Prakash Nishad @ Kewat Zinak Nishad v. State of Maharashtra
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 561; [2023] 8 S.C.R. 152
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 3 Judges: Justice Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai, Justice Vikram Nath, Justice 302 and 201, Justice Ipc –concurrently Convicted, Justice Pointing to the Guilt of The
- Decided
- 19 May 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1636/2023
- Sections
- 376, 302, 53A, 27, 53
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:25 am. Original source ↗
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A B C D E F G H 152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 8 S.C.R.[2023] 8 S.C.R. 152 PRAKASH NISHAD @ KEWAT ZINAK NISHAD v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
(Criminal Appeal Nos.1636-1637 of 2023)
MAY 19, 2023
[B. R. GAVAI, VIKRAM NATH AND SANJAY KAROL, JJ.] Evidence – Case of circumstantial evidence – Six year old child was sexually assaulted, killed and thrown her into a ‘nala’ – Appellant was arrested on the basis of suspicion – Charged for having committed offences punishable u/s.376, 377, 302 and 201, IPC –Concurrently convicted, death sentence imposed for the charge u/s.302 and sentenced for other offences – Correctness of – Held: There were yawning gaps in the chain of circumstances rendering it far from being established, pointing to the guilt of the appellant – Several irregularities and illegalities on the part of the agencies examining the case – Charges levied on the appellant not proved – Orders of the courts below set aside – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.376, 377, 302 and 201 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.53A – Criminal Law.
Criminal Law– Whether non-recording of the disclosure statement of the appellant in the language in which it was made and recording it in a language totally unknown to the appellant, contents whereof were also not read over and explained to him, can be said to have caused any prejudice to the cause of justice? – Held: Yes – Appellant did not know how to read and write in Marathi – Perusal of the alleged disclosure statement reveals that it was recorded in Marathi and the Investigating officer not having read over or explained contents thereof to the appellant in his vernacular language i.e Hindi – It was important for the appellant to understand the case of the prosecution against him – There is nothing on record to show that it was not practicable to record evidence of the appellant as well as others, whose vernacular was not Marathi, but Hindi – Statutory safeguards in reference to language not having been complied with caused prejudice to the appellant– Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
A B C D E F G H Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.53A – Non-compliance with – Held:In the present case, none of the witness deposed the fact of medical examination of the appellant as stipulated u/s.53A – No reason was given for having decided that there was no need to comply with the provisions of s.53A– Samples of the blood and semen of the appellant were sent for forensic analysis – However, there is nothing on record to establish as to who took such samples, on what date, on how many occasions and why were they not sent all at once – None of the police officials testified to the formalities of keeping the samples safe and secure being complied with – There is only one document (Ext.79) on record, indicating the appellant to have been medically examined – But even this document does not reveal sample of the body part being drawn – In any event, the doctor who conducted such examination did not testify the correctness of the contents thereof – Also, the document itself is uninspiring confidence having certain interpolations therein – Additionally, the document does not fall true to the statutory requirements imposed u/s.53A – This is a glaring lapse in the investigation of this crime, for a six year-old child was sexually assaulted on both of the private parts – Medical examination of the appellant would have resulted into ascertainment of such assault – Samples when collected are to be sent to the concerned laboratory as soon as possible – Delay in sending the samples is unexplained – “Without any delay” and “chain of custody” aspects which are indispensable to the vitality of such evidence, were not complied with – Thus, in the instant case, the DNA Report cannot be the basis to send appellant to the gallows – Maharashtra Police Manual – Appendix XXIV – Evidence – Criminal Law.
Evidence – Value of DNA evidence – Discussed.
Criminal Law – Crime involving severe punishments such as imprisonment for life or the sentence of death – Role and responsibilities of the investigating authorities, not adhered to – Deprecated.
Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1 The Appellant did not know how to read and write in Marathi. This being the position, this Court has highlighted the importance of the appellant being able to PRAKASH NISHAD @ KEWAT ZINAK NISHAD v. STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA
A B C D E F G H 154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 8 S.C.R.
understand the case of the prosecution against him. Inability to do so, by virtue of a language barrier causes prejudice to the case of the appellant. There is nothing on record to show that it was not practicable to record evidence of the appellant as well as others, whose vernacular was not Marathi, but Hindi. The original testimony, from which the text, tenor and true import of their testimony may be gauged, is not part of the record. Therefore, it is apparent that statutory safeguards in reference to language have not been complied with, causing prejudice to the appellant in terms of Syed Qasim Rizvi. [Para 45][168-F-H; 169-A] Syed Qasim Razvi v. State of Hyderabad 1953 SCR 589 – followed.
