Manjunath & Ors. v. State of Karnataka
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 978; [2023] 14 S.C.R. 727
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice In the Present Facts Is Rendered Nugatory As
- Decided
- 6 Nov 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 866/2011
- Sections
- 304, 149, 27, 378, 120B, 32
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:27 am. Original source ↗
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[2023] 14 S.C.R. 727 : 2023 INSC 978
CASE DETAILS
MANJUNATH & ORS.
v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA
(Criminal Appeal No. 866 of 2011)
NOVEMBER 06, 2023
[ABHAY S. OKA AND SANJAY KAROL, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: In a case primarily involving a dying declaration in addition to the ocular and circumstantial evidence, the Trial Court acquitted the appellants-accused along with other accused persons, whether the High Court was justified in overturning the same in respect of the appellants.
Evidence – Dying declaration – Reliance upon in addition to the ocular and circumstantial evidence – Legality:
Held: The dying declaration, although undoubtedly a substantive piece of evidence upon which reliance can be placed, in the present facts is rendered nugatory as the person who took down such declaration was not examined, nor did the police officer (PW19) endorse the said document with details of who took down the declaration – Examination of the person who reduced into writing, the dying declaration, is essential – Particularly, in the absence of any explanation forthcoming for the production of evidence – Given the nature of a dying declaration, it is required that such statement be free from tutoring, prompting, or not be a product of imagination – But it has emanated from the statement of the Doctor, PW1, that at the time of the dying declaration being made, there were numerous people present near him – It is also not clear as to in front of which of the relatives of deceased was the same taken down – Further, the circumstantial evidence present on record also does not point to the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused persons – None of the eyewitnesses-PWs 2, 3, 15, as referred to by the trial court succeeded in attributing a particular role to any of the accused 728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.
persons and equally so, to the appellants, whose acquittals were overturned by the High Court – View taken by the Trial Court was a possible view and there being no error in appreciation of evidence as also application of law; the High Court without assigning any cogent reasons ought not to have interfered with such findings – Impugned judgment set aside – Acquittal restored – However, since the sentence awarded by the High Court u/s.304 Part II was for 4 years, and the application of exemption from surrender was disallowed by this Court in 2010, the Appellants appear to have already served the sentence awarded to them – Fine made payable by each of the accused, as a result of the impugned judgment be refunded – Bail bonds discharged – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 304 Part II, 324, 326, 447, 504 and 506 r/w s.149. [Paras 11.10, 20, 29.1-29.3, 30, 31] Evidence – Ocular evidence:
Held: Ocular evidence fares better than other kinds of evidence and is considered evidence of a strong nature – The principle is that if the eyewitness testimony is “wholly reliable”, then the court can base conviction thereupon – This applies even in cases where there is a sole eyewitness – In the present case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are found to be unreliable, unworthy of credence – The testimonies differ on essential material facts, such as the number of persons, how the accused came to lay where he did, when discovered etc. – None of these witnesses, eye-witnesses as they may be, to have established beyond reasonable doubt, the guilt of the accused persons – There is a contradiction in testimonies in regard to the number of persons who formed part of the unlawful assembly – A testimony cannot be given value, in isolation – For an eye-witness to be believed, his evidence should be of sterling quality – It should be capable of being taken at face value – Numerous contradictions and inconsistencies have borne from record, rendering prosecution witnesses to be unreliable and undependable so as to place reliance on the same to hold the accused persons guilty of having committed an offence. [Paras 12, 21.8, 21.12, 22] Evidence – Dying declaration – Principles in regard to – Discussed. Evidence Act, 1872 – s.27:
Held: Discovery made, to be one satisfying the requirements of s.27, must be a fact that is discovered as a consequence of information received 729MANJUNATH & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA from a person in custody – In the present case, the Trial Court held, given that the discoveries made were either from a public place or from an area where other persons also resided, reliance thereupon, could not be made – This approach of the trial court is correct. [Paras 26, 27] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.378:
Held: In the present case, the High Court did not appreciate the severity of the allegations involved to the full extent – A Court of Appeal should be circumspect in overturning its judgment of acquittal – An acquittal will only be overturned in the presence of very compelling reasons – Presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is bolstered if the trial court hands down an acquittal. [Para 32]
LISTS OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710 – followed. Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116: [1985] 1 SCR 88 – relied on.
Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay AIR 1958 SC 22: 1[958] SCR 552; Suresh Chandra Jana v. State of West Bengal (2017) 16 SCC 466: [2017] 13 SCR 1; Jayamma v. State of Karnataka (2021) 6 SCC 213; Madan v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 13 SCC 464: [2018] 4 SCR 1003; Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar (1998) 4 SCC 517: [1998] 2 SCR 1097; Panneerselvam v. State of T.N (2008) 17 SCC 190: [2008] 8 SCR 962; Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474: [1992] 2 SCR 197; K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor (1976) 3 SCC 618: [1976] Suppl. SCR 542; Shama v. State of Haryana (2017) 11 SCC 535: [2016] 11 SCR 857; Uttam v. State of Maharashtra (2022) 8 SCC 576; Sher Singh & Anr. vs. State of Punjab (2008) 4 SCC 265: [2008] 2 SCR 959; Surendra Bangali @ Surendra Singh Routele v. State of Jharkhand Criminal Appeal No. 1078 of 2010; Amol Singh v. State of M.P (2008) 5 SCC 468: [2008] 8 SCR 956; Lakhan v. State of M.P (2010) 8 SCC 514: [2010] 9 SCR 705; Jagbir Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2019) 8 SCC 779: [2019] 11 SCR 1137; Rajaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1733; Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar 1980 Supp SCC 769; State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati 730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.
Naidu 1980 Supp SCC 455; Govind Narain v. State of Rajasthan 1993 Supp
(3) SCC 343; Kans Raj v. State of Punjab (2000) 5 SCC 207: [2000] 3 SCR 662; Sudhakar v. State of Maharashtra (2000) 6 SCC 671: [2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 507; Irfan@Naka v. State of U.P. 2023 SCC Online SC 1060; Anil Phukan vs state of Assam (1993) 3 SCC 282: [1993] 2 SCR 389; Kamal v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2023 SCC OnLine SC 933; Gargi v. State of Haryana (2019) 9 SCC 738: [2019] 13 SCR 1; Indrajit Das v. State of Tripura 2023 SCC OnLine SC 201; Prakash Nishad v. State of Maharashtra 2023 SCC OnLine SC 666; Rai Sandeep @ Deepu alias Deepu v. State (NCT of Delhi); (2012) 8 SCC 21: [2012] 6 SCR 1153; Ganesan v State (2020) 10 SCC 573: [2020] 8 SCR 768; Naresh @ Nehru v State of Haryana Criminal Appeal No.1786 Of 2023; Mohd. Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra (1976) 1 SCC 828: [1976] 1 SCR 715; Jaikam Khan v. State of U.P (2021) 13 SCC 716; Nikhil Chandra Mondal v. State of W.B. (2023) 6 SCC 605; Tulsiram Kanu v State AIR 1954 SC 1; Ghurey Lal v State of U.P. (2008) 10 SCC 450: [2008] 11 SCR 499 – referred to.
Pakala Narayana Swamy v. Emperor AIR 1939 PC 47; Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor 1946 SCC OnLine PC 47; Sheo Swarup v King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227(2) – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.866 of 2011.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.09.2010 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in CRLA No.1795 of 2004.
Appearances:
Amit Sibal, Sr. Adv., Ms. Bina Madhavan, S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Lakshay Saini, Narayana Kumar Relangi, Darpan Sachdeva, Vinay Tripathi, Vinamra Kopariha, Anshul L, Manoj S.N., M/s. Lawyer S Knit & Co., Advs. for the Appellants.
V. N. Raghupathy, Manendra Pal Gupta, Advs. for the Respondent. 731MANJUNATH & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
SANJAY KAROL, J.
1. Appellants1 (six in number) have filed this appeal against the judgment and order dated 21st September 2010 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No.1795 of 2004 whereby the appeal filed by the State against the verdict of acquittal in favour of all 29 accused, vide judgment and order dated 25th September, 2004 in S.C. No.162 of 1999, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge - Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court-II, Kolar, was partly allowed. Overturning the same in respect of A-1 to A-5 and A-7, the Court while convicting them for having committed an offence punishable under Sections 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 447, 324, 326, 504 and 506 r/w Section 149 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 sentenced each one of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 4 years and pay a fine of ₹ 5000 each.
