Yashodhan Singh & Ors. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 652; [2023] 10 S.C.R. 1196
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan Code of Criminal Procedure, Justice 148, Justice 149, Justice 302, Justice 452, Justice 307
- Decided
- 18 Jul 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2186/2023
- Sections
- 319, 227, 190, 319(1), 193, 398, 319(4), 319CR
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:29 am. Original source ↗
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A B C D E F G H 1196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.
YASHODHAN SINGH & ORS.
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 2186 of 2023)
JULY 18, 2023
[B. V. NAGARATHNA AND UJJAL BHUYAN, JJ.] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.319 – Principle of hearing a person who is summoned u/s. 319 Cr.P.C. – Applicability of – Respondent no.2-complainant got an FIR registered u/ss. 147, 148, 149, 302, 452, 307, 504 of IPC – A charge-sheet was filed against the accused persons but the names of appellants were not mentioned in it as their role was under investigation – Respondent no.2 filed application u/s. 319 Cr.P.C. to summon appellants – Trial Court summoned appellants to join trial – High Court affirmed the order passed by the trial Court – Before the Supreme Court, appellant contended that either the summoning order may be set aside in light of paragraph 9 of the Jogendra Yadav case as no opportunity of hearing that was provided to the appellants, at the time of order of summoning or the Jogendra Yadav case may be referred to a larger Bench if not followed in the instant case – Held: Merely because in certain proceedings the persons summoned had been provided an opportunity of being heard cannot be the same thing as stating that it is a mandatory requirement or a precondition that at the time of summoning a person u/s. 319 of the Cr.P.C., he should be given an opportunity of being heard – Paragraph 9 cannot be considered to be ratio of the Jogendra Yadav judgment – The judgment in Jogendra Yadav does not calls for any re-consideration and observation in paragraph 9 is relatable only to the facts of the said case – Thus, the principle of hearing a person who is summoned cannot be read into s. 319 Cr.P.C, such a procedure is not at all contemplated therein.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.319 – Object and purpose – discussed.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Hardeep Singh, it is noted that an inquiry is contemplated as against a [2023] 10 S.C.R. 1196 : 2023 INSC 652 A B C D E F G H person who has been discharged prior to the commencement of the trial in terms of Section 227 Cr.P.C. as extracted above but on an inquiry, if it appears that there is evidence against such a discharged person, then power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be exercised against such a discharged person. This clearly would mean that when a person who is not discharged but is to be summoned as per Section 319 Cr.P.C. on the basis of satisfaction derived by the court on the evidence on record, no inquiry or hearing is contemplated. This would clearly indicate that principle of natural justice and an opportunity of hearing a person summoned under 319 Cr.P.C. are not at all contemplated. Such a right of inquiry would accrue only to a person who is already discharged in the very same proceeding prior to the commencement of the trial. This is different from holding that a person who has been summoned as per Section 319 Cr.P.C. has a right of being heard in accordance with the principles of natural justice before being added as an accused to be tried along with other accused. [Para 23][1212-D-G]
2. Further, when a person is summoned as an accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. which is based on the satisfaction recorded by the Trial Court on the evidence that has emerged during the course of trial so as to try the person summoned as an accused along with the other accused, the summoned accused cannot seek discharge. It is necessary to state that discharge as contemplated under Section 227 Cr.P.C. is at a stage prior to the commencement of the trial and immediately after framing of charge but when power is exercised the under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to summon a person to be added as an accused in the trial to be tried along with other accused, such a person cannot seek discharge as the court would have exercised the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. based on a satisfaction derived from the evidence that has emerged during the evidence recorded in the course of trial and such satisfaction is of a higher degree than the satisfaction which is derived by the court at the time of framing of charge.
[Para 24][1212-G-H; 1213-A-B]
3. Merely because in certain proceedings the persons summoned had been provided an opportunity of being heard cannot be the same thing as stating that it is a mandatory YASHODHAN SINGH & ORS. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR
PRADESH & ANR.
