Ravi Dhingra v. The State of Haryana
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 182; [2023] 2 S.C.R. 164
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Justice B.V. Nagarathna Penal Code, Justice 1860 – Ss.364a, Justice 364a R/W S.149, Justice Ipc – Sentenced to Undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 3 Years U/S.148, Justice And the Use of Kidnapping, Justice Abduction, Justice Or Detention With A Demand to Pay the Ransom; and When the Demand Is Not Met, Justice Then Causing Death – in the Present Case, Justice There Are Two
- Decided
- 1 Mar 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 987/2009
- Sections
- 364A, 363, 149, 148, 216, 364, 164, 313, 506, 363OF, 361, 34
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:27 am. Original source ↗
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A B C D E F G H 164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
RAVI DHINGRA
v.
THE STATE OF HARYANA
(Criminal Appeal No. 987 of 2009)
MARCH 01, 2023
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860 – ss.364A, 363 and 364 – Modification of conviction u/s.364A to s.363 – Appellants convicted u/ss.148, 364A r/w s.149, IPC – Sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 years u/s.148, rigorous imprisonment for life and fine u/s.364A r/w s.149 – On appeal, held: s.364A has three components- kidnapping or abduction of a person and keeping them in detention; threat to cause death or hurt, and the use of kidnapping, abduction, or detention with a demand to pay the ransom; and when the demand is not met, then causing death – In the present case, there are two statements of PW-21-child victim, one made to the police 2 days after he had returned home from the captivity of appellants and another made before the Trial Court, two years after the initial statement – Three changes are noticed therein, first, a change in the exact timing of the threat; second, the specificity of the delivery of the threat to kill; and third, omission of the intent behind the threat i.e. to prevent PW-21 from crying out – These details are crucial to proving the second ingredient of the charge u/s.364A i.e, ‘threat resulting in giving rise to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt’ – Thus, this ingredient was not proved beyond reasonable doubt – For proving the ingredient of threat, the intimidation of the child victim, for the purpose of making him silent cannot be enough – If the sentence carrying a maximum sentence of death and a minimum sentence of life sentence has such a low evidentiary threshold, the difference between punishments for kidnapping u/ss.363, 364 and 364A shall become meaningless – Conviction of the appellants u/s.364A is unsustainable – Appellants convicted u/s.363 and sentenced to imprisonment for seven years with fine – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.216. [2023] 2 S.C.R. 164 A B C D E F G H Partly allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1 Section 363 of the IPC punishes the act of kidnapping and Section 364 thereof punishes the offence of kidnapping or abduction of a person in order to murder him. Section 364A further adds to the gravity of the offence by involving an instance of coercive violence or substantial threat thereof, to make a demand for ransom. Accordingly, the maximum punishment for the three crimes is seven years imprisonment; ten years’ imprisonment and imprisonment for life or death, respectively. Under section 364A, it is necessary to prove not only that such kidnapping or abduction has taken place but that thereafter, the accused threatened to cause death or hurt to such person or by his conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt or cause hurt or death to such person in order to compel the Government or any foreign State or international, inter-governmental organization or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a ransom. [Paras 12 and 13][173-F-G; 176-E-F] Lohit Kaushal v. State of Haryana (2009) 17 SCC 106;
Anil v. Administration of Daman & Diu (2006) 13 SCC 36 : [2006] 9 Suppl. SCR 466; Vishwanath Gupta v.
State of Uttaranchal (2007) 11 SCC 633 : [2007] 4 SCR 332; Vikram Singh v. Union of India (2015) 9 SCC 502 : [2015] 10 SCR 816 – relied on.