FACTUAL PRISM
2. The facts, as set out by the Courts below, shorn of unnecessary details are :- 2.1 On 6th August 1997, the deceased namely Byregowda2 and his brothers, T.V. Narayanaswamy (PW4), T.V. Gopalreddy (PW5), T.V. Rajanna (PW10) and Marappa (PW2) had gone to the fields to work when, allegedly, all the accused armed with weapons such as clubs, iron rods and choppers came and threatened them. PW2, PW4, PW5 and PW10 managed to escape but while the deceased, was attempting to do so, he was greviously assaulted by A1, A2 and A3 by means of iron rod and a steel edged weapon (chopper). Immediate medical treatment was administered to the deceased at the Sidlaghatta General Hospital by Dr. Loganayaki (PW1) who also informed the police. V.M. 1 Manjunath (s/o Bachanna) A-1; Ramegowda (s/o Bachanna) A-2; Ramappa (s/o Narayanappa) A-3; Ramesh (s/o Chikka Venkatarayappa) A-4; Manjunath (s/o Ramappa) A-5; Dyavappa (s/o Narayanappa) A-7.
2 Hereinafter, the deceased 732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.
Sonnappa (PW19), the then Sub-Inspector of Police took his statement (Ex. P1) and as a consequence therefore, registered FIR being Crime No. 249/1997 dated 08.08.1997 under several penal provisions. 2.2 After due investigation, the challan came to be filed and the case was committed to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge-Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court-II, Kolar. All the accused denied the charges under section 120B, 143, 447, 302 read with Section 149 IPC and claimed trial. Accused Nos.6 and 8 are recorded to have died and therefore, the proceedings against them stood abated at this stage.
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
3. The prosecution in order to prove the charges levied, examined 28 witnesses; exhibited 24 documents and three material objects. The accused did not lead any evidence save and except producing five witnesses to contradict the version of PW 4, Gopala Reddy (PW5), Chandrappa (PW15), T.V Krishnappa (PW17) and T.S Ramakrishna (PW13) respectively.
4. The evidence led was categorized into five heads – (a) ocular; (b) Dying declaration; (c) circumstantial evidence; (d) recovery of incriminating material; and (e) motive.
4.1 PW2, PW3 and PW15 are eyewitnesses and PW2 and PW15 have not supported the case of the prosecution. PW2 has deposed that he had heard from the family members of the deceased that he had sustained various injuries and upon reaching there found the latter to be lying a little away from his own lands and later find out that he had died. PW3 has deposed that he had seen the accused persons assaulting the deceased, and it is they who had laid the deceased, post such assault, on the eucalyptus leaves on the fields of PW11. PW15 stated that he saw the deceased lying on southern side of the eucalyptus plantation where PW2, PW4 and PW5 were also present. PW15 has deposed that he saw the accused persons armed with weapons and proceeding towards the garden. He followed them and found that the accused had chased and assaulted the deceased. It is a point of conflict whether the accused had, as per the statement of PW3, laid the deceased down on the eucalyptus fields of PW11 - Raghava or was it PW15 who had done so. No other witnesses have deposed to that effect.
733MANJUNATH & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [SANJAY KAROL, J.] The Trial Court, therefore, did not rely on the ocular evidence. 4.2 In respect of the dying declaration, it was observed that the evidence clearly shows PW19 to not have recorded the declaration. It has borne out from cross examination of this witness that it was one of his staff members, namely Nataraj who had recorded the statement who was neither cited nor examined as a witness. Moreover, this deponent has not even endorsed such a statement.
4.3 In respect of the medical evidence furnished, it was observed that PW1 admitted non stating of who furnished history of injuries- whether it was injured himself or another person who had brought him to the hospital. This, read alongside PW1’s earlier statement that numerous persons were present with the injured/deceased led the Trial Court to believe that, on account of severe head injury he was not in a position to give a statement and it was other persons present who furnished necessary details to form the same.
