Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 927; [2025] 8 S.C.R. 568
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R Mahadevan
- Decided
- 4 Aug 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 3343/2025
- Sections
- 302, 304, 25, 300, 8, 27, 313, 145, 157, 17, 21, 162
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:18 am. Original source ↗
Preview: first 50% of the document.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 568 : 2025 INSC 927 Narayan Yadav v.
State of Chhattisgarh (Criminal Appeal No. 3343 of 2025)
05 August 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court erred in passing the impugned judgment relying on the confessional FIR filed by the appellant-accused himself and the medical evidence to uphold his conviction, however, altering it from s.302, IPC to s.304 Part I.
Headnotes† Evidence Act, 1872 – s.25 – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 304 Part I – Confessional FIR, not admissible in evidence – Appellant-accused himself lodged FIR confessing the murder of the deceased in a drunken quarrel after the deceased allegedly made an obscene remark about the appellant’s girlfriend – Convicted u/s.302, IPC – High Court relied on the confessional FIR and medical evidence to uphold conviction, however, it was altered from s.302, IPC to s.304 Part I, giving benefit of Exception 4 to s.300 – Sustainability:
Held: Not sustainable – Confessional FIR is not admissible in evidence – Contents of the FIR are hit by s.25, Evidence Act, being a confession before a police officer – An FIR of a confessional nature made by an accused person is inadmissible in evidence against him, except to the extent that it shows he made a statement soon after the offence, thereby identifying him as the maker of the report, which is admissible as evidence of his conduct u/s.8, Evidence Act – High Court erred in reading the contents of the FIR lodged by the appellant into evidence – There was no question at all for the High Court to seek corroboration of the medical evidence on record with the confessional part of the FIR lodged by the appellant – Further, the High Court should have been mindful of the fact that a doctor is not a witness of fact – Evidence of such an expert is of an advisory character – An accused cannot be held guilty of the offence of murder solely on the basis of medical evidence on record – Furthermore, the depositions of the panch witnesses do not inspire any confidence – * Author [2025] 8 S.C.R. 569Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh Most of them turned hostile – No discovery of fact at the instance of the appellant, relevant and admissible u/s.27, Evidence Act, was established – Also, the High Court erred in invoking Exception 4 to s.300, IPC – Appellant acquitted. [Paras 24, 25, 28, 29, 52] Penal Code, 1860 – Exception 4 to s.300 – When cannot be invoked – Discussed. [Paras 40-43, 48-50] Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.27, 8 – Implication of – Conditions necessary for the applicability of s.27 – Discussed. [Paras 33, 36] Evidence – Of expert witness – Nature – Advisory:
Held: An expert witness is examined by the prosecution because of his specialized knowledge on certain subjects, which the judge may not be fully equipped to assess – The evidence of such an expert is of an advisory character – The credibility of the expert witness depends on the reasons provided in support of his conclusions, as well as the data and material forming the basis of those conclusions. [Para 28] Case Law Cited Nisar Ali v. State of U.P. [1957] 1 SCR 657 : 1957 SCC OnLine SC 42; Faddi v. State of M.P. [1964] 6 SCR 312 : 1964 SCC OnLine SC 123; Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar [1966] 1 SCR 134 : 1965 SCC OnLine SC 109; Murli v. State of Rajasthan [2009] 13 SCR 378 : (2009) 9 SCC 417; A. N. Venkatesh & Anr. v. State of Karnataka (2005) 7 SCC 714; State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya & Anr. [1977] 1 SCR 601 : (1976) 4 SCC 382; Budhi Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh [2012] 11 SCR 848 : (2012) 13 SCC 663; Kikar Singh v. State of Rajasthan [1993] 3 SCR 696 : (1993) 4 SCC 238; Surain Singh v. State of Punjab [2017] 2 SCR 824 : (2017) 5 SCC 796 – relied on.
