Bgm and M-Rpl-Jmct (Jv) v. Eastern Coalfields Limited
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 874; [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1275
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, Justice Manoj Misra
- Decided
- 18 Jul 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 9795/2025
- Sections
- 7, 11, 11(6), 8, 37, 16, 2
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[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1275 : 2025 INSC 874 BGM and M-RPL-JMCT (JV)
v.
Eastern Coalfields Limited (Civil Appeal No. 9795 of 2025)
18 July 2025 [Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Manoj Misra,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration
(i) Whether the question of existence of an arbitration agreement should be left for the arbitral tribunal to decide; (ii) whether clause 13 of the General Terms and Conditions of the contract and relied upon by the appellant would constitute an arbitration agreement between the parties as contemplated u/s.7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; (iii) whether clause 32 of Instructions to Bidders negates the existence of an arbitration agreement. Headnotes† Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Sub-section (6-A) of s.11 – Existence of arbitration agreement – The appellant and the respondent entered into a contract relating to transportation/handling of goods – Dispute arose between the parties – Appellant relied on clause 13 of the General Terms and Conditions of the contract as arbitration agreement – However, respondent contended that clause 13 is bereft of the essential ingredients to constitute an arbitration agreement – According to the appellant, the Referral Court should straight away refer the matter and leave it to the arbitral tribunal to decide whether the arbitration agreement exists or not – Whether the question of existence of an arbitration agreement should be left for the arbitral tribunal to decide:
Held: 1. The argument of the appellant that Referral Court should straight away refer the matter and leave it to the arbitral tribunal to decide whether the arbitration agreement exists or not cannot be accepted. [Para 19]
2. In the instant case, the appellant is relying on just one clause in the contract which, according to the appellant, constitutes an arbitration agreement whereas according to the respondent, though the clause is not disputed, the same does not constitute an arbitration agreement * Author 1276 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports – In such circumstances, the Court while exercising power u/s.11 would not have to hold a mini-trial or an enquiry into its existence rather a plain reading of the clause would indicate whether it is, or it is not, an arbitration agreement, prima facie, satisfying the necessary ingredients of it, as required by s.7 of the 1996 Act – In view of this Court, such a limited exercise would not transgress the limit set out by sub-section (6-A) of s.11 of the 1996 Act as introduced by 2015 Amendment because the object of such an exercise (i.e., of examination) is to weed out frivolous claims for appointment of an arbitrator/ reference to an arbitral tribunal. [Paras 18, 19] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.11 – The appellant and the respondent entered into a contract – Dispute arose between the parties – Appellant sought to invoke arbitration through clause 13 of the General Terms and Conditions of the contract – High Court held that clause 13 does not constitute an arbitration agreement – Whether clause 13 of the General Terms and Conditions of the contract and relied upon by the appellant would constitute an arbitration agreement between the parties as contemplated u/s.7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996:
Held: 1. Any agreement, or clause in an agreement, requiring or contemplating a further consent or consensus before a reference to arbitration, is not an arbitration agreement. [Para 26]
2. In the instant case, clause 13 does not bind parties to use arbitration for settlement of the disputes – Use of the words “may be sought”, imply that there is no subsisting agreement between parties that they, or any one of them, would have to seek settlement of dispute(s) through arbitration – It is just an enabling clause whereunder, if parties agree, they could resolve their dispute(s) through arbitration – In view of this Court, the phraseology of clause 13 is not indicative of a binding agreement that any of the parties on its own could seek redressal of inter se dispute(s) through arbitration – Therefore, the High Court was justified in holding that clause 13 does not constitute an arbitration agreement. [Para 31] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Whether clause 32 of Instructions to Bidders negates the existence of an arbitration agreement:
Held: In the instant case, clause 32 does not exclude resolution of disputes through arbitration agreement – It only fixes jurisdiction [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1277BGM and M-RPL-JMCT (JV) v. Eastern Coalfields Limited and in the event of there being an arbitration agreement could determine the juridical seat – However, since this Court has held that there is no arbitration agreement between the parties, decision of this issue is of no consequence. [Para 33] Case Law Cited Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re [2023] 15 SCR 1081 : (2024) 6 SCC 1; Cox and Kings Limited v. SAP India Private Limited and another (2024) 4 SCC 1 – followed.
Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation v. Encon Builders [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 812 : (2003) 7 SCC 418; Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander and Others [2007] 5 SCR 720 : (2007) 5 SCC 719 – relied on.
Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. IVRCL AMR Joint Venture [2022] 7 SCR 522 : (2022) 20 SCC 636 – referred to.
List of Acts Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
List of Keywords Arbitration agreement; Existence of an arbitration agreement; Referral Court; Arbitral Tribunal; Sub-section (6-A) of s.11 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Consensus before a reference to arbitration; Enabling clause; Juridical seat. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: SLP (C) Diary No. 21451 of From the Judgment and Order dated 19.01.2024 of the High Court at Calcutta in AP No. 745 of 2023 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Petitioner:
Subhabrata Dutta, Sunando Raha, Subhojit Seal, Kunal Malik, Manish Awasthi.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Ritin Rai, Sr. Adv., R. Venkat Prabhat, Daksh Pandit.
1278 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Manoj Misra, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal impugns an order of the High Court 1 dated 19.01.2024 whereby the application 2 of the appellant, under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 3 , was dismissed on the ground that there exists no arbitration agreement between the parties.
FACTS
3. The appellant and the respondent entered into a contract relating to transportation/handling of goods. Disputes arose between the parties during the subsistence of the contract. Clause 13 of the General Terms and Conditions, appended to the e-tender notice, which forms part of the contract and relied upon by the appellant as an arbitration agreement, is the subject matter of interpretation. The same is extracted below:
“13. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES It is incumbent upon the contractor to avoid litigation and disputes during the course of execution. However, if such disputes take place between the contractor and the department, effort shall be made first to settle the disputes at the company level.
The contractor should make request in writing to the Engineer-in-charge for settlement of such disputes/claims within 30 (thirty) days of arising of the cause of dispute/ claim failing which no disputes/ claims of the contractor shall be entertained by the company.
Effort shall be made to resolve the dispute in two stages. In first stage dispute shall be referred to Area CGM, GM. If difference still persist the dispute shall be referred to a 1 The High Court at Calcutta 2 A.P. No. 745 of 2023 3 1996 Act [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1279BGM and M-RPL-JMCT (JV) v. Eastern Coalfields Limited committee constituted by the owner. The Committee shall have one member of the rank of Director of the company who shall be chairman of the company.
If differences still persist, the settlement of the dispute shall be resolved in the following manner:
In the event of any dispute or difference relating to the interpretation and application of the provisions of commercial contract(s) between Central Public Sector Enterprises (CPSEs)/ Port Trusts inter se and also between CPSEs and Government Departments/ Organizations (excluding disputes concerning railways, Income Tax, Customs & Excise Departments), such dispute or difference shall be taken up by either party for resolution through AMRCD as mentioned in DPE OM No. 4(1)/2013-DPE (GM)/FTS-1835 dated 22-05-2018.
In case of parties other than Govt. Agencies, the redressal of the dispute may be sought through ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996 as amended by AMENDMENT ACT OF 2015”
(Emphasis supplied)
4. Treating the underscored portion of clause 13 as an arbitration agreement, the appellant filed an application under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act for appointment of an Arbitrator for settlement of the disputes inter se the parties.
5. The respondent objected to the prayer for appointment of an Arbitrator, inter-alia, on the ground that clause 13 is bereft of the essential ingredients to constitute an arbitration agreement and therefore the application seeking appointment of an Arbitrator deserves rejection.
6. The High Court accepted the objection and dismissed the application. While rejecting the prayer, the High Court laid emphasis on use of the word “may” before “be sought” in the underscored portion of clause 13 and, inter alia, relied on two decisions of this Court, namely, Jagdish Chander vs. Ramesh Chander and Others4 and
4 (2007) 5 SCC 719
1280 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. vs. IVRCL AMR Joint Venture5 to hold that where the word “may” is used there is no clear intention of the parties to refer the dispute between them to arbitration and therefore, the prayer to appoint an Arbitrator is not sustainable.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the materials on record.
