North Delhi Municipal Corporation v. M/S S.A. Builders Ltd.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 988; [2024] 12 S.C.R. 1581
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
- Decided
- 17 Dec 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 1878/2024
- Sections
- 31, 33(1), 33, 31(7), 20, 36, 34, 37, 32, 33(2)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:24 am. Original source ↗
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[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1581 : 2024 INSC 988 North Delhi Municipal Corporation v.
M/s S.A. Builders Ltd.
(Civil Appeal No. 1878 of 2024)
17 December 2024 [Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the Arbitrator had become functus officio after passing of the award dated 16.12.1997 and had no jurisdiction to issue the clarification dated 15.03.2005.
Headnotes† Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.31 and s.33(1)
(a) – Appellant contended that the Arbitrator had become functus officio and therefore lacked jurisdiction to issue the clarification:
Held: The interpretation given to Section 33(1) of the 1996 Act and on a cumulative assessment of the attendant facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that the clarification sought for and issued by the Arbitrator would be covered by the expression unless another period of time has been agreed upon by the parties appearing in Section 33 (1) of the 1996 Act – This is a case where court had permitted the respondent to seek clarification from the Arbitrator beyond the initial period of 30 days whereafter the appellant fully participated in the clarificatory proceeding – Therefore, the present case would be covered by the above expression – In the circumstances, contention of the appellant that the Arbitrator had become functus officio and therefore lacked jurisdiction to issue the clarification cannot be accepted and is thus rejected – That apart, it is not the case of the appellant that the interest portion is covered by the contract agreement between the parties – In the absence thereof, Section 31(7)(a) as well as Section 31(7)(b) of the 1996 Act would have their full effect – The sum awarded would mean the principal amount plus the interest awarded from the date of cause of action upto the date of the award – Thereafter, as per Section 31(7)(b) of the 1996 Act, the sum (principal plus interest) would carry interest * Author 1582 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports @ 18% from the date of the award to the date of payment – This would be consistent with the law laid down by this Court in M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. [Paras 59, 60] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.33(1) – Correction and interpretation of award; additional award:
Held: As per sub-Section (1), within 30 days from the date of receipt of the arbitral award, a party with notice to the other party, may request the arbitral tribunal to correct any computation errors, any clerical or typographical errors or any other errors of a similar nature occurring in the award – Further, if the parties agree, a party with notice to the other party, may request the arbitral tribunal to give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the award – The period of 30 days contemplated under sub-Section (1) may stand extended to another period of time if agreed upon by the parties – Therefore, ordinarily the time limit for correction of errors or for interpretation of a specific point or part of the award is 30 days from the date of receipt of the arbitral award – However, the limitation of 30 days can be waived for another period of time, if agreed upon by the parties – Question for consideration is what would be the contours of the expression unless another period of time has been agreed upon by the parties, as appearing in sub- Section (1) of Section 33. [Para 45.1] Case Law Cited M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. Governor, State of Orissa [2014] 14 SCR 1029 : (2015) 2 SCC 189 – relied on.
State of Haryana v. S.L. Arora [2010] 2 SCR 297 : (2010) 3 SCC 690; Gyan Prakash Arya v. Titan Industries Ltd. [2021] 11 SCR 1 : (2023) 1 SCC 153; Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd. [2005] Supp. 3 SCR 495 : (2005) 7 SCC 791; Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee [1953] 1 SCR 377 : (1952) 2 SCC 648; Gas Authority of India Limited v. Keti Construction (I) Limited [2007] 6 SCR 439 : (2007) 5 SCC 38; Delhi Airport Metro Express Private Limited v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation [2022] 3 SCR 716 : (2022) 9 SCC 286; UHL Power Company Limited v. State of Himachal Pradesh [2022] 1 SCR 1 : (2022) 4 SCC 116; Delhi Airport Metro Express Private Limited v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation [2022] 3 SCR 716 : (2022) 9 SCC 286; Morgan Securities & Credits (P) Ltd. v. Videocon Industries Ltd. [2022] 9 SCR 819 : (2023) 1 SCC 602 – referred to.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1583North Delhi Municipal Corporation v. M/s. S.A. Builders Ltd. Ircon International Ltd. v. Budhiraja Mining & Construction Ltd., 2007(4) Arb. LR 159 (Delhi) – referred to.
