Suresh Chandra (Deceased) Thr. LRs. & Ors. v. Parasram & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 873; [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1233
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, Justice Manoj Misra
- Decided
- 18 Jul 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 9791/2025
- Sections
- 5
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[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1233 : 2025 INSC 873 Suresh Chandra (Deceased) Thr. Lrs. & Ors.
v.
Parasram & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 9791-9793 of 2025)
18 July 2025 [Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Manoj Misra,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the order rejecting application(s) seeking condonation of delay for setting aside abatement and substitution of legal representatives of deceased appellant suffers from any legal infirmity; if the answer to (a) is in the negative, whether the second appeal abated wholly or partially, or not at all, on account of non-substitution of LRs of deceased defendant-appellant no.2. Headnotes† Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.XXII; Or.XLI r.4 – Plaintiff filed suit against the defendants (‘SC’ and ‘RB’), inter alia, for declaration of title and possession of suit property claiming that the defendants were his tenants – Defendants denied tenancy and claimed title and possession over the suit property through their father – Suit dismissed by trial court – Appeal filed by plaintiff, allowed by appellate court – LRs of ‘SC’; ‘RB’ filed second appeal however, during the pendency thereof, ‘RB’ died and his LRs were not brought on record within time – High Court declared the appeal to have abated due to nonsubstitution of the LRs of ‘RB’ within time – Applications filed for condonation of delay in applying to set aside abatement and for substitution of the LRs of the deceased defendant were also rejected – Challenge to:
Held: First appellate court accepted plaintiff’s case and held the plaintiff to be owner of the suit property and defendants to be its tenants – Thus, if, on non-substitution of the legal representatives of one of the defendant-appellants, the second appeal abated qua him, the decree as against him, holding him to be tenant and plaintiff the owner, attained finality – Therefore, if the second appeal is allowed to proceed, on it being allowed, possibility of * Author 1234 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports conflicting and contradictory decrees, in respect of same subject matter, coming into existence cannot be ruled out because one, which attained finality, held the plaintiff to be owner of the suit property and the deceased defendant its tenant whereas the other could hold the surviving defendant to be its owner – Thus, on abatement of second appeal qua the second appellant, the entire second appeal abated as continuance of the second appeal would have given rise to a possibility of inconsistent decrees i.e., one in favour of the plaintiff against the deceased defendant-appellant and the other in favour of the surviving defendant appellant, even though both defendants claimed joint interest in the suit property flowing from their father – As the second appeal was jointly filed by the two defendants, the benefit of the provisions of Or.XLI, r.4 was not available to the surviving defendant appellant to continue with the second appeal and seek for reversal or modification of the decree operating against the deceased-appellant as well – Further, there was no sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing application for substitution and setting aside abatement – Finding of the High Court not interfered with – No merit in the present appeals. [Paras 37, 38] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.XXII – Abatement of an appeal on non-substitution of a deceased party, partial or whole:
Held: Whether the entire appeal abates or it abates partially qua the deceased party alone, will depend on facts of each case and, therefore, no exhaustive statement about the circumstances in which the entire appeal would abate can be made – In a case of “joint and indivisible decree” or “joint and inseverable or inseparable decree”, the abatement of appeal in relation to one or more of the appellant(s) or respondent(s) on account of failure to bring on record his or their legal representatives in time would prove fatal to the entire appeal because proceeding qua the surviving party or parties may give rise to inconsistent or contradictory decrees – Law summarized. [Para 17] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.XLI, r.4; Or.XXII – Interplay between, qua abatement of an appeal – Law summarized – Or.XLI, r.4 cannot prevent abatement of an appeal of the deceased co-appellant on non-substitution of his LRs – There is no inconsistency between the provisions of Or.XXII and those of r. 4 of Or.XLI. [Para 31] [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1235Suresh Chandra (Deceased) Thr. Lrs. & Ors. v. Parasram & Ors. Case Law Cited Delhi Development Authority v. Diwan Chand Anand and Others [2022] 18 SCR 1053 : (2022) 10 SCC 428 – distinguished. Sakharam (since deceased) Through LRs & Another v. Kishanrao [2022] 6 SCR 901 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2035 – per incuriam. Gurnam Singh (Dead) through LRs and Others v. Gurbachan Kaur (Dead) by LRs. [2017] 3 SCR 901 : (2017) 13 SCC 414 – held inapplicable.
Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra (Dead) by LRs and Others v. Pramod Gupta (Smt.) (Dead) by LRs and Others [2002] Supp. 5 SCR 350 : (2003) 3 SCC 272; State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram [1962] SCR 636 : AIR 1962 SC 89; Ram Sarup v. Munshi [1963] SCR 858 : AIR 1963 SC 553; Hemareddi v. Ramachandra [2019] 7 SCR 262 : (2019) 6 SCC 756; Venigalla Koteswaramma v. Malampati Suryamba and Others [2021] 1 SCR 725 : (2021) 4 SCC 246; Sunkara Lakhminarasamma v. Sagi Subba Raju and Others [2018] 14 SCR 222 : (2019) 11 SCC 787; Budh Ram and Others v. Bansi and Others [2010] 9 SCR 674 : (2010) 11 SCC 476; Pandit Sri Chand and Others v. Jagdish Parshad Kishan Chand and Others [1966] 3 SCR 451 : AIR 1966 SC 1427; Rameshwar Prasad and Others v. Shambehari Lal Jagannath and Another [1964] 3 SCR 549 : AIR 1963 SC 1901; Goli Vijayalakshmi and Others v. Yenduj Sathiraju (Dead) through LRs and Others (2019) 11 SCC 352; Mahabir Prasad v. Jage Ram and Others [1971] 3 SCR 301 : (1971) 1 SCC 265; Ratan Lal Shah v. Firm Lalmandas Chhadammalal [1970] 1 SCR 296 : (1969) 2 SCC 70; State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari [1976] 2 SCR 82 : (1976) 1 SCC 719 – referred to.
Baij Nath & Another v. Ram Bharose and Others, AIR 1953 All 565 : 1953 SCC OnLine All 43 – referred to.
List of Acts Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
List of Keywords Order XXII of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ; Order XLI r.4 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Abatement of appeal; Non-substitution of a deceased party; Non-substitution of legal representatives (LRs) 1236 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports of deceased defendant; Abatement of appeal of the deceased coappellant on non-substitution of LRs; Second appeal jointly filed by two defendants; Second appeal abated wholly or partially; Entire second appeal abated; Joint interest in the suit property; Defendants claimed joint interest in the suit property flowing from their father; Applications for condonation of delay for setting aside abatement and substitution of legal representatives rejected; Predecessor-in interest of the appellants; Conflicting and contradictory decrees; Inconsistent decrees.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s).
9791-9793 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 21.02.2022 and 04.08.2022 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior in SA No. 446 of 2001 and MCC No(s). 700 and 697 of 2022, respectively Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Petitioner(s):
Jayant Mehta, Puneet Jain, Sr. Advs. Ms. Christi Jain, Mann Arora, Harsh Jain, Om Sudhir Vidyarthi, Ms. Akriti Sharma, Ojusya Joshi. Advs. for the Respondent(s):
N.K. Mody, Sr. Adv., Ms. Ishita M Puranik, Ms. Jigisha Agrawal, Suresh Kumar Bhan, Hari Sahteshwar, Praveen Swarup.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Manoj Misra, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals arise from Civil Suit No.13 of 1983 (renumbered 16A of 1997), which was dismissed by the trial court and decreed by the first appellate court. On second appeal 1 before the High 1 Second Appeal No.446 of 2001 [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1237Suresh Chandra (Deceased) Thr. Lrs. & Ors. v. Parasram & Ors. Court 2 , by the impugned order dated 21.02.2022, the appeal of the appellant(s) herein was declared to have abated due to nonsubstitution of the legal representatives (for short LRs) of Ram Babu (i.e., appellant no.2 in the second appeal) within time. By the second impugned order dated 04.08.2022, the High Court rejected the applications 3 preferred for condonation of delay in applying to set aside abatement and for substitution of the LRs of deceased Ram Babu.
FACTS:
3. The facts relevant for deciding the present appeal are as follows:
(i) Suit No.13 of 1983 (renumbered as 16A of 1997) was instituted against Suresh Chandra (predecessor-in-interest of the appellants herein) and Ram Babu by the respondent seeking declaration, recovery of possession, mesne profits in respect of a house.
(ii) Plaintiff claimed exclusive title over the suit property through its ancestor Tej Singh and pleaded that the defendants were his tenant.
(iii) Defendants i.e., Suresh Chandra and Ram Babu, filed a joint written statement in the suit.
(iv) Suresh Chandra died during the suit proceeding, his LRs, namely, the appellants, also filed their written statements.
(v) In the written statement, while denying the alleged tenancy, the defendants claimed title over the suit property through their ancestor late Gokul Prasad who, according to them, had derived exclusive interest in the suit property through a partition with his brothers in the year 1947.
(vi) The trial court dismissed the suit against which an appeal was preferred by the plaintiff.
(vii) The first appellate court decreed the suit of the plaintiff against which the LRs of Suresh Chandra and Ram Babu filed the second appeal.
2 The High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior 3 MCC No.697 and MCC No.700 of 2022 1238 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(viii) During the pendency of the second appeal, appellant no.2 (Ram Babu) died on 19.08.2015. Information of his death was given to the Court on 04.04.2016. However, his LRs were not brought on record within time.
(ix) The High Court vide first impugned order dated 21.02.2022 declared the appeal to have abated.
