spot of crime – The wound certificate for PW-1 and PW-2 was issued by Doctor, who had not been examined in the instant proceedings – Was it that the initial investigation was being managed so as to shield the real assailants, which could have been the complainant party themselves? – Particularly when, as the record reveals, as is so admitted by PW-22 of A-2 being a practicing advocate who has been, (i) pursuing the matters against the officials of the police station (ii) has been lodging complaints against the police officials for inaction; and (iii) had nothing to do with the ownership, management or control of the wine shop – The injured witnesses and the Investigation Officer in their testimony together are not inspiring confidence – The prosecution case stands shaken beyond a point to which no conviction resting thereupon can be said to be just in the eyes of law – appeals are allowed and the convictions accordingly set aside. [Paras 43, 44, 46, 47] [2024] 3 S.C.R. 749Periyasamy v. The State Represented by the Inspector of Police Case Law Cited Raghbir Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana [2008] 15 SCR 1108 : (2008) 16 SCC 33; James Martin v. State of Kerala [2003] Suppl. 6 SCR 910 : (2004) 2 SCC 203; Vidhya Singh v. State of M.P. (1971) 3 SCC 244;
Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. [2010] 1 SCR 642 : (2010) 2 SCC 333; State of Rajasthan v. Kalki [1981] 3 SCR 504 : (1981) 2 SCC 752; Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 369 (3J); Rajesh and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2023] 15 SCR 1 :
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1202 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited Russel on Crime, 11th Edition Volume I.
List of Acts Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords Standard of beyond reasonable doubt; Interested witness; Right of private defence; Independent Witness; Related Witness; Police Investigation; Star prosecution witness; Faulty Investigation; Delay in filing FIR; Delay in Examination of Witness.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.270 of 2019 From the Judgment and Order dated 26.11.2014 of the High Court of Madras at Madurai in CRLA No.240 of 2014 With Criminal Appeal No.271 of 2019 Appearances for Parties S. Arun Prakash, B. Balaji, Vipin Kumar Jai, Mrs. Gurinder Jai, Vipul Jai, Ms. Sanjna Dua, Advs. for the Appellant.
Dr. Joseph Aristotle S., Ms. Shubhi Bhardwaj, Advs. for the Respondent.
750 [2024] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Sanjay Karol J.
1. The present appeals arise from the final judgment and order dated 26th November 2014 passed by the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, in Crl. A. (MD) No. 238 and 240 of 2014, which confirmed the judgment and order dated 31 st July 2014 in Sessions Case No. 109 of 2005 passed by the Sessions Court, Tiruchirapalli, vide which the present appellants, Periyasamy1 and R. Manoharan2 were convicted in the following terms under the Indian Penal Code3 :
S. No Name Crime Punishment Awarded
1. A1 – Periyasamy
IPC – S.302
(2 counts)
Imprisonment for life and Rs.
1,000 fine
IPC – S.307
(2 counts)
Rigorous Imprisonment for seven years and Rs. 1,000 fine
2. A2 - R.
Manoharan
IPC – S.302
r/w S.109 (1 count)
Imprisonment for life and Rs.
1,000 fine
IPC – S.307
r/w S.109 (2 counts)
Rigorous Imprisonment for seven years and Rs. 1,000 fine
2. The incident in question relates to the death of two persons after being stabbed, allegedly by A-1 at the instigation of A-2. The prosecution case emerging from the record, as also set out by the Courts below, is as follows:- 2.1 On 3rd March 2002, Dharmalingam4 had after already having procured liquor in an earlier completed transaction, half an hour later demanded more brandy on credit from the owners and 1 Hereinafter ‘A-1’ 2 Hereinafter ‘A-2’ 3 Hereinafter ‘IPC’ 4 Hereinafter ‘D1’ [2024] 3 S.C.R. 751Periyasamy v. The State Represented by the Inspector of Police workers of Saravana Wine Shop located in Neithalur Colony. A quarrel arose, and a showcase of the shop was smashed, and the bottles stored therein were damaged. In this course of events, it is alleged that D-1 retrieved a knife and stabbed one Thangavel 5 (one of the owners of the shop). A-1, with a knife, caused fatal injuries to D-1. He also stabbed Sakthivel (son of Muthuveeran)6 in his stomach repeatedly. When D-2 intervened to prevent the attack, A-1 stabbed him. While the injured persons were being taken to hospital, on the way, both D-1 and D-2 succumbed to injuries.
2.2 Sakthivel, who was injured in the incident, reported it to A. Rajasekar (PW-20), a Police Inspector at the Hospital. Upon this statement, FIR no. 87/2002 came to be registered. Upon investigation on 1 st July 2004, charges were framed against A-1 and A-2, as indicated in the above table.
Trial Court Findings
3. In order to prove the charges, the prosecution examined 22 witnesses; exhibited 33 documents and nine material objects. To repel the charges, the defence produced a solitary witness and three documents.