A B C D E F G H 1198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.
requirement or a precondition that at the time of summoning a person under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C., he should be given an opportunity of being heard. That is not the mandate of law inasmuch as Section 319 clearly uses the expression “to proceed” which means to proceed with the trial and not to jeopardise the trial at the instance of the person(s) summoned by conducting a mini trial or a trial within a trial thereby derailing the main trial of the case and particularly against the accused who are already facing trail and who may be in custody. A person who is summoned in exercise of the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. cannot hijack the trial so to say and deviate from its focus and take it to a tangent in order to bolster his own case in a bid to escape trial. All that is contemplated when a person is summoned to appear is to ascertain that he is the very person who was summoned and if any summoned person fails to appear on the given date. On the appearance of the summoned person, no procedure of an inquiry or opportunity of being heard is envisaged before been added as an accused to the list of accused already facing trial unless such a summoned person had already been discharged, in which event, an inquiry is contemplated as discussed above. Thus, the contention that a summoned person must be given an opportunity of being heard before being added as an accused to face the trial is clearly not contemplated under Section 319 Cr.P.C. It is also observed by this Court in Hardeep Singh that such a summoned person can assail a summoning order before a superior Court and will also have the right of cross examining the witnesses as well as can let in his defence evidence, if any. [Para 32] [1219-D-H; 1220-A-B]
4. The lateral entry of a person summoned in exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is only to face the trial along with other accused. This, being a salutary provision in order to meet the ends of justice, the same cannot be diluted by importing within the scope of Section 319 Cr.P.C. principles of natural justice which in any case would be followed during the trial. It is well settled that principles of natural justice cannot be applied in straitjacket formula and they would depend upon the facts of each case and the object and purpose to be achieved under a provision of law. [Para 33][1220-B-C] A B C D E F G H
5. The judgment in Jogendra Yadav does not call for any re-consideration and the said observation in paragraph 9 is relatable only to the facts of the said case. Thus, the principle of hearing a person who is summoned cannot be read into Section 319 Cr.P.C. Such a procedure is not at all contemplated therein. In the circumstances, this Court does not accept the contentions of the appellants herein. [Para 34][1220-D-E] Sukhpal Singh Khair v. State of Punjab (2023) 1 SCC 289; Brijendra Singh & Ors. v/s. State of Rajasthan (2017) 7 SCC 706 : [2017] 3 SCR 374; Hardeep Singh vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (2014) 3 SCC 92 : [2014] 2 SCR 1 – followed.
Jogendra Yadav and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Anr.
(2015) 9 SCC 244 : [2015] 9 SCR 69; Ram Janam Yadav & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Anr. SLP (Crl.)
No.3199/2021 – referred to.
Case Law Reference [2015] 9 SCR 69 referred to Para 8 [2014] 2 SCR 1 followed Para 17 [2017] 3 SCR 374 followed Para 21 (2023) 1 SCC 289 followed Para 21 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2186 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 03.01.2023 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in CRLR No. 4235 of 2022.
S. Nagamuthu, Sr. Adv., Ram Kishor Singh Yadav, Kaushal Yadav, Nandlal Kumar Mishra, Dr. Ajay Kumar, Dr. Sushil Balwada, Vivekanand Rana, Pramod Kumar, Srilok Nath Rath, Ms. Reena Rao, Advs. for the Appellants.
Ratnakar Dash, Sr. Adv., Shashank Shekhar Singh, Yatharth Singh, Ms. Amrita Panda, Advs. for the Respondents.
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:
JUDGMENT
Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises out of an Order dated 03.01.2023 passed by the High Court at Allahabad in Criminal Revision No.4235 of 2022. YASHODHAN SINGH & ORS. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR
PRADESH & ANR.
A B C D E F G H 1200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.
3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case according to the Complainant-Respondent No.2 herein are that he got registered an FIR bearing No.186/2018 on 09.06.2018 at around 21.45 at P.S. Hathras Junction District Hathras Uttar Pradesh under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 452 307, 504 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, “IPC”) against the appellants herein alleging that appellant Nos. 1-7 (summoned accused) went to the Complainant-Respondent No.2’s house and started hurling abuses and firing, which consequently resulted in the Complainant’s injuries and the death of his two brothers. A charge sheet was filed against the accused persons but the names of the appellants were not mentioned in it as their role was still under investigation.
4. The Complainant filed an application before the Additional Sessions Judge Court No.1, Hathras in Case Crime No.186 of 2018 under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to summon the appellants herein on the basis of his evidence pursuant to which the Additional Sessions Judge passed an Order dated 23.09.2022 summoning the accused to join the trial.
5. Aggrieved by the said Order of the Additional Sessions Judge Court No.1, Hathras, the appellants approached the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad by way of Criminal Revision No.4235 of 2022. The High Court by way of the impugned Order dated 03.01.2023 dismissed the same and affirmed the Order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge Court No.1, Hathras in Case Crime No.186 of 2018 dated 23.09.2022, to summon the appellants.
