Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1043; [2025] 8 S.C.R. 2136
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 3 Judges: Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Sanjay Karol, Justice Sandeep Mehta
- Decided
- 25 Aug 2025
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) No. 371/2023
- Sections
- 302, 104, 20, 354(3), 51, 510, 776
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:18 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2136 : 2025 INSC 1043 Vasanta Sampat Dupare v.
Union of India & Ors.
(Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 371 of 2023)
25 August 2025 [Vikram Nath,* Sanjay Karol* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Writ petition filed u/Art.32 challenging the continuing validity of the sentence of death against the petitioner, having been affirmed on appeal, declined in review, and followed by the rejection of mercy petitions and seeks its reconsideration in the light of guidelines laid down in the case of Manoj and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh; and whether Art.32 authorises this Court to reopen a capital sentencing exercise that has otherwise attained finality, solely to cure the procedural lapse the petitioner identifies. Headnotes† Constitution of India – Art.32 – Power of the court to revisit a sentence that has attained finality – Petitioner convicted u/ss.363, 367, 376(2)(f), 302 and 201 IPC for committing rape and murder of four year old girl and awarded death sentence – Death sentence attained finality upto this Court – Petitioner exhausted all judicial remedies, including review and mercy petitions – Writ petition challenging the continuing validity of the sentence of death affirmed against him, and sought its reconsideration in the light of subsequent legislative and judicial developments-guidelines laid down in the case of Manoj v. State of M.P. whereby this Court mandated the calling of reports, the content whereof has to be duly considered in arriving at a just and proper sentence:
Held: [per Vikram Nath, J.] (for himself and Sandeep Mehta, J) Petitioner’s request for a new sentencing hearing which is compliant to Manoj’s case falls squarely within Art.32 – Relief sought does not disturb the conviction or reopen evidentiary findings but merely insists that the ultimate penalty be imposed, if at all, through the procedural safeguards now recognised as integral to a fair * Author [2025] 8 S.C.R. 2137Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors. and individualised sentence – Granting this remedy is thus, a legitimate, and indeed compelling exercise of the Court’s plenary power u/Art.32 to secure the effective enforcement of fundamental rights – Contemporary Indian society no longer conceives criminal punishment purely in retributive terms – It also measures the quantum of a sentence by its capacity to preserve the possibility of human reform – Goal of reformation, repeatedly affirmed in our jurisprudence, presupposes that the legal system will not foreclose the prospect of moral regeneration unless every procedural assurance of accuracy and fairness has first been scrupulously observed – Art.32 is the bedrock of constitutional remedies, but its exceptional scope cannot be permitted to become a routine pathway for reopening concluded matters – Reopening will be reserved only for those cases where there is a clear, specific breach of the new procedural safeguards as these breaches are so serious that, if left uncorrected, they would undermine the accused person’s basic rights to life, dignity and fair process – Finding of guilt recorded against the petitioner is left untouched – Sentence of death affirmed by this Court set aside – Matter remitted to this Court for a fresh hearing on sentence alone, to be conducted in conformity with the directions in Manoj’s case – Registry is directed to place the matter before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for assignment to an appropriate Bench. [Paras 26, 27, 32-35] Held: [per Sanjay Karol, J.] (Concurring): In Manoj’s case all that has been done is that a streamlined and time-bound process has been laid down, to be necessarily followed by the Courts below, which hitherto had not been done despite postulation in Bachan Singh’s case – If the law once declared is not followed and the same causes a demonstrable detriment to a person, or a convict, such person will have a legitimate grievance which the Courts would be then required to remedy – Law declared by the Constitutional Courts applies retrospectively – Ex-consequenti, the benefit of Manoj’s case applies to the petitioner retrospectively and the denial of such benefit, which may eventually have the effect of saving him from the hangman’s noose, if it is indeed found that his socio-economic and psychological background as also other mitigating factors as may be procured, did play a sufficient role in the petitioner committing the heinous crime that he did, nonconsideration of these factors would constitute a violation of Art.21, since the effect thereof would be that his life would be eventually taken away – Nothing whatsoever under the law can cast a shadow 2138 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports or eclipse the fundamental right, whether it be the availability of a substantive alternate remedy or procedural wrangles – Since this Court has confirmed the petitioner’s conviction, and review was also dismissed, he has no other avenue other than this Court where he may seek the benefit of the principles in Manoj’s case – It is almost impossible to conceive that the remedy under this Article would be foreclosed to the petitioner when Art.21 is the only thing that stands between the petitioner and the rope of death, only in order to underscore and emphasize the finality of a judicial determination, which in all cases apart from such exceptional circumstances, is a cardinal principle to be abided by – Submission that after dismissal of a review petition, the only available path is that of the curative petition, cannot be accepted since this jurisdiction is to be exercised only in those cases where the circumstances permit the finality of a judicial decision to be altered with – Art.32 is available to even those who are serving sentences for