Rajo @ Rajwa @ Rajendra Mandal v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 771; [2023] 11 S.C.R. 484
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, Justice 1860 and S.27 of the Arms Act
- Decided
- 25 Aug 2023
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) No. 252/2023
- Sections
- 27, 432, 432(2), 302, 432(1), 433A, 433, 32, 432CR, 429
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:28 am. Original source ↗
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CASE DETAILS
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v.
THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.
(Writ Petition (Criminal) No(s). 252 of 2023)
AUGUST 25, 2023
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Petitioner serving a sentence of life imprisonment for commission of offences punishable u/ss.302/34 of the IPC, 1860 and s.27 of the Arms Act, 1959 sought direction for his premature release on the ground that he has been in custody for 24 years without grant of remission or parole.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Remission – Grant of:
Held: Remission Board rejected the petitioner’s application for premature release twice – The reason for rejection of the petitioner’s application was the adverse report submitted by the presiding judge in the first round, which was perfunctorily relied upon and reiterated in the report submitted by the then presiding judge in the second round as well – Both the reports submitted by the presiding judges (at the relevant time), demonstrate a casual opinion, based solely on the judicial record which presumably consisted of the finding of guilt, by the trial court and High Court – Overemphasis on the presiding judge’s opinion and complete disregard of comments of other authorities, while arriving at its conclusion, would render the appropriate government’s decision on a remission application, unsustainable – The appropriate government, should take a holistic view of all the opinions received (in terms of the relevant rules), including the judicial view of the presiding judge of the concerned court, keeping in mind the purpose and objective, of remission – Remission Board to reconsider the petitioner’s application for remission afresh – Concerned presiding judge to provide an opinion on the petitioner’s application for premature release, by examining the judicial record, and provide adequate reasoning, taking [2023] 11 S.C.R. 484 : 2023 INSC 771 into account the factors laid down in Laxman Naskar case – Given the long period of incarceration already suffered by the writ petitioner and his age, the Remission Board should render its decision, preferably within three months from the date of this judgment.[Paras 14-17, 25] Sentencing – Judicial exercise vis-à-vis executive function – Statutory and Constitutional powers– s.432 CrPC; Articles 72, 161, Constitution of India:
Held: Sentencing is a judicial exercise of power – The act thereafter of executing the sentence awarded, however, is a purely executive function which includes the grant of remission, commutation, pardon, reprieves, or suspension of sentence – This executive power is traceable to Article 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India – Whilst the statutory (u/s.432 CrPC) and constitutional (under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution) powers are distinct- the former limited power, is still an imprint of the latter (much wider power), and must be understood as such and placed in this context – This executive power which is inherently discretionary in nature, has to be exercised fairly, reasonably, and not arbitrarily – Absence to do so, would compel the court to exercise its judicial review and in appropriate cases remit the matter for reconsideration – Procedure laid out in s.432(2), has been held to be mandatory.[Paras 9 and 10] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Remission – Parameters to be considered – Discussed.[Para 11] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Remission – Role of presiding judge’s view – Weightage to be attached:
Held: The discretion that the executive is empowered with in executing a sentence, would be denuded of its content, if the presiding judge’s viewwhich is formed in all likelihood, largely (if not solely) on the basis of the judicial record- is mechanically followed by the concerned authority – Such an approach has the potential to strike at the heart, and subvert the concept of remission- as a reward and incentive encouraging actions and behaviour geared towards reformation- in a modern legal system – If the presiding judge’s report is only reflective of the facts and circumstances that led to the conclusion of the convict’s guilt, and is merely a reiteration of those circumstances available to the judge at the time of sentencing (some 14 or more years earlier, as the case may be), then the appropriate government should attach weight to this finding, accordingly – Such a report, cannot be RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE
OF BIHAR & ORS.
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
relied on as carrying predominance, if it focusses on the crime, with little or no attention to the criminal.[Paras 16 and 17] Sentencing – Heinous crimes:
Held: Even at the stage of sentencing, the judge ideally is to exercise discretion after looking at a wide range of factors relating to the criminal and not just the crime; but as noticed in numerous precedents that have dealt with sentencing in the commission of heinous crimes, this is unfortunately, often not the reality – Guidance has been offered by this court on how to mitigate this in recent years, but it is pragmatic to acknowledge that it will require time for our criminal justice system to incorporate, and uniformly reach such standards.
