Mmtc Limited v. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Limited
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1279; [2025] 11 S.C.R. 327
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Sanjay Kumar, Justice K.V. Viswanathan
- Decided
- 3 Nov 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 13321/2025
- Sections
- 47, 34, 37, 7, 31, 16, 36, 30, 5, 120, 120B, 13(2)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:21 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 11 S.C.R. 327 : 2025 INSC 1279 MMTC Limited v.
Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Limited (Civil Appeal No. 13321 of 2025)
03 November 2025 [Sanjay Kumar and K.V. Viswanathan,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the High Court was justified in not entertaining the objections filed by the appellant u/s.47 CPC and in dismissing the same; and whether at least prima facie the case of breach of fiduciary duty has been established by appellant.
Headnotes† Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – ss.34, 37 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.47 – Objections under – Maintainability – Long Term Agreement-LTA between the petitioner and the respondent – Respondent invoked arbitration clause claiming damages on account of the unlifted quantity of coal contracted by the appellant – Arbitration award passed in favour of the respondent – Challenge u/s.34 of the 1996 Act rejected by the Single Judge, however, the Division Bench allowed appellant’s appeal u/s.37 and set aside the arbitral award – In appeal before this Court, the judgment of the Division Bench set aside and that of the Single Judge restored as also the arbitral award – Review Petition filed by the appellant, admitted on the limited issue of interest – Subsequently, clarification application by the appellant disposed of – In the meantime, the respondent filed execution petition seeking enforcement of award and the appellant filed its objections u/s.47 CPC – When the Judgment was reserved, the appellant filed a suit praying that the award is void and unenforceable, however, the said suit was dismissed and the Executing Court dismissed the objections u/s.47 CPC as well as Ord. XXI r.29 application, seeking stay of execution, pending the suit – Challenge to: Held: Objection petition u/s.47 should not invariably be treated as a commencement of a new trial – This Court has warned that * Author 328 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports there is a steady rise of proceedings akin to a retrial which causes failure of realization of the fruits of a decree, unless prima facie grounds are made out entertaining objections u/s.47 would be an abuse of process – On the material furnished, it cannot be said that the Senior Managerial personnel involved at the helm in appellant company during the relevant period acted in a manner as no reasonable personnel/director in the circumstances would have acted – It cannot be concluded that the decisions taken were not within the range of reasonableness or that the course adopted by them was not one, a reasonably competent personnel/director would adopt – Applying the business judgment rule, the course adopted by them cannot be said to be one to which a court of law would not defer to – Appellants have not been able to even prima facie demonstrate that circumstances exist to conclude that the personnel of appellant did not act in the best interest of the company – Appeal challenges, in the prayer clause, the judgment dismissing the objections, though in the prayer clause, no challenge to dismissal of the application u/Ord. XXI r.29 filed, in the civil appeal the appellants have indicated that they are aggrieved by the said order also – Ord. XXI r. 29 provides for stay of execution pending suit between decree holder and judgment debtor – However, the suit filed itself now stands rejected u/Ord. VII r.11 but a regular first appeal was filed – Hence, an occasion for considering an Ord. XXI r.29 application does not arise – Objection filed u/s.47 claiming that the award as upheld by this Court is inexecutable, is dealt with – Jurisdiction lies in a narrow compass – It is the mandate of this Court that the object of s.47 is to prevent unwarranted litigation and dispose of all objections as expeditiously as possible – No merit in the objections filed by the appellant – No good grounds to entertain the same. [Paras 95-98, 100] Arbitration – Arbitration award – Execution Petition seeking enforcement of the Award by the respondent – Appellant-MMTC filing its objections u/s.47 CPC and when the Judgment was reserved, MMTC filed a suit praying that the award is void and unenforceable – However, the said suit was dismissed and MMTC filed application u/Ord. XXI r.29 CPC – Executing Court dismissed the objections as well as Order XXI Rule 29 application – Postscript in relation thereto:
Held: Whether in Government, Public Sector Corporations or even in the private sector, the driving force of the entity are the persons [2025] 11 S.C.R. 329MMTC Limited v. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Limited who administer them – Certain play in the joints is inevitable for their day-to-day functioning – If they are shackled with the fear that, their decisions taken for the day-to-day administration, could years later with the benefit of hindsight, be viewed with a jaundiced eye, it will create a chilling effect on them – Tendency to play it safe will set in – Decision making will be avoided – Policy paralysis will descend – All this will in the long run prove detrimental not just to that entity but to the nation itself – This Court is not to be understood to be condoning decisions taken for improper purposes or extraneous considerations – Great caution and circumspection have to be exercised before such allegations are brought forward and adequate proof must exist to back them – Otherwise for fear that carefully built reputations could be casually tarnished, best of talent will not be forthcoming, especially for government and public sector corporations. [Para 99] Case Law Cited Electrosteel Steel Limited (Now M/s ESL Steel Limited) v. ISPAT Carrier Private Limited, 2025 INSC 525; Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman [1971] 1 SCR 66 : (1970) 1 SCC 670; Ram Preeti Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education and Ors. [2003] Supp. 3 SCR 352 : (2003) 8 SCC 311; S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath and Ors. [1993] Supp. 3 SCR 422 : (1994) 1 SCC 1; Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. [1996] Supp. 4 SCR 464 : (1996) 5 SCC 550; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh and Others [2000] 2 SCR 264 : (2000) 3 SCC 581; Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi and Ors. [2021] 4 SCR 279 : (2021) 6 SCC 418 – referred to.
Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956) 1 All ER 341; Re Living Images Ltd., (1996) 1 BCLC 348; Dovey and The Metropolitan Bank (of England and Wales) Limited v. John Cory, 1901 Appeal Cases 477; Sharp and Ors. v. Blank and Ors., (2019) EWHC 3096 (Ch); Maple Leaf Foods Inc. v. Schneider Corp., 42 OR (3d) 177; Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc., (2007) 3 SCR 331 Canadian Supreme Court Reports – referred to.
List of Acts Penal Code, 1860; Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 330 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports List of Keywords Prima facie case of breach of fiduciary duty; Objections u/s.47 CPC; Long Term Agreement; Arbitration clause; Damages; Unlifted quantity of coal contracted; Arbitration award; Review Petition; Interest; Clarification application; Execution petition; Enforcement of award; Ord. XXI r.29 CPC application; Stay of execution; Business judgment rule; Postscript; Policy paralysis.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 13321 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 09.05.2025 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in OMP (ENF.) (COMM.) No. 19 of 2018 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Venkataraman, A.S.G., Harish Salve, Sanat Kumar, Sr. Advs. Akhil Sachar, Ms. Astha Tyagi, Ms. Sunanda Tulsyan, Ms. Karishma Sharma.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Jayant Mehta, Sr. Advs., Sumeet Kachwaha, Samar Singh Kachwaha, Ms. Ankit Khushu, Ms. Garima Bajaj, Ms. Akanksha Mohan, Pratyush Khanna, Ms. Ira Mahajan.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment K.V. Viswanathan, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal calls in question the correctness of the judgment dated 09.05.2025 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in OMP (ENF.) (COMM.) No. 19 of 2018. By the said judgment, the High Court dismissed the objections filed by the appellant-MMTC Limited [for short “MMTC”] under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [“CPC”] as well as an application under Order XXI Rule 29 of CPC seeking stay of the enforcement [2025] 11 S.C.R. 331MMTC Limited v. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Limited proceedings. The High Court further directed that the amount deposited by MMTC shall be withdrawn by the decree holder-Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Limited [for short “the Anglo”] along with the interest accrued. Aggrieved, the appellant-MMTC is in appeal by way of special leave.
BRIEF FACTS:-
3. The respondent-Anglo, on 24.09.2012, invoked the arbitration clause in the Long Term Agreement [LTA] dated 07.03.2007 entered into between MMTC and Anglo. The claim in the arbitration was for damages on account of the unlifted quantity of coal contracted by the appellant-MMTC. The damages were computed based on the difference in the price between the contracted price of US$ 300 Per Metric Tonne [for short “PMT”] and the market price of US$ 126 PMT, multiplied by the unlifted quantity. In the arbitration, by an Award dated 12.05.2014, Anglo was awarded a sum of US$ 78.720 million along with interest and costs by a majority of 2:1.
4. By a judgment dated 10.07.2015, challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [for short ‘the A&C Act’] failed before a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi. However, the Division Bench, by its judgment dated 02.03.2020, allowed MMTC’s appeal under Section 37 of the A&C Act and set aside the arbitral Award along with the decision of the learned Single Judge. By a judgment of 17.12.2020, this Court allowed the Civil Appeal filed by Anglo and after setting aside the judgment of the Division Bench restored the judgment of the learned Single Judge and the arbitral Award.
5. On 29.07.2021, a review petition filed by MMTC, which was admitted on the limited issue of interest, was disposed of by reducing the pendente lite and future interest to 6%. The remaining findings were not disturbed. On 19.04.2022, a clarification application filed by MMTC was disposed of by clarifying that MMTC would be liable to pay interest @ 6% from the date of reference till the date of payment and for the period from the date of breach till the date of reference, interest was to be paid @ 7.5%.
6. In the meantime, the respondent filed Execution Petition seeking enforcement of the Award. Post the disposal of the clarification application, on 20.07.2022, MMTC deposited a sum of Rs.1,087/- 332 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports crores with the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi. On 28.11.2022, E.A. No. 3728 of 2022 in the Execution Petition was filed by MMTC seeking to stay the operation and implementation of the Award till the Central Bureau of Investigation [CBI] concludes its investigation into the matter. It transpires that on 02.09.2022 and 23.11.2022, complaints were filed by MMTC against persons including its erstwhile employees alleging fraud and collusion with the respondent in relation to the price fixed for coal for the 5 th Delivery Period. On 09.01.2023, the CBI, it transpires registered a preliminary enquiry.
7. When the matter stood thus, on 10.01.2024, MMTC filed its objections under Section 47 of the CPC. In the objections, the primary contentions of MMTC were:- 7.1 Despite having complete knowledge of the recession in the market due to the collapse of the Lehman Brothers, the officials of MMTC in collusion and conspiracy with the officials of Anglo contracted the price of coal for the 5 th delivery period at US$ 300 PMT. This price was 3 times more than the price of US$ 96.40 PMT which prevailed during the 4 th delivery period.
7.2 Viewed in the background of the fact that Neelachal Ispat Nigam Ltd (for short the “NINL”) for whom the coal was sourced did not have pressing requirement of the ultimately contracted quantity and considering the fact that there was room for negotiation of the price, the contention of collusion and conspiracy became stark.
7.3 The fraud could not be discovered earlier since Shri Ved Prakash, who was Chief General Manager in 2008, became Director (Marketing) in 2010 and ultimately Chairman-cum-Managing Director in 2015, remained at the helm of affairs till 29.02.2020. The said officer was in control of the arbitral proceedings as well as at Section 34 and Section 37 stage.