4. The Trial Court has relied on ocular and medical evidence to establish the charges against the accused persons. PW-1 and K. Sakthivel, son of Kaathaan7 (PW-2) both deposed that in the quarrel between the deceased and accused persons, though they tried to pacify the situation, A-2 handed a knife to A-1 with which the latter stabbed the deceased persons.
5. The Learned Trial Court found no substance in the challenge put forth by the defence attempting to shake the prosecution’s case. A-1 was held guilty on two counts of Section 302, IPC, i.e., for the murder of D-1 and D-2; A-2 was held guilty on one count only, i.e., for abetting the murder of D-1.
6. The charges of attempt to murder were found to be proven against both A-1 and A-2. It relied on the evidence of PW-1, PW-2, and PW-3 5 Hereinafter ‘D2’ 6 Hereinafter ‘PW-1 7 Hereinafter ‘PW2’ 752 [2024] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports to hold that A-2 instigated A-1 to attack the deceased. The learned Trial Court observed that the injuries sustained by PW-1 and K. Sakthivel (PW-2) were of such a nature that the act of the accused would be termed as an act of attempt to murder.
High Court Findings
7. The High Court, in appeal, was faced with the question of the absence of the name of A-2 in the FIR. Having referred to certain decisions of this Court, it was observed that simply because the name was not mentioned in the FIR, an accused can not be absolved of liability for having committed the offence. The next question considered by the Court with respect to A-2 was his involvement or lack thereof in the occurrence of this offence. The argument on his behalf relies on the fact that PW-1’s statement did not mention him, and neither did Exhs. P-6 and P-11, was considered unworthy, keeping in view the testimonies of injured eyewitnesses PW-1 and PW-2 as also the statement of PW-3 under Section 161 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; it was held that the involvement of A-2 stood proved beyond reasonable doubt.
8. For A-1, three primary arguments were put forth, i.e., Dr. Radhakrishnan8 (PW-17) Doctor at Seahorse Hospital did not give evidence in regard to the surgical procedure undergone by PW- 1; the injuries faced by A-1 were not sufficiently explained by the prosecution; and about the occurrence, the owner of the wine shop stood not examined.
9. It was observed that the genuineness of the statement made by PW-1 to the police could not be doubted as he had told PW-17 that he was a victim of an attack by A-1. Such genuineness stands buttressed by the fact that the document reached the court on the same day.
10. On A-1’s injuries being unexplained, it was observed that the same would not be sufficient to dispel the entire prosecution case. Reference was made to Amar Malla v. State of Tripura9. It was held that since both PW-1 and PW-2 are consistent on facts, including the place of occurrence, as also the same being an admitted fact, 8 Hereinafter ‘PW-17’
9 (2002) 7 SCC 91
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 753Periyasamy v. The State Represented by the Inspector of Police the contention in that regard on behalf of A-1 has to be negatived. Given that the presence of the owner of the shop has nowhere been mentioned, his non-examination cannot be termed fatal to the prosecution case.
11. In such terms, the High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence handed down by the Trial Court as regards A1 and A2.
Submissions
12. The present appeals are a challenge to the judgments of the Trial Court and High Court. We have heard Mr. S Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel, Mr. S. Arun Prakash for A-1, and Mr. Vipin Jai for A-2. Dr. Joseph Aristotle S. was heard for the State.
Contentions on behalf of A-1
13. The primary ground urged on behalf of A-1 was that nearly all witnesses were “interested” in the case’s outcome and, therefore, unreliable; and none of the witnesses examined were independent. Further, it was canvassed that the delay in lodging the FIR stands unexplained, more so when the medical evidence does not speak of PW-1 having undergone surgery. Also, it must be noted that there was no prior animosity or reason for discord. The events as they unfolded were the result of a spur-of-the-moment quarrel in which he also sustained grievous injuries. The right of private defence has also been pleaded as an alternate argument.
Contentions on behalf of A-2
14. It was argued on behalf of A-2 that his presence at the scene of the crime was never established. Four limbs of A-1’s arguments, i.e., delay in lodging the FIR; almost all witnesses qualifying as “interested witnesses”; there being no enmity between the involved persons; and the lack of independent witnesses, were adopted by A-2.
Submissions on behalf of the Respondent
15. The respondent has filed detailed submissions which attempt to discredit as a whole the submissions on behalf of the accused persons. In doing so, the State relied on various judgments from this Court. We have perused the written submissions filed and also examined the cases referred.
754 [2024] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Consideration and Conclusion
16. The question that we are called upon to decide is whether, in the sum total of facts, circumstances, and the law applicable, the convictions handed down to A-1 and A-2 are based on the standard of beyond reasonable doubt having been met and, therefore, are sustainable.