the most heinous offences – Given that Manoj’s case was not in operation or did not exist at the time when the petitioner was sentenced and his review was dismissed, no other recognized way was available to him to approach this Court seeking benefit thereof – Judicial pronouncements apply retrospectively and so a right was conferred upon him to have his sentence re-examined in the light of materials gathered under the principles of Manoj’s case, it is to exercise such a right which has a direct impact on his Art.21 rights that a petition u/Art.32 had to be preferred – Thus, has to be necessarily held to be maintainable in the specific facts of this case, where a subsequent development in law granted a benefit to a convict, and there was no other avenue available to him. [Paras 54-59] Sentence/Sentencing – Death sentence – Sentencing guidelines laid down in Manoj and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh’s case – Elucidated. [Paras 9, 10] Constitution of India – Art. 32 – Scope of – Principal lines of enquiry for determination:
Held: Art.32 is the constitutional conduit through which this Court may issue “appropriate” writs to secure the enforcement of Fundamental Rights – It furnishes a direct route for citizen to this Court whenever a protected Fundamental Right is said to be under threat – To understand the scope of Art.32, the settled place of Art.32 as a continuing safeguard where a sentence of death has yet to [2025] 8 S.C.R. 2139Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors. be carried out, must be considered – This Court’s power and duty to set aside procedural finality when that course alone can avert a breach of the guarantees of equality and life, is to be examined – Whether the sentencing framework articulated in Manoj’s case has assumed the character of an indispensable procedural safeguard, is to be tested – Form and extent of the corrective relief that may properly be fashioned u/Art.32 be delineated, mindful that any order is taken must both protect constitutional rights and preserve the stability of adjudication – Art.32 jurisdiction in capital cases constitutes a special constitutional continuing safeguard that survives the ordinary hierarchy of appeal, review and even mercy – Power to intervene u/Art.32 is meant to prevent the Constitution from being stymied by formal finality when a human life hangs in the balance – Procedural finality cannot stand in the way of curing a constitutional wrong which implicates life or liberty – Procedural fairness in capital sentencing is an imperative u/Arts.14 and 21 – Since Manoj’s case, an institutional practice emerged whereby this Court routinely calls for the mandated reports before deciding appeals in capital punishment cases – Manoj’ case protocol has become an indispensable component of a “meaningful, real and effective” sentencing hearing – There is plenary power to mould relief u/Arts.32 and 142 – Court’s ability to grant effective relief is not exhausted by the formal confines of appellate review – In exceptional situations it empowers this Court to revisit even its own final orders where doing so is necessary to prevent a continuing breach of fundamental rights. [Paras 11, 12] Case Law Cited In the judgment of Vikram Nath, J.
Manoj and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2022] 9 SCR 452 : (2023) 2 SCC 353 – explained and relied on.
Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 145 of 2017; Irfan @ Bhayu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1667-1668 of 2021; Harbans Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [1982] 3 SCR 235 : (1982) 2 SCC 101; Smt. Triveniben v. State of Gujarat [1989] 1 SCR 509 : (1989) 1 SCC 678; Navneet Kaur v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another [2014] 4 SCR 1138 : (2014) 7 SCC 264; Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India and Others [2014] 11 SCR 1009 : (2014) 9 SCC 737; Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq v. Registrar, Supreme Court 2140 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports of India and Others [2014] 11 SCR 1009 : (2019) 9 SCC 404; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Another [1988] Supp. 1 SCR 1 : (1988) 2 SCC 602; S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka and Another [1993] Supp. 2 SCR 1 : (1993) Supp. 4 SCC 595; Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and Another [2002] 2 SCR 1006 : (2002) 4 SCC 388; Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra [2009] 9 SCR 90 : (2009) 6 SCC 498; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab [1983] 1 SCR 145 : (1980) 2 SCC 684; Sanjay Singh and Another v. U.P. Public Service Commission, Allahabad and Another [2007] 1 SCR 235 : (2007) 3 SCC 720; Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India and Others [2024] 1 SCR 743 : (2024) 5 SCC 481; Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India and Another [1998] 2 SCR 795 : (1998) 4 SCC 409 – referred to. In the judgment of Sanjay Karol, J.
Manoj v. State of M.P. [2022] 9 SCR 452 : (2023) 2 SCC 353 – explained and relied on.
Byluru Thippaiah v. State of Karnataka [2025] 7 SCR 550 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1455; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab [1983] 1 SCR 145 : (1980) 2 SCC 684; Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India [2018] 7 SCR 379 : (2018) 10 SCC 1; Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [1994] 2 SCR 375 : (1994) 3 SCC 569; CIT v. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. [2008] 13 SCR 421 : (2008) 14 SCC 171; Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Raj Kumar Arora, 2025 SCC Online SC 819; Kanishk Sinha & Anr v. State of West Bengal & Anr. [2025] 2 SCR 1045 : 2025 SCC Online SC 443; Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union v. Union of India [1981] 2 SCR 52 : (1981) 1 SCC 568; L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India [1997] 2 SCR 1186 : (1997) 3 SCC 261; S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab & Ors. [2001] Supp. 1 SCR 621 : (2001) 7 SCC 126; K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India [2018] 8 SCR 1 : (2019) 1 SCC 1; Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and Another [2002] 2 SCR 1006 : (2002) 4 SCC 388 – referred to.