List of Acts Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Arbitration Act, 1940; Interest Act, 1978.
List of Keywords Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Correction of award; Interpretation of award; Arbitral award; Clerical error; Typographical error; Arbitral Tribunal; Functus Officio; Clarification; Clarificatory proceedings; Lack of jurisdiction; Interest portion; Interest awarded; Date of award; Date of payment.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1878 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 01.07.2019 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in EFAOS No. 17 of 2017 Appearances for Parties Ms. Madhavi Divan, Sr. Adv., Amol Chitale, Nirnimesh Dube, Sunil Goel, Ankur S. Kulkarni, Susheel Joseph Cyriac, Ms. Uditha Chakravarthy, Ms. Aiashani Narayan, Ms. Priya S. Bhalerao, Varun Kanwal, M/s. Lex Regis Law Offices, Advs. for the Appellant. C Aryama Sundaram, Sr. Adv., Tarun Gupta, Abhishek Gupta, Ms. Rohini Musa, Zafar Wayat, Raj Sudhakar Yadav, Atul Kumar, Yatinder Chaudhary, Davinder Singh Khurana, Manish Bansal, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Ujjal Bhuyan, J.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. This civil appeal by special leave is directed against the impugned order dated 01.07.2019 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court 1584 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports of Delhi at New Delhi (‘High Court’) disposing of EFA(OS) No. 17/2017 and C.M. No. 20662/2017 (North Delhi Municipal Corporation Vs. M/s. S A Builders Ltd).
3. By the impugned order dated 01.07.2019, the Division Bench held that this Court vide the order dated 12.03.2015 had directed the High Court to decide the issue of interest component payable to the respondent in accordance with the law laid down in M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. Vs. Governor, State of Orissa 1 and not in accordance with the law laid down in State of Haryana Vs. S.L. Arora, 2 declaring that the matter relating to amount payable to the respondent had attained finality and could not be interfered with. The Division Bench set aside that part of the order of the learned Single Judge dated 19.04.2017 passed in E.A. (OS) No. 34/2016 pertaining only to the calculations and permitted both the parties (appellant and respondent) to make submissions before the learned Single Judge restricted to the quantum of the amount payable to the respondent. The appeal and the miscellaneous application were disposed of with the observation that learned Single Judge would decide the amount payable by the appellant to the respondent after hearing both the sides.
4. At the outset, it would be appropriate to advert to the relevant facts having a material bearing on the lis.
Facts
5. Respondent was awarded a contract work relating to construction of approaches to flyover at the level crossing on New Rohtak Road with clover-leaf slip road and service road etc. by the appellant. A contract agreement was entered into between the parties in this regard on 11.11.1983. The work however could not be completed even beyond the stipulated date of completion till March, 1990 and, therefore, the work had to be closed in an incomplete form. The main reason for closing the work was non-availability of site.
5.1. The last payment to the tune of Rs. 4,71,48,122.00 was made to the respondent on 09.02.1988. Thereafter, no payments were
1 (2015) 2 SCC 189
2 (2010) 3 SCC 690
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1585North Delhi Municipal Corporation v. M/s. S.A. Builders Ltd. made to the respondent for the work done upto March, 1990 when the contract was closed. Respondent submitted its final bill which the appellant failed to pay. As a result, dispute arose between the parties.
6. Thereafter, respondent filed an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 before the High Court seeking appointment of an arbitrator to arbitrate the dispute between the parties. High Court appointed Sh. S.P. Rai, Ex-Member(Personnel), Postal Services Board and Additional Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Communications, as the sole Arbitrator. It may be mentioned that on the consent of both the parties, the arbitration proceedings were carried out in terms of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 whereafter award was passed by the sole Arbitrator on 16.12.1997. Learned Arbitrator awarded various sums under different heads out of the 26 claims, while rejecting a few of the claims of the respondent. Counter claim of the appellant was also allowed to a limited extent under three heads. After adjusting the two, an amount of Rs. 1,70,70,720.80 was awarded to the respondent with simple interest @ 18% per annum on the award amount w.e.f. 01.04.1990 upto the date of actual payment except on claim No. 23(b) which related to expenses incurred by the respondent on account of bank guarantee commission, margin money etc. for keeping the bank guarantee alive.