(x) To set aside abatement and to substitute the LRs of Ram Babu two set of applications were filed along with delay condonation applications. One set, namely, MCC No.700 of 2022 was filed by the appellants (i.e., LRs of Suresh Chandra, who were already on record) and the other set, namely, MCC No.697 of 2022 was filed by LRs of Ram Babu. Both were rejected by second impugned order dated 04.08.2022.
4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, the appellants are before us.
5. We have heard Shri Jayant Mehta, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants; Shri N.K. Mody, learned Senior Counsel for the contesting respondent; and have perused the record.
APPELLANTS’ SUBMISSIONS
6. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that, on non-substitution of legal heirs of a dead co-appellant, to determine whether the appeal abated partially, or wholly, what needs to be examined first is whether the surviving appellant has an independent right to pursue the appeal. If yes, whether he could seek for reversal of the entire decree under appeal. If not, then whether the decree in favour of the surviving appellant would result in a decree contradictory or conflicting with the one qua the deceased party. According to him, the appellants’ (L.Rs of Suresh Chandra’s) right was independent of the deceased appellant (Ram Babu) and as under Order XLI Rule 4 4 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 5 one of the defendants can seek 4 Order XLI Rule 4. One of several plaintiffs or defendants may obtain reversal of whole decree where it proceeds on ground common to all.—Where there are more plaintiffs or more defendants than one in a suit, and the decree appealed from proceeds on any ground common to all the plaintiffs or to all the defendants, any one of the plaintiffs or of the defendants may appeal from the whole decree, and thereupon the Appellate Court may reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or defendants, as the case may be.
5 CPC
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1239Suresh Chandra (Deceased) Thr. Lrs. & Ors. v. Parasram & Ors. reversal of the whole decree, when the decree is based on ground common to all, there could be no abatement of the appeal. In the alternative, it was submitted that abatement can always be set aside when substitution of LRs is applied for by showing sufficient cause for the delay. It was contended that the appellants as well as LRs of deceased Ram Babu applied for substitution by showing sufficient cause for the delay, therefore, the High Court ought to have set aside the abatement and proceeded to decide the appeal on merit. Certain decisions 6 were cited by appellants’ counsel which shall be dealt with, if considered necessary.
RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS
7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the contesting respondent submitted, firstly, the heirs of Ram Babu have neither filed Special Leave Petition nor have joined as petitioners, though impleaded as proforma- respondents, therefore the order rejecting their substitution application cannot be questioned. Secondly, the decree against the defendants was joint and indivisible, therefore, if the decree stands against Ram Babu, a decree in favour of Suresh Chandra (through LRs) would result in a conflicting decree. Further, the provisions of Order XLI Rule 4 do not exclude the applicability of Order XXII Rule
3. Thus, once all defendants join to file an appeal, death of one of the appellants would necessitate a substitution, if the right to sue does not survive on the surviving appellants alone. Therefore, Order XLI Rule 4 would not come to the rescue of the appellants. Hence, the whole appeal abated. To buttress his submissions learned counsel for the contesting respondent cited certain decisions 7 which we shall deal with, if considered necessary.
6 Decisions cited by the appellant: (i) Delhi Development Authority v. Diwan Chand Anand, (2022) 10 SCC 428; (ii) Sakharam v. Kishanrao, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2035; (iii) Gurnam Singh v. Gurbachan Kaur, (2017) 13 SCC 414; and (iv) State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, (1976) 1 SCC 719; (v) Baij Nath v. Ram Bharose, AIR 1953 All 565 =1953 SCC OnLine All 43.
7 Decisions cited by contesting respondent’s counsel: (i) Baij Nath v. Ram Bharose, AIR 1953 Allahabad 565 = 1953 SCC OnLine All 43; (ii) State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram, AIR 1962 SC 89 = 1961 SCC OnLine SC 137; (iii) Ram Sarup v. Munshi, AIR 1963 SC 553 = 1962 SCC OnLine SC 168; (iv) Pandit Shri Chand and others v. Jagdish Parshad Kishan Chand and others, AIR 1966 SC 1427 = 1966 SCC OnLine SC 206; (v) Badni v. Shri Chand, AIR 1999 SC 107; (vi) Hemareddi (dead) through Legal Representatives v. Ramchandra Yallappa Hosmani, (2019) 6 SCC 756; Delhi Development Authority v. Divan Chand Anand & Ors. (supra); Ashok Transport Agency v. Awadesh Kumar & Ors., (1999) SCC 567; Gurnam Singh v. Gurbachan Kaur (supra); Amba Bai v. Gopal, (2001) 5 SCC 570; and Venigalla Koteswarmma v. Madampati Suryamba, (2021) 4 SCC 246.