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 US 586 (1978); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S 1 (1986); Graham v. Collins 506, U.S 461 (1993); Tennard v. Dretke, 2004 SCC OnLine US SC 59; Barton Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 1910 SCC OnLine US SC 2; Attorney General of Canada v. George Hislop, 2007 SCC OnLine Can SC 10 – referred to.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2141Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors. Books and Periodicals Cited William W. Berry, Individualized Sentencing, 76 Wash.& Lee L. Rev.13 (2019); Kant, I. (2017). Kant: The Metaphysics of Morals. (M. Gregor, Trans., L. Denis, Ed.) (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; M.Nussbaum, Human Dignity & Political entitlements, in Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics 360 (2008).; M.J.Ryan, Taking Dignity Seriously: Excavating the backdrop of the Eight Amendment, (2016) U.ILL L.REV.2129; 15th Ed. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England; Constituent Assembly Debates, Official Report, Vol. VII (4 November 1948), at 3–5 (India); Constituent Assembly Debates, Official Report, Vol. VII (4 November 1948), at 8–10 (India) – referred to.
List of Acts Constitution of India; Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016; Mental Healthcare Act, 2017.
List of Keywords Writ petition filed u/Art.32; Continuing validity of the sentence of death; Affirmed on appeal; Review; Mercy petitions; Manoj and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh’s case; Capital sentencing; Procedural lapse; Power of the court to revisit sentence that has attained finality; Rape and murder of four year old girl; Death sentence; Judicial remedies; Subsequent legislative and judicial developments; Benefit of revisiting sentence.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 371 of 2023 Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Petitioner:
Gopal Sankarnarayanan, Sr. Adv., Ms. Prerna Priyadarshini, Shourya Dasgupta, Ms. Trisha Chandran, Pradyut Kashyap, Ms. Shreya Rastogi, Ms. Manasa Ramakrishna, Syed Faraz Alam, Atharva Gaur, Aayushman Aggarwal.
2142 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Advs. for the Respondents:
K.M.Nataraj, A.S.G., Dr. Birendra Saraf, Advocate General, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, Adarsh Dubey, Vatsal Joshi, Sanjay Kr. tyagi, Anuj Srinivas Udupa, Ms. Agrmaa Singh, Raman Yadav, Arvind Kumar Sharma.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Vikram Nath, J.
1. The majesty of our Constitution lies not in the might of the State but in its restraint. When the Court contemplates the ultimate punishment, i.e. the Capital Punishment, it enters a domain where justice must be tempered by conscience and guided by the unwavering promises of equality, dignity and fair procedure. A Constitution that proclaims liberty and dignity as its first commitments cannot permit the State to end a human life unless every safeguard of fairness has been honoured and every civilising impulse of the law has been heard. The question is never only what penalty a crime might merit, it is first whether the machinery of the Republic has honoured every safeguard that makes punishment lawful in a constitutional democracy. In the narrow space between guilt and the gallows, a robust Constitution demands that we pause, look again, and ask whether the process itself has measured up to the high bar that humanity and the rule of law together set.
2. The present writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, assails the continuing validity of the sentence of death affirmed against the Petitioner, and seeks its reconsideration in the light of subsequent legislative and judicial developments, particularly with reference to the guidelines laid down in the case of Manoj and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh1.
3. The facts giving rise to this writ petition are as follows: 3.1 The prosecution case in brief is that on 03.04.2008, the Petitioner allegedly lured a four-year-old girl away from her home in Wadi,
1 (2023) 2 SCC 353
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2143Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors. Nagpur, transported her to a secluded spot, thereafter, sexually assaulted and strangled her to death and then attempted to conceal the body among nearby shrubs. An FIR (Crime No. 71 of 2008) was registered at Wadi Police Station the same day. The Petitioner was arrested on 04.04.2008, and a charge-sheet was filed for offences under Sections 363, 367, 376(2)(f), 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 2 .
3.2 On 29.09.2010 the Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur, in Sessions Trial No. 252 of 2008 3 convicted the Petitioner under Sections 363, 367, 376(2)(f), 302 and 201 of the IPC and, on the same day, imposed the death sentence on him. During the original trial, the Petitioner, who was unable to afford private counsel, was represented by legal-aid counsel whose absence on crucial dates resulted in four material witnesses remaining un-cross-examined.
3.3 In confirmation proceedings the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench 4 , by judgment dated 24.03.2011, set aside the conviction and sentence on the ground that the Petitioner had been denied an effective defence, and remanded the matter for the limited purpose of cross-examining the said witnesses.
3.4 Upon remand, the same legal-aid counsel represented the Petitioner. The four witnesses were cross-examined, but counsel was absent at the hearing on sentence. By judgment dated 23.02.2012, the Trial Court again convicted the Petitioner of the aforesaid offences and re-imposed the sentence of death, recording the Petitioner’s age being around 45 years at the time of the incident and family dependants as mitigating circumstances.
3.5 On 27.03.2012, the High Court, in Criminal Appeal No. 112 of 2012 and Confirmation Case No. 1 of 2012, affirmed both conviction and sentence, relying principally on the nature and manner of the crime and finding no sufficient mitigating factors.