List of Acts Evidence Act, 1872; Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords Confessional FIR; Confessional FIR not admissible in evidence; Conviction altered from Section 302, Penal Code, 1860 to Section 304 Part I; Confession before a police officer; FIR of confessional nature made by accused; Confession made by accused before the police; Contents of the FIR hit by Section 25, Evidence Act, 1872; 570 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Murder; Obscene remark about girlfriend; Section 27, Evidence Act, 1872; Section 8, Evidence Act, 1872; Corroboration of medical evidence with the confessional part of the FIR; Doctor not a witness of fact; Expert Witness; Incorrect application of Exception 4 to Section 300, Penal Code, 1860; Panch witnesses turned hostile; Non-confessional FIR admissible against the accused.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
3343 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 16.01.2025 of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in CRA No. 1538 of 2021 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
A Sirajudeen, Sr. Adv., Ms. Manjeet Chawla, Vishek Vats, Ms. Shaik Soni Ahamed, Ms. Kiran Bala Agarwal.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Ms. Sugandha Jain, Prabodh Kumar.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment J.B. Pardiwala, J.
For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the following parts:- INDEX* A. FACTUAL MATRIX ........................................................................ 2 B. ANAYLYSIS ................................................................................... 6 a. Confessional FIR is not Admissible in Evidence .................... 7 b. Evidence of an Expert Witness is only Advisory in Nature .... 20 c. Implication of Section(s) 27 and 8 of the Act of 1872 ............ 22 d. Incorrect application of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC... 25 C. CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 34 * Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 571Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh in Criminal Appeal No. 1538 of 2021 dated 16.01.2025 (hereinafter referred to as “Impugned Judgment”) by which the appeal preferred by the appellant herein against the judgment and order of conviction passed by the Trial Court came to be partly allowed by altering the conviction of the appellant herein from Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “the IPC”) to Section 304 Part I of the IPC.
A. FACTUAL MATRIX
3. The appellant (original accused) himself lodged a First Information Report (FIR) dated 27.09.2019 with Korba Kotwali Police Station, District Korba, which came to be registered for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The FIR reads thus:
“On 27.09.2019 I came to the P.S. Kotwali on the orders of Chowki Incharge for getting the Nalsi number in Crime No. 0/19 for the offence under Sections 302 and 380 IPC respectively. Nalsi number detailed that I am residing in the house of my relative Rajnath Yadav situated near the Pump House, Korba. I earn my livelihood as a milk supplier. I started work with Ram Babu Sharma, Thekedar past 15-20 days. Ram Babu Sharma used to call me for having drink at his house. Ram Baby invited me at his place on 24.09.2019. I went to his house at about 9.30 PM situated at Parshuram Nagar. We both sat and drank. Meanwhile I showed my girlfriend’s pic from my mobile. Then he said that get your girlfriend at my place and leave her with me for one night. Hearing this quarrel started between us and we started to fight. Then I picked up a knife kept in his house for cutting vegetables and inflicted blows on his neck and stomach in anger and killed him by hitting a log of wood on his head, legs and private part. Thereafter I dragged his dead body near the bedside and covered it with a cloth that I took out from an almirah. Then I ransacked his room and took away his purse containing Rs. 7000 and keys of the Bolero car. I locked the room from outside and got the Bolero outside and locked the main door and ran towards Bilaspur in Bolero. I met with 572 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports an accident at Raipur Road, ahead of Bilaspur. When I regained consciousness in morning I found myself in Saragaon Hospital where my mother and Yuvraj Yadu both were present. Today morning I came to Korba after getting discharged from the hospital. I informed about the incident to my mausa Rajnath Yadav, Rahul Chaudhari and Anuj Yadav and also informed the CSEB Chowki. Then I went to Ram Babu’s house with police people and pointed out the dead body. My vehicle is at the place of accident. I am filing the report. Investigation to be done.”
4. Upon registration of the FIR, lodged by the appellant himself, at the concerned Police Station referred to above, the investigation commenced. It appears that the investigating officer, after arresting the appellant, took him to the house of the deceased. After breaking open the house, the dead body of the deceased was found lying in a pool of blood inside his residence. A panchnama of the scene of offence was prepared in the presence of panch witnesses. The knife allegedly used by the appellant to inflict injuries on the deceased was recovered from the place of occurrence, i.e., the deceased’s house. The clothes and other articles were also collected in presence of the panch witnesses by preparing a panchnama, and were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical analysis. The clothes of the appellant were discovered at his instance from the residence of his uncle, Rajnath Yadav, by drawing a panchnama.