4.4 In respect of circumstantial evidence, it was observed that PW2 has not implicated any of the accused in the circumstance relating to a mob approaching the fields in the morning of 6 August 1997. PW15 had deposed, as noted above that the deceased was laid on eucalyptus leaves in an injured state. It was however not his case that the deceased had informed him about who caused his injuries. This, led the Trial Court to observe “falsity” in the evidence of PWs 4,5,6 and 7 who stated the deceased had told that the accused assaulted him. 4.4.1 For PW3 and PW13, it was observed that their conduct did not reflect that of an “ordinary prudent man” as the former did not rush to the village or to the rescue of the deceased but instead, ostensibly, to invite the villagers to a hiding place; and the letter since he claimed to have heard the accused persons conspiring to attempt to take the lives of the deceased and his brothers and further claimed that later he heard the persons state that while one of them was caught, others ran away. Despite hearing this he proceeded to leave to attend the marriage of someone at Vijayapura. This, the Court, found to be a conduct, against of a prudent person who proceeded as normal, despite hearing of a conspiracy to kill a fellow man.
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.
4.4.2 It is in light of above conclusions that the Trial Court held the web of circumstances to be unable to point “unerring, cogently and positively” to the guilt of the accused.
4.5 On recovery of weapons, the Court observed that although the weapons had been recovered at the instance of accused persons - clubs at the instance of A10, A3, A5, A6 and A7; iron rod at the instance of A1 and A2 and chopper at the instance of A4, but doubted the veracity of the seizure on the ground that the clubs were recovered from a place of common access and the chopper as well as the rods were recovered from places where others also resided. Further, it was observed that the clubs seized (M.O. 3) were of 4 ft in length and 3 inches, in diameter which could cause such as abrasion(s), contusion(s), and laceration(s). However, the medical evidence of PW1 did not record any such injury. The Court, therefore, concluded that the incriminating objects or weapons were not of any assistance in the case against the accused. 4.6 On motive, it was observed that although a dispute had taken place on the night of 4th August, 1997 between PW4 and A1, A2, A4, A7, A8, A9, A11 and A12 regarding the obstruction of a pathway, resulting into criminal prosecution against the persons involved but leading only to their acquittals. Therefore, in view of the Court, motive was absent. 4.7 Two other aspects were also urged on behalf of the prosecution, one; regarding the place of occurrence of offence and two; the delay in recording the statements of the ocular and circumstantial witnesses. On both these grounds as well, the court did not find anything to be pointing towards the guilt of the accused persons.
4.8 In view of such findings, the court acquitted all accused persons.
5. The State, aggrieved by the acquittals en masse, appealed to the High Court.
FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT
6. It was noted that the deceased had specifically named as certain accused as also attributed specific roles to them. Having appreciated the evidence on record and the submissions of the learned counsel for the accused, who stated that the doctor had not certified the deceased fit to give a statement and in the absence of such a certificate of fitness, his declaration 735MANJUNATH & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [SANJAY KAROL, J.] could not be relied upon; and the learned counsel for the state who submitted that the dying declaration categorically indicts A1-A7.
7. The Court found :- 7.1 The dying declaration makes a clear case against A1 to A7; 7.2 The injuries sustained by the deceased correspond to narration of the incident to PW19 (S. Narayanaswamy) and that PW1 (Dr. Loganayagi) certified the deceased to have been in a fit condition to give a statement.
7.3 The dying declaration of the deceased stood corroborated by PW3, PW4, PW5 as well as other witnesses.
7.4 On submission of the learned counsel for the accused that the injuries inflicted upon the deceased were on non-vital parts of the body, no intention could be gathered on part of the accused; hence the Court, in its wisdom, convicted the above specified accused under Section 304 Part II, IPC to undergo a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a period of four years and pay fine of Rs. 5000/- each. All other accused were acquitted.
8. The position of the accused persons as it presently stands is indicated in a tabular form as under :- Sl no.
Name of Accused Sentenced b y T r i a l Court Sentenced by High Court Punishment awarded
1. Manjunath S/o Bachanna Acquitted Convicted u/s 304 Part II, IPC 4 years RI and fine of Rs. 5000/-
2. Ramegowda S/o Bachanna Acquitted Convicted u/s 304 Part II, IPC 4 years RI and fine of Rs. 5000/-
3. Ramappa S/o Narayanappa Acquitted Convicted u/s 304 Part II, IPC 4 years RI and fine of Rs. 5000/-
4. Ramesh S/o Chikka Venkatarayappa Acquitted Convicted u/s 304 Part II, IPC 4 years RI and fine of Rs. 5000/-
5. Manjunatha S/o Ramappa Acquitted Convicted u/s 304 Part II, IPC 4 years RI and fine of Rs. 5000/- 736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.