2 IPC
3 Trial Court 4 High Court 2144 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports 3.6 This Court, by judgment dated 26.11.2014 in Criminal Appeal Nos. 2486-2487 of 2014, dismissed the Petitioner’s appeal, and confirmed the death sentence as the only mitigation circumstances placed before this Court at that time were related to the Petitioner’s youth and the probability of reformation.
3.7 Review Petition (Crl.) Nos. 637-638 of 2015 was thereafter filed. Pursuant to order dated 31.08.2016, the Petitioner placed limited additional material regarding his education, prison activities and disciplinary record. By judgment dated 03.05.2017, this Court upheld the earlier decision, observing that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances adduced.
3.8 A mercy petition under Article 161 of the Constitution of India was submitted to the Governor of Maharashtra on 26.12.2017 and was rejected on 01.02.2022. The rejection was communicated to the Petitioner on 30.03.2022.
3.9 It is argued by the Petitioner that while the mercy petition was pending, this Court, on 06.10.2017, admitted in Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India5 challenge to hanging as the mode of execution which matter remains sub judice.
3.10 It is further argued that on 29.03.2022, in Irfan @ Bhayu v. State of Madhya Pradesh6, this Court highlighted the necessity of comprehensive mitigation material in death penalty cases and directed registration of Suo Motu Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 1 of 2022 to frame guidelines for sentencing.
3.11 Meanwhile, it is claimed by the Petitioner that detailed medical records obtained from Nagpur Central Jail revealed that the Petitioner was receiving treatment for major depressive disorder, psychotic features, hypertension, chronic frontal-lobe infarct and cervical myelopathy, with repeated prescriptions of antidepressant and antipsychotic medication. It is further stated that 3 independent psychiatrists, on the basis of interview transcripts supplied by the Petitioner’s legal team in 2017, 5 Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 145 of 2017 6 Criminal Appeal Nos. 1667-1668 of 2021 [2025] 8 S.C.R. 2145Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors. gave preliminary opinions indicating intellectual disability, psychosis and organic brain pathology.
3.12 It is further argued that on 20.05.2022 this Court delivered its judgment in Manoj (supra), formulating practical, time-bound guidelines obliging Trial Courts and the State to place extensive mitigation circumstances on record including psychiatric, psychological, social-history and jail-conduct reports. Pursuant to Manoj (supra), this Court and several High Courts have consistently called for probation-officer reports, psychological assessments by independent institutions, jail-conduct certificates and access for defence mitigation investigators in ongoing death-sentence matters.
3.13 Acting on the Manoj (supra) protocol, it is argued that the Petitioner’s legal team engaged Mr Swapnil Bhopi, Clinical Psychologist, who on 17.06.2022, conducted psychometric testing. The assessment disclosed a Specific Learning Disability (SLD) and low intellectual functioning, together with long-standing trauma and organic brain injury. A second mercy petition under Article 72 of the Constitution of India, enclosing the new medical records, Mr. Bhopi’s report, and supplementary submissions referencing Manoj (supra) and Suo Motu W.P. (Crl.) No. 1 of 2022, was lodged with the President of India on 01.07.2022, and was rejected on 10.04.2023, and the intimation reached the Petitioner on 15.06.2023.
3.14 On 19.09.2022, in Suo Motu W.P. (Crl.) No. 1 of 2022, a Constitution Bench reference was made to evolve a uniform sentencing framework and to delineate modalities for psychological evaluation and collection of mitigating material, the Petitioner’s case was cited as illustrative of inconsistencies in existing practice.
3.15 On 02.05.2023, in Rishi Malhotra (Supra), the Union of India informed this Court of its proposal to constitute an expert committee on alternate modes of execution. The petition remains pending before this Court.
4. In this backdrop, the Petitioner has approached this Court invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking reconsideration of the death sentence affirmed on 03.05.2017.
2146 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
5. Mr. Gopal Sankarnarayanan, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, has advanced the following submissions:
5.1 It is primarily submitted that the death sentence was affirmed in 2017 without the benefit of the sentencing protocol subsequently mandated in Manoj (supra). The judgment in Manoj (supra) requires Trial Courts and the State to place before the Judge comprehensive mitigation circumstances, including family history, socio-economic background, psychiatric and psychological evaluation, jail-conduct data, and probation reports and to afford the defence an equal opportunity to rebut. It is submitted that none of this material was elicited or considered either by the Trial Court, the High Court, or this Court in review, and the Petitioner was denied the “principled and individualised” sentencing required by Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
5.2 Furthermore, it is contended that the evolution of sentencing law in Manoj (supra) and the pending Constitution Bench reference in Suo Motu W.P. (Crl.) No. 1 of 2022 together constitute a “substantial change in law”. Applying the settled rule of beneficial construction, those developments must operate retrospectively in favour of a condemned prisoner whose sentence is yet to be executed.
