M/S Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Maharashtra State Electricity Board, Mumbai & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 864; [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1144
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, Justice Joymalya Bagchi
- Decided
- 17 Jul 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 9524/2025
- Sections
- 18, 22, 18(2), 29(2), 2(4), 18(3), 43, 24, 34, 19, 37, 32
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:19 am. Original source ↗
Preview: first 50% of the document.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1144 : 2025 INSC 864 M/s Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd.
v.
Chairman, Maharashtra State Electricity Board, Mumbai & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 9524-9532 of 2025)
17 July 2025 [Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha* and Joymalya Bagchi, JJ.] Issue for Consideration
(i) Whether the Limitation Act applies to conciliation proceedings u/s.18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act), and even if not, whether time-barred debts can be referred to conciliation; (ii) Whether the Limitation Act applies to arbitration proceedings u/s.18 of the MSMED Act, and whether time-barred debts can be referred to arbitration. Further, what is the effect of disclosure of the unpaid amount in the buyer’s financial statements as mandated u/s.22 on extending the limitation period.
Headnotes† Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 – s.18 – Limitation Act, 1963 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Whether the Limitation Act applies to conciliation proceedings u/s.18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act), and even if not, whether time-barred debts can be referred to conciliation:
Held: The Limitation Act does not apply to conciliation proceedings u/s.18(2) of the MSMED Act – s.18(2) of the MSMED Act provides that conciliation must be conducted as per ss.65 to 81 of the ACA – On perusing these provisions of the ACA, as well as the provisions of the MSMED Act, it is clear that there is no provision that extends the applicability of the Limitation Act to conciliation proceedings – Further, neither s.29(2) nor any other provision of the Limitation Act has the effect of extending its application to conciliation proceedings – On the other hand, it is a settled position that the Limitation Act only applies suits, appeals, and applications filed before courts – Conciliation being an out-of-court and non-adjudicatory process of dispute resolution, the Limitation Act cannot be extended to it – As far as the reference * Author [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1145M/s Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Maharashtra State Electricity Board, Mumbai & Ors. of time-barred claim to conciliation is concerned, a time-barred claim can be referred to conciliation as the expiry of limitation period does not extinguish the right to recover the amount, including through a settlement agreement that can be arrived at through the conciliatory process. [Paras 26, 51(i)] Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 – s.18 – Limitation Act, 1963 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.2(4) – Whether the Limitation Act applies to arbitration proceedings u/s.18 of the MSMED Act, and whether timebarred debts can be referred to arbitration – Further, what is the effect of disclosure of the unpaid amount in the buyer’s financial statements as mandated u/s.22 on extending the limitation period:
Held: The Limitation Act applies to arbitration proceedings u/s.18(3) of the MSMED Act – The applicability of the provisions of ACA to such arbitrations is determined as per s.18(3) and other provisions of the MSMED Act, as these are special laws, rather than by Section 2(4) of the ACA, which is under a general law – This is in addition to the reasoning provided in Silpi Industries – Further, the extension of the limitation period on the basis of disclosure u/s.22 of the MSMED Act must be examined on a case-to-case basis. [Para 51(ii)] Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 – s.18(3) – Limitation Act, 1963 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.2(4) – Conflict between s.18(3) of MSMED Act and s.2(4) of ACA:
