Jamnalal v. State of Rajasthan and Another
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 935; [2025] 9 S.C.R. 98
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice K.V. Viswanathan
- Decided
- 6 Aug 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 3396/2025
- Sections
- 389, 3, 376(3), 42, 164, 2, 94, 29, 302
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[2025] 9 S.C.R. 98 : 2025 INSC 935 Jamnalal v.
State of Rajasthan and Another (Criminal Appeal No. 3396 of 2025)
06 August 2025 [B.V. Nagarathna and K.V. Viswanathan,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration In the instant appeal, the father of the prosecutrix challenges the order of the High Court. By the said order, the sentence imposed on respondent no.2 herein was suspended till the final disposal of the appeal. Whether the High Court considered the relevant factors for suspension u/s.389 CrPC.
Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.389 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – s.3/4(2) – Penal Code, 1860 – s.376(3) – Respondent no.2 was found guilty for the offences punishable u/s.3/4(2) of POCSO Act as well as u/s.376(3) of IPC – Respondent no.2 was sentenced u/s.3/4(2) of POCSO Act and no sentence was imposed u/s.376(3) in view of s.42 of POCSO Act – Insofar as s.3/4(2) of POCSO Act was concerned, respondent no.2 was sentenced to undergo 20 years rigorous imprisonment – However, the High Court suspended the sentence of respondent no.2 and enlarged him on bail till the pendency of the appeal – Correctness: Held: 1. The High Court has not adverted to any of the relevant factors for considering the case for suspension u/s.389 and keeping in mind the antecedents of the respondent no.2, this Court is of the opinion that High Court was not justified in suspending the sentence. [Para 12]
2. The reasoning of the High Court, falls far short of the parameters required u/s.389 of CrPC for enlargement of a convict, punished for heinous offence, on bail after suspending the sentence – The finding that no sexual assault was found, without considering the overall nature of the evidence of the case, is completely untenable – * Author [2025] 9 S.C.R. 99Jamnalal v. State of Rajasthan and Another According to the evidence of the prosecutrix, respondent no.2, at gunpoint, closed her mouth and forcibly took her to a house and committed rape on her – All that the medical evidence said was that no conclusive opinion about the crime could be given since FSL Report was awaited – That does not mean that the ocular evidence could be ignored – As far as non-availability of FSL Report is concerned, the prosecution has explained the situation and the Trial Court has also found that the non-availability of the DNA Report did not adversely affect the case of the prosecution – The reasoning that despite the availability of washrooms in the house it was difficult to believe that the prosecutrix could go out for the toilet, is conjectural in nature – Therefore, the order of the High Court is set aside and respondent no.2 is directed to surrender before the Court of Special Judge (POCSO). [Paras 16,19] Bail – Distinction between setting aside bail by the a higher Court and cancellation of bail:
Held: There is clear distinction in law between setting aside of the bail by a higher Court and cancellation of the bail – While cancellation of bail is due to some supervening circumstances like breach of bail condition, setting aside of the bail is concerned not with the breach of condition but with the justifiability and soundness of the order granting bail. [Para 13] Case Law Cited Omprakash Sahni v. Jai Shankar Chaudhary and Another [2023] 5 SCR 141 : (2023) 6 SCC 123; Vijay Kumar v. Narendra and Others (2002) 9 SCC 364 – relied on.
Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another [2014] 12 SCR 453 : (2014) 16 SCC 508 – referred to.
List of Acts Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords Sentence; Suspension of sentence; Bail; Section 389 of CrPC; Rape; Sexual assault; Medical evidence; Ocular evidence; FSL report; DNA report; Setting aside bail; Cancellation of bail. 100 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
3396 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 03.09.2024 of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur in SBCRMSOSA(A) No. 852 of 2024 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
K. L. Janjani, Kailash J. Kashyap.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Ms. Sansriti Pathak, A.A.G., Ms. Shagufa Khan, Aman Prasad, Ms. Nidhi Jaswal, Namit Saxena.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment K.V. Viswanathan, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. We have heard Mr. K.L. Janjani, learned counsel for the appellant, Ms. Sansriti Pathak, learned Additional Advocate General for the first Respondent - State of Rajasthan, and Mr. Namit Saxena, learned counsel for Respondent No.2.