6.1. Thereafter, the sole Arbitrator issued a corrigendum dated 18.12.1997 pointing out certain typographical errors in the award, whereafter it was mentioned that the net amount payable to the respondent would be Rs. 1,70,40,720.80 instead of Rs. 1,70,70,720.80, further clarifying that the above correction would form part of the award dated 16.12.1997.
7. Respondent filed an execution petition being Ex.P. No. 99/1998 under Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (briefly ‘the 1996 Act’ hereinafter) before the Single Bench of the High Court for execution of the arbitral award. Learned Single Judge vide the order dated 26.08.2004 framed the following issue for consideration: Whether post award interest under Section 31(7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would be calculated on the principal sum adjudged or would it be calculated on 1586 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the principal sum plus interest on the principal sum which has accrued from the date of cause of action to date of passing of award, as under the new 1996 Act, award is enforced as a decree of the court.
8. Simultaneously, appellant also filed before the Single Bench a petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act challenging the award dated 16.12.1997. By order dated 08.01.2002, the petition of the appellant under Section 34 of the 1996 Act was dismissed.
9. Appellant then preferred an appeal under Section 37 of the 1996 Act before the Division Bench assailing the order dated 08.01.2002 being FAO(OS) No. 89/2002. The said appeal was, however, dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court by the judgment and order dated 14.03.2002.
10. Being aggrieved by the order dated 14.03.2002, appellant filed a special leave petition before this Court being SLP(C) No. 7474/2002. Though this Court had initially issued notice and granted limited stay qua execution of the award vis-à-vis claim Nos. 22, 25 and 26, the said special leave petition was subsequently dismissed by this Court on 03.02.2010.
11. Reverting back to the execution petition filed by the respondent, learned Single Judge vide the order dated 26.08.2004 after framing the issue as above expressed the view that post-award interest under Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act affects a large volume of litigation before the court. Therefore, in order to avoid proliferation of litigation and unnecessary appeals, learned Single Judge referred the matter to the Division Bench to clarify the position in this regard.
12. When the matter was placed before the Division Bench, respondent sought leave to approach the learned Arbitrator for seeking the clarification as to whether the interest awarded in the award was under Section 31(7)(a) of the 1996 Act or not? Division Bench vide the order dated 03.01.2005 granted such permission to the respondent with the clarification that the permission so granted should not be understood to contain any expression of opinion of the Division Bench about payment of interest under Section 31(7)(a) or Section 31(7)(b) of the 1996 Act.
13. Pursuant thereto, an application was filed by the respondent before the learned Arbitrator seeking clarification in terms of the order dated [2024] 11 S.C.R. 1587North Delhi Municipal Corporation v. M/s. S.A. Builders Ltd. 03.01.2005. It was contended on behalf of the respondent that though under sub-Section (7) of Section 31 of the 1996 Act interest can be awarded, Arbitral Tribunal, however, had not clarified as to whether the said interest was awarded under clause (a) of sub-Section (7) of Section 31 of the 1996 Act or not. Appellant filed objection to such application primarily contending on merit that no such clarification was warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.
14. Learned Arbitrator after hearing the parties issued a clarification on 15.03.2005 vis-à-vis payment of interest. After analysing the provisions of both Section 31(7)(a) and Section 31(7)(b) of the 1996 Act, learned Arbitrator clarified that post-award interest shall be payable on the awarded sum i.e. on the amount of claim awarded plus the interest for the pre-reference period as well as interest pendente lite from the date of the award till it is paid @ 18% per annum.
15. It may be mentioned that against the order of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 03.01.2005 whereby the Division Bench had granted permission to the respondent to approach the Arbitral Tribunal for clarification, appellant had filed special leave petition before this Court being SLP(C) CC No. 5011/2007 and by order dated 09.07.2007, the said special leave petition was dismissed.