6. Ramanjanappa S/o Muniswamappa (Dead)
Expired -
7. Dyavappa S/o Narayanappa Acquitted Convicted u/s 304 Part II, IPC 4 years RI and fine of Rs. 5000/-
8. Dyavappa S/oChikkaMiniswamappa (Abated)
Abated -
9. Venugopala S/o Pillappa Acquitted Acquitted
10. Chowda Reddy S/o Narayanappa Acquitted Acquitted
11. Jayachandra S/o Bachappa Acquitted Acquitted
12. Narayana Swamy @Beema S/o Munegowda Acquitted Acquitted
13. Bachegowda, S/o Pillappa Acquitted Acquitted
14. Narayana Swamy S/o Pillappa Acquitted Acquitted
15. Krishanappa S/o Guttappa Acquitted Acquitted
16. Mune Gowda S/o Venkatarayappa Acquitted Acquitted
17. Aswath S/o Gateppa Acquitted Acquitted
18. Aswathappa S/o Nanjegowda Acquitted Acquitted
19. Murthy S/o Venkatappa Acquitted Acquitted
20. Ramesh S/o Mune Gowda Acquitted Acquitted
21. Ramesh S/o Byamma Acquitted Acquitted
22. Nagaraja S/o Narayanappa Acquitted Acquitted 737MANJUNATH & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [SANJAY KAROL, J.]
23. Dayappa S/o Pillappa Acquitted Acquitted
24. Naryanaswamy S/o Bachappa Acquitted Acquitted
25. Ramappa S/o Chennarayappa Acquitted Acquitted
26. Manjunatha S/o Naryanappa Acquitted Acquitted
27. Sonne Gowda S/o Chennarayappa Acquitted Acquitted
28. Mahesh S/o Jayachandra Acquitted Acquitted
29. Lokesh S/o Bachanna Acquitted Acquitted
9. Proceeding further, we notice, that this is a case involving primarily a dying declaration made by the accused in addition to the ocular and circumstantial evidence.
10. In fact, the dying declaration (Ext. P1) proven by PW19, is the main foundation of the prosecution case. It would be beneficial to appreciate the principles that the courts must adhere to when adjudicating a case of this nature.
PRINCIPLES IN REGARD TO DYING DECLARATIONS
11.Section 32 the Indian Evidence Act, 18723 relates to statements, written or verbal of relevant fact made by a person who is dead or who cannot be found, in other words, dying declaration. The various principles laid down by pronouncements of this court in respect of dying declarations can be summarised as under: – 11.1 The basic premise is “nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire” i.e. man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth.
11.1.1 In Laxman v. State of Maharashtra4 a Constitution bench of this court observed: – 3 For brevity, “IEA”
4 (2002) 6 SCC 710 [5 Judge Bench] 738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.
“when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth The situation in which a man is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement.”
11.2 For a statement to be termed a “dying declaration”, and thereby be admissible under Section 32 of IEA, the circumstances discussed/ disclosed therein “must have some proximate relation to the actual occurrence”.
11.3 The Privy Council in Pakala Narayana Swamy v. Emperor5 explained the phrase “circumstances of the transaction” as under:- “The circumstances must be circumstances of the transaction : general expressions indicating fear or suspicion whether of a particular individual or otherwise and not directly related to the occasion of the death will not be admissible. But statements made by the deceased that he was proceeding to the spot where he was in fact killed, or as to his reasons for so proceeding, or that he was going to meet a particular person, or that he had been invited by such person to meet him would each of them be circumstances of the transaction, and would be so whether the person was unknown, or was not the person accused. Such a statement might indeed be exculpatory of the person accused. ‘Circumstances of the transaction’ is a phrase no doubt that conveys some limitations. It is not as broad as the analogous use in ‘circumstantial evidence’ which includes evidence of all relevant facts. It is on the other hand narrower than ‘res gestae’. Circumstances must have some proximate relation to the actual occurrence : though, as for instance, in a case of prolonged poisoning they may be related to dates at a considerable distance from the date of the actual fatal dose. It will be observed that ‘the circumstances’ are of the transaction which resulted in the death of the declarant. It is not necessary that there should be a known transaction other than that the death of the declarant 5 AIR 1939 PC 47 [5 Judge Bench] 739MANJUNATH & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [SANJAY KAROL, J.] has ultimately been caused, for the condition of the admissibility of the evidence is that ‘the cause of (the declarant’s) death comes into question’.”