7.4 When the Division Bench under Section 37 of the A&C Act set aside the Award on 02.03.2020, there was no occasion to examine the file to unearth the conspiracy. On 17.12.2020, when this Court set aside the judgment of the Division Bench and reinstated the Award, the matter was examined and on 24.02.2021, the then CMD of MMTC issued a confidential note requesting the Chief Vigilance Officer to seek permission of the Government of India to enquire into the matter.
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 333MMTC Limited v. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Limited 7.5 It was thereafter that the matter was enquired into, and a decision was taken to refer the matter to the CBI and a preliminary enquiry came to be registered on 09.01.2023 by the CBI.
8. A detailed reply was filed by Anglo taking objections on maintainability and limitation. Primarily, the reply to the objections on the aspect of fraud were set out as under:- 8.1 Under the LTA entered into on 07.03.2007 between MMTC and Anglo, in each of the 5 delivery periods of the contract, Anglo was to supply specified quantity of coking coal.
8.2 After the 3rd delivery period, MMTC had an option to extend the Agreement by two years on condition that the option was to be exercised latest by 31.01.2007. This was as per Clause 1.3. The 3rd delivery period was to expire on 30.06.2007. Clause 1.3 reads as under: - “1.3 The PURCHASER had the option to extend the duration of the Agreement by two more years, at its sole discretion and the Purchaser to exercise its option for extending the Agreement by two more years or otherwise by 31 st January, 2007. In case the PURCHASER decides to exercise such option, at its sole discretion, the Agreement shall have two more Delivery Periods as follows:
Fourth Delivery Period: 1st July 2007 to 30th June 2008 Fifth Delivery Period: 1 st July 2008 to 30th June 2009” 8.3 The option was indeed exercised before 31.01.2007, on 30.01.2007, with the execution of the Memorandum of Understanding [MoU]. Option once exercised, MMTC was obliged to pick up the stipulated quantities at the stipulated price during the 4th and 5 th delivery periods. The 4th delivery period was from 01.07.2007 to 30.06.2008 and the 5th delivery period was from 01.07.2008 to 30.06.2009. There could be postponement of delivery at the option of the purchaser for a period of three months following each delivery period.
8.4 As per the contract, the price was linked with the price fixed for two other Public Sector Undertakings, the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) and the Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited 334 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports (RINL). For SAIL and RINL, the prices were negotiated by the Government’s Empowered Joint Committee and those contracts were long term contracts for purchase up to 2.5 million MT per annum as opposed to MMTC’s contracted quantity of 4,66,000 Metric Tonnes per annum.
8.5 Addendum No. 2 dated 20.11.2008 to the LTA was only to firm up the terms and conditions. Shri Ved Prakash was a junior member of the Committee in 2008 and by the time he became CMD of MMTC on 14.03.2015 (as mentioned in the objections), the Award had been pronounced by the Arbitral Tribunal on 12.05.2014.
8.6 The dispute commenced in March 2010 and culminated with the judgment of this Court on 17.12.2020 and the allegation of fraud is only to escape the liability under the Award.
9. By 28.10.2024, when the judgment was reserved in the Section 47 objections, MMTC had filed a Civil Suit praying that the Award dated 12.05.2014 is void and unenforceable. It further transpires that, on 29.07.2025, the said Civil Suit has been dismissed as not maintainable and a Regular First Appeal being RFA (OS) (Comm) No. 28 of 2025 is pending before the High Court.
10. On 11.11.2024, MMTC filed an application under Order XXI Rule 29 CPC. By the impugned judgment, the Executing Court dismissed the objections under Section 47 as well as the Order XXI Rule 29 application seeking stay of execution, pending the suit. Aggrieved, MMTC has filed the present Appeal, by way of special leave, and this is how the matter presents itself before us.
11. The High Court, by the impugned judgment, though held that the objections under Section 47 were not maintainable, made a brief observation on merits. It held that on merits that the acts of the Officers bind the Corporation as MMTC being a separate legal entity can only function through its Officers. Only a preliminary enquiry had been registered (when the proceedings were pending in the High Court) and, as such, there is no finding of fraud, cheating and collusion against the Officers of MMTC with the Officers of the decree-holder.
12. We have heard Mr. N. Venkataraman, learned Additional Solicitor General and Mr. Sanat Kumar, learned Senior Advocate, ably assisted by Mr. Akhil Sachar, Ms. Astha Tyagi, Ms. Sunanda Tulsyan [2025] 11 S.C.R. 335MMTC Limited v. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Limited and Ms. Karishma Sharma, learned counsels for the appellant. We have also heard Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul and Mr. Jayant Mehta, learned Senior Advocates, ably assisted by Mr. Sumeet Kachwaha, Mr. Samar Singh Kachwaha, Ms. Ankit Khushu, Ms. Garima Bajaj, Ms. Akanksha Mohan, Mr. Pratyush Khanna and Ms. Ira Mahajan, learned counsels for the respondent.
13. We have carefully considered the submissions and perused the records of the case. Elaborate arguments were heard on 22.05.2025, 23.05.2025, 24.07.2025, 29.08.2025, 18.09.2025 and 25.09.2025, both on maintainability and merits of the Section 47-objections.
14. Before we proceed to consider the contentions, we need to notice one additional fact which transpired during the pendency of the proceedings. It appears that, on 20.07.2025, MMTC had filed a followup complaint with the CBI and the CBI, on 21.07.2025, registered an FIR. We will deal with the same during the course of the judgment.
QUESTION FOR CONSIDERATION: -
15. In the above background, the question that arises for consideration is – Whether the High Court was justified in not entertaining the objections filed by the appellant under Section 47 of CPC and in dismissing the same?
