Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v. Jagan Devi & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1105; [2025] 9 S.C.R. 825
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R Mahadevan
- Decided
- 12 Sept 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 11795/2025
- Sections
- 35, 44, 27(1), 31, 54
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:18 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 9 S.C.R. 825 : 2025 INSC 1105 Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v.
Jagan Devi & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 11795 of 2025)
12 September 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the plaintiff’s suit was time-barred or not. Whether it is Article 65 or Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which would apply to the present facts in hand.
Headnotes† Limitation Act, 1963 – Art.65 or Art.59 – The plaintiffs instituted civil suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with their peaceful possession – In the alternative, the plaintiffs prayed that they be put in joint possession along with the defendant and the sale deed dated 14.06.1973 be declared as fraudulent, concocted and thereby, void – Suit was dismissed – In first appeal, the suit of the plaintiffs came to be decreed – The High Court vide its impugned judgment and order dismissed the appeal thereby affirming the judgment and order passed by the First Appellate court decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiffs – However, insofar as the issue of limitation was concerned, the High Court differed with the First Appellate Court and came to the conclusion that it is Art.59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and not Art.63 that would be applicable to the facts of the matter – Correctness:
Held: 1. As per the dictum in Prem Singh, this Court, in order to ascertain whether Art.65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to the present factual scenario, has to first determine whether the fraud was alleged as regards the contents of the sale deed dated 14.06.1973 or the character of such sale deed – Both the First Appellate Court as well as the High Court have arrived at the finding that the plaintiff had never executed the said sale * Author 826 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports deed in the first place as it was proved that it was not her thumb impression that was affixed therein – Therefore, this finding goes to the character of the sale deed and thereby, renders it void/void ab initio – Hence, as per this decision, there remained no reason for the plaintiff to seek for its cancellation – The original sale deed also was not produced before the Trial Court by the defendants in order to rebut the doubt cast upon the veracity of the said sale deed – Consequently, Art. 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would find no application to the case in hand. [Para 31]
2. The averment of the plaintiff in the plaint, that she had not received the sale consideration, had not been otherwise proven as false – In such circumstances as well, i.e., in the absence of the sale consideration being tendered, the sale deed would be void and the plaintiff would not be required to seek its cancellation. Therefore, Art.59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 could not be said to be applicable to the present facts. [Para 38]
3. The High Court could be said to have committed an error insofar as observing that it is Art.59 and not Art. 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which would apply to the case in hand – However, irrespective of the question of which Article of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable to the suit instituted by the present plaintiff, the suit could be said to have been filed within limitation – Therefore, apart from clarifying the correct position of law, there is no infirmity in the ultimate conclusion that the High Court arrived at as far as the maintainability of the suit on the aspect of limitation is concerned. [Para 40] Case Law Cited Prem Singh v. Birbal [2006] Supp. 1 SCR 692 : (2006) 5 SCC 353; Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 892 – relied on.
State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar [2000] 2 SCR 134 : 2000 SCC OnLine SC 522; Bhim Singhji v. Union of India [1985] Supp. 1 SCR 862 : (1981) 1 SCC 166; Kewal Krishnan v. Rajesh Kumar and Others [2021] 11 SCR 588 : (2022) 18 SCC 489 – referred to.
List of Acts Limitation Act, 1963.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 827Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v. Jagan Devi & Ors.
List of Keywords Article 65 of Limitation Act, 1963; Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963; Permanent injunction; Absence of the sale consideration; Sale deed; Possession of property.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11795 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 22.02.2018 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in RSA No. 2930 of 1996 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
R. Bala Subarmanyam, Sr. Adv., Himanshu Sharma, Arun Kumar, Varun Sharma, Ms. Kamlesh, Kunal Garg.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Arjun Singh Bhati, Tanmay Nagar, Shamli Verma, Mohit Yadav. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment J.B. Pardiwala, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana dated 22.02.2018 in the Regular Second Appeal No. 2930 of 1996 by which the second appeal filed by the appellant-herein (original defendant) against the judgment and decree dated 07.10.1996 arising from Civil Appeal No. 149 of 1991 passed by the First Appellate court, came to be dismissed.