Held: There is a clear and apparent conflict in the manner in which the provisions of the ACA are made applicable–while s.2(4) provides for the exclusion of s.43 to statutory arbitrations, s.18(3) provides for the applicability of all the provisions of the ACA as would apply if there were an arbitration agreement, which includes s.43 – This Court is of the opinion that s.18(3) of the MSMED Act will prevail over s.2(4) of the ACA – There is a clear legislative intent that the provisions of the MSMED Act will have an overriding effect in case of inconsistency, which is evidenced from the non-obstante clause in s.18 and the express language in s.24 – The language of s.2(4) itself also supports this overriding effect of the special law – The same has also been recognised and affirmed by this Court in Mahakali Foods, wherein the Court considered the purpose and 1146 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports object, statutory scheme, and sequence of enactment of the ACA and the MSMED Act to arrive at the conclusion that the MSMED Act is a special law that will prevail over the provisions of the ACA, which is a general law. [Para 41] Alternate Dispute Resolution – Conciliation – Features of: Held: i) Conciliation is not an adjudicatory or judicial process where the conciliator hears the parties and decides a dispute; ii) The parties to the conciliation resolve their disputes through settlement, whose terms may be arrived at with the assistance of the conciliator – The role of the conciliator is to guide and assist the parties in arriving at a compromise or settlement, make proposals for settlement, formulate the terms of settlement or assist the parties in doing so, and reformulate the terms of settlement based on the observations of the parties; iii) The conciliator must be guided by the principles of independence, impartiality, objectivity, justice, equity, fair play, fairness, and confidentiality, and must also consider the rights and obligations of the parties, trade usages, and business practices between the parties – He must also take into account the wishes of the parties and the need for speedy settlement of dispute – The parties must also cooperate with the conciliator in good faith and endeavour to comply with the conciliator’s requests; iv) Finally, the terms of the settlement that are recorded in a settlement agreement must be signed by the parties and it shall be final and binding on them – The same is enforceable as an arbitral award. [Para 25] Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 – s.18(2) – Limitation Act, 1963 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – ss.2(4), 43 – A full bench of the High Court has held that the Facilitation Council cannot entertain time-barred claims for conciliation, and that the provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to arbitration proceedings under the MSMED – Correctness:
Held: The decision of the High Court to the extent of the Limitation Act being applicable to arbitration proceedings under the MSMED Act is correct – With respect to conciliation proceedings on the other hand, this Court is of the opinion that they do not attract the applicability of the Limitation Act – Further, there is no legal bar in the Limitation Act, the MSMED Act, the ACA, or the legal precedents laid down by this Court that proscribes conciliation with respect to time-barred debts. [Para 2] [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1147M/s Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Maharashtra State Electricity Board, Mumbai & Ors. Case Law Cited State of Kerala v. V.R. Kalliyanikutty [1999] 2 SCR 372 : (1999) 3 SCC 657 – held inapplicable.
A.P. Power Coordination Committee v. Lanco Kondapalli Power Ltd. [2015] 12 SCR 447; Silpi Industries v. Kerala SRTC [2021] 3 SCR 1044 : (2021)18 SCC 790 – held not per incuriam.
T.N. Generation & Distribution Corpn. Ltd. v. PPN Power Generating Co. (P) Ltd. [2014] 4 SCR 667 : (2014)11 SCC 53; Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd. v. Mahakali Foods (P) Ltd. [2022] 19 SCR 1094 : (2023) 6 SCC 401; My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd., 2025 INSC 56 : [2025] 1 SCR 729; Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary Irrigation Department [2008] 5 SCR 1108 : (2008) 7 SCC 169; Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra [1974] 3 SCR 31 : (1974) 2 SCC 133; Union of India v. Popular Construction [2001] Supp. 3 SCR 619 : (2001) 8 SCC 47; Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Pvt Ltd. [2009] 4 SCR 1997 : (2009) 5 SCC 791; State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh [2008] 1 SCR 922 : (2008) 2 SCC 660; M.P. Steel Corpn. v. CCE [2015] 7 SCR 291 : (2015) 7 SCC 58; Asset Reconstruction Co. (India) Ltd. v. Bishal Jaiswal [2021] 3 SCR 524 : (2021) 6 SCC 366; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Sinha [2008] 8 SCR 509 : (2008) 7 SCC 454; Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. & Anr. v. Cherian Varkey Construction Co. (P) Ltd. & Ors. [2010] 8 SCR 1053 : (2010) 8 SCC 24; B.K. Educational Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Parag Gupta and Associates [2018] 12 SCR 794 : (2019) 11 SCC 633; Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay [1958] 1 SCR 1122 : AIR 1958 SC 328 – referred to.