5.3 It is further argued that the prison medical records, 3 independent psychiatric opinions of 2017, and the detailed psychometric evaluation of the Petitioner by Clinical Psychologist, Mr. Swapnil Bhopi, on 17.06.2022, now demonstrate that the Petitioner suffers from a Specific Learning Disability coupled with low intellectual functioning; chronic frontal-lobe infarct and cervical myelopathy; and major depressive disorder with psychotic features. These conditions attract the protective umbrella of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 7 and the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017. However, no reasonable accommodation or specialised assistance was provided at any stage of trial or appeal. The absence of such accommodation is claimed to infringe Sections 3, 6 and 12 of the RPwD Act, 2016 (equality, dignity and access to justice) and Section 20 of the Mental 7 RPwD Act, 2016 [2025] 8 S.C.R. 2147Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors. Healthcare Act, 2017 (right to equal legal protection). The Petitioner, therefore, was unrepresented at the sentencing hearing and was incapable of articulating mitigating material, with the result that the death sentence was imposed on a procedurally defective foundation.
5.4 It is lastly submitted that Rishi Malhotra (supra), challenging hanging as the mode of execution, remains pending before this Court, and in that matter, the Union has proposed appointment of an expert committee to explore alternate modes of execution. Executing the Petitioner before the conclusion of those proceedings and the Constitution Bench reference would expose the Petitioner to irreversible prejudice.
6. Mr. K.M. Nataraj, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the Union of India and Dr. Birendra Saraf, learned Advocate General for the State of Maharashtra, have rendered the following submissions: 6.1 It is submitted that the present petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India is an impermissible attempt to reopen the judgment of this Court dated 26.11.2014, which has attained finality after dismissal of Review Petition (Crl.) Nos. 637-638 of 2015, and later rejection of mercy petitions by both the Governor and the President of India. Article 32 of the Constitution of India may be invoked only to redress a subsisting violation of fundamental rights and a duly pronounced decision of this Court cannot itself be characterised as such a violation.
6.2 It is contended that all aggravating and mitigating factors were exhaustively examined at three judicial tiers. All three Courts, i.e. the Trial Court, the High Court and the Supreme Court, have found that no mitigating circumstance of weight escaped scrutiny. Moreover, the Courts have concluded that the Petitioner being a history-sheeter with multiple pending cases, is devoid of remorse, and poses a continuing menace to society. Those findings were reaffirmed in review after considering the additional material later tendered by the defence.
6.3 It is further submitted that the sentencing guidelines spelt out in Manoj (supra) are prospective in operation. They are directed to Trial Courts going ahead as can be deduced from reading the judgement, and they do not authorise the wholesale 2148 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports reopening of cases finally decided years before, especially after rejection of constitutional clemency. To hold otherwise would undermine certainty in criminal justice and flood the system with stale challenges.
6.4 It is argued that the Petitioner seeks to rely on medical records and psychological opinions generated long after conviction. Even assuming their correctness (which is denied), such post-hoc material cannot displace the contemporaneous judicial finding which were made upon expert evidence then adduced. The Courts found that the crime was not committed under mental stress or emotional disturbance and that rehabilitation was improbable.
6.5 It is submitted that the RPwD Act, 2016 and the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 do not confer a right to nullify a sentence validly imposed and confirmed before their enactment. Nor do they compel retrospective reopening where, as here, the courts have already evaluated mental capacity and rejected it as a mitigating factor.
6.6 It is lastly contended that pendency of Rishi Malhotra (supra) or of the Constitution Bench reference in Suo Motu W.P. (Crl.) No. 1 of 2022 does not create any legal impediment on execution of a sentence that has survived every level of scrutiny. Until those proceedings culminate in a binding change in law, the existing framework, including hanging as the prescribed mode, remains operative.
7. Having considered the submissions of both the parties and the material on record before us, the central question before us is whether, in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, this Court may revisit a death sentence that stands concluded, having been affirmed on appeal, declined in review, and followed by the rejection of mercy petitions, on the strength of the sentencing framework propounded in Manoj (supra).
8. Before moving ahead, the reason we are primarily focusing on the threshold issue framed above is that the very maintainability of the petition hinges on it. Unless the doorway of Article 32 of the Constitution of India permits reopening a death sentence that has attained finality, any examination of fresh medical evidence, alleged [2025] 8 S.C.R. 2149Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors. mitigating factors, or the ramifications of the pending references in Suo Motu W.P. (Crl.) No. 1 of 2022 and Rishi Malhotra (supra) would be premature. Those references will be decided on their own merits in due course and unless and until they culminate in a binding change of law, they do not alter the jurisdictional bar the State is pleading before us. Our task, therefore, is confined to determining whether Article 32 of the Constitution of India itself empowers this Court to revisit a sentence that has attained finality.
9. At the outset, it would be appropriate to reproduce below the pertinent guidelines laid down in Manoj (supra) which the Petitioner invokes as the fulcrum of his claim. The relevant paras from Manoj (supra) are as follows:
“247. The goal of reformation is ideal, and what society must strive towards — there are many references to it peppered in this Court’s jurisprudence across the decades — but what is lacking is a concrete framework that can measure and evaluate it. Unfortunately, this is mirrored by the failure to implement prison reforms of a meaningful kind, which has left the process of incarceration and prisons in general, to be a space of limited potential for systemic reformation. The goal of reformative punishment requires systems that actively enable reformation and rehabilitation, as a result of nuanced policy-making. As a small step to correct these skewed results and facilitate better evaluation of whether there is a possibility for the accused to be reformed (beyond vague references to conduct, family background, etc.), this Court deems it necessary to frame practical guidelines for the courts to adopt and implement, till the legislature and executive, formulate a coherent framework through legislation. These guidelines may also offer guidance or ideas, that such a legislative framework could benefit from, to systematically collect and evaluate information on mitigating circumstances.