FACTUAL MATRIX
3. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarized as under.
4. For the sake of convenience, the appellant-herein shall be referred to as the original defendant and the respondents-herein shall be referred to as the original plaintiffs.
828 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
5. The plaintiffs instituted Civil Suit No. 782 of 1984 in the court of Senior Sub Judge, Gurgaon for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with their peaceful possession to the extent of one-third share in the agricultural land admeasuring 31 kanals 4 marlas situated within the revenue estate of village Bisar Akbarpur, Tehsil Nuh, District Gurgaon. In the alternative, the plaintiffs prayed that they be put in joint possession along with the defendant and the sale deed dated 14.06.1973 purported to have been executed by Ram Saran s/o Bhambar and the plaintiff in favor of the defendant be declared as fraudulent, concocted and thereby, void insofar as the share of the plaintiff is concerned.
6. The plaint of Civil Suit No. 782 of 1984 reads thus: “1. That the plaintiff is the lawful owner and in possession to the extent of 1/3rd share in agricultural land bearing Rect. No.40 Killa No. 1/2 (2-0), 9/2 (2-12), 10 (8-0), 11 (8-0), 12/1 (2-12) 20 (8-0), total measuring 31 Kanals 4 marlas, besides other lands situated in the revenue estate of Village Bisar Akbarpur Tehsil Nuh, Distt. Gurgaon. The fard jamabandi for the years 1973-74 and 1978-79 are attached herein.
2. That the defendant wrongly claims herself to be the purchaser of the suit land referred to above from one Ram Saran s/o Bhambar on the basis of a fraudulent and concocted sale deed alleged to have been executed on 14.06.1973. The alleged sale deed dated 14.6.73 is total fraudulent, illegal and void and cannot defeat the legal rights and share of the plaintiff in the suit land on the following grounds:-
(a) That the plaintiff never executed on registered sale deed dated 14.6. 73 or of any other date in favor of the defendant and she is still the co-owner in possession to the extent of her share in the land.
(b) That it seems that the defendant must have got executed and registered the alleged sale deed in her favor by making some impersonation in collusion with the other vendor and witnesses and must have played a fraud on the Sub-Registrar to derive wrongful gain for her personal benefit.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 829Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v. Jagan Devi & Ors.
(c) That the plaintiff never got any sale consideration of the alleged sale deed and she came to know about this fraudulent transaction only when he came to the village mourn the death of Ram Saran and heard that her land is going to be sold by the defendant without any right in it.
(d) That the alleged sale deed if made by any other person by making impersonation or otherwise, the same does not effect the rights of the plaintiff in the land in suit.
3. That the plaintiff is owner in possession her 1/3rd share in the land and is entitled to file suit for permanent injunction against the defendant restraining her from interfering with the possession and ownership of the plaintiff in the suit land in any manner. In the alternative, if it is found and held that that defendant is in possession of the whole land then the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for joint possession to the extent of 1/3rd share in the land in suit.
4. That the cause of action for the suit arose on or about 4.2.1984 when the plaintiff came to know about the fraudulent transaction and the defendant attempted to sell away to the property of the plaintiff and denied to admit the claim of the plaintiff. Hence this suit.
5. That the suit property is situated within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court, hence this Hon’ble Court has got jurisdiction to try this suit.
6. That the value of the suit for the purpose of court fees and jurisdiction is assessed at Rs.200/- and for relief of possession is also Rs. 100/-. A court fees of Rs.25/- is paid.