Siju Kurian v. State of Karnataka 2023 SCC OnLine 429 – distinguished.
1.2 No blood of the appellant was found on any one of the articles recovered by the police. Only stains of semen were found on the nicker (brown) belonging to the prosecutrix and her vaginal swabs. Samples of the blood and semen of the appellant were sent for forensic analysis. Importantly though, there is nothing on record to establish as to who took such samples, on what date, on how many occasions and why were they not sent all at once, none of the police officials have testified to the formalities of keeping the samples safe and secure being complied with. There is only one document (Ext.79) on record, indicating the appellant to have been medically examined. But even this document does not reveal sample of the body part being drawn. In any event, the doctor who conducted such examination, has not stepped into the witness box to testify the correctness of the contents thereof. Also the document itself is uninspiring confidence as this Court notices certain interpolations therein and in a different hand. Additionally, the document does not fall true to the statutory requirements imposed under Section 53A Cr.P.C.Here, a child of the tender age of six was assaulted brutally and killed. The appellant was arrested on suspicion of having committed the crime. The police proceeded in accordance therewith and were supposed to have made discoveries as per the statements made by the appellant in custody, then in what manner can it be said A B C D E F G H that, at the time when such a positive call was required to be made by the authorities, reasonable grounds did not exist for the compliance with Section 53A to be a must? This, in the view of this Court is a glaring lapse in the investigation of this crime, for a six-year-old child was sexually assaulted on both of the private parts of her body. Medical examination of the appellant would have resulted into ascertainment of such assault. In the present case, the delay in sending the samples is unexplained and therefore, the possibility of contamination and the concomitant prospect of diminishment in value cannot be reasonably ruled out. Samples when collected are sent to the concerned laboratory as soon as possible. Chain of custody implies that right from the time of taking of the sample, to the time its role in the investigation and processes subsequent, is complete, each person handling said piece of evidence must duly be acknowledged in the documentation, so as to ensure that the integrity is uncompromised. It is recommended that a document be duly maintained cataloguing the custody. A chain of custody document in other words is a document, “which should include name or initials of the individual collecting the evidence, each person or entity subsequently having custody of it, dated the items were collected or transferred, agency and case number, victim’s or suspect’s name and the brief description of the item.” Indisputably, these “without any delay” and “chain of custody” aspects which are indispensable to the vitality of such evidence, were not complied with. In such a situation, this court cannot hold the DNA Report Ext.85 to be so dependable as to send someone to the gallows on this basis. In the present case, even though, the DNA evidence by way of a report was present, its reliability is not infallible, especially not so in light of the fact that the uncompromised nature of such evidence cannot be established; and other that cogent evidence is absent almost in its entirety. [Paras 52, 54, 56, 58, 61-63 and 66][173-A-B; 174-D-E, F-G; 176- B-G; 179-C-D] Guidelines for collection, storage and transportation of Crime Scene DNA samples For Investigating Officers- Central Forensic Science Laboratory Directorate Of Forensic Sciences Services Ministry Of Home Affairs, Govt. of India – referred to.
PRAKASH NISHAD @ KEWAT ZINAK NISHAD v. STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA
A B C D E F G H 156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 8 S.C.R.
1.3 In the instant case, the reasons why the investigation officers were changed time and again from PW 6 to PW 12 and then to PW 13, is surprising and unexplained. No reason stands given for having decided that there was no need to comply with the provisions of Section 53A, Cr.P.C.; there is unexplained delay in sending the samples collected for analysis; a premises already searched was searched again, the reason for which is not borne from record; lock panchnama is not prepared; no samples of blood and semen of the appellant can be said to have been drawn by any medical or para medical staff; allegedly an additional sample is taken from the appellant more than a month after the arrest; alleged disclosure statement of the appellant was never read over and explained to the appellant in his vernacular language; the appellant was not residing alone at the place alleged to be his residence; and what was the basis of appellant being a suspect at the first instance, remains a mystery; persons who may have shed light on essential aspects- ‘GB’ and ‘MS’ went unexamined etc., such multitudinous lapses have compromised the quest to punish the doer of such a barbaric act in absolute peril. The charges levied on the appellant stand not proved [Paras 77 and 79][180- G-H; 181-A-C] Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 : [1985] 1 SCR 88; Indrajit Das v.
