Ravinder Singh v. The State Govt. of NCT of Delhi
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 426; [2023] 4 S.C.R. 480
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Sanjay Kumar Code of Criminal Procedure, Justice 1973 – S. 432 – Penal Code, Justice 1860 – Ss. 45, Justice 377, Justice Held: It Is Settled That the Power to Impose A Modified Punishment Within The
- Decided
- 25 Apr 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1031/2023
- Sections
- 432, 376, 376(2), 376(3), 377, 506, 53, 45, 433, 302, 53OF, 433A
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A B C D E F G H 480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
RAVINDER SINGH
v.
THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI
(Criminal Appeal No. 1031 of 2023)
APRIL 25, 2023
[ABHAY S. OKA AND SANJAY KUMAR, JJ.] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 432 – Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 45, 53 – Power to impose a modified punishment – Special category sentencing to life imprisonment in excess of 14 years – Appellant was convicted for having committed offence u/s. 376, 377, 506 and was sentenced to life imprisonment – Trial Court directed that the appellant should not be given any clemency by the State before he spent at least 20 years in jail – Same was confirmed by the High Court – On appeal, held: It is settled that the power to impose a modified punishment within the punishment provided for in the Penal Code for such specified offences can only be exercised by the High Court and in the event of further appeal, by the Supreme Court, and not by any other Court in the country – In the light of this settled legal position, it was clearly not within the domain of the Additional Sessions Judge to impose a restriction that the term of the appellant’s life imprisonment should be for at least 20 years and that he should not be given any clemency till then – Such power could only be exercised by the High Courts or by Supreme Court – In the instant case, the child was raped by her father during the month of August, 2012, so the amended provisions s.376(2)(f) and s.376(3) have no role to play – Now, the maximum punishment prescribed by law is imprisonment for life with nothing further – Even in such cases, it would be a parody of justice to allow the convicts so sentenced to avail the benefit of remissions and the like, liberally conferred by the State, and cut short the length of their life sentence to a mere 14 years – Special category sentencing to life imprisonment in excess of 14 years by fixing a lengthier term would be available to the High Courts and this Court, even in cases where the maximum punishment, permissible in law and duly imposed, is life imprisonment with nothing further – Exercise of such power must be restricted to grave cases – Appellant herein was found guilty of one of the most monstrous and horrific of offences – Therefore, [2023] 4 S.C.R. 480 A B C D E F G H the appellant directed to serve the life imprisonment for a minimum of 20 years of actual incarceration before he can seek remissions under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or any other enacted law – Constitution of India – Arts.72 and 161. Disposing of the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. Affirming the view taken in Swamy Shraddananda, the majority opinion in V. Sriharan observed that it could be said without any scope for controversy that, when by way of a judicial decision after a detailed analysis, having regard to the proportionality of the crime committed, it is decided that the offender deserves to be punished with the sentence of life imprisonment, i.e., till the end of his life or for a specific period of 20 years or 30 years or 40 years, such a conclusion should survive without any interruption. It was, therefore, held that in order to ensure that the punishment imposed, which is legally provided for in the Penal Code read along with Criminal Procedure Code, operates without any interruption, the inherent power of the Court concerned should empower the Court, in public interest as well as in the interest of the society at large, to make it certain that such punishment will operate, as imposed, by stating that no remission or other liberal approach should come into effect to nullify such imposition. It was further observed that no prohibition is prescribed in the Penal Code, or for that matter any of the provisions where death penalty or life imprisonment is provided for, that imprisonment cannot be imposed for a specific period within the said life span and, when life imprisonment means the whole life span of the person convicted, it cannot be said that the Court which is empowered to impose the said punishment cannot specify the period up to which the said sentence of life should remain, befitting the nature of the crime committed. The majority opinion, therefore, concluded by stating that the ratio laid down in Swamy Shraddananda, that a special category of sentence, instead of death, can be substituted by the punishment of imprisonment for life or for a term exceeding 14 years and that category can be put beyond application of remission, is well founded. It was further held that the power to impose a modified punishment within the punishment provided for in the Penal Code for such specified offences can only be exercised by the High RAVINDER SINGH v. THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI A B C D E F G H 482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