1240 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
ISSUES
8. Based on the rival submissions, following issues fall for our consideration:
(a) Whether the order rejecting application(s) seeking condonation of delay for setting aside abatement and substitution of legal representatives of deceased-appellant Ram Babu suffers from any legal infirmity?
(b) If the answer to (a) is in the negative, whether the second appeal abated wholly or partially, or not at all, on account of non-substitution of LRs of deceased defendant-appellant no.2 (i.e., Ram Babu)?
ANALYSIS
Issue (a)
9. Issue (a) arises for our consideration because the High Court rejected two set of applications. One filed by LRs of Ram Babu and the other filed by LRs of Suresh Chandra (i.e., the surviving appellants of the second appeal) who were already impleaded. Both were filed after the High Court had declared the appeal to have abated for non-substitution of LRs of Ram Babu. No doubt, the Court has power to condone the delay in filing an application for setting aside abatement as well as for substitution and can set aside the abatement in exercise of its power under Order XXII Rule 9 8 of CPC. But before condoning the delay the Court must consider whether sufficient cause has been shown for condonation.
10. In the instant case, death of Ram Babu took place on 19.08.2015; 90 days period of limitation to move an application for substitution9 , 8 Order XXII Rule 9. Effect of abatement or dismissal. – (1) Where a suit abates or is dismissed under this Order, no fresh suit shall be brought on the same cause of action.
(2) The plaintiff or the person claiming to be the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or the assignee or the receiver in the case of an insolvent plaintiff may apply for an order to set aside the abatement or dismissal; and if it is proved that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from continuing the suit, the Court shall set aside the abatement or dismissal upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit.
(3) The provisions of Section 5 of the Indian limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877), shall apply to applications under sub- rule (2).
Explanation. -- Nothing in this rule shall be construed as barring, in any later suit, a defense based on the facts which constituted the cause of action in the suit which had abated or had been dismissed under this Order.
9 Article 120 of the Schedule to The Limitation Act, 1963 [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1241Suresh Chandra (Deceased) Thr. Lrs. & Ors. v. Parasram & Ors. and 60 days limitation period to set aside abatement 10 , expired in the month of January 2016 itself. Importantly, through IA No.1621 of 2016 filed by the respondent, the Court was informed about the death of Ram Babu in 2016 itself, yet no application was moved till 2022. In fact, the applications were filed after the appeal was declared to have abated. Besides that, the surviving appellant(s) and the deceased appellant were close relatives, therefore, it cannot be believed that they were not aware of the death of co-appellant Ram Babu. In these circumstances, if the High Court found there was no sufficient cause to condone the delay, no fault can be found with its order as to justify our interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. Issue (a) is decided accordingly.
Issue (b)
11. Now the question arises whether the second appeal abated wholly or partially on death of sthe deceased appellant.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES RELATING TO ABATEMENT OF AN
APPEAL
12. Before we set out to address the aforesaid issue, an overview of the provisions governing abatement of an appeal under the CPC would be apposite. Order XXII Rule 111 of the CPC lays down the general principle that if the right to sue survives, the suit shall not abate on death of either the plaintiff or the defendant. Order XXII Rule 1112 makes it clear that all previous rules i.e., rules 1 to 10 of Order XXII would apply to appeals and for that purpose reference to the word ‘plaintiff’ would include an appellant; ‘defendant’ would include a respondent; and suit would include an appeal. As a logical corollary thereof, the right to sue includes the ‘right to appeal’. Rule 2 13 of Order XXII deals with a situation where one of the plaintiffs or 10 Article 121 of the Schedule to The Limitation Act, 1963 11 Order XXII Rule 1 – No abatement by party’s death if right to sue survives. - The death of a plaintiff or defendant shall not cause the suit to abate if the right to sue survives. 12 Order XXII Rule 11 – Application of Order to appeals. – In the application of this Order to appeals so far as may be, the word ‘plaintiff’ shall be held to include an appellant, the word ‘defendant’ a respondent, and the word ‘suit’ an appeal.
13 Order XXII Rule 2 – Procedure where one of several plaintiffs or defendants dies and right to sue survives. - Where there are more plaintiffs or defendants than one, and any of them dies, and where the right to sue survives to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, or against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, the court shall cause an entry to that effect to be made on the record, and the suit shall proceed at the instance of the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs, or against the surviving defendant or defendants. 1242 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports defendants to a suit dies and the right to sue survives to the surviving plaintiff(s) or defendant(s). In a situation governed by Rule 2, the suit does not abate; only a note is to be put that the right to sue survives to the surviving plaintiff(s) or defendant(s). Order XXII Rule 3 14 deals with a situation where one of two or more plaintiffs dies and the right to sue survives, though not to the surviving plaintiff(s) alone, or where the sole plaintiff dies and the right to sue survives. In such a case, if within time limited by law no application is made for substituting the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff or plaintiffs, the suit would abate so far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned. Rule 4 15 of Order XXII is a provision corresponding to Rule 3 to deal with a situation where one of several defendants or the sole defendant dies and the right to sue survives, though not against the surviving defendant alone.