Practical guidelines to collect mitigating circumstances
248. There is urgent need to ensure that mitigating circumstances are considered at the trial stage, to avoid slipping into a retributive response to the brutality of the 2150 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports crime, as is noticeably the situation in a majority of cases reaching the appellate stage.
249. To do this, the trial court must elicit information from the accused and the State, both. The State, must—for an offence carrying capital punishment—at the appropriate stage, produce material which is preferably collected beforehand, before the Sessions Court disclosing psychiatric and psychological evaluation of the accused. This will help establish proximity (in terms of timeline), to the accused person’s frame of mind (or mental illness, if any) at the time of committing the crime and offer guidance on mitigating factors (1), (5), (6) and (7) spelled out in Bachan Singh [Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] . Even for the other factors of (3) and (4)—an onus placed squarely on the State—conducting this form of psychiatric and psychological evaluation close on the heels of commission of the offence, will provide a baseline for the appellate courts to use for comparison i.e. to evaluate the progress of the accused towards reformation, achieved during the incarceration period.
250. Next, the State, must in a time-bound manner, collect additional information pertaining to the accused. An illustrative, but not exhaustive list is as follows:
(a) Age
(b) Early family background (siblings, protection of parents, any history of violence or neglect)
(c) Present family background (surviving family members, whether married, has children, etc.)
(d) Type and level of education
(e) Socio-economic background (including conditions of poverty or deprivation, if any)
(f) Criminal antecedents (details of offence and whether convicted, sentence served, if any)
(g) Income and the kind of employment (whether none, or temporary or permanent, etc.);
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2151Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors.
(h) Other factors such as history of unstable social behaviour, or mental or psychological ailment(s), alienation of the individual (with reasons, if any), etc.
This information should mandatorily be available to the trial court, at the sentencing stage. The accused too, should be given the same opportunity to produce evidence in rebuttal, towards establishing all mitigating circumstances.
251. Lastly, information regarding the accused’s jail conduct and behaviour, work done (if any), activities the accused has involved themselves in, and other related details should be called for in the form of a report from the relevant jail authorities (i.e. Probation and Welfare Officer, Superintendent of Jail, etc.). If the appeal is heard after a long hiatus from the trial court’s conviction, or High Court’s confirmation, as the case may be — a fresh report (rather than the one used by the previous court) from the jail authorities is recommended, for a more exact and complete understanding of the contemporaneous progress made by the accused, in the time elapsed. The jail authorities must also include a fresh psychiatric and psychological report which will further evidence the reformative progress, and reveal post-conviction mental illness, if any.”
10. A bare perusal of these guidelines makes it evident that this Court, in Manoj (supra), sought to implement the reformative ideal underlying capital sentencing by replacing ad-hoc impressions of accused with verifiable data. The directions oblige the State, rather than the accused, to place before the trial court, at the very sentencing stage, a structured dossier covering psychiatric assessment proximate to the offence, socio-economic and family history, educational attainments, prior conduct, and a contemporaneous report on jail behaviour. By doing so, this Court intended to prevent sentencing from defaulting into a purely retributive response to the brutality of the crime and to supply appellate courts with a baseline against which genuine progress towards reformation can later be measured. These guidelines would serve as an interim, judicially crafted framework pending comprehensive legislative or executive action with respect to capital sentencing. Whether these guidelines can be enforced to disturb a sentence that has attained finality, therefore, depends upon 2152 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the scope of Article 32 of the Constitution of India, an issue we shall now proceed to examine.
11. Article 32 of the Constitution of India is the constitutional conduit through which this Court may issue “appropriate” writs to secure the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. Described in the Constituent Assembly as the “heart and soul” of the Constitution, it furnishes a direct route for citizen to this Court whenever a protected Fundament Right is said to be under threat. The present petitioner invokes that power on a narrow but grave premise. Although his conviction has long since become final, the State now proposes to end his life through a sentencing process that the Petitioner claims ignored the safeguards later formalised in Manoj (Supra). According to the Petitioner, that omission offends the twin guarantees of equality and due procedure embodied in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The question that consequently arises, and to which we next turn, is whether Article 32 authorises this Court to reopen a capital sentencing exercise that has otherwise attained finality, solely to cure the procedural lapse the Petitioner identifies.
12. In order to understand the scope of Article 32 of the Constitution of India, in the present case, we must consider four principal lines of enquiry to help shape our determination. Firstly, we must consider the settled place of Article 32 of the Constitution of India as a continuing safeguard where a sentence of death has yet to be carried out. Secondly, we will examine this Court’s power and duty to set aside procedural finality when that course alone can avert a breach of the guarantees of equality and life. Thirdly, it becomes necessary to test whether the sentencing framework articulated in Manoj (supra) has assumed the character of an indispensable procedural safeguard. Finally, we must delineate the form and extent of the corrective relief that may properly be fashioned under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, mindful that any order we make must both protect constitutional rights and preserve the stability of adjudication.