7. That the plaintiff, therefore, prays that a decree for permanent injunction be passed in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant to the effect that the plaintiff is co-owner in possession to the extent of 1/2 share (sic) (1/3 rd share) in the land in suit described in para no.1 of the plaint restraining the defendant from interfering or dealing with it in any manner. In the alternative a decree for joint possession be passed in favor of the plaintiff and 830 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports against the defendant in respect of suit land mentioned in para 1 of the plaint declaring the alleged sale deed dated 14.6.73 to be fraudulent and void qua the share of the plaintiff. The costs of the suit be also awarded. Any such other relief which the Ld. Court may deem just and proper be also granted to the plaintiff.”
(Emphasis supplied)
7. The written statement filed on behalf of the defendant reads thus: “Pre Objections
1. That the suit is not maintainable in the present form. The plaintiff has got no right, interest or title in the land in dispute or any part of it.
2. That the plaintiff has got no locus standi nor any cause of action to file the present suit.
3. That the suit for permanent injunction in the alternative for joint possession is not maintainable. It is mandatory to seek declaration
4. That the plaintiff is estopped from filing the present suit by acts, conduct, omission, acquiescence, latches and admission.
5. That the suit is barred by time.
On Merits
1. That Para no.1 of the plaint is wrong and denied. It is wrong and denied that the plaintiff is owner or in possession of the suit land to the extent of 1/3rd share or she has got any right, interest or title in the land in dispute or any part of it.
2. That para no.2 of the plaint alongwith its sub-paras 2(a.) to (d) are wrong and denied. The plaintiff alongwith the brother Ram Saran sold the land in dispute in favour of the defendant vide sale deed dated 14.6.1973 for sale consideration of Rs.15000/-. The contents of the sale deed were read over and explained to the plaintiff. She had appeared before the Sub Registrar and had admitted [2025] 9 S.C.R. 831Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v. Jagan Devi & Ors.
and acknowledged the contents of the sale deed. She was identified by Sehdev Sarpanch of village Kawari. It is wrong and denied that the sale deed dated 14.6.1973 is totally fraudulent, illegal and ineffective, the rights of the plaintiff in the suit land on the grounds mentioned in sub-para 2(a) to 2(d) of the plaint or on another grounds. 2(a) Para 2(a) of the plaint is wrong and denied. It is wrong and denied that the sale deed dated 14.6.1973 was not executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant. It is wrong and denied that she is still owner of the land in dispute or any part of it. Mutation on the basis of sale deed dated 14.6.1973 was also got sanctioned by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant.
2(b) Para 2(b) of the plaint is wrong and denied. It is wrong and denied that the sale deed was got registered by false impersonation in collusion with Ram Saran, brother of the plaintiff or any other person. It is wrong and denied that any fraud was played on the Sub Registrar to derive wrongful gain for personal benefit. All these allegations are false to the positive knowledge of the plaintiff.
2(c) Para no.2(c) of the plaint is wrong and denied. It is wrong and denied that the plaintiff did not execute the sale deed or she did not receive the sale consideration. It is further wrong and denied that the sale deed was fraudulent transaction or she came to know about the same on the death of Ram Saran. All these allegations are false. It is unthinkable that her brother Ram Saran did not know the plaintiff.
2(d) Para no.2(d) of the plaint is wrong and denied. It is wrong and denied that the sale deed was not executed by the plaintiff or somebody else falsely impersonated in her place. It is wrong and denied that the plaintiff is owner or in possession of the land in dispute as alleged.
3. That para no.3 of the plaint is wrong and denied. It is wrong and denied that the plaintiff has got any right, interest or title in the suit land or she is owner or in possession of the same or any part of it. It is further wrong and denied that she is entitled to sue for possession in the alternative. 832 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
4. That para no.4 of the plaint is wrong and denied. No cause of action ever accrued to the plaintiff. Cause of action if any is bogus, fictitious and imaginary one. 5&6. Paras no.5 and 6 of the plaint are legal.
7. That para no.7 of the plaint is wrong and denied. It is, therefore, humbly prayed that the suit of the plaintiff may kindly be dismissed with costs. Since the suit of the plaint is false, frivolous and vexatious, therefore, the plaintiff be burdened with special costs U/s 35-A C.P.C.”