3. The present Appeal by the father of the prosecutrix challenges the order of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur dated 03.09.2024 in S.B. Criminal Misc. Suspension of Sentence Application (Appeal) No. 852 of 2024 in S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 397 of 2024. By the said order, the sentence imposed on Respondent No.2 herein was suspended till the final disposal of the appeal and Respondent No.2 was directed to be released on bail, subject to certain conditions imposed on him by Special Judge (POCSO) Karauli (Rajasthan) by her judgment and order dated 07.02.2024.
4. Respondent No.2 has been found guilty for the offences punishable under Section 3/4 (2) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short ‘POCSO Act’) as well as under Section 376(3) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Respondent No.2 was [2025] 9 S.C.R. 101Jamnalal v. State of Rajasthan and Another sentenced under Section 3/4 (2) of POCSO Act and no sentence was imposed under Section 376(3) in view of Section 42 of POCSO Act. Insofar as Section 3/4 (2) of POCSO Act was concerned, Respondent No.2 was sentenced to undergo 20 years rigorous imprisonment and was ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000/-. In default of payment of fine, Respondent No.2 was directed to undergo additional 2 years rigorous imprisonment. Respondent No.2 had undergone imprisonment for a period of 1 year and 3 months after which his sentence was suspended by the High Court.
5. The High Court while suspending the sentence, after setting out the contention of the respective parties, has recorded only the following reasons before enlarging Respondent No.2 on bail:
“5. Upon a consideration of the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant as well as learned State Counsel and counsel for the complainant and having regard to the facts and circumstances as available on the record and especially the fact that no sign of sexual assault was found by the medical expert on the body of the prosecutrix; no FSL as well as DNA report is available on record; despite the availability of washrooms in the house, it is little difficult to digest that prosecutrix will go out for toilet; there is no prospect of being heard and disposal of this appeal in near future, this Court is of the opinion that the appellant has available to him strong grounds to assail the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence. Thus, it is a fit case for suspending the sentences awarded to the applicantappellant during pendency of the instant appeal.”
6. The Trial Court, while convicting Respondent No.2, relied on the evidence of prosecutrix PW-3 who had deposed to the following effect: - On 13.06.2023, at 4 PM, when she had gone to the field to defecate, Respondent No.2 came from behind and at gun point after closing her mouth took her to Amro’s house near the dry tank located in the field. Thereafter, the prosecutrix deposed that Respondent No.2 committed rape on her; that she came back and narrated the incident to her mother and other family members; that her father had gone out at that time and he came little while thereafter; that she went with her father to the police station where her father lodged the First Information Report. She also deposed that she was medically examined, and she had given her undergarments and Pajama to 102 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the Doctor. The statement under Section 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘Cr.P.C’) was recorded earlier where she maintained her case against Respondent No.2. She further deposed that Respondent No.2 had forcibly removed her clothes and laid her on the mattress on the cot on the ground floor of the house.
7. The Trial Court found that no material contradictions had emerged in the evidence. The Trial Court further relied on the evidence of the mother of the prosecutrix-PW-2 and father PW-4. Dealing with the age of the victim, the Trial Court, by relying on the admission application filled for admission to the school (Exhibit P-1) the original school record register (Exhibit P-2) as well as the birth certificate (Exhibit P-9), came to the conclusion that the prosecutrix was a child under Section 2(d) of POCSO Act, since the date of birth was 07.03.2009. The date of incident being 13.06.2023, the victim was 14 years and 3 months of age. According to the Trial Court, the documentary evidence fulfilled the parameters set out under Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.
8. Dealing with the medical evidence, the Trial Court stated that the prosecutrix was medically examined and the evidence was to the effect that no external visible injury was found on the body and genitals of the victim and her hymen was in an old torn healed state. The medical evidence was to the effect that no conclusive opinion about the crime could be given and FSL report was kept awaited for further opinion.
9. The Trial Court also noticed that the prosecution did not furnish the FSL and DNA report till the Trial was over. However, the Court held that the case was not adversely affected, since DNA report could only be corroborative in nature. The Trial Court raised the presumption under Section 29 and 30 of POCSO Act to presume that unless the contrary was proved, it was the accused who had committed the offence.
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