11.3.1 In the well-known case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra,6 principles in respect of the application of section 32 have been noted as under: – Per S. Murtaza Fazal Ali J.,- “21. …
(1) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible the statement of a person who dies, whether the death is a homicide or a suicide, provided the statement relates to the cause of death, or exhibits circumstances leading to the death. In this respect, as indicated above, the Indian Evidence Act, in view of the peculiar conditions of our society and the diverse nature and character of our people, has thought it necessary to widen the sphere of Section 32 to avoid injustice.
(2) The test of proximity cannot be too literally construed and practically reduced to a cut-and-dried formula of universal application so as to be confined in a straitjacket. Distance of time would depend or vary with the circumstances of each case. For instance, where death is a logical culmination of a continuous drama long in process and is, as it were, a finale of the story, the statement regarding each step directly connected with the end of the drama would be admissible because the entire statement would have to be read as an organic whole and not torn from the context. Sometimes statements relevant to or furnishing an immediate motive may also be admissible as being a part of the transaction of death. It is manifest that all these statements come to light only after the death of the deceased who speaks from death. For instance, where the death takes place within a very short time of the marriage or the distance of time is not spread over more than 3-4 months the statement may be admissible under Section 32.
6 (1984) 4 SCC 116 [3 Judge Bench] 740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.
(3) The second part of clause (1) of Section 32 is yet another exception to the rule that in criminal law the evidence of a person who was not being subjected to or given an opportunity of being cross-examined by the accused, would be valueless because the place of cross-examination is taken by the solemnity and sanctity of oath for the simple reason that a person on the verge of death is not likely to make a false statement unless there is strong evidence to show that the statement was secured either by prompting or tutoring.
(4) It may be important to note that Section 32 does not speak of homicide alone but includes suicide also, hence all the circumstances which may be relevant to prove a case of homicide would be equally relevant to prove a case of suicide.
(5) Where the main evidence consists of statements and letters written by the deceased which are directly connected with or related to her death and which reveal a tell-tale story, the said statement would clearly fall within the four corners of Section 32 and, therefore, admissible. The distance of time alone in such cases would not make the statement irrelevant.”
11.4 Numerous judgments have held that provided a dying declaration inspires confidence of the court it can, even sans corroboration, form the sole basis of conviction. In this regard, reference may be made to Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay7, Suresh Chandra Jana v. State of West Bengal8 and Jayamma v. State of Karnataka9.
11.5 In order to rely on such a statement, it must fully satisfy the confidence of the court, since the person who made such a statement is no longer available for cross-examination or clarification or for any such like activity.
11.5.1 In Madan v. State of Maharashtra10, while referring to an earlier decision in Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar11 it 7 AIR 1958 SC 22 [3 Judge Bench] 8 (2017) 16 SCC 466 [2 Judge Bench] 9 (2021) 6 SCC 213 [3 Judge Bench] 10 (2019) 13 SCC 464 [2 Judge Bench] 11 (1998) 4 SCC 517 [2 Judge Bench] 741MANJUNATH & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [SANJAY KAROL, J.] was observed that a Court must rely on dying declaration if it inspires confidence in the mind of the court.
11.5.2 On a similar note, this Court in Panneerselvam v. State of T.N12 has observed: – “Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of crossexamination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness.”
11.5.3 However, a note of caution has also been sounded. If such a declaration does not inspire confidence in the mind of the court, i.e., there exist doubts about the correctness and genuineness thereof, it should not be acted upon, in the absence of corroborative evidence.
11.5.3.1 In Paniben v. State of Gujarat13 it was observed- “The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination.”
A reference may also be made to K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor14 11.6 The Court must be satisfied that at the time of making such a statement, the deceased was in a “fit state of mind”. In Shama v. State of Haryana,15 a fit state of mind has been held to be a prerequisite, alongside the ability to recollect the situation and the state of affairs at that point in time in relation to the incident, to the satisfaction of the court.