1.2 The Courts below, as is usual in kidnapping cases, have placed singular reliance on the testimony of PW-21 to prove the element of ‘threat to cause death or hurt’, or to determine whether the appellants’ conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt. The statement of PW-21 made to the police on 18.02.2000, i.e., two days after he had returned home from the captivity of appellants herein records that he was threatened at night by the appellants with a ‘revolver,’ which was claimed to be possessed by them. The exact statement was, “One handkerchief and one black cloth were tied on the eyes and said to me they have revolver and they will kill him if [he] raises any voice.” However, the statement before the Trial Court dated 15.04.2002, nearly two years after the initial statement, includes a substantial detail that was omitted in the previous RAVI DHINGRA v. THE STATE OF HARYANA A B C D E F G H 166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
statement. After mentioning that the PW-21 was forcibly put inside the car and gagged, the statement reads, “The occupants threatened me with a knife and pistol and threatened me to kill.” Thus, three crucial changes may be noticed: first, a change in the exact timing of the threat; second, the specificity of the delivery of the threat to kill; and third, omission of the intent behind the threat i.e. to prevent PW-21 from crying out. These details are crucial to proving the second ingredient of the charge under Section 364A and essential to bring home the guilt under this section namely, threat resulting in giving rise to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt. It is clear that this ingredient has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Courts below did not thoroughly address this doubt before convicting the appellants. For proving the ingredient of threat, the intimidation of the child victim, for the purpose of making him silent, cannot be enough. If the sentence carrying a maximum sentence of death and a minimum sentence of life sentence has such a low evidentiary threshold, the difference between punishments for kidnapping under 363, 364 and 364A shall become meaningless. [Para 15][179-F-H; 180-A-D]
2. This Court has wide power to alter the charge under Section 216 of the Cr.PC whilst not causing prejudice to the accused. In the facts of the present case, the conviction of the appellants is unsustainable under Section 364A of the IPC. The conviction under Section 364A of the IPC is set aside. The judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court are modified to the above extent. The appellants are now convicted for the offence under Section 363 of the IPC; i.e., kidnapping and sentenced to imprisonment for seven years and a fine of Rs.2000/-. [Paras 17 and 18][180-H; 181-A, G-H; 182-A] Sk. Ahmed v. State of Telangana (2021) 9 SCC 59;
Jasvinder Saini v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2013) 7 SCC 256 : [2013] 7 SCR 340; Central Bureau of Investigation v. Karimullah Osan Khan (2014) 11 SCC 538 : [2014] 3 SCR 588; Dr. Nallapareddy Sridhar Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2020) 12 SCC 467 : [2020] 1 SCR 1116 – relied on.
A B C D E F G H Malleshi v. State of Karnataka (2004) 8 SCC 95 : [2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 441 – referred to.
Case Law Reference [2006] 9 Suppl. SCR 466 relied on Para 13 [2007] 4 SCR 332 relied on Para 13 [2015] 10 SCR 816 relied on Para 13 [2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 441 referred to Para 16 [2013] 7 SCR 340 relied on Para 18 [2014] 3 SCR 588 relied on Para 18 [2020] 1 SCR 1116 relied on Para 18 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
987 of 2009.
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.02.2008 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRLA No. 525 of 2003. With Criminal Appeal Nos. 989-990, 986, 988 of 2009 and 645 of 2023. Gaurav Agrawal, (SCLSC), Saurav Sunil, Santosh Krishnan, Simon Benjamin, Ms. Deepshikha Sansanwal, Krishnam Mishra, Rajeev Kumar Dubey, Kamlendra Mishra, Advs. for the Appellant.
Rakesh Mudgal, A.A.G., Dr. Monika Gusain, Dinesh Mudgal, Rakesh Kumar Yadav, Ms. Savita Kaushik, Advs. for the Repondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
NAGARATHNA, J.
Leave granted in Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.5296 of 2012. In all other cases, leave has already been granted.
2. The present appeals have been filed by five accused whose convictions were confirmed by the impugned judgement of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 13.02.2008, under Sections 148, 149 and 364A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’, for short).The details of the cases are as under:
RAVI DHINGRA v. THE STATE OF HARYANA A B C D E F G H 168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
Criminal Appeal No.987 of 2009, filed by Raman Goswamistands abated on account of his death vide order dated 08.04.2019. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No.987 of 2009, is considered in respect of Ravi Dhingraalone. All these matters were heard together and they are being disposed of by this common judgment.