State of Tripura 2023 SCC OnLine SC 201; Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana (2011) 7 SCC 130 :
[2011] 8 SCR 774; Rajendra PrahladraoWasnik v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 12 SCC 460 : [2018] 14 SCR 585; Pattu Rajan v. State of T.N. (2019) 4 SCC 771;
Manoj v. State of M.P. (2023) 2 SCC 353;
Maghavendra Pratap Singh @Pankaj Singh v. State of Chattisgarh 2023 SCC OnLine SC 486 – relied on.
Case Law Reference [1985] 1 SCR 88 relied on para 24 [1953] SCR 589 followed para 44 [2011] 8 SCR 774 relied on para 57 [2018] 14 SCR 585 relied on para 57 A B C D E F G H CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.1636-1637 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.10.2015 in CRLAP No.88 of 2015, CONFC No.4 of 2014 and SC No.407 of 2010 and dated 14.10.2015 in CONFC No.4 of 2014 and CRLAP No.88 of 2015 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay.
B. H. Marlapalle, Sr. Adv., Ms. Pratiksha Basarkar, Rishad Ahmed Chowdhury, Avinish Kumar Saurabh, Ms. Anuja Mishra, Advs. for the Appellant.
Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Bharat Bagla, Ms. Shreya Saxena, Ms. Yamini Singh, Sourav Singh, Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SANJAY KAROL, J.
Leave granted.
2. The following issues arise for consideration in the present appeals :
1) Whether non-recording of a disclosure statement of the appellant in the language in which it is made and recording of the same in a language totally unknown to the appellant, contents whereof are also not read over and explained to him, can be said to have caused any prejudice to the cause of justice?
2) Whether DNA evidence can form the solitary basis in determining the guilt of the appellant?
3) Whether the circumstances as identified and relied on by the prosecution indeed point to the guilt only of the appellant, closing out any and all other possibilities of any other person? The Factual Prism
3. Pursuant to FIR No.109/2010 dated 12.6.2010 registered at P.S. Bhayander (Thane, Maharashtra), the appellant Prakash Nishad @ Kewat Zinak Nishad was charged for having committed an offence punishable under Sections 376, 377, 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’ for short). The Trial Court vide judgment dated PRAKASH NISHAD @ KEWAT ZINAK NISHAD v. STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA
A B C D E F G H 158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 8 S.C.R.
27.11.2014 rendered in Sessions Case No.407/2010, convicted the accused in connection with all the offences and imposed capital punishment for the charge under Section 302 IPC and sentence of imprisonment for other offences. Hereinbelow is a tabular representation of the sentences as imposed by the Trial Court:
4. Such findings of fact and conviction, including that of the death sentence imposed were affirmed by the High Court of Bombay, being the first Court of Appeal in both the proceedings. The reference was also answered in terms of common judgment dated 13-14.10.2015 rendered in Criminal Appeal No.88/2015 and Criminal Confirmation Case No.4/2014.
Hence, the present appeals preferred by the appellant.
5. The courts below concurrently found the prosecution to have established the case beyond reasonable doubt, i.e., the appellant after sexually assaulting a minor girl (aged six years) put her to death. Also, in an attempt to destroy the evidence threw her into a ‘nala’ (drain) and concealed material evidence of crime.
6. At the threshold, we may point out that it is a case of circumstantial evidence, as none has witnessed the crime for which the appellant stands charged for. The prosecution case is primarily based, not on ocular evidence but on the confessional statement of the appellant leading to the recovery of incriminating articles and through scientific analysis establishing his guilt. The sheet-anchor of the case being the DNA analysis report stating the semen of the appellant found on the undergarments of the prosecutrix (nicker) and the vaginal smear slide of the prosecutrix.