11.6.1 In Uttam v. State of Maharashtra16, it was discussed that it is for the court to determine, from the evidence available 12 (2008) 17 SCC 190 [3 Judge Bench] 13 (1992) 2 SCC 474 [2 Judge Bench] 14 (1976) 3 SCC 618 [2 Judge Bench] 15 (2017) 11 SCC 535 [2 Judge Bench] 16 (2022) 8 SCC 576 [2 Judge Bench] 742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.
on record, the state of mind being fit or not.
11.6.2 In order to make a determination of the state of mind of the person making the dying declaration, the court ordinarily relies on medical evidence.17 However, equally, it has been held that if witnesses present, while the statement is being made, state that the deceased while making the statement was in a fit state of mind, such statement would prevail over the medical evidence.18 The statement of witnesses present prevailing over the opinion of the doctor has been reiterated in Uttam (supra).
11.6.3 It has also, however, been held in Laxman (supra) that the mere absence of a doctor’s certificate in regard to the “fit state of mind” of the dying declarant, will not ipso facto render such declaration unacceptable. This position had been once again recognised in Surendra Bangali @ Surendra Singh Routele v. State of Jharkhand19.
11.7 In case of a plurality of such statements, it has been observed that it is not the plurality but the reliability of such declaration determines its evidentiary value. The principle as held in Amol Singh v. State of M.P20 was:- “13. … it is not the plurality of the dying declarations but the reliability thereof that adds weight to the prosecution case. If a dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made in fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without any corroboration [but] the statement should be consistent throughout. … However, if some inconsistencies are noticed between one dying declaration and the other, the court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies, namely, whether they are material or not [and] while scrutinising the contents of various dying declarations, in such a situation, the court has to examine the same in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances.”
17 (2008) 4 SCC 265 [2 Judge Bench] 18 (2002) 6 SCC 710 [5 Judge Bench] 19 Criminal Appeal No. 1078 of 2010 [2 Judge Bench] 20 (2008) 5 SCC 468 [2 Judge Bench] 743MANJUNATH & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [SANJAY KAROL, J.] 11.7.1 Faced with multiple dying declarations, this Court in Lakhan v. State of M.P21 observed- “21. …. In such an eventuality no corroboration is required. In case there are multiple dying declarations and there are inconsistencies between them, generally, the dying declaration recorded by the higher officer like a Magistrate can be relied upon, provided that there is no circumstance giving rise to any suspicion about its truthfulness. In case there are circumstances wherein the declaration had been made, not voluntarily and even otherwise, it is not supported by the other evidence, the court has to scrutinise the facts of an individual case very carefully and take a decision as to which of the declarations is worth reliance.”
11.7.2 This Court, in Jagbir Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi)22, in this respect, concluded as under: – “32. We would think that on a conspectus of the law as laid down by this Court, when there are more than one dying declaration, and in the earlier dying declaration, the accused is not sought to be roped in but in the later dying declaration, a somersault is made by the deceased, the case must be decided on the facts of each case. The court will not be relieved of its duty to carefully examine the entirety of materials as also the circumstances surrounding the making of the different dying declarations. If the court finds that the incriminatory dying declaration brings out the truthful position particularly in conjunction with the capacity of the deceased to make such declaration, the voluntariness with which it was made which involves, no doubt, ruling out tutoring and prompting and also the other evidence which support the contents of the incriminatory dying declaration, it can be acted upon. Equally, the circumstances which 21 (2010) 8 SCC 514[2 Judge Bench] 22 (2019) 8 SCC 779 [2 Judge Bench] 744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.
render the earlier dying declaration, worthy or unworthy of acceptance, can be considered.”
11.8 The presence of a Magistrate in recording of a dying declaration, is not a necessity but only a rule of Prudence. To this effect in Jayamma (supra), this Court observed :
“…law does not compulsorily require the presence of a judicial or executive Magistrate to record a dying declaration or that a dying declaration cannot be relied upon as the solitary piece of evidence unless recorded by judicial or executive Magistrate. It is only a rule of prudence, and if so permitted by the facts and circumstances, the dying declaration may preferably be recorded by a judicial or executive Magistrate so as to muster additional strength to the prosecution case.”
Referring to the Constitution bench in Laxman (supra) the principle of a dying declaration not necessarily to be recorded by a Magistrate stands reiterated in Rajaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh23 11.9 Dying Declaration is not to be discarded by reason of its brevity is what is held in Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar24.
11.9.1 It was observed in the State of Maharashtra v.
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