MAINTAINABILITY: -
16. Mr. N. Venkataraman, learned ASG, assailed the impugned judgment by first contending that the finding on maintainability is completely untenable in view of the judgment of this Court in Civil Appeal No. 2896 of 2024 [Electrosteel Steel Limited (Now M/s ESL Steel Limited) vs. ISPAT Carrier Private Limited1] decided on 21.04.2025. According to the learned ASG, this Court has held that the plea of nullity qua an Arbitral Award can be raised in a proceeding under Section 47 of CPC though the scope was very narrow.
17. Before the High Court, considerable arguments were advanced on the question of maintainability of Section 47 objections under the CPC, once the award had been challenged and the Section 34 objection had been dismissed and sustained right up to the highest
1 2025 INSC 525
336 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Court. The High Court held that if the objections under Section 47 are allowed to be entertained during the enforcement proceedings of an Award, it would effectively open a second round for challenging the Award. According to the High Court, this was not intended by the legislature and would defeat the purpose of the A&C Act, apart from delaying the finality of disputes.
18. Mr. N. Venkataraman, learned ASG, drew our attention to the judgment of this Court in Electrosteel (supra). In Electroteel (supra), certain arbitration proceedings between parties therein were commenced on 07.06.2017. On 27.06.2017, proceedings commenced under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016(IBC) against the appellant therein. The arbitration proceedings were kept in abeyance, due to the moratorium. The respondent therein filed a claim before the resolution professional who partly admitted the claim. A resolution plan submitted by the successful resolution applicant therein was approved by the Adjudicating Authority on 17.04.2018 under Section 31 of the IBC. In the plan, ‘nil’ value was provided for the operational creditors. The approval of the plan attained finality right up to this Court and the challenge made by some other operational creditors were not fruitful.
19. The arbitrator, whose proceedings were kept in abeyance, resumed proceedings after the lifting of the moratorium and passed an Award on 06.07.2018 with the appellant therein Electrosteel not even contesting the proceedings. An award for a sum of Rs. 1,59,09,214/- along with interest was made in terms of Section 16 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (for short ‘MSME Act’). No challenge was made under Section 34. Execution came to be levied by the respondent therein, when appellant Electrosteel filed a petition under Section 47 CPC, contending that the Award was a nullity and is not executable. The Executing Court dismissed the petition resulting in a challenge under Article 227 before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the Article 227-petition primarily holding that since arbitral proceedings were initiated prior to the insolvency resolution process, the arbitrator was not barred from proceeding.
20. Before this Court, apart from arguments on Section 31 of the IBC which provided for binding nature of the plan on all the stakeholders, Electrosteel also argued that it was not barred from challenging the [2025] 11 S.C.R. 337MMTC Limited v. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Limited award at the execution stage. The contention was that since the award was a nullity, even if the appellant had not filed a petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act, it would not foreclose them from challenging the award in the execution proceedings. It was argued therein that the Facilitation Council in the said case inherently lacked jurisdiction to arbitrate the claim of the respondent, post the approval of the resolution plan. The respondent therein contended that since the appellant-Electrosteel did not challenge the award it was not open to them to raise a challenge to the award in the Section 47 proceeding.
21. In answering the issue about the maintainability of the objection under Section 47, this Court held that the High Court was correct insofar as it stated that plea of nullity qua an Arbitral award can be raised in a proceeding under Section 47 of CPC, but such a challenge would lie within a very narrow compass. This Court further held that in terms of Section 36 of the A&C Act, an Award can be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the CPC, in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Civil Court. This Court further held as under. “48. ………. Execution of decrees and orders is provided for in Order XXI CPC. The law is well settled that at the stage of execution, an objection as to executability of the decree can be raised but such objection is limited to the ground of jurisdictional infirmity or voidness. The law laid down by this Court in Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi Vs. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman, (1970) 1 SCC 670, is that only a decree which is a nullity can be the subject matter of objection under Section 47 CPC and not one which is erroneous either in law or on facts. The aforesaid proposition of law continues to hold the field.”
22. In conclusion, this Court on the said issue, held that objection to execution of an award under Section 47 was not dependent or contingent upon filing a petition under Section 34. Ultimately insofar as Electrosteel (supra) was concerned, the appeal of Electrosteel was allowed in view of the provisions of the IBC, particularly, Section 30 and 31. It was found that the Facilitation Council did not have jurisdiction to arbitrate the claim after approval of the plan.
23. Electrosteel (supra) held that any challenge under Section 47 would lie within a narrow compass. It has also been held that at the stage 338 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports of execution, an objection as to executability of the decree can be raised, limited to the ground of jurisdictional infirmity or voidness. It has been further held that errors of facts and law cannot be the subject matter of objection under Section 47.
24. In Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi vs. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman 2 , it was held that an Executing Court cannot go behind the decree. It was also held that where a decree is a nullity like, for example, in cases where it is passed without bringing the legal representatives on record or made by a Court which inherently lacked jurisdiction, objections can be raised at the execution stage.
25. It should be pointed out that, in the present case, the objection is not based on the ground of any inherent lack of jurisdiction. What is really argued is that the Officials of MMTC committed fraud on MMTC, their employer and there was collusion and conspiracy between the Officials of MMTC and Anglo in pegging the price at US$ 300 PMT for the 5th delivery period. So, the argument on inexecutability of the decree was based on fraud committed by the Officials of MMTC on MMTC, by collusion and conspiracy resulting in a favourable Award for Anglo. It is also argued that fraud was discovered only after the Award was upheld by this Court.
26. Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, learned senior counsel for Anglo, argued that objections under Section 47 were barred by law; that the A&C Act is a complete Code and Section 5 bars any form of judicial intervention other than what is expressly provided in the Act. According to the learned senior counsel, the A&C Act contains a comprehensive mechanism not just for the conduct of arbitral proceedings but also for challenge to an execution of an arbitral award. Learned senior counsel contended that awards cannot be challenged by a sidewind in Section 47-proceedings. Mr. Kaul contended that the fraud alleged in the present case is a fraud on itself by the employees (on the MMTC) and is not a fraud on the Arbitral Tribunal. According to the learned senior counsel, fraud alleged is a fraud on the formation and validity of the underlying contract. Learned Senior Counsel also submits that these objections were never taken at any point in the earlier stage of litigation.
2 (1970) 1 SCC 670
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 339MMTC Limited v. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Limited
27. In response, Mr. N. Venkataraman, learned ASG drew our attention to a judgment of the English Court and to the following passage in Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley 3, as cited in Ram Preeti Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education and Ors.4:- “I cannot accede to this argument for a moment. No court in this land will allow a person to keep an advantage which he has obtained by fraud. No judgment of a court, no order of a minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything. The court is careful not to find fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved it vitiates judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever;”
28. Learned ASG also relied on the principle that fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal and relied on the judgment in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath and Ors.5, as cited in Ram Preeti Yadav (supra). Learned ASG further relied on Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. 6, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh and Others 7, and judgment of the Delhi High Court in National Projects Construction Corporation v. Royal Construction Company Private Ltd.8, to contend that fraud avoids all judicial acts and that fraud affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the proceedings. By relying on Rajendra Singh (supra), it was contended that no Court or Tribunal can be regarded as powerless to recall its own order if it is convinced that the order was wangled due to fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension as would affect the very basis of the claim.
29. In Rajendra Singh (supra), while allowing the appeal of the Insurance Company to recall two awards of the Motor Accident claims Tribunal and permitting them to resist the claim on the ground of fraud, this Court opened the judgment with the following strong words:- “2. If what the appellant Insurance Company now says is true, then a rank fraud had been played by two claimants 3 (1956) 1 All ER 341
4 (2003) 8 SCC 311
5 (1994) 1 SCC 1
6 (1996) 5 SCC 550
7 (2000) 3 SCC 581
8 2017 SCC Online Del 10944 340 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports who wangled two separate awards from a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal for a bulk sum. But neither the Tribunal nor the High Court of Allahabad, before which the Insurance Company approached for annulling the awards, opened the door but expressed helplessness even to look into the matter and hence the Insurance Company has filed these appeals by special leave.
3. “Fraud and justice never dwell together” (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) is a pristine maxim which has never lost its temper over all these centuries. Lord Denning observed in a language without equivocation that “no judgment of a court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for, fraud unravels everything” (Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley : (1956) 1 All ER 341).
4. For a High Court in India to say that it has no power even to consider the contention that the awards secured are the by-products of stark fraud played on a tribunal, the plenary power conferred on the High Court by the Constitution may become a mirage and people’s faith in the efficacy of the High Courts would corrode. We would have appreciated if the Tribunal or at least the High Court had considered the plea and found them unsustainable on merits, if they are meritless. But when the courts preempted the Insurance Company by slamming the doors against them, this Court has to step in and salvage the situation.”
30. Faced with this situation, Mr. Kaul submitted that even if the case is examined on merits, the MMTC has not made out any case, nor even a prima facie case, by establishing any fraud or collusion warranting a decision that the Award is inexecutable.
31. In the light of the judicial pronouncements discussed hereinabove, we are not inclined to dismiss the objections only on maintainability. Elaborate arguments spanning over several days have been heard on merits and we set out to examine the objection of the appellants on merits to see if any prima facie case of fraud is made out for the appellant to contend that the Award is inexecutable.
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 341MMTC Limited v. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Limited
NATURE OF ALLEGATION OF FRAUD – BREACH OF FIDUCIARY
DUTY: -
32. The fraud that is alleged in this case originates in the grievance of MMTC that its employees in senior managerial roles including directors on the Board committed a breach of fiduciary duty. According to MMTC, there was collusion and criminal conspiracy by them with the Officials of Anglo in fixing the contracted price for the 5th delivery period at US$ 300 PMT. MMTC contends that the market price was only US$ 96.40 PMT for the 4th delivery period. The further contention is that the contracted quantity was far in excess of what was in need for NINL for whom the coal was being sourced. They also seek to explain the delay in unearthing the fraud for the reasons adduced by them which have been discussed in the earlier part of the judgment.
33. It is important to recollect here that we are at a stage where the award has attained finality in view of the dismissal of the appeal by this Court in proceedings arising under Section 34 of the A&C Act. The initiation of the dispute was on 04.03.2010 and the judgment of this Court was delivered on 17.12.2020.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO DETERMINE BREACH OF FIDUCIARY
DUTY: -
34. Before we discuss the nitty-gritty of the merits insofar as they are essential for adjudication of Section 47-objection to examine whether at all even a prima facie case is made out, it is important to set out the legal parameters as laid down in judicial precedents in cases involving breach of fiduciary duty. The broad framework as to what would constitute the breach of fiduciary duty and what are the legal parameters for deciding the same have arisen before courts across the globe in various fact situations. To understand the principles that would govern is even more important in a case like ours where parties have litigated for over a period of 15 years and the allegation of breach of fiduciary duty has cropped up after the Award has had the imprimatur of this Court.
