Harvinder Singh @ Bachhu v. The State of Himachal Pradesh
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 907; [2023] 13 S.C.R. 1157
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice M.M. Sundresh, Justice Only Because He Was Educated and A God Fearing Ss. 302, Justice 376, Justice 511, Justice 454
- Decided
- 13 Oct 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 266/2015
- Sections
- 34, 3, 8, 161, 454, 134, 378, 384
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:28 am. Original source ↗
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CASE DETAILS
HARVINDER SINGH @ BACHHU v.
THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 266-267 of 2015)
OCTOBER 13, 2023
[M. M. SUNDRESH AND J. B. PARDIWALA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the order of acquittal and convicting the appellant for murder and attempt to rape relying on the testimony of the prosecution witness despite contradictions, only because he was educated and a god fearing person.
Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 302, 376, 511, 454, 380 r/w s.34 – Murder and attempt to rape – High Court convicted the appellant for murder and attempt to rape, setting aside the order of acquittal by the trial court – Correctness:
Held: Trial court gave substantial reasons for arriving at its conclusion – However, the High Court was persuaded by the homicidal death of the deceased while ignoring multiple findings rendered by the trial court – High Court after holding that a homicide had occurred, blindly placed reliance upon the evidence of the informant and misconstrued the concept of reputation and blindly believed his evidence – Furthermore, the statement of one of the witness that there was no prior enmity – Also non-availability of the fingerprint report and non-examination of the witnesses though the witnesses were available – Prosecution failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt, thus, the appellant entitled to the benefit of doubt – Impugned order passed by the High Court set aside and that of the trial court is restored. [Para 26, 28-29, 31] Evidence Act ,1872 – s.3 – Fact – Reputation, forming part of facts – Connectivity between reputation and character – Evidentiary value of person’s reputation:
[2023] 13 S.C.R. 1157 : 2023 INSC 907 1158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
Held: Reputation is indeed a fact – Reputation has to be seen from the point of view of an identifiable group while character is what a person really is – Character is to be formed while reputation is to be acquired – Character may lead to formation of one’s reputation – Character and reputation do have an element of interconnectivity but both are distinct and different – Reputation thus forms part of internal facts which arise through thoughts and feelings such as love, anger, fear, hatred and intention etc and thus, it is required to be proved in the form of opinion of persons who form it accordingly – When reputation is to be taken as a relevant fact, its evidentiary value becomes restrictive and limited – It is indeed a weak piece of evidence when becomes relatable to a fact in issue – Court cannot declare the reputation of a person based upon its own opinion merely because a person is educated and said to be Godfearing, that by itself will not create a positive reputation – Courts are not expected to get carried away by the mere background of a person especially when his conduct, being a relevant fact, creates serious doubt – Conduct of a witness is a relevant fact to decide, determine and prove the reputation of a witness. [Para 16-18] Evidence – Circumstantial Evidence – Reliance upon:
Held: One has to be circumspect and cautious while undertaking the exercise of linking the evidence available – Courts should not lose sight of the fact that such evidence should unerringly lead and point out the accused alone, of course, on the facts of each case. [Para 22] Evidence – Double Presumption – Presumption of innocence:
Held: When the view of the trial court, which had the benefit of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses, is both a possible and plausible one, it shall not be replaced by yet another one – Presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets strengthened by the decision of the trial court when he gets an order of acquittal. [Para 23] Witnesses – Material witnesses – Non-examination of:
Held: Non-examination of a witness, though material, by itself would not vitiate the trial – However, when facts are so glaring and with the witnesses available, particularly when they are likely to give a different story, the Court shall take adequate note of it – When 1159HARVINDER SINGH @ BACHHU v.
THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
a circumstance has been brought to the notice of the Court by the defense and the Court is convinced that a prosecution witness has been deliberately withheld, as it in all probability would destroy its version, it has to take adverse notice – Anything contrary would be an affront to the concept of fair play. [Para 24] Evidence – Effect of absconding:
Held: Subsequent conduct would be a relevant fact u/s. 8 of the Evidence Act - However, such a fact has to be proved – Mere absconding by itself cannot constitute a sole factor to convict a person because an accused may abscond as he might fear an illegal arrest. [Para 25]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Lahu Kamlakar Patil And Another v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 6 SCC 417 : [2012] 9 SCR 1173; Narendrasinh Keshubhai Zala v. State of Gujarat 2023 (4) SCALE 478; Rajesh Yadav And Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2022) 12 SCC 200; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 : [1985] 1 SCR 88; Jafarudheen and Others v. State of Kerala (2022) 8 SCC 440; Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing (2001) 6 SCC 145; Durga Burman Roy v. State of Sikkim (2014) 13 SCC 35 : [2014] 8 SCR 311 – referred to. R. v. Hodge (1838) 2 Lew 227 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos.
266-267 of 2015.
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.06.2014 and 11.07.2014 of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in Criminal Appeal No. 411 of 2007.
Appearances:
Mansoor Ali, Adv. for the Appellant.
Rishi Malhotra, Jaydip Patil, Advs. for the Respondent.
1160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
M. M. SUNDRESH, J.
1. Conviction rendered for life imprisonment by the Division Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, by setting at naught the order of acquittal rendered by the Additional Sessions Judge (Presiding Officer), Fast Track Court, Solan, Himachal Pradesh, is under challenge in these appeals.
BRIEF FACTS
2. The appellant, along with the co-accused (since deceased), was charged under Sections 302, 376, 511, 454, 380 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”). The case of the prosecution is that PW1 while making a visit to his cow-shed on 17.06.2003 at about 3.15 pm heard the cries of the deceased frantically asking him for help stating “Mama ji Bachao”. He went to the house of the deceased, and called out the name of her husband (PW5) but received no response. Thereafter, he heard the hushed voices of the accused, two in number. He then saw both of them at the main gate. Accused No. 1 was found with blood stains on his shirt while smelling of alcohol. The accused threatened him with dire consequences and made an attempt to grab him. After extricating himself from the accused, he ran towards his house. PW1 informed one Chandrawati about the incident, who in turn advised him to wait till his wife joins. It was preceded by an enquiry with the mother-in-law of the deceased.
3. After the advent of PW2, his wife, he, along with her and Chandrawati made a visit to the house of the deceased. They saw two children of the deceased who were studying in 5th and 7th standards respectively, at the house. On inquiry they informed that their mother was sleeping. PW1 and PW2, along with Chandrawati, entered the room and saw the deceased in a pool of blood, half-naked. PW2 sent telephonic information to the police station, followed by the registration of the first information report at about 6.30 pm at the instance of PW1.
4. The first information report was sent after about 5 hours, despite the office of the Magistrate being very near to the police station. The inquest was done on the same day. Of the two witnesses who signed the inquest report, one has not been examined. It was found that certain articles including gold jewels were missing while liquor bottles were recovered.
5. Though, fingerprints were lifted and sent to the expert, there was no report as it appears that there was no sufficient indication of the availability of adequate marks.
6. A charge-sheet was filed on 14.05.2004, primarily placing reliance upon the statement of PW1, who was incidentally a literate and presumably a God-fearing man. The children of the deceased gave their statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “CrPC”) but they, along with scores of other witnesses, though, not seen the occurrence, have not been examined.
7. Both the accused were found absconding and curiously they have been arrested on the same day and at the same time – 16.01.2006, after they were declared as proclaimed offenders on 10.09.2003. Recovery of the stolen articles was made, inclusive of gold jewels, from the custody of PW6, a lady from Tibet, with whom they were allegedly pledged, though the prosecution was not very clear as to whether they were sold or pledged.
8. A supplementary charge-sheet was filed on 01.04.2006, slightly modifying the earlier charge-sheet, giving a narration that the accused broke open the house of the deceased and PW5, her husband, due to previous enmity and when she made her entry into the house, she was raped and murdered. The murder took place as she was resisting rape and tried to attack the accused with a sword, recovered from the place of occurrence, which was actually used by them.