Sentencing – Imprisonment – Aim and goal of – Discussed.[Para 19] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Remission – Report submitted by the SP in the second round was adverse – Duty of the appropriate government:
Held: Report submitted by the Superintendent of Police in the second round (was diametrically different from that which was submitted in the first round), was adverse – In each case, the appropriate government has to be cognizant of the latent (not always) prejudices of the crime, that the police as well as the investigating agency, may be citing- especially in a case such as the present one, where the slain victims were police personnel themselves, i.e., members of the police force – These biases may inform the report, and cannot be given determinative value – Apart from the other considerations (on the nature of the crime, whether it affected the society at large, the chance of its recurrence, etc.), the appropriate government should while considering the potential of the convict to commit crimes in the future, whether there remains any fruitful purpose of continued incarceration, and the socio-economic conditions, review: the convict’s age, state of heath, familial relationships and possibility of reintegration, extent of earned remission, and the post-conviction conduct including, but not limited to- whether the convict has attained any educational qualification whilst in custody, volunteer services offered, job/work done, jail conduct, whether they were engaged in any socially aimed or productive activity, and the overall development as a human being – The Board should not entirely rely either on the presiding judge, or the report prepared by the police – It would also serve the ends of justice if the appropriate government had the benefit of a report contemporaneously prepared by a qualified psychologist after interacting/interviewing the convict that has applied for premature release. [Paras 20 and 21] Adminstration of Criminal Justice – Sentencing – Balancing societal interests with the rights of the convict:
Held: The majority view and the minority view in Sriharan underlined the need to balance societal interests with the rights of the convict (that in a given case, the sentence should not be unduly harsh, or excessive) – The court acknowledged that it lies within the executive’s domain to grant, or refuse premature release; however, such power would be guided, and the discretion informed by reason, stemming from appropriate rules.[Para 22] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Remission – Different policies on the date of conviction and on the date of consideration for premature release:
Held: This court had grappled with the situation of different remission policies/rules prevailing at different points of the convict’s sentence- i.e., when the policy on the date of conviction, and on the date of consideration for premature release, are different – It has been held that the policy prevailing on the date of the conviction20 , would be applicable – However, in Jagdish it was also recognised that if a more liberal policy exists on the date of consideration, the benefit should be provided – In the present case, on the date of conviction (24.05.2001), it is the pre-2002 policy that was applicable – In the old pre-2002 policy, there is no mention of any ineligibility criteria, much less one that is analogous to Rule 529(iv)(b) of the 2002 policy, which was cited by the Remission Board in its rejection of the petitioner’s application on 20.04.2023. [Paras 23 and 24]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Union of India v. V. Sriharan [2015] 14 SCR 613 – followed.
State of Haryana v. Jagdish [2010] 3 SCR 716; Laxman Naskar v. State of W.B (2000) 2 SCC 595 : [2000] 1 SCR 796 – relied on.
Sangeet v. State of Haryana [2012] 13 SCR 85; Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra [1961] 3 SCR 440; Maru Ram v. Union of India [1981] 1 SCR 1196; Sarat Chandra Rabha v. Khagendranath Nath [1961] 2 RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE
OF BIHAR & ORS.
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
SCR 133; Kehar Singh v. Union of India [1988] Supp. 3 SCR 1102; State of Haryana v. Mohinder Singh [2000] 1 SCR 698; Sangeet v. State of Haryana [2012] 13 SCR 85; Rajan v. The Home Secretary, Home Department of Tamil Nadu [2019] 6 SCR 1035; Ram Chander v. State of Chhattisgarh [2022] 4 SCR 1103; Union of India v. V. Sriharan [2015] 14 SCR 613; Laxman Naskar v. State of W.B. (2000) 7 SCC 626 : [2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 62; Jaswant Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 35; Swamy Shraddananda
(2) @ Mural Manohar Mishra v. State of Karnataka [2008] 11 SCR 93; Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra [2009] 9 SCR 90; Chhannu Lal Verma v. State of Chattisgarh [2018] 14 SCR 355; Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra [2018] 14 SCR 585; and Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2022] 9 SCR 452; Maru Ram v. Union of India [1981] 1 SCR 1196; State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar, (2021) 9 SCC 292 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Criminal)
No. 252 of 2023.
(UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA)
Appearances:
Randhir Kumar Ojha, Adv. for the Petitioner.
Azmat Hayat Amanullah, T. G. Shahi, Advs. for the Respondents. JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. The petitioner, currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment for commission of offences punishable under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 approaches this court under its Article 32 jurisdiction, seeking appropriate direction to the first respondent to prematurely release him, on the ground that he has been in custody for 24 years without grant of remission or parole.
2. The petitioner (aged 40, at the time), with three other co-accused persons, was convicted1 on 24.05.2001 for the murder of three persons – two of which were police personnel (dafadars) and the third being a chowkidar, who were all on duty during a village mela – by indiscriminate firing, while they were waiting to be served food. The petitioner was accused to be one among those who had shot at the deceased victims, in a premediated and planned manner. The trial court sentenced the petitioner and three other co-accused persons to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life; while three other accused were acquitted on all charges. A co-accused (Baudha Mandal), who was the first to fire at the victims, was killed during the pendency of investigation/trial in a police encounter. The petitioner’s conviction and sentence (along with that of three other co-accused convicts), was affirmed by the High Court on 01.09.2005.2 Owing to a lack of means and awareness, the petitioner could not approach this court to challenge the same, and his conviction by the High Court, attained finality.
3. Pursuant to an order of this court, after notice was issued, the respondent-state has filed an affidavit indicating the computation of his period of sentence undergone, the status of his plea for remission to be granted, as well as the remission policies (as amended from time to time) of the state government. This affidavit confirms that the petitioner long completed 14 years of actual imprisonment (on 19.07.2013), and in fact has, as on 26.07.2023, completed over 24 years of actual imprisonment. Accounting for the remission earned (of over 4 years and 8 months of remission, i.e., a total 1694 days), he has served 28 years, 8 months and 21 days. It is pertinent to mention that he completed 20 years of actual imprisonment on 19.07.2019, and if computed with remission earned as per prevailing rules, then on 05.11.2014 itself.
4. After the completion of the mandatory 14 years actual imprisonment, and 20 years of custody with remission, the petitioner’s case (application dated 14.04.2021) was considered by the Remission Board on 19.05.2021. In accordance with the prescribed rules, prior to this meeting, the opinion of the Presiding Officer of the convicting court, probation officer and 1 By the Sessions Court, Madhepura in Sessions Case No. 123/2000 and Sessions Case No. 194/2000.
2 By the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 327/2001 (which was disposed along with Criminal Appeal No 309/2001, filed by three co-accused persons). RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] 490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
Superintendent of Police, was also sought. The Board rejected the petitioner’s application for premature release – despite a favourable report by the Probation Officer and Superintendent of Police – noting the adverse report by the Presiding Judge.
5. After this rejection, a writ petition was filed before the High Court, seeking relief similar to what is sought in the present petition. It was however dismissed for non-prosecution. Later, in terms of prevailing rules3, the petitioner’s proposal was again put up before the Remission Board in its meeting dated 20.04.2023. This time, the proposal was rejected in light of adverse/negative opinions received from the Superintendent of Police, Purnea and the Presiding Officer of the convicting court, and noting Rule 529(iv)(b) of the remission policy contained in the Bihar Jail Manual (as amended by Notification dated 10.12.2002 and notified on 28.12.2002). The relevant rule is extracted below:
“(iv)Ineligibility for premature release The following category of convicted prisoners undergoing life sentence may not be considered eligible for premature release. – a) Prisoners convicted of the heinous offences such as rape, dacoity, terrorist crimes, etc.
b) Prisoners who have been convicted for organized murder in a premeditated manner and in an organized manner.
c) Professional murders who have been found guilty of murder by hiring.