A B C D E F G H
7. We now proceed to examine the prosecution case, as has unfurled through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. However, in the service of ease, the 13 prosecution witnesses given in a tabular form, which are categorised as follows:
1) Testimony of the medical examiner, i.e., PW 4 – Dr. Anjali Pimple (Ext.27);
2) Testimonies of the independent witnesses, i.e., PW 1 – Mustakin Mohamad Ismail Shaikh, father (Ext.18), PW 2 – Rehanabano, mother (Ext.20) and PW 3 – Falim Ahmed Ibrahim Shaikh, uncle (Ext.21)(all being the relatives of the prosecutrix);
3) Testimonies of the Investigating Officer, i.e., PW 6 – Sub- Inspector Suresh Ganpat Chillawar, 1st Investigating Officer (Ext.42 ), PW 11 – Ashok Sonar, Head Constable (Ext.56), PW 12 – A.P.I. Sudhir Shantaram, 2nd Investigating Officer (Ext.65) and PW 13 – Deputy Commissioner of Police Deepak Pundalik Devraj, 3rd Investigating Officer (Ext.67); and 4) Testimonies of the witnesses to the recovery of incriminating articles, i.e., PW 5 – Bipin Sohanlal Bafna (Ext.34), PW 7 – Suresh Jagdish Khandelwal (Ext.46), PW 8 – Vishal Navin Chandra Saha (Ext.49), PW 9 – Vijay Sudama Soni (Ext.53) and PW 10 – Ramlakhan Jaiswal (Ext.54), who are panch witnesses.
PRAKASH NISHAD @ KEWAT ZINAK NISHAD v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [SANJAY KAROL, J.] A B C D E F G H 160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 8 S.C.R.
8. The prosecutrix was born from the wedlock of PW 1 and PW 2 and at the time of occurrence of the incident, i.e., on 11.6.2010, she was just 6 years of age. Neither her identity, nor the fact that she died as a result of major ante-mortem injuries, is in dispute.
9. Dr. Anjali Pimple (PW 4), who examined the body of the prosecutrix, has testified to the factum of the post-mortem conducted by her and preparation of medical report (Ext.28) thereof. As a witness on oath, she has deposed that the prosecutrix suffered multiple injuries (15 in total) on her body, including on both of her private parts. Undoubtedly such injuries are severe, serious and grievous in nature. Thus, the prosecution has established the case of homicidal death beyond any doubt.
10. The question which arises for consideration is: as to who committed the dastardly crime? Was it only the appellant or someone else?
11. For ascertaining such fact, we now proceed to examine the prosecution case as set out in different stages, be it investigation or trial.
12. The FIR dated 12.6.2010 (Ext.44), so registered on the complaint of PW 1 (Ext.19 which forms part of Ext.1), records that in the morning of 12th June, 2010 the dead body of the prosecutrix was found floating in the Nala, in close proximity to her house. She had been sexually assaulted and killed by an “unidentified person”, after which the body was thrown into the nala with the objective of destruction of evidence of such assault.
13. Significantly, none is suspected at this stage. The said FIR was recorded by Police Officer - PW 11. The investigation consequent thereto was conducted by three people – PW 6, PW 12, and PW 13.
14. PW 6 (the 1st Investigating Officer) in the presence of Panch Witnesses – PW 9 and PW 10, recovered the body of the prosecutrix A B C D E F G H and sent it for post-mortem, which was conducted by PW 4. This Investigating Officer only conducted the spot search. His role ends here.
15. Thereafter, PW 12 (the 2nd Investigating Officer) based on certain inputs (not disclosed), arrested the appellant from his workplace on 13.6.2010 and searched his house in the presence of two independent witnesses, namely, PW 5 and Piyush Ramesh Kumar Jain (not examined). The search resulted in recovery of certain incriminating articles vide memo Ext.35. The appellant was in no manner associated with such a search.
16. Thereafter, further investigation was entrusted to PW 13 - the Deputy Commissioner of Police (the third Investigating Officer), who, on the basis of disclosure statement of the appellant, conducted the search at two places, including the house of the appellant previously searched on 13.6.2010. Such searches were conducted on 16th and 17th of June, 2010, leading to the recovery of certain incriminating articles linking the appellant to the crime, which stood established in DNA reports (Ext.85 & 86) prepared by the forensic experts through scientific analysis. The Investigating Officer found tell-tale signs of the appellant in the shape of stains of his semen, on the vaginal smear slide of the prosecutrix and blood stains of the prosecutrix on the banian (vest) of the appellant, linking the appellant to the crime. As such, on completion of the investigation, a challan was presented in the Court for trial.