9. Before the trial court, the prosecution has examined 16 witnesses, while a police officer has been examined on behalf of the accused based upon Exhibits D1 and D2, statements recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC, given by the minor children of the deceased, to elucidate the contradiction in the case of the prosecution.
10. PW1, as already stated, is the informant and PW2 is his wife. PW3 is the witness to the recoveries made from the house of the deceased. PW5 is the husband of the deceased and PW6 is the lady from Tibet to whom jewels were pledged. PW9 is the doctor who conducted the post-mortem. This witness had deposed that there was no evidence of rape. PW16 and PW13 HARVINDER SINGH @ BACHHU v.
THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.] 1162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
are the Investigating Officers who filed the initial and the supplementary charge sheets respectively.
11. The trial court, after a complete and thorough examination of the evidence placed before it, rendered an order of acquittal. It disbelieved the testimony of PW1 on account of his unnatural conduct. This witness had chosen not to react and to take follow-up action even after the accused left the place. It took into consideration the statement given by the children under Section 161 of the CrPC that this witness advised the children to tell their mother to give a complaint to the police, though she was found dead. There were a number of houses adjoining the home of the deceased. It was not known as to how PW1 could come to the conclusion about the manner of the death, if according to his statement, he had not actually seen the occurrence.
12. The Court further found that there was no explanation as to why the fingerprint report has not been placed on record. The children of the deceased, her mother-in-law and her neighbour Chandrawati have not been examined, despite being material witnesses. Taking note of the statement of PW6, the trial court observed that the so-called recovery is highly doubtful as she has stated that the jewels have been pledged, but not sold.
13. The High Court in the impugned order set aside the acquittal rendered by the trial court by substantially placing reliance upon the evidence of PW1. It held that the evidence of PW1 would indicate the prior enmity between PW5 and the accused. PW9 has clearly stated that the death was homicidal. Recovery of the sword and knife has been proved by the evidence of PW3, from the scene of occurrence. PW1 being a natural, educated and God-fearing person, his testimony has to be accepted. The evidence of PW2 is also in tune with that of PW1. PW5 has also deposed that he was informed by PW1 that the accused was seen fleeing away towards the hillside. The fact that the accused were declared as the proclaimed offenders would add substance to the case of the prosecution. Non-examination of the material witnesses and the non-availability of the fingerprint report would not render the prosecution version doubtful. However, it was held that the offences pertaining to rape and theft are not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the appellant was convicted for committing murder with a further conviction for an attempt 1163HARVINDER SINGH @ BACHHU v.
THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.] to rape. Incidentally, conviction was also rendered for house breaking under Section 454 of the IPC.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT
14. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant made a primary contention that the High Court without specifically pointing out the conclusion arrived at by the trial court on a factual analysis has chosen to reverse it. Reliance made on the evidence of PW1, despite existence of contradictions, ought not to have been undertaken. The question is not as to whether there occurred a homicidal death or not but who did it. The lapses on the part of the prosecution would go to the root of the case especially when there was no explanation forthcoming. Having not agreed with the version of the prosecution qua the recovery, the High Court ought not to have placed reliance on the doubtful testimony of PW1.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT
15. Repelling the contentions made, the learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that it is well open to the High Court to reappreciate the evidence available on record, which was actually done. In the absence of any motive on the part of PW1 to implicate the appellant on purpose, the High Court rightly ignored minor contradictions. Having found the existence of prior enmity between accused and PW5, a conviction was accordingly rendered. The mere fact that the appellant was acquitted for rape while holding him guilty for an attempt to rape, is itself a testimony to hold that there was application of mind by the High Court. Inasmuch as relevant materials having been taken note of, the order of conviction requires to be confirmed.