Court and in the event of further appeal, by the Supreme Court, and not by any other Court in the country. [Para 9][486-G-H; 487-A-D]
2. In the light of this settled legal position, it was clearly not within the domain of the learned Additional Sessions Judge to impose a restriction that the term of the appellant’s life imprisonment should be for at least 20 years and that he should not be given any clemency till then. Such power could only be exercised by the High Courts or by this Court. No doubt, the Delhi High Court confirmed the sentence passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge but mere affirmation of the hollow exercise of a power, that was not conferred, by the Additional Sessions Judge does not qualify as an independent exercise by the High Court and would not suffice in terms of the legal requirement. It is only the High Courts or this Court that would have the power, upon proper application of mind, to take recourse to special category sentencing, depending upon the nature of the offence and its gravity. To that extent, the sentence imposed by the Additional Sessions Judge was, therefore, without legal basis. [Para 10][487-E-G]
3. The observations manifest the applicability of the same principle in cases where the maximum punishment prescribed by law is imprisonment for life with nothing further. Even in such cases, it would be a parody of justice to allow the convicts so sentenced to avail the benefit of remissions and the like, liberally conferred by the State, and cut short the length of their life sentence to a mere 14 years. The law laid down in Swamy Shraddananda and V. Sriharan with regard to special category sentencing to life imprisonment in excess of 14 years by fixing a lengthier term would be available to the High Courts and this Court, even in cases where the maximum punishment, permissible in law and duly imposed, is life imprisonment with nothing further. However, the exercise of such power must be restricted to grave cases, where allowing the convict sentenced to life imprisonment to seek release after a 14-year-term would tantamount to trivializing the very punishment imposed on such convict. [Para 15][491-G-H; 492-A-B] A B C D E F G H
4. The ends of justice would be sufficiently served if the life imprisonment of the appellant is for a minimum of 20 years of actual incarceration before he can seek remissions under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or any other enacted law. [Para 17][492-F] Maru Ram v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 107 : [1981] 1 SCR 1196; Union of India v. V. Sriharan Alias Murugan and Others (2016) 7 SCC 1 : [2015] 14 SCR 613 – followed.
Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1961 SC 600; Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767 : [2008] 11 SCR 93; Gouri Shankar v. State of Punjab (2021) 3 SCC 380; Shiva Kumar @ Shiva @ Shivamurthy v. State of Karnataka 2023 SCC OnLine SC 345; Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey and Another (1992) 3 SCC 204 : [1992] 2 SCR 921 – referred to.
Case Law Reference [1981] 1 SCR 1196 followed Para 7 [2015] 14 SCR 613 followed Para 7 [2008] 11 SCR 93 referred to Para 8 (2021) 3 SCC 380 referred to Para 13 [1992] 2 SCR 921 referred to Para 16 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1031 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.09.2017 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLA No. 1509 of 2014.
Sudhir Naagar, Digvijay Chaudhary, Vikrant Mehta, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ms. Sonia Mathur, Sr. Adv., Abhishek Singh, B. K. Satija, Ms. Suhasini Sen, Dr. N. Visakamurthy, Simarjeet Singh Saluja, Divik Mathur, Nikhil Chandra Jaiswal, Shreekant Neelappa Terdal, Advs. for the Respondent.
RAVINDER SINGH v. THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI A B C D E F G H 484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SANJAY KUMAR, J.
1. Convicted and sentenced for the dastardly and most depraved of offences – the rape of his own 9-year-old daughter, the appellant is before this Court.
2. By judgment dated 18.02.2013 in Sessions Case No. 01 of 2013, the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Special Fast Track Court), Dwarka Courts, New Delhi, held the appellant guilty under Sections 376, 377 and 506 IPC. By order of sentence dated 23.02.2013, the appellant was imposed with imprisonment for life under Section 376 IPC and payment of fine of ` 25,000/-; imprisonment for life under Section 377 IPC and payment of fine of ` 25,000/-; and rigorous imprisonment for 2 years under Section 506 IPC along with payment of fine of ` 10,000/-. Default in payment of fines entailed further periods of imprisonment. In addition thereto, the learned Additional Sessions Judge directed that the appellant should not be given any clemency by the State before he spent at least 20 years in jail. In appeal, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court upheld the appellant’s conviction and sentence, vide judgment dated 01.09.2017 in Criminal Appeal No. 1509 of 2014. Hence, this appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.