16. Against the clarification of the learned Arbitrator dated 15.03.2005, an application was filed by the appellant before the Single Bench being EA(OS) No. 270/2005 in the pending Ex.P. No. 99/1998 for setting aside the said clarification. By the order dated 19.02.2008, learned Single Judge, after referring to Section 32 of the 1996 Act and a decision of the Delhi High Court in Ircon International Ltd. Vs. Budhiraja Mining & Construction Ltd.,3 held that learned Arbitrator had become functus officio and, therefore, had no authority to entertain the application for clarification. After 30 days of the award, learned Arbitrator had no authority to make any change in the award. The earlier order of the learned Arbitrator awarding simple interest @ 18% per annum on the awarded amount from 01.04.1990 till the date of actual payment takes care of the interest part. Learned Single Judge, therefore, set aside the clarification issued by the learned 3 2007(4) Arb. LR 159 (Delhi)
1588 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Arbitrator, declaring that the award dated 16.12.1997 passed earlier and the interest granted thereunder would hold the field and would be payable by the judgment debtor (appellant) to the judgment holder (respondent).
17. According to the appellant, it paid the interest component and submitted before the executing court that the decree stood satisfied. Learned Single Judge vide the order dated 08.10.2010 disposed of the execution petition being Ex.P. No. 99/1998 holding that the decree stood satisfied.
18. Against the order dated 19.02.2008, respondent preferred an appeal before the Division Bench being EFA(OS) No. 16/2008. Division Bench vide the order dated 23.02.2012 referred to the decision of this Court in S.L. Arora (supra) and held that the settled legal position that prevailed was that compound interest under the 1996 Act could not be granted in view of the decision in S.L. Arora (supra). Resultantly, the amount covered by the compound interest was not payable. It was observed that in view of the settled legal position that respondent was not entitled to compound interest as per the decision in S.L. Arora (supra), the appeal had become an academic exercise. Division Bench therefore declined to examine the reasoning of the learned Single Judge while passing the order dated 19.02.2008. The appeal of the appellant was dismissed in the aforesaid manner and not on the basis of the reasons given by the learned Single Judge.
19. Assailing the order dated 23.02.2012 of the Division Bench, respondent preferred SLP(C) No. 18614/2012. This Court passed an order on 13.07.2012 to tag the aforesaid SLP with Civil Appeal No. 3148 of 2012 (M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. Vs. Governor, State of Orissa Thr. Chief Engineer).
20. On leave being granted, SLP(C) No. 18614/2012 came to be registered as Civil Appeal No. 2841 of 2015. Civil Appeal No. 3148 of 2012 (M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. Vs. Governor, State of Orissa) came to be disposed of alongwith Civil Appeal No. 2841 of 2015 (M/s. S.A. Builders Vs. North Delhi Municipal Corporation) and other connected appeals vide the order dated 12.03.2015. This Court referred to its earlier decision in M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra) and held that the decision in S.L. Arora (supra) does not lay down the correct law. Computation of the amount has to be done by the executing court on the basis of the principles stated in [2024] 11 S.C.R. 1589North Delhi Municipal Corporation v. M/s. S.A. Builders Ltd. M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra). In M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra), it has been held that the sum directed to be paid by the award would mean a sum inclusive of the principal amount adjudged and the interest thereon. Therefore, the post-award interest that may be awarded would be on the principal amount as well as on the interest on the principal amount which together would constitute the sum awarded.
21. Civil Appeal No. 2841 of 2015 i.e. the civil appeal of the respondent was allowed by directing that the interest component payable to the respondent shall be computed in accordance with the law laid down in M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra) and not in accordance with S.L. Arora (supra) since S.L. Arora (supra) has been overruled in M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra). Resultantly, the decisions of the Single Bench as affirmed by the Division Bench were set aside; respondent was given liberty to seek execution of the award in terms of M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra).
22. It is stated by the appellant that in the course of an audit, it transpired that it had made excess payment to the respondent due to an error in calculation of interest. Therefore, appellant filed an application being EA(OS) No. 364/2013 in the disposed of execution petition being Ex. P. No. 99/1998 praying for a direction for refund of the excess payment which was quantified at Rs. 1,54,19,281.00 alongwith interest @ 18% from 09.09.2010 till the date of payment. Thereafter, appellant filed another application being EA(OS) No. 25/2015 for amending the earlier application being EA(OS) No. 364/2013. It was stated that the refund claim amount was Rs. 5,45,41,756.00 as on 09.09.2010. In the proceedings held on 10.03.2017, learned Single Judge prima facie held that respondent would be entitled to interest on the pre-award interest. Appellant was directed to verify the calculation of interest and to deposit the said amount before the High Court which would be without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the appellant.