5. The inquest panchnama of the dead body of the deceased was drawn in the presence of the panch witnesses. The body of the deceased was then sent for post-mortem examination. The post-mortem report Exhibit-PW 34 recorded the following injuries found on the body of the deceased:
“1. An incised wound was present on the right Side of his forehead measuring 6 X 2 cm, deep to the bone, in a vertical position.
2. An incised wound was present on the left side of his forehead, the size of which was 3 X 1 cm, deep to the bone, in a vertical position.
3. An incised wound was present on the skin of the right parietal bone of the head, which was 4 X 2 cm, deep to the bone, in a vertical position.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 573Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh
4. An incised lesion was present on the skin of the left parietal bone, which was 5 X 2 cm in size, deep to the bone, in a vertical position, which was on the middle part of parietal bone.
5. An incised wound was present on the anterior part of the abdomen at the iliac fossa part which was 4 X 2 X 2 cm in size.
6. An incised wound was present on the upper right side of the chest, below the clavicle bone, the size of which was 4 X 2 deep to the upper part of the lung.”
6. The cause of death, as stated in the post-mortem report and duly proved by Dr. R.K. Divya (PW-10), was shock resulting from excessive bleeding from the right side of the chest and injury to the upper lobe of the right lung.
7. Upon completion of the investigation, chargesheet came to be filed by the investigating officer, and the filing of chargesheet for the offence enumerated above culminated in the Sessions Case No. 9 of 2020.
8. The Sessions Judge, Korba, proceeded to frame charge against the appellant for the offences mentioned above. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. In the course of trial, the prosecution examined the following witnesses:
i. PW-1, Rahul Kumar Chaudhari, panch witness (turned hostile); ii. PW-2 Kamlesh Kumar, son of the deceased;
iii. PW-3 Ravishanker Sriniwas, panch witness;
iv. PW-4 Rampradeep Sharma, panch witness;
v. PW-5 Ramniwas Sharma, panch witness;
vi. PW-6 Jalashwar Sakar, panch witness;
vii. PW-7 B.R. Chaudhary, Police witness viii. PW-8 Sudama Prasad, Police witness ix. PW-9 Ashok Pandey, Police witness x. PW-10 Dr. R.K. Divya, Medical Officer who performed postmortem xi. PW-11 Hemant Patle, Police witness 574 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
9. The prosecution also adduced a few documentary evidence.
10. Upon completion of the recording of the oral evidence, further statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In his statement, the appellant claimed that he had been falsely implicated in the alleged crime and asserted his complete innocence.
11. The Trial Court, upon overall appreciation of both oral as well as the documentary evidence on record, reached the conclusion that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, and accordingly, it held the appellant guilty of the offence of murder and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment.
12. The appellant being aggrieved by the judgment and order of conviction passed by the Trial Court, preferred an appeal before the High Court. The High Court partly allowed the appeal and altered the conviction of the appellant from Section 302 of the IPC to Section 304 Part I of the IPC, giving benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC
13. In such circumstances referred to above the appellant is before this Court with the present appeal.
B. ANAYLYSIS
14. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any error in passing the Impugned Judgment.
15. The entire judgment of the High Court could be termed as erroneous on several grounds, there are errors apparent on the face of the Impugned Judgment. The first misstep was that the High Court examined the medical evidence on record in detail and then proceeded to directly corroborate it with the contents of the FIR lodged by the appellant himself. In doing so, the High Court fully convinced itself that the appellant’s statements in the form of a confession, as contained in the FIR, were entirely corroborated by the medical evidence. Consequently, the Court concluded that the appellant had committed the alleged crime. In arriving at such a conclusion, the High Court overlooked some fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 575Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh a. Confessional FIR is not Admissible in Evidence
16. The FIR was exhibited in evidence (Exhibit P-14) through the oral evidence of the investigating officer PW-9, Ashok Pandey. PW-9 proved his signature on the FIR and also identified the signature of the first informant i.e., the appellant-herein. However, the other contents of the FIR could not have been proved through the testimony of the investigating officer. A plain reading of the FIR indicates that it contains a confession by its maker i.e., the appellant-herein, regarding the commission of the alleged offence.