3. Facts in brief, as per FIR No.64 dated 15.02.2000 at Police Station, City Thanesarlodged at the instance of complainant, Dr. H.K. Sobti (PW-20) are that the appellants accused kidnapped Harsh (PW- 21), aged 14 years, son of Dr H.K. Sobti and Smt Indra Sobti (PW-5) when he was going to school, at about 8:15 a.m. on the aforesaid date. The Station House Officer had filed the FIR with a remark that a case under Section 364/34 of the IPC seems to be made out from the facts. As per the statement of PW-21, he was intimidated by co-accused Ravi Dhingra to ride as a pillion rider on his scooter and upon his refusal, he was forcibly put inside a car. Upon screaming for safety, he was threatened to be killed with a knife and pistol if he cried. They also told him that his affluent father could even pay the ransom of Rs.50 lakhs. It emerged in the investigation that PW-21 was kept in House No.772, Sector-13, Kurukshetra. Smt.Kanta Goyal (PW-2) who was a A B C D E F G H resident of house No. 1653/13 which was near the said school and another student of 9th Standard, namely, Manish (PW-4) told them that at 8:15 a.m., two boys with muffled faces had put Harsh in a Maruti car without a number plate and having tinted window glass.Later,on the same day, calls demanding ransom were received, acting on which, PW-20 reached the concerned location with the ransom demanded. While he was waiting for the appellants accused to receive the ransom and release his child, PW-21 Harsh Sobti was released between 04:00 a.m. and 04:30 a.m.on 16.2.2000 and dropped near the house of PW-11 Suraj BhanRathee. He made a phone call to his mother, who took him to his house at around 5:30 a.m.
4. That demands and enquiries for ransom were made through letters and telephonic messages to PW-20 on 09.03.2000, 12.03.2000, 13.03.2000 and 14.03.2000. Another message regarding ransom was received via telephoneon 15.03.2000 at 2:30 p.m.He informed the appellants that while he could not arrange Rs.15 lakhs, he had arranged Rs.12 lakhs.Acting on the instructions received in these messages, PW-20, after intimating the police, boarded the train at 8:15 p.m. with a bag of money. When the train stopped at Ambala, he got down.He went back to Kurukshetra wherefrom he was asked to leave his house with the bag of money and come to Karnal. PW-20 went in his car with two sub-inspectors in civil dress. Upon the delivery of the cash in a bag near a bridge, it was discovered that calls were made from a mobile phone registered in the name of an engineering student, Ravi Duhan (PW-19). He revealed that his friends, appellants herein, had borrowed his phone. On 17.03.2000, upon receiving secret information about the whereabouts of four accused persons, namely, Ravi Dhingra, Baljit Pahwa, Parvej Khan and Raman Goswami, were apprehended by the police except accused Laxmi Narain who was apprehended on 03.04.2000. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kurukshetra, committed the case to the Court of Sessions for trial on 06.06.2000.
5. Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Kurukshetra,(‘Trial Court’, for the sake of convenience) tried the appellants accused for the commission of offences under Sections 364, 364A, 342, 506 read with Section 148 of the IPC. The prosecution presented 27 witnessesand 72 documentary Exhibits, including statements of the appellants under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter ‘Cr.PC’, for short) and 5 case properties.From the appellants’ side,13 documentary RAVI DHINGRA v. THE STATE OF HARYANA [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.] A B C D E F G H 170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
exhibitswere presented.The Trial Court recorded the appellants’accused’s statements under Section 313 of the Cr. PC.
6. Appellants maintained that they were falsely implicated and had been kept in illegal confinement after being apprehended. They also argued that they were produced before the Court after their pictures had been widely publicised through local media and confronted with prosecution witnesses. Further, it was submitted that they were tortured before being presented before the court on 18.03.2000. They also stated that they were forced to sign statements prepared by Investigating Officer on 20.03.2000.
7. The Trial Court considered the aforementioned statements and the other evidence on record and held that appellants formed an unlawful assembly and in pursuance of a common object, kidnapped PW-21 to compel his father to pay a ransom amount of Rs.15 Lakhs. The Trial Court also concluded that theappellants sought to take advantage of PW-21’s confinement and the threat to cause death to him for compelling PW-20 to pay the ransom.
The Trial Court found no reason to disbelieve the statement of the PW-21.
Thus, appellants were held guilty for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 148 and 364A read with Section 149 of the IPC.Appellants prayed for leniency in the sentence on the ground that they had old parents and there was no one else to look after them.The Trial Court concluded the trial and rendered its verdict on 29.05.2003.The Trial Court sentenced the accused-appellants to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years under Section 148 of the IPC, rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.2000/- each under Section 364A read with Section 149 of the IPC.The Trial Court further clarified that the period of under-trial detention would be set off and both sentences shall run concurrently.
8. Appellants appealed against the order of conviction and sentence before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The High Court considered the question as to whether there existed reliable evidence to identify and connect the appellants with the offence of kidnapping for ransom under Section 364A of the IPC.The High Court termed PW-21’s statement to be crucial, and placing reliance on the same, held that all ingredients of Section 364A of the IPC had been satisfied.