14 Order XXII Rule 3 – Procedure in case of death of one of several plaintiffs or of sole plaintiff. –
(1) Where one of two or more plaintiffs dies and the right to sue does not survive to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, or a sole plaintiff or sole surviving plaintiff dies and the right to sue survives, the court on the application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit.
(2) Where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub-rule (1) the suit shall abate so far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned, and, on the application the defendant, the court may award to him the costs which he may have incurred in defending the suit, to be recovered from the estate of the deceased plaintiff.
15 Order XXII Rule 4 – Procedure in case of death of one of several defendants or of sole defendant. –
(1) Where one of two or more defendants dies and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, or a sole defendant or sole surviving defendant dies and the right to sue survives, the court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit.
(2) Any person so made a party may make an any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased defendant.
(3) Where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub-rule (1), the suit shall abate as against the deceased defendant.
(4) The Court whenever it thinks fit, may exempt the plaintiff from the necessity of substituting the legal representatives of any such defendant who has failed to file a written statement or who, having filed it, has failed to appear and contest the suit at the hearing; and judgment may, in such case, be pronounced against the said defendant notwithstanding the death of such defendant and shall have the same force and effect as if it has been pronounced before death took place.
(5) Where --
(a) the plaintiff was ignorant of the death of a defendant, and could not, for that reason, make an application for the substitution of the legal representative of the defendant under this rule within the period specified in the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), and the suit has, in consequence, abated, and
(b) the plaintiff applies after the expiry of the period specified therefor in the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), for setting aside the abatement and also for the admission of that application under Section 5 of that Act on the ground that he had, by reason of such ignorance, sufficient cause for not making the application within the period specified in the said Act, the court shall, in considering the application under the said Section 5 have due regard to the fact of such ignorance, if proved.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1243Suresh Chandra (Deceased) Thr. Lrs. & Ors. v. Parasram & Ors.
13. A plain reading of Rules 3 and 4 of Order XXII of the CPC would create an impression that in absence of substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff or defendant, or the deceased appellant or respondent, as the case may be, abatement is qua the deceased plaintiff or defendant alone, in the context of a suit, or the deceased appellant or respondent alone, in the context of an appeal, provided the right to sue does not survive to the surviving plaintiff(s) or appellant(s) alone, or against the surviving defendant(s) or respondent(s) alone, as the case may be. Though this is all that Rules 3 and 4 declare, the law has evolved that in certain kinds of litigation the consequences of abatement qua a party are not limited to the deceased party alone; rather, it affects the litigation in its entirety.
14. As to when an appeal would abate in its entirety for non-substitution of legal representatives of a deceased party depends upon the facts and circumstances of an individual case. The law in this regard has been discussed in detail and summarized by a five-Judge Bench of this Court in Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra (Dead) by LRs and Others v. Pramod Gupta (Smt.) (Dead) by LRs and Others16 as under:
“21. ……………….. (a) In case of “joint and indivisible decree”, “joint and inseverable or inseparable decree”, the abatement of proceedings in relation to one or more of the appellant(s) or respondent(s) on account of omission or lapse and failure to bring on record his or their legal representatives in time would prove fatal to the entire appeal and require to be dismissed in toto, as otherwise inconsistent or contradictory decrees would result and proper reliefs could not be granted, conflicting with the one which had already become final with respect to the same subject-matter vis-à-vis the others; (b) the question as to whether the court can deal with an appeal after it abates against one or the other would depend upon the facts of each case and no exhaustive statement or analysis could be made about all such circumstances wherein it would or would not be possible to proceed with the appeal, despite abatement, partially; (c) existence of a
16 (2003) 3 SCC 272
1244 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports joint right as distinguished from tenancy-in-common alone is not the criterion but the joint character of the decree, dehors the relationship of the parties inter se and the frame of the appeal, will take colour from the nature of the decree challenged; (d) where the dispute between two groups of parties centered around claims or was based on grounds common relating to the respective groups litigating as distinct groups or bodies — the issue involved for consideration in such class of cases would be one and indivisible; and (e) when the issues involved in more than one appeal dealt with as a group or batch of appeals, are common and identical in all such cases, abatement of one or the other of the connected appeals due to the death of one or more of the parties and failure to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased parties, would result in the abatement of all appeals.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
30. The question, therefore, as to when a proceeding before the court becomes or is rendered impossible or possible to be proceeded with, after it had partially abated on account of the death of one or the other party on either side has been always considered to depend upon the fact as to whether the decree obtained is a joint decree or a severable one and that in case of a joint and inseverable decree if the appeal abated against one or the other, the same cannot be proceeded with further for or against the remaining parties as well. If otherwise, the decree is a joint and several or separable one, being in substance and reality a combination of many decrees, there can be no impediment for the proceedings being proceeded with among or against those remaining parties other than the deceased. …
31. But, in our view also, as to what those circumstances are to be, cannot be exhaustively enumerated and no hard and fast rule for invariable application can be devised. With the march and progress of law, the new horizons explored and modalities discerned and the fact that the procedural laws must be liberally construed to really serve [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1245Suresh Chandra (Deceased) Thr. Lrs. & Ors. v. Parasram & Ors. as handmaid, make it workable and advance the ends of justice, technical objections which tend to be stumbling blocks to defeat and deny substantial and effective justice should be strictly viewed for being discouraged, except where the mandate of law inevitably necessitates it. …… At times, one or the other parties on either side in the litigation involving several claims or more than one, pertaining to their individual rights may settle among themselves the dispute to the extent their share of proportion of rights is concerned and may drop out of context, bringing even the proceedings to a conclusion so far as they are concerned. If all such moves are allowed to boomerang adversely on the rights of the remaining parties even to contest and have their claims adjudicated on merits, it would be a travesty of administration of justice itself.