List of Acts Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006; Limitation Act, 1963; Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993; Contract Act, 1872; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. List of Keywords Arbitration; Conciliation; Alternate Dispute Resolution; Time barred claims; Conciliation proceedings under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act; Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006; Special laws; Conciliatory process; Acknowledgement of liability; Entry in the balance sheet; 1148 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Section 18 of the Limitation Act; Limitation Act applicablity to arbitral proceedings under the MSMED Act; Conflict between s.18(3) of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 and s.2(4) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s). 9524-9532 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 20.10.2023 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay at Nagpur in CA No(s). 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of 2018 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Jayant Bhushan, Sr. Advs., Prashant Pakhiddey, Surjendu Sankar Das, Manav Gill, Ms. Annie Mittal.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Shikhil Suri, Sr. Adv., Udit Gupta, Anup Jain, Ms. Prachi Gupta, Ms. Nishtha Goel, Amarendra Kumar, M/S. Udit Kishan and Associates.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.
Table of Contents* I. Introduction ....................................................................... 2 II. Brief Facts ......................................................................... 3 III. High Court order dated 24.08.2018 .................................. 4 IV. Impugned order: ................................................................ 6 V. Submissions: ..................................................................... 11 * Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1149M/s Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Maharashtra State Electricity Board, Mumbai & Ors. VI. Issues ................................................................................ 15 VII. Relevant statutory provisions: ........................................... 17 VIII. Whether time-barred claims can be referred to conciliation under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act ........................... IX. Whether time-barred claims can be referred to arbitration under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act ........................... X. Conclusion ........................................................................ 49
1. Leave granted.
I. Introduction:
2. The issue arising in the present appeals are whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 19631 are applicable to conciliation and arbitration proceedings initiated under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 20062 . Further, even if the Limitation Act is not applicable, whether a supplier can recover a time-barred debt by taking recourse to the remedies provisioned under Section 18 of the MSMED Act. In the order impugned before us in the present appeals, a full bench of the High Court has held that the Facilitation Council cannot entertain time-barred claims for conciliation, and that the provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to arbitration proceedings under the MSMED. On considering the statutory scheme and provisions of the MSMED Act, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19963 , and the Limitation Act, along with the precedents of this Court as well the submissions of the parties, we have partly allowed the present appeals as follows. We have upheld the decision of the High Court to the extent of the Limitation Act being applicable to arbitration proceedings under the MSMED Act and have provided our reasons for the same. With respect to conciliation proceedings on the other 1 Hereinafter “Limitation Act”.
2 Hereinafter “MSMED Act”.
3 Hereinafter “ACA”.
1150 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports hand, we are of the opinion that they do not attract the applicability of the Limitation Act. Further, there is no legal bar in the Limitation Act, the MSMED Act, the ACA, or the legal precedents laid down by this Court that proscribes conciliation with respect to time-barred debts. II. Brief Facts:
3. The appellants are small-scale industries registered with the District Industries Centre, Nagpur. The appellants supplied transformers to respondent no. 1 under various purchase orders between 1993 to 2004. Due to delay in payments, the appellants filed references in 2005-06 before the Industry Facilitation Council established under the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 19934 . The 1993 Act came to be repealed by the MSMED Act, 2006 5 , and the proceedings initiated by the appellants were taken up by the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council 6 under the MSMED Act.
3.1 By its award dated 28.01.2010, the Facilitation Council allowed the appellants’ claims and awarded interest on the delayed payments.
3.2 Respondent nos. 1 and 2 challenged the award under Section 34 of the ACA, and deposited the requisite amount under Section 19 of the MSMED Act. This was allowed by the Commercial Court by order dated 26.10.2017 and it set aside the award on the ground that the claims were barred by limitation, against which order the appellants filed appeals under Section 37 of the ACA before the High Court.
III. High Court order dated 24.08.2018:
4. On taking up these appeals under Section 37, the division bench referred the issue of applicability of Limitation Act to proceedings 4 Hereinafter “1993 Act”.
5 Section 32 of the MSMED Act, which reads:
“32. Repeal of Act 32 of 1993.—(1) The Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 is hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the Act so repealed under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act.”