6. Hence, this appeal.
7. We have heard Shri S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel for the appellants and Dr. Sushil Balwada, learned counsel for appellantNos. 1, 3 and 4; Shri Ratnakar Dash, learned senior counsel for the State and Shri Yatharth Singh, learned counsel for the complainant, at length.
8. Vide Order dated 08.05.2023, this Court issued notice and the matter was directed to be listed in the second week of July, 2023. For the sake of immediate reference, the said Order is extracted as under - “We have heard Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners.
Delay condoned.
This is a case where by the impugned order the High Court has dismissed the revision challenging the order passed under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. summoning the petitioners.
A B C D E F G H In the course of his submission, Mr. Nagamuthu drew our attention to the judgment of this Court in the case of Jogendra Yadav and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in (2015) 9 SCC 244. Therein, he pointed out that this Court has found that since a person who is added under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is necessarily heard before he was so added and often gets a further hearing if he challenges the summoning order he cannot avail the remedy of discharge.
This Court may not have been inclined to interfere with the impugned order but would have been inclined to reserve the remedy of seeking discharge, if so advised at the appropriate stage. We have the benefit of hearing Mr. Yatharth Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no.2-complaint on caveat.
We are of the view that this aspect must be gone into if the court is to take a view which is at variance with the view taken in the judgment of Jogendra Yadav and Ors. (supra).
Issue notice.
The petitioners may serve dasti also to the standing counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh.
List the matter in the second week of July 2023.”
On a reading of the same, it is evident that this Court was inclined to issue notice to the respondent(s) having regard to the submission made by Shri S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel in the context of the judgment of this Court in the case of Jogendra Yadav and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in (2015) 9 SCC 244 (‘Jogendra Yadav’).
9. Shri S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel, at the outset submitted that paragraph 9 of Jogendra Yadav has categorically recorded that when an accused is summoned in exercise of the power under Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (‘Cr.P.C’ for short), such an accused has to be heard before being added as an accused to face trial; that such an accused has a further right of hearing if he challenges the summoning order before the High Court and further before this court. In light of the observations of this Court in Jogendra Yadav, the right of an accused, who is summoned to be heard before being added asan accused has been recognised by this Court; that in the instant YASHODHAN SINGH & ORS. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR
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A B C D E F G H 1202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.
case because there was no such hearing that was provided to the appellants, who were added as accused, in light of the aforesaid judgment, the impugned order may be set aside and the matter may be remanded to the Sessions Court for giving an opportunity to the appellants of being heard before being added as accused.
10. In this context, learned senior counsel drew our attention to another Order of this Court in the case of Ram Janam Yadav &Ors. V/ s. State of U.P. & Anr. in SLP (Crl.) No.3199/2021(‘Ram Janam Yadav’), wherein this Court had directed that an Amicus Curiae be appointed to consider the question which emanated from the judgment in Jogendra Yadav and to refer the matter to a larger Bench, to decide: (1) as to, whether, an accused, who is impleaded under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C., is entitled to file an application for discharge and (2) whether, a person before being impleaded as an accused is entitled to prior hearing or not. Of course, it was also pointed out that ultimately the said matter was not referred to answer the said questions as this Court found that in the said case the accused had, in fact, been given an opportunity of hearing and, therefore, held that the issues raised would be purely academic in nature.
11. Emphasising the importance of the principles of natural justice in a criminal trial, learned senior counsel Sri Nagamuthu, submitted that if such a hearing is not provided to the accused then the rights of the persons summoned to be added as an accused would be jeopardised. In this regard, learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the invocation of power under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. is one to proceed with the trial on the basis of the evidence already recorded and that the satisfaction of the Sessions Court/Trial Court in such a case would be an objective satisfaction and not a subjective one and, therefore, in order to ensure that the right of the persons summoned to be added as an accused is enforced,it is necessary that such a person is heard before his addition asan accused to be tried along with other accused already facing trial.
12. It was next contended that if ultimately the person summoned is not given a right to seek discharge which he is also entitled to seek, it becomes all the more crucial that on notice being issued to the person to be added as an accused, he is heard in the first instance and, thereafter, an order is passed on his addition to the list of accused to be tried along with other accused.
According to him, though Section 319 Cr.P.C. is silent as to opportunity of hearing before being added as an accused, the same has A B C D E F G H to be read into the provision which would be in compliance to the principle of natural justices. In this connection, he has referred to the development of law regarding filing of protest petition against a closure report.