17. In the aforesaid backdrop, we now proceed to examine the testimonies of the witnesses as categorized above.
18. On oath, PW 1, (father of the prosecutrix) categorically admits that he had not expressed any doubt on any person for having caused the death of his daughter. He expressly stated that “I had no doubt on any one about the death of my daughter”. He recognized the appellant who, according to the said witness, lived in the same “chawl”. His testimony is indicative of the fact that on the evening of 11.6.2010, his daughter (the prosecutrix), aged 6 years, after having dinner left home. Finding her not to have returned home, he searched for her and found her to be dead, in a “gutter” near his house. Later on, he states that prior to 14.6.2010, he had not suspected the appellant of having committed the crime. Significantly, the date and the basis leading to such suspicion is not disclosed by him.
19. Other aspects of his deposition, in particular, his statement with respect to the recovery of the nicker shall be dealt with separately. He recognized the nicker (Article 10) to be that of his daughter. PRAKASH NISHAD @ KEWAT ZINAK NISHAD v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [SANJAY KAROL, J.] A B C D E F G H 162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 8 S.C.R.
20. PW 2, the mother of the prosecutrix, while corroborating the testimony of her husband, added that till 14.6.2010 she was not aware as to who had assaulted and killed her daughter. However, in Court, she testified to having given the appellant a match box, upon his request, in the early hours of 12.6.2010.
21. PW 3, while corroborating the version of PW 1 and PW 2, only added that finding the prosecutrix not to have returned home, he thought that perhaps she had gone to the neighbour’s house to watch television. On the morning of 12.6.2010, a neighbour - whom he does not name - informed PW 2 of the dead body of the prosecutrix lying in a “gutter”.
22. It is to be noted that none of the relatives have disclosed either the complicity of the appellant in the crime or the reason for their suspicion towards him, particularly on 14.6.2010 which was two days after the incident.
23. The law on circumstantial evidence is well settled. When a case is governed by such evidence, the evidence must point singularly to the guilt of the appellant, closing out the possibility of all other hypotheses.
24. The locus classicus on the subject is Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra1. A recent judgement of this Court authored by one of us (Vikram Nath, J.) has highlighted the well settled law on circumstantial evidence in Indrajit Das v. State of Tripura2, reiterating the golden principles, as under :
“10. The present one is a case of circumstantial evidence as no one has seen the commission of crime. The law in the case of circumstantial evidence is well settled. The leading case being Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra.
According to it, the circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused; the circumstances taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and they should be incapable of explanation on any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence. The said principle set out in the case of Sharad Birdhichand
1 (1984) 4 SCC 116
2 2023 SCC OnLine SC 201 A B C D E F G H Sarda (supra) has been consistently followed by this Court. In a recent case - Sailendra Rajdev Pasvan v. State of Gujarat, this Court observed that in a case of circumstantial evidence, law postulates two-fold requirements. Firstly, that every link in the chain of circumstances necessary to establish the guilt of the accused must be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and secondly, all the circumstances must be consistent pointing out only towards the guilt of the accused. We need not burden this judgment by referring to other judgments as the above principles have been consistently followed and approved by this Court time and again.”
25. To establish the guilt of the appellant, the prosecution relies upon the following circumstances:
a) The appellant was residing in the same chawl as that of the prosecutrix;
b) Appellant was found near the scene of the crime;
c) The appellant made disclosure statements, i.e., dated 16.6.2010 Ext.47 and dated 17.6.2010 Ext.50, which led to the recovery of incriminating articles vide Memo Nos. Ext.48 and Ext.51. from the house of the appellant and another place where he had hidden the clothes belonging to him and the prosecutrix;
d) The DNA reports prepared on scientific analysis by an expert, establishing the blood of the prosecutrix on banian of the appellant and his semen on the clothes of prosecutrix and her vaginal smear slide.