35. As was rightly forewarned in Re Living Images Ltd. 9, the first precaution to be taken is not to fall into the trap of being too wise
9 (1996) 1 BCLC 348
342 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports after the event. In Re Living Images (supra), highlighting the need to discount the benefit of hindsight, the Court observed as under:- “I should add that the court must also be alert to the dangers of hindsight. By the time an application comes before the court, the conduct of the directors has to be judged on the basis of statements given to the Official Receiver, no doubt frequently under stress, and a comparatively small collection of documents selected to support the Official Receiver’s and the respondents’ respective positions.
On the basis of this the court has to pass judgment on the way in which the directors conducted the affairs of the company over a period of days, weeks or, as in this case, months. Those statements and documents are analysed in the clinical atmosphere of the courtroom.
They are analysed, for example, with the benefit of knowing that the company went into liquidation. It is very easy therefore to look at the signals available to the directors at the time and to assume that they, or any other competent director, would have realised that the end was coming. The court must be careful not to fall into the trap of being too wise after the event.” (Emphasis supplied)
36. It is always useful while adjudicating on alleged breach of fiduciary cases to remember the memorable words of Lord Davey in Dovey and The Metropolitan Bank (of England and Wales) Limited v. John Cory10:- “I think the respondent was bound to give his attention to and exercise his judgment as a man of business on the matters which were brought before the board at the meetings which he attended, and it is not proved that he did not do so”
(Emphasis supplied)
10 1901 Appeal Cases 477 [2025] 11 S.C.R. 343MMTC Limited v. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Limited
37. MMTC now launches a ‘no holds barred attack’ on most of the directors and senior managerial personnel who were in office from 2008-2009 right up to those who held office till 2020. The case projected is that the senior managerial personnel including the directors operated as a cabal to defraud MMTC and that it was only after this Court upheld the Award that an enquiry was launched and the fraud unearthed.
TEST OF A REASONABLY COMPETENT DIRECTOR: -
38. Before we examine the merits, we should also bear in mind the principle that in cases like this, a court cannot be swayed by what the Court thinks would have been a reasonable course of action for the director to adopt but the duty is to enquire whether on the available evidence before the Court to consider whether the course adopted by the director was one reasonably competent directors could have adopted. In Sharp and Ors. v. Blank and Ors,11 a judgment by Norris J in Chancery Division in the context of negligence the Court observed as under:
“631. … in testing whether a director has been negligent the question is not simply what the Court thinks it would be reasonable for the director to have done; rather it is what the evidence before the Court establishes were the courses open to reasonably competent directors (the burden lying on a complainant to establish that the course of which complaint is made is not amongst them).
627. … When embarking upon a transaction a director does not guarantee or warrant the success of the venture. Risk is an inherent part of any venture (whether it is called ‘entrepreneurial’ or not). A director is called upon (in the light of the material and the time available) to assess and make a judgment upon that risk in determining the future course of the company. Where a director honestly holds the belief that a particular course is in the best interests of the company then a complainant must show that the director’s belief is one which no reasonable director in the same circumstances could have entertained.”
11 (2019) EWHC 3096 (Ch)
344 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
RANGE OF REASONABLENESS - TEST
39. Dealing with the aspect of how the Court cannot second guess the directors by substituting its opinion and laying down that the enquiry should be whether the decision taken was within the range of reasonableness, it was held by the Court of appeal for Ontario in Maple Leaf Foods Inc. v. Schneider Corp.12 , thus:
“The mandate of the directors is to manage the company according to their best judgment; that judgment must be an informed judgment; it must have a reasonable basis.
If there are no reasonable grounds to support an assertion by the directors that they have acted in the best interests of the company, a court will be justified in finding that the directors acted for an improper purpose.
The law as it has evolved in Ontario and Delaware has the common requirements that the court must be satisfied that the directors have acted reasonably and fairly. The court looks to see that the directors made a reasonable decision not a perfect decision. Provided the decision taken is within a range of reasonableness, the court ought not to substitute its opinion for that of the board even though subsequent events may have cast doubt on the board’s determination. As long as the directors have selected one of several reasonable alternatives, deference is accorded to the board’s decision…...
This formulation of deference to the decision of the Board is known as the “business judgment rule”.
The fact that alternative transactions were rejected by the directors is irrelevant unless it can be shown that a particular alternative was definitely available and clearly more beneficial to the company than the chosen transaction”
(Emphasis supplied)
12 42 OR (3d) 177 [2025] 11 S.C.R. 345MMTC Limited v. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Limited
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: -
40. The above decision also highlights the principle that as long as the decision taken falls within the range of options reasonably available, Court would defer to the decision of the Board under the “Business Judgment Rule”. The said principle was also reiterated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc.,13 in the following words:
“On the broader legal proposition, however, I agree with the appellants that while forecasting is a matter of business judgment, disclosure is a matter of legal obligation. The Business Judgment Rule is a concept well-developed in the context of business decisions but should not be used to qualify or undermine the duty of disclosure. The Business Judgment Rule was well stated by Weiler J.A. in Maple Leaf Foods Inc. v. Schneider Corp. (1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 177 (C.A.): The court looks to see that the directors made a reasonable decision not a perfect decision. Provided the decision taken is within a range of reasonableness, the court ought not to substitute its opinion for that of the board even though subsequent events may have cast doubt on the board’s determination. As long as the directors have selected one of several reasonable alternatives, deference is accorded to the board’s decision ...”
APPLICATION OF THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO THE FACTS AT
HAND
41. With the above legal principles in mind, it is time to apply the same to the facts of the case and consider the contentions raised by the respective parties. The dispute revolves around the 5 th delivery period, i.e., from 01.07.2008 to 30.06.2009, as well as on the status and execution of Addendum No.2 dated 20.11.2008, to the LTA of 07.03.2007. A brief narration of the facts essential for appreciating this aspect of the controversy has also been discussed, while dealing with the rival contentions.