6 Hereinafter “Facilitation Council”.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1151M/s Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Maharashtra State Electricity Board, Mumbai & Ors. under the MSMED Act to a larger bench. It took note of a coordinate bench’s decision in M/s. Delton Electricals v. MSEDCL7 wherein the High Court found that the law of limitation applies to claims filed before the Facilitation Council. The High Court took a different view and referred the issue to a larger bench for the following reasons:
4.1 In Delton’s case, the Court held that by virtue of Section 2(4) of the ACA, which excludes the applicability of Section 43 of the ACA to statutory arbitrations, the Limitation Act was inapplicable to arbitrations under the MSMED Act. However, analysing the issue from a different perspective and interpreting the term “amount due” in the scheme of the MSMED Act, the High Court relied on this Court’s decision in State of Kerala v. V.R. Kalliyanikutty8 and held that “amount due” does not include a time-barred debt. On this basis, the High Court therein set aside the award of the Facilitation Council that allowed time-barred claims as being violative of public policy.
4.2 In the order dated 24.08.2018, the division bench doubted the correctness of the interpretation of “amount due” in Delton’s (supra) case as various aspects were not considered by the Court therein, and it framed 9 issues for consideration by a larger bench. The relevant portion with the issues framed is extracted hereinbelow:
“46. We find that in Deltons case, this Court was not required to look into cardinal issues which may have made some difference on the outcome. Those issues are - A. Whether in view of a more comprehensive scheme in MSMED Act and improvement made by it over Act no. 32 of 1993, the jurisdiction of Civil Court is taken away by 2006 Act?
B. Whether an incongruous situation perceived in paragraph 71 of its judgment by the Division Bench in Delton case (supra) can emerge due to reading 7 Commercial Appeal No. 38/2017, judgment dated 31.08.2017.
8 (1999) 3 SCC 657.
1152 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports of Section 6 of Act no. 32 of 1993, (not in force) and Section 18 of the MSMED Act?
C. Whether the period of limitation runs from the appointed date only to find out limitation for cause of action to approach Council under Section 18 of 2006 Act?
D. Whether Section 21 of 1996 Act has any relevance in the scheme of Section 18 of the MSMED Act?
E. Whether the peculiar provisions like “thrice the bank rate of interest”, interest compounded monthly, direction to mention principal, interest and amount unpaid in balance sheet by buyer, step by step approach adopted in Section 18 and overriding effect in Section 24 of the 2006 Act, all are sufficient to exclude the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963?
F. Whether the mention of “unpaid amount” in balance sheet of the buyer must include “time barred” claims?
G. What is the legislative intent in mandating the mention of “unpaid amount” or even time-barred recoveries separately?
H. Whether such disclosure of “unpaid principal amount” or the “compound interest quantum”
separately gives rise to the fresh or repeated annual causes of action for recovery of the principal and/or interest amount?
I. Whether the present controversy need to be viewed independent of the Act No. 32 of 1993?”
IV. Impugned order:
5. By judgment dated 20.10.2023, a full bench of the High Court framed the following issues for its consideration:
“(1) Whether the provisions of Indian Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to conciliation proceedings initiated and conducted under Section 18 (1) & (2) of MSMED Act, 2006?
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1153M/s Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Maharashtra State Electricity Board, Mumbai & Ors.
(2) Whether the provisions of Indian Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to arbitration proceedings under Section 18(3) of MSMED Act, 2006?”
5.1 Taking up the second question on the applicability of the Limitation Act to arbitration proceedings under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, the High Court proceeded as follows. Relying on this Court’s decision in Silpi Industries9 and Mahakali Foods10 and the overriding effect of the MSMED Act as provided under Section 24 therein, the High Court held that Sections 15 to 23 of the MSMED Act will override Section 2(4) of the ACA. The language of Section 18, which commences with a non-obstante clause, fortifies this position. Therefore, the conduct of arbitration under the MSMED Act will be guided by Section 18(3), which makes the entirety of the ACA, including Section 43, applicable to arbitrations under the MSMED Act. Further, the Court noted that taking an alternative view would permit time-barred and stale claims to be raised in arbitration under the MSMED Act, which is contrary to the purpose and object of the statute to provide speedy remedy to the supplier to recover his claims. The Court also analysed the scheme of the MSMED Act and observed that the statute prescribes time-limits for payment under Section 15, provides for a penal rate of interest in case of default under Section 16, and also provides a time-limit for the Facilitation Council to decide the reference under Section 18(5). The prescription of such timelines shows that the legislature did not intend for time-barred claims to be raised in arbitration under Section 18(3). Finally, the High Court rejected the appellants’ contention that the decisions in Silpi Industries (supra) and Mahakali Foods (supra) are per incuriam and held that the same are binding on it.