17. It would be apposite for this Court to consider the law on the various facets of the penal laws of the land, involved in this case. The Right of Private Defence
18. A-1 has contended that his actions were covered under the ambit of the right of private defence. The principle is best captured in the following words found in Russel on Crime, 11th Edition Vol.I “… a man is justified in resisting by force anyone who manifestly intends and endeavours by violence or surprise to commit a known felony against either his person, habitation or property. In these cases, he is not obliged to retreat, and may not merely resist the attack where he stands but may indeed pursue his adversary until the danger is ended and if in a conflict between them he happens to kill his attacker, such killing is justifiable”.
19. The right of private defence is not defined under the IPC. Whether under the circumstances of each case, such a right is available or not is determined within the said boundaries only. No test in the abstract can be laid down for determining whether a person legitimately acted in private defence. The law only provides that the person claiming such a right bears the onus10 to prove the legitimacy of the actions done in furtherance thereof and it is not for the Court to presume the presence of such circumstances or the truth in such a plea being taken. (See: Raghbir Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana11.) The burden on the person pleading the right of private defence has been succinctly explained in James Martin v. State of Kerala12. This right has been held to be “very valuable, serving a social purpose” 10 Section 105 Indian Evidence Act 1872 11 [2008] 15 SCR 1108 : (2008) 16 SCC 33 12 [2003] Suppl. 6 SCR 910 : (2004) 2 SCC 203 [2024] 3 S.C.R. 755Periyasamy v. The State Represented by the Inspector of Police and, therefore, it should not be construed narrowly. (See: Vidhya Singh v. State of M.P.13)
20. This Court has summarised the principles in regard to the exercise of right of private defence in Darshan Singh v State of Punjab & Anr.14 as referred to in Sukumaran v State15 "(i) Self-preservation is the basic human instinct and is duly recognised by the criminal jurisprudence of all civilised countries. All free, democratic and civilised countries recognise the right of private defence within certain reasonable limits.
(ii) The right of private defence is available only to one who is suddenly confronted with the necessity of averting an impending danger and not of self-creation.
(iii) A mere reasonable apprehension is enough to put the right of self-defence into operation. In other words, it is not necessary that there should be an actual commission of the offence in order to give rise to the right of private defence. It is enough if the accused apprehended that such an offence is contemplated and it is likely to be committed if the right of private defence is not exercised.
(iv) The right of private defence commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension arises and it is coterminous with the duration of such apprehension.
(v) It is unrealistic to expect a person under assault to modulate his defence step by step with any arithmetical exactitude.
(vi) In private defence the force used by the accused ought not to be wholly disproportionate or much greater than necessary for protection of the person or property.
(vii) It is well settled that even if the accused does not plead self-defence, it is open to consider such a plea if the same arises from the material on record.
13 (1971) 3 SCC 244
14 (2010) 2 SCC 333
15 (2019) 15 SCC 117
756 [2024] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
(viii) The accused need not prove the existence of the right of private defence beyond reasonable doubt.
(ix) The Penal Code confers the right of private defence only when that unlawful or wrongful act is an offence.
(x) A person who is in imminent and reasonable danger of losing his life or limb may in exercise of self-defence inflict any harm even extending to death on his assailant either when the assault is attempted or directly threatened.”
However, this Court will only enter into the question of applicability of the right of private defence if the primary submission of complete acquittal fails, for it has been submitted by Mr. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel that this submission is an alternate to the arguments advanced by Mr. S. Arun Prakash, learned counsel for A-1. Independent and Related or Interested Witnesses
21. It is a well-recognised principle in law that the non-examination of independent witnesses would not be fatal to a case set up by the prosecution. The difference between a witness who is “interested” and one who is “related” stand explained by a Bench of three learned Judges in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki16 “7. …“Related” is not equivalent to “interested”. A witness may be called “interested” only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. A witness who is a natural one and is the only possible eyewitness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be “interested.”
We may refer to the observation in Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab17 as under to appreciate the evidentiary value of such testimonies: – “...Moreover, it is not the law that the evidence of an interested witness should be equated with that of a tainted evidence or that of an approver so as to require corroboration as a matter of necessity. The evidence of 16 [1981] 3 SCR 504 : (1981) 2 SCC 752
17 (1976) 4 SCC 369 (3J)
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 757Periyasamy v. The State Represented by the Inspector of Police an interested witness does not suffer from any infirmity as such, but the courts require as a rule of prudence, not as a rule of law, that the evidence of such witnesses should be scrutinised with a little care. Once that approach is made and the court is satisfied that the evidence of interested witnesses have a ring of truth such evidence could be relied upon even without corroboration. Indeed there may be circumstances where only interested evidence may be available and no other, e.g. when an occurrence takes place at midnight in the house when the only witnesses who could see the occurrence may be the family members. In such cases it would not be proper to insist that the evidence of the family members should be disbelieved merely because of their interestedness…”
In other words, if witnesses examined are found to be ‘interested’ then, the examination of independent witnesses would assume importance.
Faulty Police Investigation
22. Recently, this Court in Rajesh and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (3-Judge Bench)18, while setting aside the conviction of the three Appellants therein, remarked:
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