M/S Motilal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal & Anr.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1062; [2025] 8 S.C.R. 2400
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice K.V. Viswanathan
- Decided
- 28 Aug 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 4480/2016
- Sections
- 31(5), 34, 2, 34(3), 34(2), 2(1), 33, 31(1), 31, 3, 33(1), 33(4)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:18 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2400 : 2025 INSC 1062 M/s Motilal Agarwala v.
State of West Bengal & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 4480 of 2016)
28 August 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the delivery of the true/xerox copy of the Arbitral Award duly signed by the Arbitrator to an authorised representative of the State would constitute delivery upon the respondent in accordance with s.31(5) of the 1996 Act. Headnotes† Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – ss.31(5), 2(1) (h) – Form and contents of arbitral award – Delivery of signed copy to each party – Delivery of the true/xerox copy of the Arbitral Award duly signed by the Arbitrator to Assistant Engineer-authorised representative of the State on 12.11.2013 – Period of limitation to challenge the award could be said to have expired on
12.02. 2014 – State filed application u/s.34 on 20.03.2014, and addressed a letter to the Arbitrator to provide a certified copy of the arbitral award – Case of the State that till 12.02.2014, it had no idea about the passing of the arbitral award, it was only when the appellant initiated execution proceedings that they came to know about the same – s.34 application, being time-barred, dismissed by the trial court, however, allowed by the High Court – Correctness:
Held: Authorised representative would not fall within the ambit of “party” as defined by Clause (h) of Sub-Section (1) of s.2 to an arbitration agreement – Delivery to the Assistant Engineer who was not “a party to the arbitration” and who was not in a decisionmaking capacity to take further recourses on the award would not be a valid service of the award – Application for setting aside an arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of the Act 1996 has to be preferred by such party within three months from the date of the receipt of the arbitral award – In order to constitute [2025] 8 S.C.R. 2401M/s Motilal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal & Anr. an effective service, a copy of an award, where such party is the Ministry of a particular Department, is to be delivered to a person who has the knowledge and is the best person to understand and appreciate an award and more particularly, to take decision for its challenge – Authorised representative of the State could not have taken the final decision to challenge the award – It is only the Secretary of the concerned Department or the Executive Engineer, who could be said to be the competent authority to take a decision as to whether the award could be challenged or not – Order passed by the High Court upheld. [Paras 20-26] Case Law Cited Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors [2005] 2 SCR 983 : (2005) 4 SCC 239 – relied on.
Benarsi Krishna Committee and Others v. Karmyogi Shelters Private Limited [2012] 7 SCR 1175 : (2012) 9 SCC 496 – referred to. List of Acts Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
List of Keywords Delivery of signed copy of award to each party; Arbitral Award; Period of limitation; Certified copy of the arbitral award; Authorised representative; Expression “party”.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4480 of 2016 From the Judgment and Order dated 01.03.2016 of the High Court of West Bengal at Calcutta in FMA No. 4576 of 2015 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Ajit Kumar Sinha, Pijush K. Roy, Sr. Advs., Pritthish Roy, Ms. Kakali Roy, Ms. Khushboo Sharma, Rajan K. Chourasia, Anand Kumar Chaurasia, Naveen Soni.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Ms. Madhumita Bhattacharjee, Ms. Debarati Sadhu.
2402 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Order
1. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High Court at Calcutta (Civil Appellate Jurisdiction), dated 01.03.2016, in F.M.A. No. 4576/2015, by which the order passed by the District Court in Miscellaneous Case No.12/2014, came to be set aside thereby holding that the Section 34 application, preferred by the State against the arbitral award, was time-barred.
2. We need not delve much into the facts of this litigation as we are in a position to affirm the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court on a neat question of law.