Submissions on behalf of the Appellant
8. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the use of the word “may” is only to indicate that parties to the agreement have an option to take recourse to settlement of dispute(s) through arbitration under the 1996 Act. However, once that option is exercised by any of the parties to the agreement, as in the present case, it becomes a binding contract to settle inter se dispute(s) through arbitration. It was contended that the decisions of this Court in Jagdish Chander (supra) and Mahanadi Coalfields (supra) dealt with entirely different clauses than the one in question and, therefore, the High Court erred in placing reliance on them to reject the application of the appellant.
9. In addition to above, it was argued that at the stage of appointment of an arbitrator the court is required to examine whether arbitration agreement exists or not. Such examination is for the Court to satisfy itself that, prima facie, an arbitration agreement exists, though the final call on its existence is to be taken by the arbitral tribunal, which is competent to rule on its own jurisdiction, including ruling on any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. Thus, it was argued, the appropriate course for the High Court was to appoint an arbitral tribunal and leave the issue open for the arbitral tribunal to decide.
Submissions on behalf of the Respondent
10. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned order and also referred to Clause 32 of the Instructions to Bidders to contend that there was no definite agreement between the parties to settle their disputes through arbitration. According to
5 (2022) 20 SCC 636
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1281BGM and M-RPL-JMCT (JV) v. Eastern Coalfields Limited the learned counsel for the respondent, the use of the word “may” in the so-called arbitration clause clearly indicates that at the time of entering the agreement, parties were not ad idem on referring present or future disputes between them to arbitration. The clause only enabled the parties to agree on any future date to refer the disputes to arbitration. Therefore, in the absence of proof of any such agreement, reference to arbitral tribunal has been justifiably declined.
11. In addition to above, by referring to Clause 32 of the Instructions to Bidders, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that disputes between the parties were to be settled through regular court proceedings and not through arbitration. Clause 32 is extracted below: “Clause 32- Legal Jurisdiction: - Matters relating to any dispute or difference arising out of this tender and subsequent contract awarded based on this tender shall be subject to the jurisdiction of District Court where the subject work is to be executed.”
12. Besides above, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that if, on a plain reading of the relevant clause, relied by any one of the parties as an arbitration agreement, it does not appear that parties are ad idem on settlement of inter se, present or future, disputes through arbitration to the exclusion of domestic courts, the very existence of an arbitration agreement comes into question, which can be taken notice of by the Court so as to decline the prayer for appointment of an arbitral tribunal under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. Issues
13. Having regard to the facts and the submissions made before us, we are of the view that following three issues arise for our consideration:
(i) Whether the question of existence of an arbitration agreement should be left for the arbitral tribunal to decide?
(ii) Whether clause 13 (supra) would constitute an arbitration agreement between the parties as contemplated under Section 7 of the 1996 Act?
(iii) Whether clause 32 of Instructions to Bidders negates the existence of an arbitration agreement?
1282 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Issue (i)
14. Insofar as issue (i) is concerned, a seven-Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re 6 , after surveying several decisions as also the impact of the 2015 Amendment on the 1996 Act, has settled the law in the following terms:
“164. The 2015 Amendment Act has laid down different parameters for judicial review under Section 8 and Section
11. Where Section 8 requires the Referral Court to look into the prima facie existence of a valid arbitration agreement, Section 11 confines the Court’s jurisdiction to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement. Although the object and purpose behind both Sections 8 and 11 is to compel parties to abide by their contractual understanding, the scope of power of the Referral Courts under the said provisions is intended to be different. The same is also evident from the fact that Section 37 of the Arbitration Act allows an appeal from the order of an Arbitral Tribunal refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under Section 8, but not from Section 11. Thus, the 2015 Amendment Act has legislatively overruled the dictum of Patel Engg. [SBP & Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618] where it was held that Section 8 and Section 11 are complementary in nature. Accordingly, the two provisions cannot be read as laying down a similar standard.