A B C D E F G H The High Court rejected the plea that there was material discrepancy in the prosecution’s case and held that there was no reason to cast any doubt on the veracity of the versions of prosecution witnesses. Regarding PW-21, the High Court remarked that he was “a child witness, but he faced long and searching cross-examination” and there is no contradiction in his version. It rejected the contention as to the contradictions in PW-20’s stance by declaring that “Discrepancy in investigation cannot by itself a ground to reject the testimony of a reliable witness.”Further, the High Court concluded that by virtue of the testimony of PW-20 and PW-21 itself, the “connection of the accused with the crime stands established beyond reasonable doubt.”
9. The High Court rejected the plea of the appellants to modify the conviction to that for an offence under Section 363 or 365 of the IPC or under Section 506 IPC, which did not provide for a minimum sentence of life imprisonment on the ground of prolonged detention of over seven years.
Being aggrieved by the judgement and sentence of the High Court, the accused have approached this Court by filing their respective Special Leave Petitions, in which leave has been granted and are now considered Criminal Appeals.
On 11.05.2009, this Court noted that the appellants had served seven years in prison and could be granted bail on the satisfaction of the Trial Court of necessary conditions. It also granted leave to appeal in the Special Leave Petitions and admitted the matters.
10. Appellants-accused before this Court have submitted that there is grave doubt about the fact that the appellants herein are the very persons who had kidnapped Harsh Sobti, PW-21, but the Courts below have found reasons to believe the evidence of PW-21. Thus, without conceding the arguments made for acquittal by raising questions about the investigation, appellants have urged that judicial notice may be taken of the long period of their incarceration and their conviction under Section 364A of the IPC be modified to a conviction under Section 363 of the
IPC.
Sri Gaurav Agrawal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellantsappointed by Supreme Court Legal Services Committee, placed reliance on Sk. Ahmed vs. State of Telangana, (2021) 9 SCC 59 RAVI DHINGRA v. THE STATE OF HARYANA [B. V. NAGARATHNA, J.] A B C D E F G H 172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R.
(“SK Ahmed”), to contend that the essential ingredients of Section 364A of the IPC have not been proved in this case. The crux of his argument was that the Sessions’ Court as well as the High Court have disregarded the fact that PW-21’s statement before the Court on 15.04.2002 was a substantial improvement upon the statement made to the police on 15.02.2000. Therefore, he submitted that no threat to cause death or hurt has been proven. He also submitted that no demand for ransom on the basis of the cause of death or hurt could be proven as these emanated from the police. He submitted that PW-12 turned hostile and PW-13 was only a chance witness. Hence, the judgments impugned may be interfered with and the appellants may be granted relief by modifying the sentences imposed on them even if acquittal of the appellants may not be possible.
On the other hand, Sri Rakesh Mudgal, learned AAG for the respondent-State supported the judgment of the High Court and contended that there is no merit in these appeals and the same may be dismissed. He submitted that the High Court was justified in its reasoning and in dismissing the appeals filed by the appellants herein.
11. In view of the facts on record and the rival submissions of the parties, we deem it appropriate to limit the point for consideration in this appeal to whether the facts, in this case, attract the offence under Section 364A of the IPC and if the answer is in the negative, would it be just and proper to modify the conviction to a sentence under Section 363of the
IPC.
To put the matter in perspective, the provisions of Section 361 read with Sections 363, 364 and 364A ought to be compared. The said provisions read as under:
Section 361:Kidnapping from lawful guardianship.Whoever takes or entices any minor under sixteenyears of age if a male, or under eighteen years of age if a female, or any person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind, without the consent of such guardian, is said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful guardianship. Explanation.—The words “lawful guardian” in this section include any person lawfully entrusted with the care or custody of such minor or other person.
A B C D E F G H Exception.—This section does not extend to the act of any person who in good faith believes himself to be the father of an illegitimate child, or who in good faith believes himself to be entitled to the lawful custody of such child, unless such act is committed for an immoral or unlawful purpose.
x x x Section 363: Punishment for kidnapping. Whoever kidnaps any person from India or from lawful guardianship, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. Section 364. Kidnapping or abducting in order to murder. Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person in order that such person may be murdered or may be so disposed of as to be put in danger of being murdered, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
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