5.2 With respect to conciliation under Sections 18(1) and 18(2) of the MSMED Act, the Court noted that there is no provision that extends the Limitation Act to conciliation proceedings. It also noted that conciliation is mandated under the MSMED Act when a reference is made before the Facilitation Council, and Section 9 Silpi Industries v. Kerala SRTC, (2021) 18 SCC 790.
10 Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd. v. Mahakali Foods (P) Ltd., (2023) 6 SCC 401. 1154 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports 18 has done away with the requirement of consent for conciliation that is required under the ACA. In case conciliation fails, the Facilitation Council can take up the dispute for arbitration or refer it to an institution or centre. Further, taking into account the purpose and object of the MSMED Act to provide a more robust mechanism for recovery of “amount due” to the supplier, the Court held that the MSMED Act does not create any “special right” in favour of the supplier and the right of recovery of the amount is the same as available under common law. In this light, it relied on this Court’s decisions in V.R. Kalliyanikutty (supra) and A.P. Power Coordination Committee v. Lanco Kondapalli Power Ltd.11 to hold that “amount due” does not include a timebarred, stale and dead claim. It also noted that if this were the legislative intent, there must be a specific provision enacted to this effect. Further considering the compulsory nature of statutory conciliation, the buyer must be allowed to take the defence of limitation. Hence, although the Limitation Act does not apply to conciliation proceedings, the Facilitation Council cannot entertain a dead or stale claim.
5.3 In this light, the High Court answered each of the issues raised in paragraph 46 of the division bench’s order (extracted hereinabove) as follows:
Issue A: The MSMED Act does not debar the jurisdiction of the civil court and only provides an alternative, speedy mechanism under Section 18 for recovery of money with a higher rate of interest.
Issue B: An incongruous situation as contemplated in Delton (supra) arises. If the limitation provisions are not applied to conciliation and arbitration under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, it would lead to an incongruous situation where a suit before the civil court for recovery of money would be rejected on the ground of limitation but the same can be claimed under Section 18 a number of years after the supply.
11 (2016) 3 SCC 468, hereinafter “Lanco”. These were subsequently followed in B.K. Educational Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Parag Gupta and Associates, (2019) 11 SCC 633, which is also referred and cited by the High Court.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1155M/s Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Maharashtra State Electricity Board, Mumbai & Ors. Issue C: Limitation commences from the date provided under Section 15 of the MSMED Act.
Issue D: Section 21 of the ACA does not have relevance as conciliation and arbitration are statutorily provided under Section 18 when a supplier makes a reference before the Facilitation Council.
Issue E: Section 22 of the MSMED Act mandates the buyer to make entries in its books of account to ensure that the remedy under Section 18 is a speedy remedy, and therefore supports the plea that the Limitation Act applies. Issues F and G: Section 22 does not have the effect of permitting dead and stale claims, and the concept of a continuing cause of action cannot be stretched to “an absurd point of time, where its enforcement would make it an engine of oppression and not of providing justice to one”. Issue H: The purpose and object of Section 16 read with Sections 22 and 23 is to dissuade the buyer from delaying payments but not to be used as a tool for oppression by the supplier by letting time lapse and inflating the claim by charging interest for that period before the Facilitation Council. The charging of interest under Section 16 does not amount to a fresh cause of action at the end of every month, for then there would be no time limit within which the supplier is required to raise his claim.
Issue I: Considering the scheme of the 1993 Act and the MSMED Act, 2006, the latter provides a more robust recovery mechanism by reducing timelines for payments, providing for higher interest, and a timeline for conciliation and arbitration. However, the basic provisions remain the same and hence, what has been considered and held in respect of provisions under the 1993 Act will hold good in respect of the MSMED Act, unless a contrary intention appears from the language of the MSMED Act.