3. Here is a case in which an arbitral award came to be passed in favour of the appellant herein dated 12.11.2013. The State having suffered an award challenged the same invoking Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, `the Act 1996’). The period of limitation prescribed for the purpose of preferring Section 34 application is 90 days. Going by the date of the award and the receipt of the xerox copy of the award by the authorised representative of the State, the period of limitation could be said to have expired on 12.02.2014. It is the case of the State that till 12.02.2014, it had no idea at all about the passing of the arbitral award. It is only when the appellant herein initiated execution proceedings that they came to know about the same. In such circumstances, they immediately preferred Section 34 application on 20.03.2014. On 03.04.2014, the State addressed a letter to the learned Arbitrator to provide for a certified copy of the arbitral award dated 12.11.2013. The letter upon which reliance has been placed by the State reads thus: “GOVERNMENT OF WEST BENGAL
IRRIGATION & WATERWAYS DIRECTORATE
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER
TEESTA CANAL DIVISION NO.1
ISLAMPUR, UTTAR DINAJPUR
From The Executive Engineer Teesta Canal Division No.1 [2025] 8 S.C.R. 2403M/s Motilal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal & Anr. Teesta Pally, Islampur Uttar Dinajpur To Justice Kalyanmoy Ganguli High Court (Retd.)
51/4, Biren Roy Road (West)
Kolkata – 700008 Sub: Prayer for certified copy of the arbitral award passed on 12/11/2013 Ref. A.P. No. - 200 of 2002 in the matter of Arbitration between M/s Motilal Agrawal – vs – The State of West Bengal & Others Sir, You are requested to provide a certified copy of the arbitral award passed by your kind self on 12/11/2013 as sole arbitrator in the above cited reference at the earliest possible. It is urgently required for filing the same before the Ld. District Judge, District Court, Uttar Dinajpur before 29.04.2014 which is the next date fixed for filing the certified copy of Arbitration award in the matter of Misc.12/2014 (Arbitration) – State of West Bengal Vs.
M/S Motilal Agarwal.
In this context, I would like to inform you that certified copy of the said award was not delivered to the undersigned or the department from your end on 12/11/2013. Charges for certified copy, if any, will be paid to you.
Thanking you, Yours sincerely,
(NRAJ KUMAR SINGH)
Executive Engineer Teesta Canal Division No.1 Islampur, Uttar Dinajpur”
4. The Section 34 application being time-barred, according to the District Court, was not entertained and in such circumstances, the Miscellaneous Case No.12/2014 came to be dismissed.
2404 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
5. The State being dissatisfied with the order passed by the District Court dismissing the application being Miscellaneous Case No.12/2014 went before the High Court by way of F.M.A. No.4576/2015. The High Court, by its impugned judgment and order, allowed the FMA, preferred by the State, and thereby set aside the order passed by the District Court, referred to above. The High Court while allowing the FMA, preferred by the State, observed as under:
“In our view, limitation under Section 34(3) would start running from the date on which the party applying for setting aside of the arbitral award received a signed copy of the award from the Arbitral Tribunal. Such copy need not necessarily be signed in original by the Arbitrator/majority of the Arbitrators. An authentic photo copy along with signatures would suffice. This issue is covered by a judgment dated 28 th August, 2015 of this Bench in APOT 337 of 2015 (National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India Ltd. vs. M/s R. Piyarelal Import & Export Ltd.). The award made over by the learned Arbitrator to Sri Pradip Saha, Assistant Engineer was a signed copy. However, the question is whether the period of limitation for making an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, would start running from the date on which the signed copy was received by Mr. Pradip Saha, Assistant Engineer.
In State of Maharashtra Vs. ARK Builders reported in (2011) 4 SCC 616, cited by Mr. Sen, the issue was, whether the period of limitation for making an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, for setting aside an arbitral award, was to be reckoned from the date on which a copy of the award was received by the applicant by any means or source, or whether it was to start running from the date a signed copy of the award was delivered to the applicant by the Arbitrator.
The Supreme Court held that the period of limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, could only commence from the date on which the award was received by the applicant in the manner prescribed by law and/or in other words, in the manner for service of the award prescribed in Section 31(5) of the 1996 Act.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2405M/s Motilal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal & Anr. In ARK Builders (supra) the Arbitrators had not supplied a copy of the award to the appellants. The award holder had, however, forwarded a photocopy of the award to the appellant and claimed payment in terms of the award. The Supreme Court held that limitation would run from the time the award duly signed, was received by the appellant, from the Arbitrator.
In ARK Builders (supra) the Supreme Court did not consider the question of whether the copies served by the Arbitrators to the parties concerned, would all have to actually and separately be signed by the Arbitrators themselves. However, the Supreme Court clearly held that limitation would start running from the date on which a copy of the award was received by the applicant from the Arbitral Tribunal.