32. The area of differences in the catena of decisions brought to our notice is not so much with reference to the principles to be applied to different nature of decrees but only as to which of the decree(s) falls, when or under what circumstances under one or the other of the classification i.e. joint and inseverable or joint and severable or separable. This aspect seems to have been adjudged in different cases depending upon the nature/source of rights, the cause of action, the manner they were asserted by the parties themselves and the contradictory nature of decrees impossible of execution, likely to result when considered differently. It is for this reason any standardized formula was avoided and the matter left for the consideration of courts, on the peculiar nature of the cases coming for determination. ……
33. Even assuming that the decree appealed against or challenged before the higher forum is joint and several but deals with the rights of more than one recognized in law to belong to each one of them on their own and unrelated to the others, and the proceedings abate in respect of one or more of either of the parties, the courts are not disabled in any manner to proceed with the proceedings so far as the remaining parties and part of the appeal is concerned. As and when it is found necessary to interfere 1246 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports with the judgment and decree challenged before it, the court can always declare the legal position in general and restrict the ultimate relief to be granted by confining it to those before the court only rather than denying the relief to one and all on account of a procedure lapse or action or inaction of one or the other of the parties before it. The only exception to this course of action should be where the relief granted and the decree ultimately passed would become totally unenforceable and mutually selfdestructive and unworkable vis-à-vis the other part, which had become final. As far as possible, courts must always aim to preserve and protect the rights of parties and extend help to enforce them rather than deny relief and thereby render the rights themselves otiose, “ubi jus ibi remedium” (where there is a right, there is a remedy) being a basic principle of jurisprudence. Such a course would be more conducive and better conform to a fair, reasonable and proper administration of justice.
34. In the light of the above discussion, we hold:
(1) Wherever the plaintiffs or appellants or petitioners are found to have distinct, separate and independent rights of their own and for the purpose of convenience or otherwise, joined together in a single litigation to vindicate their rights, the decree passed by the court thereon is to be viewed in substance as the combination of several decrees in favour of one or the other parties and not as a joint and inseverable decree. The same would be the position in the case of defendants or respondents having similar rights contesting the claims against them.
(2) Whenever different and distinct claims of more than one are sought to be vindicated in one single proceedings, as the one now before us, under the Land Acquisition Act or in similar nature of proceedings and/or claims in assertion of individual rights of parties are clubbed, consolidated and dealt with together by the courts concerned and a single judgment or decree has been passed, it should be treated as a mere combination of several decrees in favour of or against one or more of the parties and not as joint and inseparable decrees.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1247Suresh Chandra (Deceased) Thr. Lrs. & Ors. v. Parasram & Ors.
(3) The mere fact that the claims or rights asserted or sought to be vindicated by more than one are similar or identical in nature or by joining together of more than one of such claimants of a particular nature, by itself would not be sufficient in law to treat them as joint claims, so as to render the judgment or decree passed thereon a joint and inseverable one.
(4) The question as to whether in a given case the decree is joint and inseverable or joint and severable or separable has to be decided, for the purposes of abatement or dismissal of the entire appeal as not being properly and duly constituted or rendered incompetent for being further proceeded with, requires to be determined only with reference to the fact as to whether the judgment/decree passed in the proceedings vis-à-vis the remaining parties would suffer the vice of contradictory or inconsistent decrees. For that reason, a decree can be said to be contradictory or inconsistent with another decree only when the two decrees are incapable of enforcement or would be mutually self-destructive and that the enforcement of one would negate or render impossible the enforcement of the other.”