13. Learned counsel appearing for the other appellants also submitted that in the instant case, the appellants were named in the FIR but in the final report, their names were not mentioned. No protest petition was filed as against the said final report. It is only at the stage of trial that the summoning order was passed by the Sessions Court, which could not have invoked Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. to summon the appellants herein to be added to the list of accused when their names did not figure in the final report.
14. Therefore, it was contented on behalf of the appellants that either the judgment in Jogendra Yadav be complied with by granting an opportunity of hearing to the appellants herein or the matter may be referred to a larger Bench in case this Bench is not inclined to follow the said judgment.
15. Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing for the State and also learned counsel appearing for the complainant contended that the observations of this Court in Jogendra Yadav as well as the observations of this Court in Ram Janam Yadav have to be construed only from the perspective of the peculiar facts of the said cases.
16. Learned senior counsel appearing for the State drew our attention to paragraph 2 of Jogendra Yadav to contend that in the said case, the Additional Sessions Judge had in fact issued notice to the appellants therein to show cause as to why they should not be added as accused. After giving an opportunity to the appellants therein to file a reply, the Additional Sessions Judge summoned the appellants as accused for being added to the proceedings. Therefore, it was a case where the accused therein had been heard before such summons was issued. It was contended that it is in the aforesaid context, that this Court had observed that the persons to be summoned as an accused would be heard before being added. The said observations of this Court in paragraph 9 must be read in the context of the facts of the said case and not taken out of its context and blown out of proportion.
In order tobuttress this submission, it was pointed out that in the order passed by this Court subsequently in the case of Ram Janam Yadav, the reference to a larger Bench was not taken forward by noticing that YASHODHAN SINGH & ORS. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR
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in the said case, it was not necessary to refer the questions of law to a larger Bench as in that case also, the persons who had been summoned as accused were in fact, given an opportunity of being heard and hence, the aforesaid two cases would turn on their own peculiar facts. In other words, what was sought to be contended was that an opportunity of being heard to the persons summoned under Sections 319 of the Cr.P.C. was on the facts of those cases and that cannot be made a rule or principle, which is applicable to all cases having regard to the object and purpose of Section 319 of the Cr.P.C.
17. Learned counsel appearing for the complainant also supported the arguments of the learned senior counsel appearing for the State and contended that if the submissions of learned senior counsel for the appellants are to be accepted, then the entire trial of the accused would be disrupted and there would be a trial within the trial, a concentric circle, and there can be no conclusion of a trial on a timely basis which would vitiate the salutary principle of speedy trial which is recognized under Article 21 of the Constitution of India as well as the right of the victims to get justice. According to the learned Counsel, if the submissions of learned Counsel for the appellants is to be accepted by this Court, it would not only jeopardise a criminal trial but also prejudice the rights of the accused already facing trial and who possibly may be in custody during their trial. In other words, the persons who are to be added as an accused and summoned under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. may come out with their own pleas and contentions which would have to be first considered by the Trial Court/Sessions Court and this would not only cause delay in the progress of the main trial. It was submitted that Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. is a wholesome provision which has to be invoked by the Sessions Court having regard to the evidence that has emerged in the trial and on the satisfaction derived by the trial court as has been envisaged by this Court in the case of Hardeep Singh V/s. State of Punjab &Ors. (2014) 3 SCC 92 (“Hardeep Singh”). Therefore, the said contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants may not be accepted was the joint plea of learned counsel for the respondents.
18. Having heard learned senior counsel and learned counsel for the respective parties, at the outset, we would refer to the Order dated 8.5.2023 passed by this Court and the context in which notice was issued to the respondent(s) herein. The said context can be clearly discerned by the fact that Mr. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel contended that in paragraph 9 of the judgment in Jogendra Yadav, it is clearly indicated A B C D E F G H that the right of hearing must be afforded to a person summoned before being added as an accused in the trial, and therefore, the impugned order stood vitiated.
19. Before we proceed, we would refer to Sections 227 and 319 of the Cr.P.C., which are extracted as under:
“227. Discharge.- If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.
“319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence. -
(1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed.
(2) Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid.
(3) Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed.
(4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under sub-section (1), then -
(a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses re-heard;
(b) subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced.”
20. Section 227 Cr.P.C. provides for discharge of an accused if the court finds that there is no sufficient grounds or reasons for proceeding against him. Consequently, the proceeding against discharged person is YASHODHAN SINGH & ORS. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR
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A B C D E F G H 1206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.
dropped. On the other hand, under Section 319 Cr.P.C., a person who has not been named as an accused is summoned to be tried along with other accused while section 227 Cr.P.C. results in conclusion of proceedings against a person who is an accused on his discharge. On the other hand, a person who is not an accused is summoned to be tried along with other accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C.