V. Submissions:
6. We have heard Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi and Mr. Jayant Bhushan, learned senior counsels for the appellants and Mr. Shikhil Suri, 1156 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports learned senior counsel for the respondents, as well as perused the written submissions of the parties. The submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants are as follows:
6.1 The decision of this Court in Silpi Industries (supra) that has held that the Limitation Act is applicable to arbitration proceedings under Section 18 of the MSMED Act is per incuriam for two reasons: first, Section 2(4) of the ACA that excludes the applicability of Section 43 of the ACA to statutory arbitrations was not brought to the notice of the Court, and second, the Court relies on another decision in Lanco (supra), which is itself per incuriam as it is directly contrary to an earlier coordinate bench decision in T.N. Generation & Distribution Corpn. Ltd. v. PPN Power Generating Co. (P) Ltd.12 6.2 Relying on Section 2(4) of the ACA, it is submitted that Section 43, which provides for the applicability of limitation provisions in arbitral proceedings, does not apply to statutory arbitrations. Further, the Limitation Act only applies to courts, and not to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals. Hence, in view of Section 2(4), Limitation Act cannot be extended to arbitrations under the MSMED Act. Further, there is no provision under the MSMED Act providing for the applicability of the Limitation Act to proceedings under it.
6.3 Section 22 of the MSMED Act mandates the buyer to disclose in its books of accounts the principal amount and interest due thereon that remains unpaid to any supplier. It is submitted that such an entry in the balance sheet or financial statement of the buyer reflecting the unpaid sum is an acknowledgement of debt and extends the period of limitation as per Section 18 of the Limitation Act. Contravention of this requirement is punishable under Section 27 of the MSMED Act.
6.4 The MSMED Act has been enacted with the object of protecting suppliers, and the onus is on the buyers to make payments. Suppliers often do not raise complaints or claims in the fear that it would jeopardise future business with the buyer. No injustice would be caused to the buyer if Limitation Act is not applicable. 12 (2014) 11 SCC 53, hereinafter “TANGEDCO”.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1157M/s Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Maharashtra State Electricity Board, Mumbai & Ors. 6.5 Finally, with respect to conciliation proceedings, it is submitted that the same is to provide an opportunity to parties to explore an amicable settlement. If time-barred claims cannot be referred to conciliation, it would render Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 187213 otiose, which enables parties to agree to pay timebarred debts. Further, the MSMED Act creates substantive rights beyond establishing a mechanism for speedy recovery. Hence, the decisions in V.R. Kalliyanikutty (supra) and Lanco (supra) do not apply.
7. On behalf of the respondents, it is submitted that:
7.1 The language Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act provides for the applicability of the ACA to arbitrations under it as if the arbitration was in pursuance of an arbitration agreement under Section 7(1) of the ACA. Hence, the statutory fiction places arbitration under the MSMED Act on the same footing as those under the ACA and incorporates the entirety of the ACA, including Section 43. 7.2 Section 2(4) of the ACA addresses situations where statutes mandating arbitration prescribe their own limitation periods, and then the applicability of Section 43 of the ACA is excluded. However, when such statutes do not prescribe any such limitation period, Section 2(4) cannot preclude the applicability of limitation law to such arbitrations.
7.3 This Court’s decision in Lanco (supra) is not per incuriam as it took note of the decision in TANGEDCO (supra) and held that the issue of limitation was not examined in detail therein. 7.4 Further, it is clear from the statutory framework and intent of the MSMED Act that the intent was not to exclude the applicability of the Limitation Act. Rather, the applicability of limitation laws complements the scheme of the MSMED Act for speedy dispute resolution. Further, a contrary interpretation would create an anomalous position where claims barred by law can be revived by approaching a different forum.
7.5 Finally, Section 22 of the MSMED Act that requires disclosure of the unpaid amount in the buyer’s balance sheet is to promote 13 Hereinafter “Contract Act”.
1158 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports transparency and accountability in financial reporting, rather than alter or extend statutory limitation periods.