A. Article 32 jurisdiction in capital cases constitutes a special constitutional safeguard
13. The irreversible character of capital punishment has always obliged this Court to scrutinise death-sentence cases through a constitutional lens more gruelling than that applied to any other category of criminal [2025] 8 S.C.R. 2153Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors. cases. Because an execution, once carried out, forecloses every possibility of correction, Article 32 has been treated as a continuing safeguard that survives the ordinary hierarchy of appeal, review and even mercy.
14. The first clear articulation of this principle is found in Harbans Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh and others8. Therein, this Court was confronted with a situation in which one co-accused had secured commutation while another had already been executed. If the petitioner alone were hanged, the result would have been a blatant disparity. Declining to allow “manifest injustice” to stand, the Court invoked its powers under Articles 32 and 136 of the Constitution of India, and its inherent jurisdiction to commute the sentence, thereby affirming that constitutional relief remains available even after the conventional judicial process has concluded. The relevant paras for the same have been reproduced hereunder:
“21. In the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court would have been justified in commuting the death sentence imposed on the petitioner to one of life imprisonment.
As, however, the case of the petitioner had earlier been considered by the President of India to whom the petitioner had presented the petition for mercy, I am of the opinion that propriety and decorum require that the matter should be referred back to the President instead of this Court deciding to commute the death sentence of the petitioner to one of life imprisonment.
20. Very wide powers have been conferred on this Court for due and proper administration of justice. Apart from the jurisdiction and powers conferred on this Court under Articles 32 and 136 of the Constitution, I am of the opinion that this Court retains and must retain, an inherent power and jurisdiction for dealing with any extraordinary situation in the larger interests of administration of justice and for preventing manifest injustice being done. This power must necessarily be sparingly used only in exceptional circumstances for furthering the ends of justice. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of
8 (1982) 2 SCC 101
2154 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the opinion that this is a fit case where this Court should entertain the present petition of Harbans Singh and this Court should interfere.
19. In the circumstances hereinabove stated, I am of the opinion that it will be manifestly unjust to allow the death sentence imposed on the petitioner to be executed. The question that, however, troubles me is whether this Court retains any power and jurisdiction to entertain and pass any appropriate orders on the question of sentence imposed on the petitioner in view of the fact that not only his special leave petition and review petition have been dismissed by this Court but also the further fact that his petition for clemency has also been rejected by the President.”
15. In Smt. Triveniben v State of Gujarat9, a Constitution Bench carried the doctrine forward by holding that supervening circumstances occurring after conviction, most notably, inordinate delay in carrying out the sentence, may so undermine human dignity as to offend Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Bench made it explicit that such violations are justiciable in an Article 32 petition of the Constitution of India notwithstanding the finality of the original judgment in the following terms:
“22. It was contended that the delay in execution of the sentence will entitle a prisoner to approach this Court as his right under Article 21 is being infringed. It is well settled now that a judgment of court can never be challenged under Article 14 or 21 and therefore the judgment of the court awarding the sentence of death is not open to challenge as violating Article 14 or Article 21 as has been laid down by this Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1967 SC 1 : (1966) 3 SCR 744] and also in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1988) 2 SCC 602 :
1988 SCC (Cri) 372] , the only jurisdiction which could be sought to be exercised by a prisoner for infringement of his rights can be to challenge the subsequent events after the final judicial verdict is pronounced and it is because of this that on the ground of long or inordinate delay a
9 (1989) 1 SCC 678
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2155Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors. condemned prisoner could approach this Court and that is what has consistently been held by this Court. But it will not be open to this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 32 to go behind or to examine the final verdict reached by a competent court convicting and sentencing the condemned prisoner and even while considering the circumstances in order to reach a conclusion as to whether the inordinate delay coupled with subsequent circumstances could be held to be sufficient for coming to a conclusion that execution of the sentence of death will not be just and proper. The nature of the offence, circumstances in which the offence was committed will have to be taken as found by the competent court while finally passing the verdict. It may also be open to the court to examine or consider any circumstances after the final verdict was pronounced if it is considered relevant. The question of improvement in the conduct of the prisoner after the final verdict also cannot be considered for coming to the conclusion whether the sentence could be altered on that ground also.”
16. In Navneet Kaur v State (NCT of Delhi) and another10, this Court demonstrated that once a safeguard is recognised as integral to Article 21 of the Constitution of India, its benefit must be afforded retrospectively to prisoners whose executions are still pending. This Court accordingly commuted the sentence of accused Devender Pal Singh Bhullar who was convicted of a terror offence, on the combined grounds of inordinate delay and serious mental illness, notwithstanding an earlier contrary precedent. In Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq v Registrar, Supreme Court of India and others 11, a Constitution Bench ruled that a death-row convict is entitled, as a matter of right by virtue of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, to an oral hearing before a bench of at least three judges at the review stage, describing capital cases as “a distinct category altogether”. When a subsequent Constitution Bench revisited the matter in Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq v Registrar, Supreme Court of India and
10 (2014) 7 SCC 264
11 (2014) 9 SCC 737
2156 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports others12, it clarified that this procedural guarantee applies even where a curative petition has been dismissed, the limited grounds of curative jurisdiction being insufficient to extinguish so fundamental a right.