17. A statement in an FIR can normally be used only to contradict its maker as provided in Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, “the Act of 1872”), or to corroborate his evidence as envisaged in Section 157 of the Act of 1872. In a criminal trial, however, neither of these is possible as long as the maker of the statement is an accused in the case, unless he offers himself to be examined as a witness [See: Nisar Ali v. State of U.P., 1957 SCC OnLine SC 42]. J.L. Kapur, J. speaking for the three-Judge Bench in that decision has observed:
“A first information report is not a substantive piece of evidence and can only be used to corroborate the statement of the maker under Section 157, Evidence Act, or to contradict it under Section 145 of that Act. It cannot be used as evidence against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused, nor to corroborate or contradict other witnesses. In this case, therefore, it is not evidence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
18. The High Court failed to take into consideration two landmark decisions of this Court – one in Faddi v. State of M.P., 1964 SCC OnLine SC 123, and the other in Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar, 1965 SCC OnLine SC 109.
19. In Faddi (supra), this Court stated that:
“If the FIR given by the accused contains any admission as defined in Section 17 of the Evidence Act there is no bar in using such an admission against the maker thereof as permitted under Section 21 of the Act, provided such 576 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports admission is not inculpatory in character. In the judgment their Lordships distinguished Nisar Ali case [AIR 1957 SC 366] in the following lines:
“But it appears to us that in the context in which the observation is made and in the circumstances, which we have verified from the record of that case, that the Sessions Judge had definitely held the first information report lodged by the co-accused who was acquitted to be inadmissible against Nisar Ali, and that the High Court did not refer to it at all in its judgment, this observation really refers to a first information report which is in the nature of a confession by the maker thereof. Of course, a confessional first information report cannot be used against the maker when he be an accused and necessarily cannot be used against a co-accused.”
(Emphasis supplied)
20. In Aghnoo Nagesia (supra), this Court sounded a note of caution that when the statement in the FIR given by an accused contains incriminating materials and it is difficult to sift the exculpatory portion therefrom, the whole of it must be excluded from evidence.
21. In Faddi (supra), the issue before this Court was whether the FIR lodged by the accused himself therein was admissible in evidence. In the facts of the said case, this Court held that the objection to the admissibility of the FIR lodged by the appellant was not sound, as the FIR only contained a few admissions, and those admissions did not amount to a confession so as to render the entire FIR inadmissible in evidence. We quote the relevant observations made by this Court in Faddi (supra) as under:
“14. It is contended for the appellant that the first information report was inadmissible in evidence and should not have been therefore taken on the record. In support, reliance is placed on the case reported as Nisar Ali v. State of U.P [AIR 1957 SC 366]. We have considered this contention and do not see any force in it.
15. The report is not a confession of the appellant. It is not a statement made to a police officer during the [2025] 8 S.C.R. 577Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh course of investigation. Section 25 of the Evidence Act and Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not bar its admissibility. The report is an admission by the accused of certain facts which have a bearing on the question to be determined by the Court viz. how and by whom the murder of Gulab was committed, or whether the appellant's statement in Court denying the correctness of certain statements' of the prosecution witnesses is correct or not. Admissions are admissible in evidence under Section 21 of the Act. Section 17 defines an admission to be a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons, and under the circumstances, thereafter mentioned, in the Act. Section 21 provides that admissions are relevant and may be proved as against a person who makes them. Illustrations (c), (d) and (e) to Section 21 are of the circumstances in which an accused could prove his own admissions which go in his favour in view of the exceptions mentioned in Section 21 to the provision that admissions could not be proved by the person who makes them. It is therefore clear that admissions of an accused can be proved against him.
16. The Privy Council, in very similar circumstances, held long ago in Dal Singh v. King Emperor [LR 44 IA 137] such first information reports to be admissible in evidence. It was said in that case at p. 142:
“It is important to compare the story told by Dal Singh when making his statement at the trial with that what he said in the report he made to the police in the document which he signed, a document which is sufficiently authenticated. The report is clearly admissible. It was in no sense a confession. As appears from its terms, it was rather in the nature of an information or charge laid against Mohan and Jhunni in respect of the assault alleged to have been made on Dal Singh on his way from Hardua to Jubbulpur. As such the statement is proper evidence against him….
578 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports It will be observed that this statement is at several points at complete variance with what Dal Singh afterwards stated in Court. The Sessions Judge regarded the document as discrediting his defence.
He had to decide between the story for the prosecution and that told for Dal Singh.”
