Punjab and Sind Bank v. Frontline Corporation Ltd
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 386; [2023] 4 S.C.R. 858
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai, Justice Inter Alia, Justice The Suit Property As Collateral – Thereafter, Justice A Purported Settlement Agreement, Justice Dated 29.11.2010, Justice Filed in the Ejectment Suit Which Was Filed Earlier By the Previous
- Decided
- 18 Apr 2023
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 2924/2023
- Sections
- 34, 13
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A B C D E F G H 858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.[2023] 4 S.C.R. 858
PUNJAB AND SIND BANK
v.
FRONTLINE CORPORATION LTD.
(Civil Appeal No.2924 of 2023)
APRIL 18, 2023
[B. R. GAVAI AND ARAVIND KUMAR, JJ.] Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 – s. 34 – Respondent purchased the suit property wherein the appellant-bank was inducted as a tenant by the previous owner in the ground floor of the suit premises – Respondent availed various credit facilities from the appellant-bank to the tune of Rs.42.74 crore by mortgaging, inter alia, the suit property as collateral – Thereafter, a purported settlement agreement, dated 29.11.2010, filed in the ejectment suit which was filed earlier by the previous owner, before the City Civil Court and a lease deed dated 11.02.2011 was executed between the parties – Financial defaults were committed by the respondent – Demand notice u/s. 13 of the SARFAESI Act was issued by appellantbank – Demand remained unmet – Appellant declared that it had taken possession of the suit property – Respondent filed securitisation application before the DRT and instituted a suit before the High Court for specific performance of the settlement deed and lease deed – An injunction application was also filed restraining appellant from disposing any part of suit property – Interim order was passed by the Single Judge of the High Court that no final orders of sale be passed and this was extended from time to time – Thereafter, the Single Judge set aside the interim order noting therein that the appellant, being a secured creditor, could not be restrained from taking appropriate steps qua the secured suit property, especially in light of the express bar on the jurisdiction of the civil court, as provided u/s. 34 of the SARFAESI Act – Division Bench set aside the order of the Single Judge and observed that the bar u/s. 34 of the SARFAESI Act was not absolute and restrained the appellant from selling the suit property until the final determination of the rights of the parties – On appeal, held: It is settled that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in respect of matters which a DRT or an Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine in respect of any action A B C D E F G H taken “or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred under this Act” – Bar of civil court thus applies to all such matters which may be taken cognizance of by the DRT, apart from those matters in which measures have already been taken under sub-section (4) of s.13 of the SARFAESI Act – Though a very limited extent jurisdiction of the civil court can also be invoked, where for example, the action of the secured creditor is alleged to be fraudulent or his claim may be so absurd and untenable which may not require any probe whatsoever – In the instant case, it cannot be said that the action of the secured creditor, i.e. the appellant is either fraudulent or that its claim is so absurd or untenable which may not require any probe whatsoever – Single Judge had passed the said order on the basis of a statutory bar – Division Bench has grossly erred in interfering with the discretion exercised by the Single Judge – Thus, the judgment and order passed by the Single Judge upheld.
Allowing the appeal, the Court Held : 1. The Supreme Court has held in Mardia Chemicals Limited and Others v. Union of India and Others that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in respect of matters which a DRT or an Appellate Tribunal is empowered to 11 determine in respect of any action taken “or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred under this Act”. The Court has held that the prohibition covers even matters which may be taken cognizance of by the DRT though no measure in that direction has so far been taken under subsection (4) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act. It has been held that the bar of jurisdiction is in respect of a proceeding which matter may be taken to the Tribunal. It has categorically been held that any matter in respect of which an action may be taken even later on, the civil court shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding thereof. The Court held that the bar of civil court thus applies to all such matters which may be taken cognizance of by the DRT, apart from those matters in which measures have already been taken under sub-section
(4) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act. [Para 13][867-A-C]
2. This Court has further held that, to a very limited extent jurisdiction of the civil court can also be invoked, where for example, the action of the secured creditor is alleged to be fraudulent or his claim may be so absurd and untenable which PUNJAB AND SIND BANK v. FRONTLINE CORPORATION
LTD.
A B C D E F G H 860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
may not require any probe whatsoever or to say precisely to the extent the scope is permissible to bring an action in the civil court in the cases of English mortgages. [Para 14][867-D]
3. In the present case, it cannot be said that the action of the secured creditor, i.e. the appellant is either fraudulent or that its claim is so absurd or untenable which may not require any probe whatsoever. It is further to be noted that the SARFAESI Act itself provides remedies to an aggrieved party in view of the provisions of Sections 17 and 18. [Para 15][867-E-F]
4. It has been held by this Court in the case of Wander Ltd. and Another v. Antox India P. Ltd that the Appellate Court would not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. It has been held that an appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. It has further been held that the Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. It has been held that if the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court’s exercise of discretion. [Para 17][868-F-H]
5. Undisputedly, in the present case, while vacating the interim relief granted vide order dated 15th July 2013, the Single Judge had held that the relief claimed by the plaintiff could not have been granted in view of the provisions of Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. As such, the Single Judge had passed the said order on the basis of a statutory bar. As observed earlier, the scope in which a civil suit is maintainable as determined by this Court in the case of Mardia Chemicals Limited is very limited. The case of the respondent/plaintiff would not come within the said limited scope. The Division Bench has grossly erred in interfering with the discretion exercised by the Single Judge. [Para 18][869-A-C] A B C D E F G H Mardia Chemicals Limited and Others v. Union of India and Others (2004) 4 SCC 311 : [2004] 3 SCR 982;
Wander Ltd. and Another v. Antox India P. Ltd. 1990 (Supp) SCC 727 – relied on.