(Emphasis supplied)
15. In State of Punjab vs. Nathu Ram 17 , which was noticed and followed by the five-Judge Bench in Sardar Amarjit Singh (supra), this Court enumerated certain tests to determine whether the whole appeal would abate on account of non-substitution of the legal representatives of one or some of the deceased parties. In this regard it was observed:
“6. The question whether a court can deal with such matters or not, will depend on the facts of each case and therefore no exhaustive statement can be made about the circumstances when this is possible or is not possible. It may, however, be stated that ordinarily the considerations which weigh with the court in deciding 17 Referred to in Footnote 7 1248 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports upon this question are whether the appeal between the appellants and the respondents other than the deceased can be said to be properly constituted or can be said to have all the necessary parties for the decision of the controversy before the court. The test to determine this has been described in diverse forms. Courts will not proceed with an appeal (a) when the success of the appeal may lead to the court coming to a decision which be in conflict with the decision between the appellant and the deceased respondent and therefore which would lead to court passing a decree which will be contradictory to the decree which had become final with respect to the same subject-matter between the appellant and the deceased respondent; (b) when the appellant could not have brought the action for the necessary relief against those respondents alone who are still before the court; and (c) when the decree against the surviving respondents, if the appeal succeeds, be ineffective that is to say, it would not be successfully executed.”
(Emphasis supplied)
16. In Ram Sarup vs. Munshi18 there was a decree of pre-emption against the defendant-appellants who had bought the property from the co-defendants in the suit. One of the appellants died and his legal representatives were not brought on record. The issue which fell for consideration was whether the whole appeal abated, or the abatement was qua the deceased appellant only. Argument on behalf of the surviving appellants was whatever might be the position as regards the share to which the deceased appellant was entitled in the property purchased, the interest of the deceased was distinct and separate from that of the others and that the abatement could, in any event, be only partial and would not affect the continuance of the appeal by the surviving appellants at least as regards their share in the property. To deal with the above argument, this Court called for the sale deed by which the appellants had purchased the property. Upon consideration of the sale deed, the Court found that it was not a case of sale of any separated item of property in 18 Referred to in Footnote 7 [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1249Suresh Chandra (Deceased) Thr. Lrs. & Ors. v. Parasram & Ors. favour of the deceased appellant but of one set of properties to be enjoyed by vendees in equal shares. Based on that, the five-Judge Bench of this Court held:
“It is clear law that there can be no partial pre-emption because pre-emption is the substitution of the pre-emptor in place of the vendee and if the decree in favor of the pre-emptor in respect of the share of the deceased Mehar Singh has become final it is manifest that there would be two conflicting decrees if the appeal should be allowed and the decree for pre-emption insofar as appellants 2 to 5 are concerned is interfered with. Where a decree is a joint one and a part of the decree has become final, by reason of abatement, the entire appeal must be held to be abated.”
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Having regard to the aforesaid decisions, the law governing determination of the issue as to whether abatement of an appeal on non-substitution of a deceased party is partial or whole, can be summarized as under:
1. The answer to the question whether the entire appeal abates or it abates partially qua the deceased party alone, will depend on facts of each case and, therefore, no exhaustive statement about the circumstances in which the entire appeal would abate can be made.
2. As a matter of course courts will not proceed with an appeal (a) when the success of the appeal may lead to the court coming to a decision which is in conflict with the decision between the appellant and the deceased respondent which had become final with respect to the same subject-matter between the appellant and the deceased respondent; (b) when the appellant could not have brought the action for the necessary relief against those respondents alone who are still before the court; and
(c) when the decree against the surviving respondents, if the appeal succeeds, be ineffective that is to say, it would not be successfully executed.
3. In a case of “joint and indivisible decree” or “joint and inseverable or inseparable decree”, the abatement of appeal in relation to 1250 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports one or more of the appellant(s) or respondent(s) on account of failure to bring on record his or their legal representatives in time would prove fatal to the entire appeal because proceeding qua the surviving party or parties may give rise to inconsistent or contradictory decrees.
4. The question as to whether the decree is joint and inseverable, or joint and severable or separable, must be decided, for the purposes of abatement or dismissal of the entire appeal, only with reference to the fact as to whether the judgment/decree passed in the proceedings vis-à-vis the remaining parties would suffer the vice of contradictory or inconsistent decrees.
5. A decree can be said to be contradictory or inconsistent with another decree only when the two decrees are incapable of enforcement or would be mutually self-destructive and that the enforcement of one would negate or render impossible the enforcement of the other which means that the two decrees are mutually irreconcilable or totally inconsistent, that is, if laid side by side, the only impression would be that one is in the teeth of the other.
6. Where the plaintiffs or appellants have distinct, separate and independent rights of their own i.e., not inter-dependent upon the other, and for the purpose of convenience, or otherwise, joined together in a single litigation to vindicate their rights, the decree passed by the court thereon is to be viewed in substance as a combination of several decrees in favour of one or the other parties and not as a joint and inseverable decree.