3. By order dated 19.03.2018, this Court issued notice to the State only on the question of sentence.
4. Heard Mr. Sudhir Naagar, learned counsel for the appellant; and Ms. Sonia Mathur, learned senior counsel, appearing for the State.
5. As the scope of this appeal has been restricted to the sentence imposed upon the appellant, we need not dilate on or deal with the issues raised vis-à-vis the merits of his conviction for the offences under Sections 376, 377 and 506 IPC.
6. Section 376(2) IPC, prior to its amendment with retrospective effect from 03.02.2013 by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, consisted of clauses (a) to (g). Section 376(2)(f), as it stood then, provided that whoever commits rape on a woman when she is under 12 years of age shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 10 years but which may be for life and shall also be liable to fine. Section 377 IPC states that whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal A B C D E F G H shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years, and shall also be liable to fine. It was in exercise of power under Sections 376(2)(f) and 377 IPC that the learned Additional Sessions Judge sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment, as the victim was merely 9 years of age and was also subjected to carnal intercourse against the order of nature. He, however, added the riderthat the appellant should not be given clemency by the State until he spent at least 20 years in jail. In effect, the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment of a minimum term of 20 years.
7. Imprisonment for life, in terms of Section 53 IPC read with Section 45 IPC, means imprisonment for the rest of the life of the prisoner, subject to the right to claim remission, etc., as provided under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution and under Section 432 Cr.P.C. In Gopal Vinayak Godse Vs. State of Maharashtra1, this Court held that a sentence of imprisonment for life must, prima facie, be treated as imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted person’s natural life. InMaru Ram Vs. Union of India2, a Constitution Bench endorsed this view and affirmed that a life sentence is nothing less than life-long imprisonment and would last until the last breath. Again, in Union of India Vs. V. Sriharan alias Murugan and others3, another Constitution Bench reiterated that imprisonment for life means imprisonment for the rest of the life of the convict.
8. However, in actual practice, one finds that a sentence of life imprisonment works out only to a term of 14 years, in terms of Section 433 Cr.P.C., and may prove to be grossly inadequate to the gravity of the offence for which the convict had been so sentenced. In Swamy Shraddananda Vs. State of Karnataka4, this Court noted that the days of remission earned by a prisoner are added to the period of his actual imprisonment to make up the term of the sentence and the question that then arises is how such remission can be applied to life imprisonment, as the way in which remission is allowed can only apply to a fixed term of imprisonment and life imprisonment, being for the rest of the life, is indeterminate by nature. It was observed that, in the States of Karnataka and Bihar, remissionis granted to life convicts by ‘deemed’ conversion
1 AIR 1961 SC 600
2 (1981) 1 SCC 107
3 (2016) 7 SCC 1
4 (2008) 13 SCC 767
RAVINDER SINGH v. THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI [SANJAY KUMAR, J.] A B C D E F G H 486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
of life imprisonment into a fixed term of 20 years by executive orders issued by the State Government, flying in the face of a long line of decisions by this Court, and no provision of law exists sanctioning such a course. It was pointed out that life convicts are granted remission and released from prison upon completing a 14-year-term, without any sound legal basis, and one can safely assume that the position would be no better in other States. This Court, therefore, took judicial notice of the fact that remission is allowed to life convicts in the most mechanical manner without any sociological or psychiatric appraisal of the convict and without proper assessment as to the effect of an early release of a particular convict on the society. This Court also noted that grant of remission is the rule and remission is denied, one may say, in the rarest of rare cases. Faced with this conundrum, while commuting a death sentence to life imprisonment in that case, this Court pondered over what should be done in such a situation. It was observed that, if the option is limited only to two punishments - one, being a sentence of life imprisonment, for all intents and purposes, of not more than 14 years, and the other, death, the Court may feel tempted and find itself nudged into endorsing the death penalty and such a course would indeed be disastrous. It was therefore held that a far more just, reasonable and proper course would be to expand the options and to take over what, as a matter of fact, lawfully belongs to the Court, i.e., the vast hiatus between 14 years’ imprisonment and death, and substitute a death sentence by life imprisonment or by a term in excess of 14 years and, further, to direct that the convict must not be released from prison for the rest of his life or for the actual term as specified in the order, as the case may be. It was emphasized that the Court would take recourse to this expanded option primarily because, in the facts of the case, the sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment would amount to no punishment at all.
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