17. From this discussion, we can conclude that death-sentence cases stand apart because the punishment extinguishes the right to life in an irreversible way, and that singular feature obliges this Court to keep the door of constitutional review open even after the ordinary appellate and review avenues have closed. Article 32 of the Constitution of India, therefore, remains available whenever a supervening fact, such as inordinate delay, emergent mental illness, or a parity-based anomaly, or a subsequently recognised procedural guarantee throws the legitimacy of a capital sentence into doubt. The power to intervene under Article 32 of the Constitution of India is meant to prevent the Constitution from being stymied by formal finality when a human life hangs in the balance.
B. Power to do complete justice notwithstanding procedural finality
18. The settled law of this Court is that procedural finality cannot stand in the way of curing a constitutional wrong which implicates life or liberty. In A.R. Antulay v R.S. Nayak and another13, a Constitutional Bench of this Court, speaking through multiple concurring opinions, held that this Court retains an inherent jurisdiction ex debito justitiae, to recall or modify its own orders whenever such intervention is necessary to prevent the continuing violation of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The majority stressed that no litigant should suffer a deprivation “merely because of technical objections or irregularities” and that the constitutional duty to dispense justice must prevail over considerations of formal finality. The relevant para has been reproduced hereunder: “83. This passage was quoted in the Gujarat High Court by D.A. Desai, J., speaking for the Gujarat High Court in Soni Vrajlal v. Soni Jadavji [AIR 1972 Guj 148 : (1972) 13 Guj LR 555] as mentioned before. It appears that in giving directions on 16-2-1984, this Court acted per
12 (2019) 9 SCC 404
13 (1988) 2 SCC 602
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2157Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India & Ors. incuriam inasmuch it did not bear in mind consciously the consequences and the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of the 1952 Act and the binding nature of the larger Bench decision in Anwar Ali Sarkar case [(1952) 1 SCC 1 : AIR 1952 SC 75 : 1952 SCR 284 : 1952 Cri LJ 510] which was not adverted to by this Court. The basic fundamentals of the administration of justice are simple. No man should suffer because of the mistake of the court. No man should suffer a wrong by technical procedure of irregularities. Rules or procedures are the handmaids of justice and not the mistress of the justice. Ex debito justitiac, we must do justice to him. If a man has been wronged so long as it lies within the human machinery of administration of justice that wrong must be remedied. This is a peculiar fact of this case which requires emphasis.”
19. That proposition was reiterated in S. Nagaraj v State of Karnataka and another14 , wherein this Court described itself as being under a “constitutional and legal obligation” to set technical barriers aside whenever they obstruct the remedy of a palpable injustice. Subsequent decisions have invoked the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium to emphasise that the denial of a remedy is itself a denial of the right. “18. Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way. The order of the Court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered for consistency but it is not as inflexible in Administrative Law as in Public Law. Even the law bends before justice. Entire concept of writ jurisdiction exercised by the higher courts is founded on equity and fairness. If the Court finds that the order was passed under a mistake and it would not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice then it cannot on any principle be precluded from rectifying the error. Mistake is accepted as valid reason to recall an order. Difference lies in the nature of mistake and scope of rectification, 14 (1993) Supp. 4 SCC 595 2158 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports depending on if it is of fact or law. But the root from which the power flows is the anxiety to avoid injustice. It is either statutory or inherent. The latter is available where the mistake is of the Court. In Administrative Law the scope is still wider. Technicalities apart if the Court is satisfied of the injustice then it is its constitutional and legal obligation to set it right by recalling its order. Here as explained, the Bench of which one of us (Sahai, J.) was a member did commit an error in placing all the stipendiary graduates in the scale of First Division Assistants due to State’s failure to bring correct facts on record. But that obviously cannot stand in the way of the Court correcting its mistake. Such inequitable consequences as have surfaced now due to vague affidavit filed by the State cannot be permitted to continue.”
20. Against that backdrop, a curative petition would offer the petitioner no meaningful recourse. The curative jurisdiction, defined in Rupa Ashok Hurra v Ashok Hurra and another15, is confined to patent naturaljustice violations apparent on the original record and requires that the same grounds were urged in review. The Petitioner’s grievance, namely, the absence of the procedural guarantees subsequently crystallised in Manoj (supra) and the emergence of new medical evidence, could not have formed part of the earlier record and therefore lies outside the curative ambit. It follows that the only efficacious avenue is the inherent corrective power recognised in Antulay (Supra), exercised through Article 32 of the Constitution of India and, where necessary, Article 142 of the Constitution of India, to fashion relief that vindicates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India notwithstanding the formal finality of prior proceedings. C. Procedural fairness in capital sentencing as an imperative under Articles 14 and 21
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