7. Existence of a joint right as distinguished from tenancyin-common is not the criterion of a joint or inseverable or inseparable decree. The joint character of the decree will take colour from the nature of the decree challenged.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES WHERE ENTIRE APPEAL STOOD
ABATED ON NON-SUBSTITUTION OF A DECEASED PARTY
18. Now, we shall examine those decisions where this Court held appeal to have abated in its entirety on non-substitution of legal representatives of one of the deceased parties.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1251Suresh Chandra (Deceased) Thr. Lrs. & Ors. v. Parasram & Ors.
19. In Hemareddi vs. Ramachandra19 , one Govindareddi, the propositus died, leaving behind two sons and a daughter. The plaintiffs were children of one of the two sons. The second defendant was the wife of the other son. The suit properties were alleged to be the properties of the joint family of Govindareddi and his sons. Suit was filed for injunction as also for declaration that defendant no.1 is not the adopted son. Trial court dismissed the suit and upheld the adoption. Against which, an appeal was filed. During the pendency of the appeal, one of the plaintiff-appellants died. His LRs were not brought on record. The High Court took the view that the entire appeal abated. The matter travelled to this Court. The question that fell for consideration was whether the whole appeal abated, or it abated qua the deceased appellant only. Upholding the decision of the High Court, this Court reasoned thus:
“17. ………. The appeal having abated in regard to the late brother, the decree of the trial court has become final qua the deceased brother of the appellant. The effect of the same is that the adoption is found legal. The result of the appeal being allowed to proceed further and succeed in the appeal would be the passing of a decree by the High Court. The said decree would be to the effect that the adoption is invalid. The suit which was jointly filed by the appellant and his late brother would have to be decreed whereas the suit filed by the appellant and his late brother stands dismissed by the trial court. Both the decrees cannot stand together. There would be irreconcilable conflict. The defendants are common. They would be faced with two decrees regarding the same subject matter which are irrevocably conflicting.”
20. In State of Punjab vs. Nathu Ram (supra), the State acquired on lease certain parcels of land belonging to Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram for military purposes under the Defence of India Act, 1939. Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram, brothers, refused to accept the compensation offered to them by the Collector and applied to the Punjab Government through the Collector, under rule 6 of the Punjab Land Acquisition (Defence of India) Rules, 1943. The State Government referred the 19 Referred to in Footnote 7 1252 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports matter to an arbitrator under rule 10, who, after inquiry, passed an award ordering the payment of an amount higher than what was offered by the Collector. The State Government appealed against the award to the High Court of Punjab. During the pendency of the appeal, Labhu Ram, one of the respondents, died. The High Court held that the appeal abated against Labhu Ram and that its effect was that the appeal against Nathu Ram also abated. The State Government appealed to this Court. While dismissing the appeal, this Court, inter alia, observed:
“9. …… the award of the arbitrator in each of these cases was a joint one, in favor of both the respondents Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram. To illustrate the form of the award, we may quote the award for the year 1945-46 in the proceedings leading to Civil Appeal No.635 of 1957. It is: “On the basis of the report of S Lal Singh, Naib Tehsildar (Exhibit PW9/1) and Sheikh Aziz Din, Tehsildar, (Exhibit PW9/2), the applicants are entitled to sum of Rs. 4140 on account of rent, plus Rs.3872/ 8/0 on account of income tax etc., due to the inclusion of Rs. 6193/8/0 in their total income, plus such sum as the petitioners have to pay to the Income Tax Department on account of the inclusion of Rs. 4140 in their income as awarded by this award.”
The result of the abatement of the appeal against Labhu Ram is therefore that his legal representatives are entitled to get compensation on the basis of this award even if they are to be paid separately on calculating their rightful share in the land acquired, for which this compensation is decreed. Such calculation is foreign to the appeal between the State of Punjab and Nathu Ram. The decree in the appeal will have to determine not what Nathu Ram’s share in this compensation is, but what is the correct amount of compensation with respect to the land acquired for which this compensation has been awarded by the arbitrator.
The subject matter for which the compensation is to be calculated is one and the same. There cannot be different assessments of the amount of compensation for the same [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1253Suresh Chandra (Deceased) Thr. Lrs. & Ors. v. Parasram & Ors. parcel of land. The appeal before the High Court was an appeal against a decree jointly in favour of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram. The appeal against Nathu Ram alone cannot be held to be properly constituted when the appeal against Labhu Ram had abated. To get rid of the joint decree, it was essential for the appellant, the State of Punjab, to include both the joint decree holders in the appeal. In the absence of one joint-decree holder, the appeal is not properly framed. It follows that the State appeal against Nathu Ram alone cannot proceed.”
While holding so, the argument on behalf of the State that Labhu Ram had an equal share in the land acquired and, therefore, the appeal against Nathu Ram alone could deal with half the amount of the award was rejected, reasoning thus:
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