8. The Trial Court framed the following issues:
“1. Whether the sale deed dated 14.6.1973 is illegal, fraudulent and ineffective on the grounds mentioned in the para no.2 of the plaint? OPP
2. Whether the plaintiff is in joint possession of the suit property? OPP.
3. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD
4. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi and cause of action to file the suit? OPD
5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the present suit by her own act and conduct? OPD.
6. Whether the suit is time barred? OPD
7. Relief.”
9. All the above referred issues framed by the Trial Court came to be answered against the plaintiffs. The suit ultimately came to be dismissed vide the judgement and decree dated 14.10.1991.
10. The plaintiffs being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court preferred First Appeal before the district court. The First Appeal came to be registered as Civil Appeal No. 149 of 1991. The First Appeal came to be allowed. The suit of the plaintiffs came to be decreed. On the question of limitation, the First Appellate Court observed as thus:
“Lastly the question of limitation has been raised in the present proceedings. As per the defendant the present suit [2025] 9 S.C.R. 833Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v. Jagan Devi & Ors.
should have been filed within three years of the sanction of mutation. He mainly reliance on 1996 (1) PLR 482 The State of Punjab Vs. Babu Singh which lays down that illegal or void order have to be got set aside from the court of competent jurisdiction and limitation for the same is three years from the date of passing of the order. On the other hand, the counsel for plaintiff-appellant has relied upon Article 65 in order to assert that the period of limitation shall be 12 years for getting the relief of possession from the date when the possession of the defendant would be deemed to be adverse to that of the plaintiff. Accordingly he argued that even if it is presumed that the defendant came into adverse possession from the date of execution of the present sale deed even then the plaintiff was entitled to get the relief of possession within the period of 12 years and the suit was filed within that period. Merely because it was filed after about 11 years cannot deprive the plaintiff of the relief. The said arguments of the plaintiff appellant is convincing. She has claimed relief of joint possession. It has already been held that the transaction in question was void and Risali had never executed the sale deed in question. So under these circumstances the plaintiff could have maintained action to obtain possession of the property within the period of 12 years from the date of knowledge. So even if the knowledge party is ignored still the suit has been filed within 12 years from the date of sale and the same is maintainable.”
(Emphasis supplied)
11. The defendants being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate court preferred Second Appeal No. 2930 of 1996 in the High Court.
12. The High Court vide its impugned judgment and order dismissed the appeal thereby affirming the judgment and order passed by the First Appellate court decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. However, insofar as the issue of limitation was concerned, the High Court differed with the First Appellate Court and came to the conclusion that it is Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and not Article 63 that would be applicable to the facts of the matter.
834 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
13. The High court while dismissing the Second Appeal held as under: “I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, appraised the judgments and decrees as well as record of both the Courts below and of the view that there is no force and merit in the submissions of Mr. Keshav Pratap Singh.
In my view, limitation would not come in the way of the plaintiff-respondents, for, the suit can be filed from the date of the knowledge as per the provisions of Article 59 of the Limitation Act, which reads thus:-
59. To cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the rescission of a contract Three years When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first becomes known to him.
The defendant for the best known reasons has not examined any expert in his evidence to counter and rebut the testimony of PW4. Appellant-defendant Shanti Devi (since deceased) represented through legal representatives made a statement that she was present at the time of execution and registration of the sale deed and one Rasali was also present to whom she knew very well. Rasali had also put her thumb impressions on the sale deed in her presence but in cross-examination, she stated that she was not in a position to identify Rasali Devi. If at all, Rasali was known to Shanti Devi, she could have been very bold to identify Rasali. Endorsement made by Sub-Registrar showed that her husband Bagdawat had appeared on her behalf before the Sub Registrar and the aforementioned document did not carry the thumb impression/signatures of Shanti Devi. The other witness to the sale deed, i.e., Budhu, an attesting witness of the document was none else but the real brother of Shanti Devi, obviously he was expected to make a favourable deposition. He also admitted that sale deed [2025] 9 S.C.R. 835Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v. Jagan Devi & Ors.