d) Convicted prisoners, who commit murder while involving in smuggling operations or who are guilty of murder of public servants on duty”
(emphasis supplied)
6. These are the facts, leading to the present writ petition. Analysis and conclusion
7. Section 432(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereafter ‘CrPC’) empowers the appropriate government to suspend or remit sentences and applies only in the case of additional remission, over and above what is earned as per the jail manual or statutory rules.4 Section 432(2) prescribes 3 Rule 6(d) of the Notification No. 3106 dated 10.12.2002 which stipulates that rejection of proposal for pre-mature release shall not be a bar for reconsideration. 4 Sangeet v. State of Haryana[2012] 13 SCR 85.
the procedure whereby the appropriate government may seek the opinion of the Presiding Judge of the court before, or by which the applicant had been convicted, on whether the applications should be allowed or rejected, along with reasoning. Section 432(2) of the CrPC is extracted for ready reference: “432. Power to suspend or remit sentences.—(1)***
(2) Whenever an application is made to the appropriate Government for the suspension or remission of a sentence, the appropriate Government may require the Presiding Judge of the Court before or by which the conviction was had or confirmed, to state his opinion as to whether the application should be granted or refused, together with his reasons for such opinion and also to forward with the statement of such opinion a certified copy of the record of the trial or of such record thereof as exists.”
8. This statutory power to grant remission is limited by Section 433A (which was incorporated in the CrPC subsequently5) when it comes to those convicted for an offence where death is one of the punishments: “433-A. Restriction on powers of remission or commutation in certain cases.—Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 432, where a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction of a person for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law, or where a sentence of death imposed on a person has been commuted under Section 433 into one of imprisonment for life, such person shall not be released from prison unless he had served at least fourteen years of imprisonment.”
9. Sentencing is a judicial exercise of power. The act thereafter of executing the sentence awarded, however, is a purely executive function – which includes the grant of remission, commutation, pardon, reprieves, or suspension of sentence.6 This executive power is traceable to Article 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India, by which the President of India, and Governor of the State, respectively, are empowered to grant pardons and to suspend, remit or commute sentences in certain cases. Whilst the statutory 5 By Act 45 of 1978, sec. 32 (w.e.f. 18.12.1978).
6 See Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra [1961] 3 SCR 440; Maru Ram v. Union of India[1981] 1 SCR 1196; Sarat Chandra Rabha v. Khagendranath Nath [1961] 2 SCR 133; Kehar Singh v. Union of India [1988] Supp. 3 SCR 1102. RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] 492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
(under Section 432 CrPC) and constitutional (under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution) powers are distinct- the former limited power, is still an imprint of the latter (much wider power), and must be understood as such and placed in this context. This framework of executive power and how it is to be exercised, is lucidly explained, in the judgment of State of Haryana v. Jagdish7:
“27. Neverthelesswe may point out that the power of the sovereign to grant remission is within its exclusive domain and it is for this reason that our Constitution makers went on to incorporate the provisions of Article 72 and Article 161 of the Constitution of India. This responsibility was cast upon the executive through a constitutional mandate to ensure that some public purpose may require fulfilment by grant of remission in appropriate cases. This power was never intended to be used or utilised by the executive as an unbridled power of reprieve. Power of clemency is to be exercised cautiously and in appropriate cases, which in effect, mitigates the sentence of punishment awarded and which does not, in any way, wipe out the conviction. It is a power which the sovereign exercises against its own judicial mandate. The act of remission of the State does not undo what has been done judicially. The punishment awarded through a judgment is not overruled but the convict gets benefit of a liberalised policy of State pardon. However, the exercise of such power under Article 161 of the Constitution or under Section 433-A CrPC may have a different flavour in the statutory provisions, as short-sentencing policy brings about a mere reduction in the period of imprisonment whereas an act of clemency under Article 161 of the Constitution commutes the sentence itself.”