13 (2007) 3 SCR 331 Canadian Supreme Court Reports 346 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
LONG TERM AGREEMENT (LTA) OF 07.03.2007
42. Indisputably, on 07.03.2007, an agreement for sale and purchase of coking coal was executed between the MMTC and Anglo. This is the Long Term Agreement (LTA). Under the LTA, Clauses 1 and 2 are crucial for the determination of the case and they are set out hereunder: “CLAUSE 1: MATERIAL, QUANTITY, QUALITY AND
DELIVERY PERIOD:
1.1 The SELLER shall sell and the PURCHASER shall buy, a) The base quantity during the currency of the contract shall be 466,000 (Four hundred Sixty six thousand)
metric tons (of one thousand kilograms each) firm.
b) During the First Delivery Period (1 st July, 2004 to 30 th June, 2005), a quantity of 464,374 (Four Hundred Sixty Four Thousand, Three Hundred and Seventy Four) metric tons (of one thousand kilograms each) firm quantity of freshly mined and washed “Isaac”, “Moranbah North” and “German Creek” coking coals.
c) During the Second Delivery Period (1 st July, 2005 to 30 th June, 2006) a quantity of 382,769 (Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand, Seven Hundred and Sixty Nine) metric tons (of one thousand kilograms each) firm quantity of freshly mined and washed “Isaac”, “Moranbah North” and “German Creek”
coking coals.
d) During the Third Delivery Period (1 st July, 2006 to 30th June, 2007) a quantity of 466,000 (Four Hundred Sixty Six Thousand) metric tons (of one thousand kilograms each) firm quantity of freshly mined and washed “Isaac”, “Moranbah North” and “German Creek” coking coals.
e) During the subsequent Delivery Periods, in case of the PURCHASER exercising the option to extend the duration of the Agreement by two more years, at its sole discretion, as indicated at Para 1.3 herein below, a quantity of 466,000 [2025] 11 S.C.R. 347MMTC Limited v. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Limited (Four Hundred Sixty Six Thousand) metric tons (of one thousand kilograms each) of freshly mined and washed “Isaac”, “Moranbah North” and “German Creek” coking coals hereinafter referred to as the MATERIALS, in conformity with the Technical Specifications incorporated in Annexure- IIA (applicable for “Isaac” coking coal) and Annexure- IIB (applicable for “Moranbah North” coking coal)
and Annexure IIC (applicable for “German Creek”
coking coal) to this Agreement and which shall constitute an integral part of this Agreement, for use of imported coking coals in the coke ovens in its integrated iron and steel works for production of metallurgical coke. The quality of the prime washed coking coals to be supplied under this Agreement shall under no circumstances be inferior to the Technical Specifications as contained in Annexure IIA, Annexure IIB and Annexure IIC to this Agreement as applicable.
1.1.1 Annual base quantity from 15 th July, 2007 to 30 th June, 2009, in case Purchaser exercises its option to extend the Agreement by 2 years, shall be 466,000 metric tonnes, subject to further discussions at the time of contract extension and the logical contract specification modifications to reflect the changing nature of existing reserves at the Moranbah North and German Creek mining operations will be mutually agreed.
1.2 For the purpose of this Agreement, the Delivery Periods shall be reckoned as follows:
First Delivery Period: 1st July 2004 to 30th June 2005 Second Delivery Period: 1 st July 2005 to 30 th June Third Delivery Period: 1st July 2006 to 30th June 2007 The shipments will be evenly spread during each Delivery Period. The PURCHASER reserves the right to prepone shipments against any Delivery 348 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Period based on its requirement and subject to availability with the SELLER.
The PURCHASER reserves the right to postpone the deliveries to be effected under each Delivery Period by upto 3 months i.e. upto the month of September following each Delivery Period, without any additional financial liability to the PURCHASER.
1.3 The PURCHASER had the option to extend the duration of the Agreement by two more years, at its sole discretion and the Purchaser to exercise its option for extending the Agreement by two more years or otherwise by 31 January, 2007. In case the PURCHASER decides to exercise such option, at its sole discretion, the Agreement shall have two more Delivery Periods as follows:
Fourth Delivery Period: 1 st July 2007 to 30 th June Fifth Delivery Period: 1 st July 2008 to 30 th June 2009
CLAUSE 2: PRICE:
2.1 The firm price of the MATERIALS for the First Delivery Period 1 st July 2004 to 30 th June, 2005 shall be US$ 57.75 (United States Dollars, Fifty Seven and Cents Seventy Five only) per metric ton (of one thousand kilograms each) Free on Board (Trimmed). Port of Loading will be Dalrymple Bay Coal Terminal, Queensland, Australia.
The firm price of the MATERIALS for the Second Delivery Period 1 st July 2005 to 30th June, 2006 shall be US$ 126.75 (United States Dollars One hundred twenty six and Cents Seventy Five only) per metric ton (of one thousand kilograms each) Free on Board (Trimmed). Port of Loading will be Dalrymple Bay Coal Terminal, Queensland, Australia.
2.2 The Price for the delivery of AGREEMENT quantity for subsequent Delivery Periods shall [2025] 11 S.C.R. 349MMTC Limited v. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Limited be fixed in accordance with Para 1 of Annexure I and shall be firm and shall not be subject to any escalation for any reason, whatsoever, until the completion of delivery of the AGREEMENT quantity due for delivery in the relevant Delivery Period with such extensions as might be mutually agreed upon between the PURCHASER and the SELLER.