26. Let us examine whether all these circumstances stand established by the prosecution or not.
Circumstance of 13 residing in the ‘chawl’ being seen at the spot of the crime
27. PW 1 and PW 2 stated that the appellant resided in the very same chawl as they, although they did not identify his house. Well, that’s about all. There being no other evidence of he residing there. Even if the version of the mother of having seen the appellant and giving him a matchbox, in the early hours of 12.6.2010, is believed, the same does not advance the case of the prosecution any further. The appellant was not PRAKASH NISHAD @ KEWAT ZINAK NISHAD v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [SANJAY KAROL, J.] A B C D E F G H 164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 8 S.C.R.
found at the place where the alleged crime took place or the place from where the body was recovered. The prosecution has not been able to establish the distance between the two places - that of the crime and the place where the appellant was spotted in the morning hours. There is no spot map or any ocular evidence to this effect. As noted above, what led these witnesses to discover the appellant of having committed the crime has gone unstated. It is only on the basis of the information furnished by PW 1, expressing his suspicion on the appellant, that he was on 13.6.2010 arrested and the same day, his residence was searched. It is here that the major contradiction, if not falsity, in the prosecution case emerges. The Investigating Officer PW 12 is categorical of having suspected the appellant only on the basis of the information furnished by the father of the prosecutrix, i.e., PW 1. PW 12 states that “the father of deceased expressed suspicion against the appellant and at the time of his house search was taken.” and PW 1 states that “He did not suspect anyone prior to 14.6.2010.” The search was conducted on 13th and not on 14th of June, 2010. He added that finding the house of the appellant to be locked, he called the medical analyzer, Mumbai, whereafter, he, by breaking open the lock of the house of the appellant, recovered incriminating articles vide Ext.36 on 13.6.2010 and such articles being: “Article 1 – Square cardboard;
Article 2 – Blanket;
Article 3 – Floor tiles pieces;
Article 4 – Mat;
Article 5 –Towel;
Article 6 –Spanner;
Article 7 –Hair found on pillow;
Article 8 – Mat; and Article 9 – Pillow”
28. Having conducted the search in the presence of PW 5 and Piyush Ramesh Kumar Jain (unexamined), he locked and sealed the house. Out of the two, the prosecution examined only one witness, namely PW 5. Perusal of the testimony of this witness as also the Investigating Officer and the relatives of the prosecutrix, does not establish one major fact, that being, who actually identified the house of the appellant. A B C D E F G H
29. A ‘chawl’ is a group of tenements clustered together, very small in size and densely populated. It’s an inexpensive accommodation, temporary for some, permanent for others. Living in the same chawl, cannot be, in the attending facts of no one having identified with certainty the exact house/room of the appellant, a circumstance pointing to the guilt of the appellant. As is evident from the decisions referred (supra), for a circumstance to be established, there shouldn’t be doubt; it should not leave room for the possibility that, not the appellant against whom the circumstance is sought to be proved but someone else, may have done the said crime.
30. None of the witnesses have deposed that it was at the instance of the appellant that the prosecutrix left the house, nor has anyone deposed to the effect of having seen the appellant and the prosecutrix together at any point in time; Appellant was not even a visitor to the house of PW 1. They have no relationship, be it of whatever nature. All that is stated is that after having dinner prosecutrix left home, and PW 3 states that he thought she may have gone to the neighbour’s house to watch TV. With this being the case, last seen theory, does not come into play. Although argued before us, the Trial Court has correctly not considered the same to be a circumstance of consequence, in either direction.
The Circumstance Disclosure Statement of the appellant and the Recovery of incriminating articles
31. Conjoint reading of the testimonies of PW 12 and PW 13 further renders the prosecution case to be inherently improbable, if not self-contradictory and impossible on this circumstance.
32. Unlike PW 5, who is categorical about having seen the bloodstained nicker in the house of the appellant, PW 12 does not disclose such fact. Undisputedly, both these witnesses together visited the alleged house of the appellant only once, i.e., on 13.6.2010. It is a matter of record that police recovered only one nicker belonging to the prosecutrix, which was recovered at the time of the second search conducted on 16.6.2010, which renders the recovery by PW 13 in the presence of PW 9 to be extremely doubtful, specifically when the search and subsequent recovery of incriminating articles is refuted.
33. There is yet another contradiction which bears significance in the attending facts and that being the time of the seizure of the articles PRAKASH NISHAD @ KEWAT ZINAK NISHAD v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [SANJAY KAROL, J.] A B C D E F G H 166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 8 S.C.R.
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