was thumb marked by Shanti Devi, whereas, as noticed above, it was not Bagdawat, husband of Shanti Devi, for the reasons best known had not stepped into witness box. The second witness, Sahdev, Sarpanch had died before the statement of Budhu could be recorded. Shanti Devi admitted that Sahdev was well acquainted with his brother Budhu. Thus, defendant failed to prove that there was any impartial witness. Things do not end here. The plaintiffs had moved an application for directing the defendant to produce the original sale deed and answer was that the original had been misplaced. Defendant had admitted that prior to sale deed, there was an agreement to sell but the same has also not seen the light of day. On the contrary, expert compared the disputed thumb impressions found on the Special Power of Attorney Ex.P2 and thumb impressions put by Rasali on her statement recorded by the Court on 20.03.1984. Special Power of Attorney Ex.P2 had been proved through the testimony of PW3, who stated that executant had put her thumb impressions on the said document after it was read over and explained. The defendant failed to put any cross-examination to the aforementioned witness. It is settled law that in case, statement made in examination-in-chief is not subjected to cross-examination, the same would be admitted.
The defendant in the evidence did not dispute that Rasali had not appeared before the Court on 20.03.1984. The handwriting expert also compared the thumb impressions on two affidavits executed by Rasali, i.e., on 27.02.1984 and 28.02.1984. Both the affidavits were duly attested by Oath Commissioner and identified by K.S. Jain, Advocate. The expert also examined the thumb impressions on the plaint and vakalantnama to form an opinion that they were not of the same person, therefore, there was no occasion for the Lower Appellate Court to discard the report of expert. In my view, evidence brought on record by the plaintiffs un-clinchly proved that Rasali had never executed disputed sale deed.
There is another aspect of the matter, mutation Ex.DE was affected on the basis of the sale deed which also carried 836 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports a presumption of truth under Section 44 of Punjab Land Revenue Act, unless the same is rebutted. No evidence has been led to rebut the same. Even from perusal of Ex.D3, it was not proved that Rasali at the time of attestation and sanction was there. Defendant miserably failed to prove that document actually executed by Rasali. There is no force in the submission of Mr. Keshav Pratap Singh that improvement made by the defendant was in the knowledge of the plaintiffs, and therefore, suit was barred by law of limitation but fact of the matter is that no such improvement had been proved, therefore, the pleading was beyond evidence. The suit could not be said to be barred by law of limitation as relief of declaration qua joint possession was sought as every owner is owner of each and every inch of land until the same is partitioned.
As an upshot of my findings, I do not find any illegality and perversity in the findings under challenge which are based upon the appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, much less no substantial question of law arises for adjudication of the present appeal.
No other argument has been raised. Resultantly, the appeal stands dismissed.”
(Emphasis supplied)
14. In such circumstances referred to above, the legal heirs of the original defendant are here before us with the present appeal.
15. Upon a perusal of the facts of the case in hand, this Court vide order dated 03.02.2025, confined itself to the question whether the plaintiff’s suit was time-barred or not.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT/ ORIGINAL
DEFENDANT
16. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant vehemently submitted that the High court committed a serious error in dismissing the second appeal thereby affirming the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate court in favor of the plaintiffs. The counsel would submit that the suit itself was barred by limitation as the same had [2025] 9 S.C.R. 837Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v. Jagan Devi & Ors.
been filed on 28.02.1984 i.e., after a delay of more than 11 years from the date of the execution of the sale deed dated 14.06.1973.