2.3 The payment of the price of the MATERIALS delivered by the SELLER under this Agreement shall be made by the PURCHASER by means of an irrevocable, without recourse to drawer Letter of Credit providing for payment of the full invoice value of the MATERIALS at sight. The Letter of Credit will provide for full payment in US Dollars at Brisbane, Queensland, Australia. The payment shall be made on presentation of the documents mentioned in Para 6.2 of Annexure - 1.
2.3.1 Notwithstanding the method of payment as mentioned at 2.3 above, the SELLER may also provide Supplier’s credit for 180 days at the terms and conditions mutually agreed upon from time to time, against an irrevocable, without recourse to drawer letter of credit upon presentation of documents mentioned at Para 6.2 of Annexure-I.
The documents in original and by fax referred to hereinabove should be delivered at the following address.
General Manager (Coal & Coke)
MMTC Limited, SCOPE Complex, Core-1, 7, Institutional Area, Lodi Road, New Delhi-110003 India All bank charges at the Seller’s end (outside India) shall be borne and paid for by the SELLER.
All bank charges at the PURCHASER’S end 350 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports (inside India) shall be borne and paid for by the PURCHASER.”
(Emphasis supplied)
43. It will be noticed that under Clause 1.1 (a), the base quantity of 4,66,000 MT was fixed for the currency of the contract. For the first three delivery periods, the quantity was mentioned along with the period. Clause 1.1 (e) dealt with the option of the purchaser to extend the duration by two more years, after the third delivery period. It further provided that if option is exercised a quantity of 4,66,000 MT of coal was to be purchased.
44. Clause 1.3 vested the option in the purchaser to extend the contract. Clause 2.1 provided the firm price of the materials for subsequent delivery periods. As per Clause 2.2, the price was to be fixed in accordance with Para 1 of Annexure-I which dealt with General Conditions of Agreement. Under Para 1 of Annexure-I, the price for delivery of the materials during subsequent delivery periods was to be mutually discussed and settled by the purchaser and seller prior to the commencement of relevant delivery period at the same price as settled between the seller and SAIL/RINL, applicable to the relevant delivery period under the LTAs.
45. Clause 1.1 of the General Conditions of Agreement in Annexure-I is extracted hereunder:
“GENERAL CONDITIONS OF AGREEMENT (GCA)
PARA 1.0: PRICE FIXATION
1.1 The price for delivery of the MATERIALS during subsequent Delivery Periods shall be mutually discussed and settled by the PURCHASER and SELLER prior to commencement of the relevant Delivery Period at the same price as settled between the SELLER AND STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA (SAIL) / RASHTRIYA ISPAT NIGAM LTD (RINL), applicable to the relevant Delivery Period under their respective Long Term Agreements.”
(Emphasis supplied)
[2025] 11 S.C.R. 351MMTC Limited v. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Limited It is undisputed that the third delivery period also passed off smoothly from 01.07.2006 to 30.06.2007.
EXECUTION OF THE MoU AND EXERCISE OF OPTION: -
46. One of the questions that arise is whether option was exercised on or before 31.01.2007 as required under Clause 1.3 of the LTA. While Mr. Venkataraman-learned ASG, contends that it was Addendum No.2 dated 20.11.2008 which was the real agreement, Mr. Kaul submits that, on 30.01.2007, a MoU was executed between MMTC and Anglo. Mr. Kaul contends that while the LTA was not formally signed, deliveries for the first and second delivery period were completed and by 30.01.2007 they were in the process of completing the third delivery period which was from 01.07.2006 to 30.06.2007. It was at this point that on 30.01.2007, a MoU has been executed with the following Clauses:
“1. MMTC to execute the long term contract agreed between the parties in correspondence and provide to Anglo for execution earliest.
2. The parties agree to foreclose a quantity of a) 1615 MT undelivered against first delivery period July 2004- June 2005 of long term contract @ USD 57.75 PMT FOBT and b) 83231 MT undelivered against second delivery period July 2005-June 2006 of long term contract @ USD 126.75 PMT FOBT
2. Supply of a quantity of 466,000 MT @ USD 114.00 PMT FOBT for third delivery period July 2006-June 2007. The delivery period is extended to September 30,2007.
3. Supply of a quantity 466,000 MT at price to be finalized by EJC for SAIL and RINL, for fourth delivery period July 2007- June 2008. The delivery period is extendable up to September 2008.
4. The contract is extended by a further two years in accordance with clause 1.3 of the long term agreement.
352 [2025] 11 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Fourth delivery period 1st July 2007 to 30th June 2008.
Fifth delivery period 1st July 2008 to 30th June 2009.
The price terms & Conditions of coal supply to MMTC for fourth and fifth delivery periods shall be as per Anglo-Agreement UNL/SAIL”
(Emphasis supplied)
47. It will be noticed that this MoU was signed on 30.01.2007 and this is a fact not disputed by the learned ASG and, in fact, filed by the learned ASG as part of his additional documents. This date was one day before the deadline of 31.01.2007.#
DELIVERIES DID NOT AWAIT FORMAL EXECUTION OF
AGREEMENTS: -
48. As is clear from the MoU, based on the agreement in the correspondence, deliveries were taking place and by the time the LTA was signed, it was mid-way during the third delivery period. As could be seen from the MoU, even the 4th delivery period was agreed upon and passed on without any dispute. The 5 th delivery period was to begin on 01.07.2008, when the 4 th delivery period stood extended till 30.09.2008.
PRICES PEGGED TO SAIL/RINL PRICE: -
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