REPUTATION IS A FACT
Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 “3. Interpretation clause.—In this Act the following words and expressions are used in the following senses, unless a contrary intention appears from the context:— xxx xxx xxx “Fact”.—“Fact” means and includes— 1164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
(1) any thing, state of things, or relation of things, capable of being perceived by the senses;
(2) any mental condition of which any person is conscious. Illustrations
(a) That there are certain objects arranged in a certain order in a certain place, is a fact.
(b) That a man heard or saw something, is a fact.
(c) That a man said certain words, is a fact.
(d) That a man holds a certain opinion, has a certain intention, acts in good faith or fraudulently, or uses a particular word in a particular sense, or is or was at a specified time conscious of a particular sensation, is a fact.
(e) That a man has a certain reputation, is a fact.”
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
16. Reputation is indeed a fact as defined under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as “Evidence Act”). Facts can broadly be divided into external and internal facts. External facts are those which can be perceived by the five senses while internal facts arise through thoughts and feelings such as love, anger, fear, hatred and intention etc. A reputation has to be seen from the point of view of an identifiable group while character is what a person really is. Character is to be formed while reputation is to be acquired. Character may lead to formation of one’s reputation but both are distinct and different. Reputation thus forms part of internal facts and therefore it is required to be proved in the form of opinion of persons who form it accordingly. When reputation is to be taken as a relevant fact, its evidentiary value becomes restrictive and limited. It is indeed a weak piece of evidence when becomes relatable to a fact in issue.
17. A court of law cannot declare the reputation of a person based upon its own opinion merely because a person is educated and said to be God-fearing, that by itself will not create a positive reputation.
18. Character and reputation do have an element of interconnectivity. Reputation is predicated on the general traits of character. In other words, character may be subsumed into reputation. Courts are not expected to get carried away by the mere background of a person especially while acting as an appellate forum, when his conduct, being a relevant fact, creates serious doubt. In other words, the conduct of a witness under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, is a relevant fact to decide, determine and prove the reputation of a witness. When the conduct indicates that it is unnatural from the perspective of normal human behaviour, the so-called reputation takes a back seat.
19. We wish to place reliance on the decision of this Court in Lahu Kamlakar Patil And Another v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 6 SCC 417, “26. From the aforesaid pronouncements, it is vivid that witnesses to certain crimes may run away from the scene and may also leave the place due to fear and if there is any delay in their examination, the testimony should not be discarded. That apart, a court has to keep in mind that different witnesses react differently under different situations. Some witnesses get a shock, some become perplexed, some start wailing and some run away from the scene and yet some who have the courage and conviction come forward either to lodge an FIR or get themselves examined immediately. Thus, it differs from individuals to individuals. There cannot be uniformity in human reaction. While the said principle has to be kept in mind, it is also to be borne in mind that if the conduct of the witness is so unnatural and is not in accord with acceptable human behaviour allowing variations, then his testimony becomes questionable and is likely to be discarded.
27. Keeping in mind the aforesaid, we shall proceed to scrutinise the evidence of PW 2. As is evincible from his deposition, on seeing the assault he got scared, ran away from the hotel and hid himself behind the pipes till early morning. He went home, changed his clothes and rushed to Pune [Ed.: Since the case has been tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, Raigad, Alibag, it would seem that the incident took place in Alibag, Raigad, which is about 300 km from Pune.] . He did HARVINDER SINGH @ BACHHU v.
THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.] 1166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
not mention about the incident to his family members. He left for Pune and the reason for the same was also not stated to his family members. He did not try to contact the police from his residence which he could have. After his arrival at Pune, he did not mention about the incident in his sister-in-law’s house. After coming back from Pune, on the third day of the occurrence, his wife informed him that the police had come and that Bhau, who had accompanied him, was dead. It is interesting to note that in the statement under Section 161 of the Code, PW 2 had not stated that he was hiding himself out of fear or he was scared of the police. In the said statement, the fact that he was informed by his wife that Bhau was dead was also not mentioned. One thing is clear from his testimony that on seeing the incident, he was scared and frightened and ran away from the hotel. He was frightened and hid himself behind the pipes throughout the night and left for home the next morning. But his conduct not to inform his wife or any family member and leaving for Pune and not telling anyone there defies normal human behaviour. He has also not stated anywhere that he was so scared that even after he reached home, he did not go to the police station which was hardly at any distance from his house. There is nothing in his testimony that he was under any kind of fear or shock when he arrived at his house. It is also surprising that he had not told his family members and he went to Pune without disclosing the reason and after he arrived from Pune and on being informed by his wife that his companion Bhau had died, he went to the police station. We are not oblivious of the fact that certain witnesses in certain circumstances may be frightened and behave in a different manner and due to that, they may make themselves available to the police belatedly and their examination gets delayed. But in the case at hand, regard being had to the evidence brought on record and, especially, non-mentioning of any kind of explanation for rushing away to Pune, the said factors make the veracity of his version doubtful. His evidence cannot be treated as so trustworthy and unimpeachable to record a conviction against the appellants. The learned trial court as well as the High Court has made an endeavour to connect the links and inject theories like fear, behavioural pattern, tallying of injuries inflicted on the deceased with the post-mortem report and convicted the appellants. In the absence of any kind of clinching evidence to connect the appellants with the crime, we are disposed to think that it would not be appropriate to sustain the conviction.” (emphasis supplied)
20. In Narendrasinh Keshubhai Zala v. State of Gujarat, 2023 (4)
SCALE 478,
“8. It is a settled principle of law that doubt cannot replace proof. Suspicion, howsoever great it may be, is no substitute of proof in criminal jurisprudence [Jagga Singh v. State of Punjab, 1994 Supp
(3) SCC 463]. Only such evidence is admissible and acceptable as is permissible in accordance with law. In the case of a sole eye witness, the witness has to be reliable, trustworthy, his testimony worthy of credence and the case proven beyond reasonable doubt. Unnatural conduct and unexplained circumstances can be a ground for disbelieving the witness. This Court in the case of Anil Phukan v. State of Assam, (1993) 3 SCC 282 has held that:
“3. … So long as the single eyewitness is a wholly reliable witness the courts have no difficulty in basing conviction on his testimony alone. However, where the single eyewitness is not found to be a wholly reliable witness, in the sense that there are some circumstances which may show that he could have an interest in the prosecution, then the courts generally insist upon some independent corroboration of his testimony, in material particulars, before recording conviction. It is only when the courts find that the single eyewitness is a wholly unreliable witness that his testimony is discarded in toto and no amount of corroboration can cure that defect…”
(emphasis supplied)
21. On the issue of appreciation of evidence, we wish to place reliance upon the decision of this Court in Rajesh Yadav And Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2022) 12 SCC 200, “13. The definition of the word “proved” though gives an impression of a mere interpretation, in effect, is the heart and soul HARVINDER SINGH @ BACHHU v.
THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.] 1168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
of the entire Act. This clause, consciously speaks of proving a fact by considering the “matters before it”. The importance is to the degree of probability in proving a fact through the consideration of the matters before the court. What is required for a court to decipher is the existence of a fact and its proof by a degree of probability, through a logical influence.
14. Matters are necessary, concomitant material factors to prove a fact. All evidence would be “matters” but not vice versa. In other words, matters could be termed as a genus of which evidence would be a species. Matters also add strength to the evidence giving adequate ammunition in the Court’s sojourn in deciphering the truth. Thus, the definition of “matters” is exhaustive, and therefore, much wider than that of “evidence”. However, there is a caveat, as the court is not supposed to consider a matter which acquires the form of an evidence when it is barred in law. Matters are required for a court to believe in the existence of a fact.
15. Matters do give more discretion and flexibility to the court in deciding the existence of a fact. They also include all the classification of evidence such as circumstantial evidence, corroborative evidence, derivative evidence, direct evidence, documentary evidence, hearsay evidence, indirect evidence, oral evidence, original evidence, presumptive evidence, primary evidence, real evidence, secondary evidence, substantive evidence, testimonial evidence, etc.
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