17. It was argued that the Trial Court rightly dismissed the suit being barred by limitation. The First Appellate court wrongly invoked Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to bring the suit within the period of limitation. According to the learned counsel, it is Article 56 of the Limitation Act, 1963 that governs the period of limitation in the present case. It was also argued that the original plaintiff, namely, Rasali failed to enter the witness box in the presence of the defendant. Moreover, Sibba s/o Lal Singh, in whose favour the plaintiff had executed a power of attorney to pursue the case, never entered the witness box.
18. In the last, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant submitted that heavy burden of proof is cast upon a person impugning the transaction to show that the same is sham or fraudulent one. According to the learned counsel a distinction should be borne in mind in regard to the nominal nature of the transaction which is no transaction in the eye of law at all and the nature and character of a transaction as reflected in a deed of conveyance. In other words, according to the learned counsel appearing for the defendant, the initial burden of proving the transaction as bogus or sham was on the plaintiffs and they could be said to have miserably failed to lead any evidence in that regard. In such circumstances, the onus could not be said to have shifted upon the defendant to establish or prove the valid execution of the sale deed. The registered document and the registration of the sale deed reinforced the valid execution of the sale deed. He would submit that a registered document carries with it a presumption that it was validly executed. It is for the party challenging the genuineness of the transaction to rebut such presumption.
19. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed that there being merit in his appeal, the same may be allowed and the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court be set aside and the impugned judgment and order passed by the Trial Court dismissing the suit, be affirmed.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS/ORIGINAL
PLAINTIFFS
20. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondentsherein submitted that no error not to speak of any error of law could 838 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports be said to have been committed by the High Court in passing the impugned judgment and order. It was argued that there are concurrent findings recorded by the First Appellate court and the High Court respectively that the plaintiff was not a party to the sale deed of 1973 i.e., the sale deed in question. In other words, the plaintiff had not put her thumb impression on the sale deed.
21. It was argued that it is settled law that when an instrument of sale of an immovable property is not executed by the owner, then such a sale deed is void ab initio and is considered a nullity qua the owner. In such a case, the owner is not required to seek cancellation of such an instrument or seek a declaration that such an instrument is void. This is the reason why the plaintiff had not sought the cancellation of the sale deed dated 14.06.1973 in the present case and therefore, there arises no question of application of Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. The counsel has placed reliance on several decisions to emphasize that when the instrument is void/void ab initio and not voidable, it would be Article 65 which would apply to a suit for possession based on title filed by the plaintiffs.
22. In the last, it was argued that since the alleged possession of the defendant over the suit property can at best be considered to have been adverse to the plaintiff from the date of execution of the sale deed dated 14.06.1973, the suit having been filed on 28.02.1984, i.e., within 12 years of the execution of the impugned sale deed, cannot be said to be barred by limitation as per Article 65.
23. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed that there being no merit in this appeal the same may be dismissed.
ANALYSIS
24. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any error in passing the impugned judgment and order?
25. The crux of the issue seems to be whether it is Article 65 or Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which would apply to the present facts in hand. The aforesaid Articles are reproduced as under:
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 839Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs. Goran v. Jagan Devi & Ors.
59. To cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the recission of a contract Three years When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him.
65. For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title Twelve years When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.
26. The counsel for the plaintiff would submit that it is Article 65 which must be applied to the present suit for possession since the sale deed dated 14.06.1973 was found to be fraudulent and therefore, void. Insofar as the question whether the aforesaid sale deed was void, the First Appellate Court observed as thus:
“[…] In my view, the evidence led by the plaintiff leaves no room for doubt that Smt. Rasali never executed the disputed sale deed. According the finding on issue no. 1 given by the trial court was incorrect and is reversed. -xxx- […] But here, the said mutation was based on void transaction, as Smt. Risali had never executed the sale deed in question. So the question of estoppels against the plaintiff does not arise in the present proceedings.”
27. The High Court has also expressed its agreement with the aforesaid finding of the First Appellate Court and observed that: “In my view, evidence brought on record by the plaintiffs un-clinchly proved that Rasali had never executed the disputed sale deed.”
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