23. Respondent filed a fresh application before the Single Bench being EA(OS) No. 34/2016 claiming a sum of Rs. 9,10,43,399.53 as on 31.12.2015 from the appellant in view of the order of this Court dated 12.03.2015 passed in C.A. No. 2841 of 2015.
24. Appellant also filed an application being EA(OS) No. 166/2017 before the executing court for recall of the direction for deposit of 1590 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the additional interest. Learned Single Judge vide the judgment and order dated 19.04.2017 held that the arbitral award dated 16.12.1997 has to be considered in the light of the decision of this Court in M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra). On the contention of the appellant that the learned Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to issue such clarification as the Arbitral Tribunal had become functus officio, the same was rejected by the learned Single Judge on the ground that such clarification was obtained in terms of the leave granted by the Division Bench; the special leave petition filed by the appellant against the order of the Division Bench was dismissed by this Court; further, the decision of the Single Bench dated 19.02.2008 setting aside the clarification issued by the learned Arbitrator as upheld by the Division Bench was expressly set aside by this Court. Therefore, learned Single Judge held that respondent would be entitled to post-award interest not only on the claims as awarded [except claim No. 23(b)] but also on the pre-award interest. The quantum of preaward interest would be included in the amount awarded and that the post-award interest would run on the said composite amount. Thus, the amount payable by the appellant to the respondent would have to be computed on the said basis. Accordingly, the appellant was directed to verify the calculations and to pay the amount to the respondent within four weeks.
25. The aforesaid judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 19.04.2017 was assailed by the appellant in appeal before the Division Bench being EFA(OS) No.17/2017. Division Bench vide the order dated 26.07.2017 noted that an amount of Rs. 5,14,44,393.00 was outstanding, due to be paid by the appellant to the respondent. Accordingly, without prejudice to the respective rights and contentions of the parties, a direction was issued to the appellant to deposit a sum of Rs. 5,14,44,393.00 before the High Court on or before 06.09.2017 to be released in favour of the respondent, subject to offering of solvent security.
26. In terms of the aforesaid direction, appellant deposited on 04.09.2017 a sum of Rs. 5,14,44,393.00 before the High Court by way of a demand draft dated 30.08.2017.
27. Thereafter, an application was filed before this Court by the appellant for seeking clarification of the order dated 12.03.2015 passed in C.A. No. 2541 of 2015. It was contended therein that the civil appeal of [2024] 11 S.C.R. 1591North Delhi Municipal Corporation v. M/s. S.A. Builders Ltd. the respondent was decided on the principles of law laid down in M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra) but the main issue that learned Arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to entertain the application for clarification and then to pass a clarificatory order was not gone into.
28. However, the aforesaid application being M.A. No. 927 of 2018 was withdrawn by the appellant and was disposed of as such vide the order dated 13.04.2018.
29. Division Bench thereafter passed the impugned order dated 01.07.2019 rejecting the contention of the appellant that the learned Arbitrator had no jurisdiction because by the order dated 12.03.2015, this Court had directed that the High Court would decide the issue of interest component payable to the respondent in accordance with the law laid down in M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra) and not in accordance with S.L. Arora (supra). That apart, such a contention was not available to the appellant at the stage of execution proceeding. The matter had attained finality upto the level of this Court and, thus, cannot be interfered with on merit. Therefore, with the consent of the parties, Division Bench set aside the operative part of the order dated 19.04.2017 pertaining only to the calculations and permitted both the parties to make submissions restricted to the quantum of the amount payable to the respondent. Learned Single Judge was requested to decide the amount payable to the respondent after hearing both the sides.
Pleadings
30. According to the appellant, learned Arbitrator had become functus officio after passing of the award dated 16.12.1997. Therefore, he had no jurisdiction to issue the clarification dated 15.03.2005.
30.1. In the garb of the clarification dated 15.03.2005, learned Arbitrator had substantially modified the award dated 16.12.1997. Appellant’s challenge to the same on the ground that learned Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to issue the clarification since he had become functus officio was upheld by the learned Single Judge vide the order dated 19.02.2008. Challenge to the aforesaid order by the respondent was rejected by the Division Bench vide the order dated 23.02.2012. However, Division Bench did not examine the question of jurisdiction but applied the ratio of S.L. Arora (supra) while dismissing the appeal of 1592 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the respondent though this was the issue before the Division Bench. When the aforesaid order of the Division Bench was questioned before this Court by the respondent in C.A. No. 2841 of 2015, the same was allowed vide the order dated 12.03.2015 relying on the decision of this Court in M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra) which had overruled the earlier decision in S.L. Arora (supra). This Court also did not examine the primary question as to whether the learned Arbitrator had become functus officio while issuing the clarification.