10. That this executive power which is inherently discretionary in nature, has to be exercised fairly, reasonably, and not arbitrarily, has been held by this court in numerous cases.8 Absence to do so, would - like is the 7 [2010] 3 SCR 716 [hereafter referred to as ‘Jagdish’] 8 State of Haryana v. Mohinder Singh [2000] 1 SCR 698; Sangeet v. State of Haryana[2012] 13 SCR 85; Union of India v. V. Sriharan[2015] 14 SCR 613; Rajan v. The Home Secretary, Home Department of Tamil Nadu [2019] 6 SCR 1035; Ram Chander v. State of Chhattisgarh [2022] 4 SCR 1103.
case for other executive action- compel the court to exercise its judicial review, and in appropriate cases remit the matter for reconsideration.9 The procedure laid out in Section 432(2), has been held to be mandatory by a five-judge bench of this court, in Union of India v. V. Sriharan10. The court also observed how the said procedure operated as a safeguard, much like the ones provided under Article 72 and 161 of the Constitution: “141. […] Therefore, when in the course of exercise of larger constitutional powers of similar kind under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution it has been opined by this Court to be exercised with great care and caution, the one exercisable under a statute, namely, under Section 432(1)CrPC which is lesser in degree should necessarily be held to be exercisable in tune with the adjunct provision contained in the same section. Viewed in that respect, we find that the procedure to be followed whenever any application for remission is moved, the safeguard provided under Section 432(2)CrPC should be the sine qua non for the ultimate power to be exercised under Section 432(1)CrPC.
142. By following the said procedure prescribed under Section 432(2), the action of the appropriate Government is bound to survive and stand the scrutiny of all concerned, including the judicial forum. It must be remembered, barring minor offences, in cases involving heinous crimes like, murder, kidnapping, rape, robbery, dacoity, etc. and such other offences of such magnitude, the verdict of the trial court is invariably dealt with and considered by the High Court and in many cases by the Supreme Court. Thus, having regard to the nature of opinion to be rendered by the Presiding Officer of the court concerned will throw much light on the nature of crime committed, the record of the convict himself, his background and other relevant factors which will enable the appropriate Government to take the right decision as to whether or not suspension or remission of sentence should be granted. It must also be borne in mind that while for the exercise of the constitutional power under Articles 72 and 161, the 9 See Rajan and Ram Chander (ibid).
10 [2015] 14 SCR 613 [hereafter referred to as ‘Sriharan’].
RAJO @ RAJWA @ RAJENDRA MANDAL v. THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] 494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.
Executive Head will have the benefit of act and advice of the Council of Ministers, for the exercise of power under Section 432(1)CrPC, the appropriate Government will get the valuable opinion of the judicial forum, which will definitely throw much light on the issue relating to grant of suspension or remission.”
The court then proceeded to approve the following reasoning in Sangeet v. State of Haryana11 on this point (Sangeet SCR pp. 119-120): “63. It appears to us that an exercise of power by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 432CrPC cannot be suo motu for the simple reason that this sub-section is only an enabling provision. The appropriate Government is enabled to “override” a judicially pronounced sentence, subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions. Those conditions are found either in the Jail Manual or in statutory rules. Sub-section (1) of Section 432CrPC cannot be read to enable the appropriate Government to “further override” the judicial pronouncement over and above what is permitted by the Jail Manual or the statutory rules. The process of granting “additional” remission under this section is set into motion in a case only through an application for remission by the convict or on his behalf. On such an application being made, the appropriate Government is required to approach the Presiding Judge of the court before or by which the conviction was made or confirmed to opine (with reasons) whether the application should be granted or refused. Thereafter, the appropriate Government may take a decision on the remission application and pass orders granting remission subject to some conditions, or refusing remission. Apart from anything else, this statutory procedure seems quite reasonable inasmuch as there is an application of mind to the issue of grant of remission. It also eliminates “discretionary” or en masse release of convicts on “festive” occasions since each release requires a case-by-case basis scrutiny.”
(emphasis supplied)
11 [2012] 13 SCR 85[hereafter referred to as ‘Sangeet’]
11. This court, in various judgments, has outlined the parameters to be considered, when considering grant of remission. In Jagdish (supra) this court held:
“38. At the time of considering the case of premature release of a life convict, the authorities may require to consider his case mainly taking into consideration whether the offence was an individual act of crime without affecting the society at large; whether there was any chance of future recurrence of committing a crime; whether the convict had lost his potentiality in committing the crime; whether there was any fruitful purpose of confining the convict any more; the socio-economic condition of the convict’s family and other similar circumstances.” (emphasis supplied)
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