165. The legislature confined the scope of reference under Section 11(6-A) to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement. The use of the term “examination” in itself connotes that the scope of the power is limited to a prima facie determination. Since the Arbitration Act is a self-contained code, the requirement of “existence” of an arbitration agreement draws effect from Section 7 of the Arbitration Act. In Duro Felguera [Duro Felguera, S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Ltd., (2017) 9 SCC 729 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 764] , this Court held that the Referral Courts only need to consider one aspect to determine the existence
6 (2024) 6 SCC 1
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1283BGM and M-RPL-JMCT (JV) v. Eastern Coalfields Limited of an arbitration agreement — whether the underlying contract contains an arbitration agreement which provides for arbitration pertaining to the disputes which have arisen between the parties to the agreement. Therefore, the scope of examination under Section 11(6-A) should be confined to the existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of Section 7. Similarly, the validity of an arbitration agreement, in view of Section 7, should be restricted to the requirement of formal validity such as the requirement that the agreement be in writing. This interpretation also gives true effect to the doctrine of competence-competence by leaving the issue of substantive existence and validity of an arbitration agreement to be decided by Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16. We accordingly clarify the position of law laid down in Vidya Drolia [Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 549] in the context of Section 8 and Section 11 of the Arbitration Act.
166. The burden of proving the existence of arbitration agreement generally lies on the party seeking to rely on such agreement. In jurisdictions such as India, which accept the doctrine of competence-competence, only prima facie proof of the existence of an arbitration agreement must be adduced before the Referral Court. The Referral Court is not the appropriate forum to conduct a mini-trial by allowing the parties to adduce the evidence in regard to the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement. The determination of the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement on the basis of evidence ought to be left to the Arbitral Tribunal. This position of law can also be gauged from the plain language of the statute.
167. Section 11(6-A) uses the expression “examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement”. The purport of using the word “examination” connotes that the legislature intends that the Referral Court has to inspect or scrutinise the dealings between the parties for the existence of an arbitration agreement. Moreover, the expression “examination” does not connote or imply a laborious or contested inquiry. [ P. Ramanatha Aiyar, The Law Lexicon (2nd Edn., 1997) 666.] On the other 1284 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports hand, Section 16 provides that the Arbitral Tribunal can “rule” on its jurisdiction, including the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement. A “ruling” connotes adjudication of disputes after admitting evidence from the parties. Therefore, it is evident that the Referral Court is only required to examine the existence of arbitration agreements, whereas the Arbitral Tribunal ought to rule on its jurisdiction, including the issues pertaining to the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement. A similar view was adopted by this Court in Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd. [Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC 234] xxx xxx xxx
169. When the Referral Court renders a prima facie opinion, neither the Arbitral Tribunal, nor the Court enforcing the arbitral award will be bound by such a prima facie view. If a prima facie view as to the existence of an arbitration agreement is taken by the Referral Court, it still allows the Arbitral Tribunal to examine the issue in depth. Such a legal approach will help the Referral Court in weeding out prima facie non-existent arbitration agreements. It will also protect the jurisdictional competence of the Arbitral Tribunals to decide on issues pertaining to the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement.”
15. The legal principles deducible from the above decision qua the scope of Referral Court’s power under Section 11 of 1996 Act are as follows:
(a) Section 11 confines the Court’s jurisdiction to the examination regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement.
(b) The use of the term “examination” in itself connotes that the scope of the power is limited to a prima facie determination.
(c) Referral Courts only need to consider one aspect to determine the existence of an arbitration agreement — whether the underlying contract contains an arbitration agreement which provides for arbitration pertaining to the disputes which have arisen between the parties to the agreement. Therefore, the scope of examination under Section 11(6-A) should be confined [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1285BGM and M-RPL-JMCT (JV) v. Eastern Coalfields Limited to the existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of Section 7. Such a legal approach will help the Referral Court in weeding out prima facie non-existent arbitration agreements.
(d) The purport of using the word “examination” connotes that the legislature intends that the Referral Court has to inspect or scrutinise the dealings between the parties for the existence of an arbitration agreement. However, the expression “examination” does not connote or imply a laborious or contested inquiry.
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