30.2. When the appellant had earlier questioned the award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act and thereafter under Section 37 of the 1996 Act, the clarification dated 15.03.2005 was not in existence. Therefore, appellant could challenge the same only in the execution proceeding. Though the learned Single Judge had upheld the objection of the appellant and had set aside the clarification, Division Bench of the High Court while upholding the decision of the learned Single Judge and this Court while setting aside both the orders of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, did not examine this aspect of the matter.
30.3. It is also contended that learned Arbitrator had terminated the arbitral proceedings vide the award dated 16.12.1997 followed by the corrigendum dated 18.12.1997. No application having been moved for rectification of any clerical or calculation error within 30 days in terms of Section 33 of the 1996 Act and the respondent having not challenged the award under Section 34 of the said Act, learned Arbitrator could not have introduced any correction to the award, that too, in the manner in which it has been done. In the award, he had granted simple interest whereas by way of clarification, the same was changed to compound interest.
30.4. It is settled law that Section 33 is the only provision in the 1996 Act which allows correction of clerical errors. In the garb of clarification or correcting clerical errors, learned Arbitrator introduced substantial change in the award. In any view of the matter, the power under Section 33 of the 1996 Act could not have been exercised by the learned Arbitrator more than 6 years after passing of the award.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1593North Delhi Municipal Corporation v. M/s. S.A. Builders Ltd.
31. Respondent in its counter affidavit has stated that the special leave petition out of which the present civil appeal arises is totally misconceived and is an abuse of the process of law.
31.1. Learned Arbitrator vide the award dated 16.12.1997 had awarded a sum of Rs. 1,70,70,720.80 (corrected to Rs.
1,70,40,720.80) alongwith interest @ 18% per annum in favour of the respondent. In the course of the execution proceeding, the executing court i.e. the learned Single Judge referred the matter to the Division Bench on the question as to whether under Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act, post-award interest would be on the principal sum adjudged or would be on the principal sum plus interest on the principal sum which had accrued from the date of the cause of action to the date of passing of the award. Division Bench permitted the respondent to seek clarification from the learned Arbitrator. This order was challenged by the appellant before this Court by way of a special leave petition. However, the said special leave petition was dismissed. It was, thereafter, that the clarification was issued by the learned Arbitrator. Appellant never challenged the clarified award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act; instead approached the executing court. The executing court i.e. learned Single Judge had erroneously set aside the clarification. Appeal filed by the respondent against such order was dismissed by the Division Bench. When the respondent had approached this Court by filing special leave petition, a three-Judge Bench of this Court had already decided the issue in M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra). In the said decision, this Court held that an arbitrator has the power to grant postaward interest under Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act on the sum comprising of the principal plus interest on the principal which has accrued from the date of cause of action to the date of passing of the award. Leave was granted whereafter the civil appeal of the respondent was allowed by this Court. Following the law laid down in M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra), the orders of Single Bench and Division Bench were set aside. Liberty was granted to the respondent to seek execution as per the law in M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra).
31.2. In the above context, it is contended on behalf of the respondent that the clarification issued by the learned Arbitrator stood affirmed by this Court. Therefore, post the decision of this 1594 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Court, it is not open to the appellant to again question the clarification on the ground that learned Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to issue such clarification.
31.3. Notwithstanding the same, appellant had filed M.A. No. 927/2018 before this Court seeking clarification of the order dated 12.03.2015 passed in the disposed of civil appeal which was decided in favour of the respondent. Same grounds qua lack of jurisdiction on the part of the learned Arbitrator were raised in the miscellaneous application as are being raised now. The miscellaneous application was extensively argued before this Court. It was orally observed by this Court during the hearing that the clarification was in consonance with the law laid down by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra) and was on the verge of dismissing the miscellaneous application. It was at that stage that learned counsel for the appellant sought leave of this Court to withdraw the miscellaneous application and accordingly, the same was disposed of as withdrawn. However, no liberty was granted to the appellant to reagitate the said issue again in any other proceeding. That being the position, appellant is estopped from raking up the said issue again before this Court.