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the facts of that case were distinguishable in some respects from the facts of this case. Such a distinction, if any, has no bearing on the question of the admissibility of the report. The report was held admissible because it was not a confession and it was helpful in determining the matter before the Court.
17. In Nisar Ali case [AIR 1957 SC 366] Kapur, J. who spoke for the Court said, after narrating the facts:
“An objection has been taken to the admissibility of this report as it was made by a person who was a co-accused. A first information report is not a substantive piece of evidence and can only be used to corroborate the statement of the maker under Section 157, Evidence Act, or to contradict it under Section 145 of that Act. It cannot be used as evidence against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused, not to corroborate or contradict other witnesses. In this case, therefore, it is not evidence.” It is on these observations that it has been contended for the appellant that his report was inadmissible in evidence. Ostensibly, the expression ‘it cannot be used as evidence against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused’ supports the appellant’s contention. But it appears to us that in the context in which the observation is made and in the circumstances, which we have verified from the record of that case, that the Sessions Judge had definitely held the first information report lodged by the co-accused who was acquitted to be inadmissible against Nisar Ali, and that the High Court did not refer to it at all in its judgment, this observation really refers to a first information report which is in the nature of a confession by the maker thereof. [2025] 8 S.C.R. 579Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh Of course a confessional first information report cannot be used against the maker when he be an accused and necessarily cannot be used against a co-accused. Further, the last sentence of the above-quoted observation is significant and indicates what the Court meant was that the first information report lodged by Qudratullah, the coaccused, was not evidence against Nisar Ali. This Court did not mean — as it had not to determine in that case — that a first information report which is not a confession cannot be used as an admission under Section 21 of the Evidence Act or as a relevant statement under any other provisions of that Act. We find also that this observation has been understood in this way by the Rajasthan High Court in State v. Balchand [AIR 1960 Raj 101] and in State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Singh [AIR 1962 Raj 3] and by the Allahabad High Court in Allahdia v. State [1959 All LJ 340] .
18. We therefore hold that the objection to the admissibility of the first information report lodged by the appellant is not sound and that the Courts below have rightly admitted it in evidence and have made proper use of it.”
(Emphasis supplied)
22. We now proceed to look into the decision of this Court in Aghnoo Nagesia (supra). The following observations of this Court at paragraphs 9 to 18 are relevant and are quoted below:- “9. Section 25 of the Evidence Act is one of the provisions of law dealing with confessions made by an accused.
The law relating to confessions is to be found generally in Ss. 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act and Ss. 162 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Sections 17 to 31 of the Evidence Act are to be found under the heading “Admissions”. Confession is a species of admission, and is dealt with in Ss. 24 to 30. A confession or an admission is evidence against the maker of it, unless its admissibility is excluded by some provision of law. Section 24 excludes confession caused by certain inducements, threats and promises. Section 25 provides: “No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a 580 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports person accused of an offence”. The terms of S. 25 are imperative. A confession made to a police officer under any circumstances is not admissible in evidence against the accused. It covers a confession made when he was free and not in police custody, as also a confession made before any investigation has begun. The expression “accused of any offence” covers a person accused of an offence at the trial whether or not he was accused of the offence when he made the confession. Section 26 prohibits proof against any person of a confession made by him in the custody of a police officer, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. The partial ban imposed by S. 26 relates to a confession made to a person other than a police officer. Section 26 does not qualify the absolute ban imposed by S. 25 on a confession made to a police officer. Section 27 is in the form of a proviso, and partially lifts the ban imposed by Ss. 24, 25 and 26.It provides that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure forbids the use of any statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation for any purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of the offence under investigation, save as mentioned in the proviso and in cases falling under sub-s. (2), and it specifically provides that nothing in it shall be deemed to affect the provisions of S. 27 of the Evidence Act. The words of S. 162 are wide enough to include a confession made to a police officer in the course of an investigation. A statement or confession made in the course of an investigation may be recorded by a Magistrate under S. 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure subject to the safeguards imposed by the section. Thus, except as provided by S. 27 of the Evidence Act, a confession by an accused to a police officer is absolutely protected under S. 25 of the Evidence Act, and if it is made in the [2025] 8 S.C.R. 581Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh course of an investigation, it is also protected by S. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and a confession to any other person made by him while in the custody of a police officer is protected by S. 26, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. These provisions seem to proceed upon the view that confessions made by an accused to a police officer or made by him while he is in the custody of a police officer are not to be trusted, and should not be used in evidence against him. They are based upon grounds of public policy and the fullest effect should be given to them.
10. Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the recording of the first information. The information report as such is not substantive evidence. It may be used to corroborate the informant under S. 157 of the Evidence Act or to contradict him under S. 145 of the Act, if the informant is called as a witness. If the first information is given by the accused himself, the fact of his giving the information is admissible against him as evidence of his conduct under S. 8 of the Evidence Act. If the information is a non-confessional statement, it is admissible against the accused as an admission under S. 21 of the Evidence Act and is relevant, see Faddi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Cri. Appeal No. 210 of 1963, dated 24-1-1964: (AIR 1964 SC 1850), explaining Nisar Ali v. State of U. P., (S) AIR 1957 SC 366 and Dal Singh v. King Emperor, 44 Ind App 137:
(AIR 1917 PC 25). But a confessional first information report to a police Officer cannot be used against the accused in view of S. 25 of the Evidence Act.
11. The Indian Evidence Act does not define “confession”. For a long time, the Courts in India adopted the definition of “confession” given in Art. 22 of Stephen’s Digest of the Law of Evidence. According to that definition a confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime. This definition was discarded by the Judicial Committee in Pakala Narayanaswami v. Emperor, 66 Ind App 66 at p. 81: (AIR 1939 PC 47 at p. 52). Lord Atkin observed:
582 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports “.......no statement that contains self exculpatory matter can amount to confession, if the exculpatory statement is of some fact which if true would negative the offence alleged to be confessed. Moreover, a confession must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact, is not of itself a confession, e.g., an admission that the accused is the owner of and was in recent possession of the knife or revolver which caused a death with no explanation of any other man’s possession.” These observations received the approval of this Court in Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab (1), 1953 SCR 94 at p. 104; (AIR 1952 SC 354 at p. 357). In State of U. P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya, (1961) 1 SCR 14 at p.
21: (AIR 1960 SC 1125 at pp. 1128-1129). Shah, J., referred to a confession as a statement made by a person stating or suggesting the inference that he has committed a crime.
12. Shortly put, a confession may be defined as an admission of the offence by a person charged with the offence. A statement which contains self-exculpatory matter cannot amount to a confession, if the exculpatory statement is of some fact which, if true, would negative the offence alleged to be confessed. If an admission of an accused is to be used against him, the whole of it should be tendered in evidence and if part of the admission is exculpatory and part inculpatory, the prosecution is not at liberty to use in evidence the inculpatory part only. See Hanumant Govind v. State of M. P. 1952 SCR 1091 at p. 1111: (AIR 1952 SC 343 at p. 350) and 1953 SCR 94 : (AIR 1952 SC 354). The accused is entitled to insist that the entire admission including the exculpatory part must be tendered in evidence. But this principle is of no assistance to the accused where no part of his statement is self-exculpatory; and the prosecution intends to use the whole of the statement against the accused.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 583Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh
13. Now, a confession may consist of several parts and may reveal not only the actual commission of the crime but also the motive, the preparation, the opportunity, the provocation, the weapons used, the intention, the concealment of the weapon and the subsequent conduct of the accused. If the confession is tainted the taint attaches to each part of it. It is not permissible in law to separate one part and to admit it in evidence as a non-confessional statement. Each part discloses some incriminating fact, i.e., some fact which by itself or along with other admitted or proved facts suggests the inference that the accused committed the crime, and though each part taken singly may not amount to a confession, each of them being part of a confessional statement partakes of the character of a confession. If a statement contains an admission of an offence, not only that admission but also every other admission of an incriminating fact contained in the statement is part of the confession.
14. If proof of the confession is excluded by any provision of law such as S.24, S. 25 and S. 26 of the Evidence Act, the entire confessional statement in all its parts including the admissions of minor incriminating facts must also be excluded, unless proof of it is permitted by some other section under as S. 27 of the Evidence Act. Little substance and content would be left in Ss. 24, 25 and 26 if proof of admission of incriminating facts in a confessional statement is permitted.
Continue reading
Sign in and become a member to continue reading this judgment and every other document in the library.
Members read the full text, download where permitted, and keep notes and bookmarks.