In Benarsi Krishna Committee & Ors. Vs. Karmyogi Shelters Private Limited reported in (2012) 9 SCC 496 the Supreme Court held that the expression ‘party’ as defined in Section 2(i)(h) of the 1996 Act clearly indicates a person who is a party to an arbitration agreement. The said definition is not clarified in any way so as to include the agent of the party to such agreement. Any reference, therefore, made in Section 31(5) and Section 34(2) of the 1996 Act could only mean the party himself and not his or her agent or advocate empowered to act on the basis of a vakalatnama. In the aforesaid case, the award had been served on the advocate.
In this case, Sri Pradip Saha, Assistant Engineer was not a party to the arbitration. The State of West Bengal, represented through the Secretary, Irrigation and Waterways Department and the Executive Engineer were parties. Copies of the award should have been served on the Secretary, Irrigation and Waterways Department, and the Executive Engineer.
The award not having been served on the Secretary, Irrigation and Waterways Department, or the Executive Engineer, it cannot be said that limitation had started running. The application under Section 34(2) for setting 2406 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports aside of the arbitral award cannot be held to have been barred by limitation.
The appeal is therefore, allowed.
The order under appeal is set aside. The learned Court is directed to hear and dispose of the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act on merits, at the earliest preferably within 6 months from the date of communication of this order.”
6. Thus, it appears on a plain reading of the impugned order passed by the High Court that what weighed with the High Court was the fact that the award was not served on the Secretary, Irrigation and Waterways Department or the Executive Engineer. According to the High Court, it is only the Secretary, Irrigation and Waterways Department or the Executive Engineer, who could be termed as “party”, as defined in Section 2(1)(h) of the Act 1996. An authorised representative of the State, who might have participated in the proceedings before the Arbitrator and who might have also received a xerox copy of the award cannot be said to be falling within the expression “party”.
7. Mr. Ajit Kumar Sinha, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant would vehemently submit that the High Court committed an error in passing the impugned order. The principal argument of the learned Senior Counsel is that the authorised representative, who actually participated in the arbitral proceedings and was in complete knowledge of every fact of the proceedings, had collected the xerox copy of the award duly signed by the Arbitrator and in such circumstances, it could be said that the State had the knowledge of passing of such award on 12.11.2013. He would argue that this Court may take the view that the authorised representative in full knowledge of the entire litigation would fall within the expression “party”, as defined under the Act 1996.
8. In such circumstances, referred to above, the learned Senior Counsel prayed that there being merit in his appeal, the same may be allowed and the Section 34 application be declared to be time-barred.
9. On the other hand, Ms. Madhumita Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel appearing for the State, would submit that no error, not to speak of any error in law, could be said to have been committed by [2025] 8 S.C.R. 2407M/s Motilal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal & Anr. the High Court in passing the impugned order. She fairly submitted that the State is unable to run away from the fact that the authorised representative had collected the xerox copy of the arbitral award, duly signed by the Arbitrator, on 12.11.2013 but unfortunately the authorised representative never brought it to the notice of the State that such award had been passed. According to her, it is only when the execution proceedings were initiated by the award-holder, i.e., the appellant herein and a notice was issued to the State that for the first time, the State came to learn about the passing of such award. Having learnt about the passing of such award, immediately on 20.03.2014, Section 34 application was filed. Since there was delay, an application was filed before the District Court. According to her, the District Court was in error in taking the view that the Section 34 application was time-barred.
10. In the last, she submitted that the authorised representative of the State would not fall within the ambit of “party”, as defined under the Act 1996.
11. In such circumstances, referred to above, she prayed that there being no merit in this appeal, the same may be dismissed.
ANALYSIS
12. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the delivery of the true/xerox copy of the Arbitral Award duly signed by the Arbitrator to an authorised representative of the State on 12.11.2013 would constitute delivery upon the respondent herein in accordance with Section 31(5) of the Act 1996?
13. The limitation period under the Act 1996 for the Section 34 application is three months from the date of “receipt” of an Arbitral Award or from the date on which request under Section 33 of the Act is disposed.
14. The proviso to sub-section (3) gives an additional 30 days to a party provided it can satisfy the Court that it was prevented in filing on time for sufficient reasons. Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act 1996 are reproduced below:
“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award- (1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be 2408 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with subsection (2) and sub-section (3)
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