31.4. It is contended that learned Arbitrator was well within his powers under Section 33 of the 1996 Act to issue the clarification which has now attained finality.
31.5. In that view of the matter, the civil appeal being devoid of any merit should be dismissed.
Submissions
32. Ms. Madhavi Divan, learned senior counsel for the appellant, at the outset, submitted that the clarification of the learned Arbitrator dated 15.03.2005 is a nullity in the eyes of law. Referring to the final award dated 16.12.1997, learned senior counsel submits that learned Arbitrator had awarded simple interest @ 18% per annum from the date of the cause of action i.e. 01.04.1990 till the date of actual payment which includes the post-award period as well. She submits that since the award provided for post-award interest, provisions of Section 31(7)(b) of the 1996 Act would not come into play. [2024] 11 S.C.R. 1595North Delhi Municipal Corporation v. M/s. S.A. Builders Ltd.
32.1. This position is clear and unambiguous. Notwithstanding the same, after a period of about 8 years, respondent, at the stage of execution proceeding, made a request before the Division Bench of the High Court for clarification from the learned Arbitrator as to whether the interest was awarded under Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act or not. Without expressing any opinion on the said issue, Division Bench vide the order dated 03.01.2005 permitted the respondent to approach the learned Arbitrator for clarification. Though this decision of the Division Bench was challenged before this Court by the appellant by way of special leave petition, the same was dismissed.
32.2. Learned senior counsel submits that the clarification sought for by the respondent from the learned Arbitrator was that in the award it was not specifically mentioned that interest was granted under sub-Section(7) of Section 31 of the 1996 Act. Highlighting this aspect, learned senior counsel submits that learned Arbitrator was requested only to specifically mention whether the interest was awarded under Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act or not.
32.3. She further submits that in the clarificatory proceedings before the learned Arbitrator, it was specifically urged on behalf of the appellant that the learned Arbitrator had awarded past, pendente lite and future interest in terms of Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act. However, in the garb of issuing a clarification, learned Arbitrator fundamentally altered the award resulting in heavy financial burden on the appellant.
32.4. Therefore, learned Arbitrator had transgressed the scope of clarification sought for by the respondent, much beyond the scope of Section 33(1)(a) of the 1996 Act.
32.5. Learned senior counsel in support of her above contention has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Gyan Prakash Arya Vs. Titan Industries Ltd.,4 more particularly on paragraph 13 thereof.
32.6. Ms. Divan vehemently argued that under the 1996 Act the arbitration proceedings came to be terminated upon making
4 (2023) 1 SCC 153
1596 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports of the award under Section 32 thereof. Any fresh award beyond the four corners of Section 33 of the said Act is barred and would be a nullity. It is a case of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and, therefore, the clarification is non est in the eyes of law. In this connection, she has referred to a decision of this Court in Harshad Chiman Lal Modi Vs. DLF Universal Ltd.,5 more particularly to paragraphs 30 to 33 thereof. Any order passed by a tribunal lacking inherent jurisdiction would be coram non judice. Such an order would be a nullity and is non est. The same can be questioned at any stage i.e. at the stage of execution or even in a collateral proceeding.
32.7. Proceeding further, learned senior counsel submits that this Court never had the opportunity in the earlier proceedings to examine the issue as to whether learned Arbitrator had acted without jurisdiction while issuing the clarification which resulted in modifying the original award. Therefore, the said issue may be examined and the civil appeal should be allowed.
32.8. Finally, learned senior counsel referred to the decision of this Court in M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra) and submits that in that case this Court had clarified the expression ‘the arbitral tribunal may include in the sum, for which the award is made’, occurring in Section 31(7)(a) of the 1996 Act, holding that the sum may include the principal amount and the interest accrued thereon and, therefore, grant of interest on interest or compound interest is permissible under Section 31(7)(b) of the said Act. She asserts that M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra) is not an authority for the proposition that where the arbitrator had exercised his jurisdiction not to grant compound interest, even then such compound interest ought to be granted or is mandated to be granted. On the contrary, M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra) recognises that such interest may be contained in the ‘sum’ or may not be contained in the said ‘sum’. According to her, it would be a complete absurdity if M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra) is interpreted to mean that where interest on interest has not been granted or interest is not contained in the sum, it should be superimposed on an
5 (2005) 7 SCC 791
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1597North Delhi Municipal Corporation v. M/s. S.A. Builders Ltd. existing award. Seen in the above backdrop, the direction of this Court to compute the interest amount, in accordance with the law laid down in M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra), cannot be interpreted to mean that compound interest must be granted where it has not been granted in the first place.