21. A reading of the said Section would clearly indicate that power is given to the Court to proceed against any other person appearing to be guilty of an offence. The expression ‘proceed’ as appearing in Section 319 Cr.P.C. is of significance. The exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is not at the initial stage where cognizance is taken of the offence and the summoning order is passed before committal of the matter to the Sessions Court. That power exercised under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. is quite distinct from the power exercised by the Trial Court/Sessions Court under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. In our view, much significance turns on the expression ‘proceed’ in Section 319 Cr.P.C. The said Section came up for consideration before this Court in innumerable cases.However, it is of relevance to mention Constitution Bench judgments in Hardeep Singh; Sukhpal Singh Khair vs. State of Punjab, (2023) 1 SCC 289, (“Sukhpal Singh Khair”) and in Brijendra Singh &Ors. v/s. State of Rajasthan (2017) 7 SCC 706, (“Brijendra Singh”).
22. The relevant paragraphs in Hardeep Singh can be crystallised as under: –
(i) The Constitution Bench of this Court was concerned with three aspects: firstly, the stage at which powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be invoked; secondly, the materials on the basis whereof the invoking of powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be justified; and thirdly, the manner in which powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. have to be exercised. While answering the five questions referred to the Constitution Bench in paragraph 117, it was concluded as under:
“117. We accordingly sum up our conclusions as follows:
Questions (i) and (iii)
— What is the stage at which power under Section 319 CrPC can be exercised?
AND
— Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319(1) CrPC has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the A B C D E F G H evidence collected during investigation or the word “evidence” is limited to the evidence recorded during trial?
Answer
117.1. In Dharam Pal case [Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, (2014) 3 SCC 306 : AIR 2013 SC 3018] , the Constitution Bench has already held that after committal, cognizance of an offence can be taken against a person not named as an accused but against whom materials are available from the papers filed by the police after completion of the investigation. Such cognizance can be taken under Section 193 CrPC and the Sessions Judge need not wait till “evidence” under Section 319 CrPC becomes available for summoning an additional accused.
117.2. Section 319 CrPC, significantly, uses two expressions that have to be taken note of i.e. (1) inquiry (2) trial. As a trial commences after framing of charge, an inquiry can only be understood to be a pre-trial inquiry. Inquiries under Sections 200, 201, 202 CrPC, and under Section 398 CrPC are species of the inquiry contemplated by Section 319 CrPC. Materials coming before the court in course of such inquiries can be used for corroboration of the evidence recorded in the court after the trial commences, for the exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC, and also to add an accused whose name has been shown in Column 2 of the charge-sheet.
117.3. In view of the above position the word “evidence” in Section 319 CrPC has to be broadly understood and not literally i.e. as evidence brought during a trial.
Question (ii)—Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319(1) CrPC could only mean evidence tested by crossexamination or the court can exercise the power under the said provision even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned?
Answer
117.4. Considering the fact that under Section 319 CrPC a person against whom material is disclosed is only summoned to face the trial and in such an event under Section 319(4) CrPC the proceeding against such person is to commence from the stage of taking of cognizance, the court need not wait for the evidence YASHODHAN SINGH & ORS. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR
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A B C D E F G H 1208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.
against the accused proposed to be summoned to be tested by cross-examination.
Question (iv)—What is the nature of the satisfaction required to invoke the power under Section 319 CrPC to arraign an accused? Whether the power under Section 319(1) CrPC can be exercised only if the court is satisfied that the accused summoned will in all likelihood be convicted?
Answer
117.5. Though under Section 319(4)(b) CrPC the accused subsequently impleaded is to be treated as if he had been an accused when the court initially took cognizance of the offence, the degree of satisfaction that will be required for summoning a person under Section 319 CrPC would be the same as for framing a charge [Ed. : The conclusion of law as stated in para 106, p. 138c-d, may be compared:”Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross-examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction”. See also especially in para 100 at p. 136f-g.] . The difference in the degree of satisfaction for summoning the original accused and a subsequent accused is on account of the fact that the trial may have already commenced against the original accused and it is in the course of such trial that materials are disclosed against the newly summoned accused. Fresh summoning of an accused will result in delay of the trial therefore the degree of satisfaction for summoning the accused (original and subsequent) has to be different.
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