Case Law Reference [2004] 3 SCR 982 relied on Para 12 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.2924 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.01.2017 of the High Court at Calcutta in APOT No.411 of 2016.
Ashim Banerjee, Sr, Adv., Ms. Tina Garg, Adv. for the Appellant. Karan Batura, Adv. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B. R. GAVAI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal assails the judgment and order dated 30th January 2017, passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as “High Court”) in A.P.O.T. No.411 of 2016, thereby setting aside the order of the Single Judge dated 2nd November 2016, vide which an earlier interim order of the Single Judge dated 15th July 2013, directing the appellant herein to take steps to sell the suit property but not to pass final orders on the sale, had been vacated.
3. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeal are as under:
3.1 The appellant - Punjab & Sind Bank, was inducted as a tenant in the ground floor of premises No.8, Old Court House Street, Kolkata, 700001, now known as 28, Hemant Basu Sarani, Kolkata, 700001 (hereinafter referred to as the “suit property”) in the year 1972 by one M/s Bharat Chamber of Commerce. In the year 2003, M/s Bharat Chamber of Commerce preferred an ejectment suit bearing No. 2 of 2003 against the appellant before the City Civil Court, Calcutta. 3.2 During the pendency of the aforesaid ejectment suit, the respondent - M/s Frontline Corporation Ltd. purchased the suit property PUNJAB AND SIND BANK v. FRONTLINE CORPORATION
LTD.
A B C D E F G H 862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
from M/s Bharat Chamber of Commerce, vide sale deed dated 17th February 2005. Thereafter, the respondent availed various credit facilities from the appellant to the tune of Rs.42.74 crore by mortgaging, inter alia, the suit property as collateral.
3.3 Subsequently, in furtherance of the terms of a purported settlement agreement, dated 29th November 2010, filed in the aforementioned ejectment suit before the City Civil Court, Calcutta, a lease deed dated 11th February 2011 was executed between the parties, thereby demising the suit property in favour of the appellant for a period of 21 years. It is pertinent to note that no consent decree was actually passed by the City Civil Court, Calcutta.
3.4 Owing to the financial defaults committed by the respondent, the appellant was constrained to classify the credit facilities availed by the respondent as Non-Performing Assets (for short, “NPA”) on 31st March 2012. Soon afterwards, a demand notice dated 13th June 2012 was also issued by the appellant under sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred as ‘SARFAESI Act’) for recovery of outstanding dues of approximately Rs.44.89 crore, with interest, from the respondent. The demand remained unmet, and so the appellant issued a possession notice under sub-section
(4) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, declaring therein that it had taken possession of the suit property.
3.5 Aggrieved thereby, the respondent preferred a securitization application, being S.A. No. 19 of 2013, before the learned Debt Recovery Tribunal-I, Calcutta (for short, “DRT”). Simultaneously, a civil suit, being C.S. No. 217 of 2013, was also instituted before the High Court, inter alia, for specific performance of the purported settlement agreement entered into between the parties, as well as the consequent lease deed. The respondent claimed therein that, as per the terms of the purported settlement agreement, the fulfilment of the obligations on part of the appellant, which involved the temporary vacation of the appellant from the suit property so as to enable the respondent to reconstruct the suit property and, thereafter, to hand over possession of the ground floor of the suit property back to the appellant, would enable the outstanding dues to be set off and adjusted from the amounts receivable from the creation of third party interests in the newly constructed building. An A B C D E F G H injunction application, being G.A. No. 1884 of 2013, was also moved by the respondent in the suit to restrain the appellant from dealing with, disposing of or encumbering any part or portion of the suit property. 3.6 The learned Single Judge, vide interim order dated 15th July 2013, allowed the aforesaid application and directed that no final orders of sale be passed for a period of 6 weeks. This interim order was extended from time to time, and lastly vide order dated 2nd December 2013.
3.7 Contending that the ejectment suit had been dismissed and that the purported settlement agreement had not fructified into a consent decree, the appellant filed an application being G.A. No. 2352 of 2014 for vacating the aforesaid interim order. The Single Judge, vide order dated 2nd November 2016, set aside the interim order dated 15th July 2013, noting therein that the appellant, being a secured creditor, could not be restrained from taking appropriate steps qua the secured suit property, especially in light of the express bar on the jurisdiction of the civil court, as provided under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. Cost of Rs.5,00,000/- was also imposed on the respondent.
3.8 Being aggrieved thereby, the respondent challenged the aforesaid order before the learned Division Bench of the High Court, in A.P.O.T. No. 411 of 2016, along with an application for stay being G.A. No. 3535 of 2016.
3.9 It is pertinent to note that, in the securitization application preferred by the respondent, the DRT, vide order dated 7th August 2013, refused to proceed further on account of the pendency of the civil suit before the High Court.
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