32.9. She, therefore, submits that the impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court is required to be set aside and the entire controversy is required to be given a quietus.
33. Mr. C. Aryama Sundaram, learned senior counsel representing the respondent at the outset submits that the primary issue raised by the appellant in the present proceeding i.e. whether the Arbitrator had become functus officio and thus had no jurisdiction to issue the clarification dated 15.03.2005, was expressly raised by the appellant and decided in favour of the respondent by this Court on three earlier occasions. Firstly, the Division Bench of the High Court vide the order dated 03.01.2005 had permitted the respondent to approach the Arbitral Tribunal for seeking clarification. In the special leave petition filed by the appellant before this Court assailing the aforesaid order of the Division Bench, appellant had specifically challenged not only the power of the High Court to refer the matter to the learned Arbitrator for clarification but also the very jurisdiction of the learned Arbitrator to issue such clarification. The said SLP was dismissed by this Court vide the order dated 09.07.2007. Secondly, the clarification dated 15.03.2005 of the learned Arbitrator was challenged by the appellant by filing objection in the pending execution proceeding. The challenge was made on the ground that the learned Arbitrator had become functus officio and thus had no authority to issue any clarification. Learned Single Judge had set aside the clarification of the learned Arbitrator by accepting the contention of the appellant which order was upheld by the Division Bench. Special leave petition filed by the respondent against the aforesaid order of the Division Bench was allowed by this Court vide the order dated 12.03.2015; judgments of the learned Single Judge as well as of the Division Bench of the High Court whereby the clarification issued by the learned Arbitrator was set aside were reversed by this Court vide the order dated 12.03.2015. Thirdly, appellant had filed a miscellaneous application before this Court seeking clarification of the aforesaid order dated 12.03.2015. In the said application, it was specifically pleaded that the order dated 12.03.2015 only considered the issue of interest: 1598 [2024] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports whether governed by S.L. Arora (supra) or by M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra) and that other issues contained in the order of the learned Single Judge dated 19.02.2008 were not considered by this Court. After arguing the miscellaneous application at considerable length, appellant unconditionally withdrew the same when it was about to be dismissed. Mr. Sundaram submits that when an objection is raised but not pressed, it must be taken to have been impliedly overruled. Therefore, the party that had raised objection earlier would be precluded from raising the same again in view of the bar of res judicata. Thus, appellant is debarred from raising the same issue again and again (in this case for the fourth time).
33.1. Learned senior counsel submits that the principle of constructive res judicata is applicable to execution proceeding as well and in this connection, relies upon a decision of this Court in Mohanlal Goenka Vs. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee. 6
33.2. He also submits that when the respondent had filed application before the learned Arbitrator for clarification on the question of interest upon permission being granted by the Division Bench of the High Court, appellant did not raise any objection before the learned Arbitrator as to its jurisdiction to issue such clarification or that the learned Arbitrator had become functus officio. Referring to the decision of this court in Gas Authority of India Limited Vs. Keti Construction (I) Limited, 7 he submits that if objection as to jurisdiction is not raised before the Arbitral Tribunal, the same cannot be allowed to be raised later in subsequent proceedings.
33.3. Proceeding further, Mr. Sundaram, learned senior counsel submits that after the learned Arbitrator had issued the clarification dated 15.03.2005, no petition was filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Therefore, appellant had consciously waived off its right to challenge the said clarification which has thus become final.
33.4. Referring to the decision of this Court in M/s. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra), learned senior counsel submits that this
6 (1952) 2 SCC 648
7 (2007) 5 SCC 38
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1599North Delhi Municipal Corporation v. M/s. S.A. Builders Ltd. Court in the aforesaid decision has held that the moment the arbitrator awards pendente lite interest under Section 31(7)
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