VI. Issues:
8. Upon perusing the impugned order, we find that the full bench set out two issues, namely the applicability of limitation law to arbitration proceedings and conciliation proceedings respectively under the MSMED Act. However, in its conclusion, the High Court proceeded to answer several other issues that were referred to it by the division bench’s order dated 24.08.2018 (paragraph 46). There are several questions of law arising therein, such as whether the jurisdiction of civil courts is ousted by the MSMED Act, commencement of the limitation period, extension of the limitation period, and applicability of decisions rendered in the context of the 1993 Act. These issues do not directly arise for our consideration in the present appeals and the parties’ submissions have been confined to the two legal issues framed by the full bench, as well as brief submissions on the effect of Section 22 of the MSMED Act. In this light, we will confine our examination to the two issues that have been formulated and answered by the High Court and while doing so, we will also briefly deal with Section 22 of the MSMED Act. We may reformulate the issues arising in the present appeals as follows:
i. Whether the Limitation Act applies to conciliation proceedings under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, and even if not, whether time-barred debts can be referred to conciliation?
ii. Whether the Limitation Act applies to arbitration proceedings under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, and whether time-barred debts can be referred to arbitration? Further, what is the effect of disclosure of the unpaid amount in the buyer’s financial statements as mandated under Section 22 on extending the limitation period?
VII. Relevant statutory provisions:
9. Before we analyse each issue, it would be relevant to understand the statutory scheme and interplay of the Limitation Act, ACA, and the MSMED Act.
10. Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides that when a suit, appeal, or application is filed after the prescribed period of limitation as per the [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1159M/s Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Maharashtra State Electricity Board, Mumbai & Ors. Schedule, the same shall be dismissed even if limitation is not set up as a defence. The calculation of the limitation period is subject to Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act.14 Further, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act makes its provisions applicable to special or local laws when they prescribe a different period of limitation than what is provided in the Schedule. In such a situation, Section 3 will apply as if such period were prescribed in the Schedule, and Sections 4 to 24 will apply to the extent that they are not impliedly or expressly excluded by the local or special law. 15
11. Coming to the ACA, Section 2(4) deals with the applicability of Part I of the ACA to statutory arbitrations. It provides that all the provisions of Part I, except Sections 40(1), 41 and 43, shall apply to arbitrations under other enactments as if such arbitration were pursuant to an arbitration agreement and as if such other enactment were an arbitration agreement, except insofar as the provisions of Part I are inconsistent with the other enactment or rules made thereunder. Section 2(4) is extracted for ready reference:
“2. Definitions.— ***
(4) This Part except sub-section (1) of section 40, sections 41 and 43 shall apply to every arbitration under any other enactment for the time being in force, as if the arbitration were pursuant to an arbitration agreement and as if that other enactment were an arbitration agreement, except in 14 The relevant portion of Section 3 of the Limitation Act is: “3. Bar of limitation.— (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.”
15 Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act reads:
“29. Savings.— ***
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.” Although the expression used in the provision is “expressly excluded”, this Court has consistently interpreted the same to include implied exclusions. See Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, (1974) 2 SCC 133, para 17; Union of India v. Popular Construction, (2001) 8 SCC 470, paras 8-11; Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Pvt Ltd, (2009) 5 SCC 791, para 35. 1160 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports so far as the provisions of this Part are inconsistent with that other enactment or with any rules made thereunder.”
12. Arbitration agreement is defined in Section 7 of the ACA as an agreement to submit disputes which have arisen or which may arise between parties in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, to arbitration. 16
13. Further, Section 43(1) provides for the applicability of the Limitation Act to arbitral proceedings. It reads:
“43. Limitations.—(1) The Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall apply to arbitrations as it applies to proceedings in court.”
14. Part III of the ACA deals with conciliation of disputes. Section 67 therein provides for the role of the conciliator, and is extracted for ready reference:
“67. Role of conciliator.— (1) The conciliator shall assist the parties in an independent and impartial manner in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute.
(2) The conciliator shall be guided by principles of objectivity, fairness and justice, giving consideration to, among other things, the rights and obligations of the parties, the usages of the trade concerned and the circumstances surrounding the dispute, including any previous business practices between the parties.
(3) The conciliator may conduct the conciliation proceedings in such a manner as he considers appropriate, taking into account the circumstances of the case, the wishes the parties may express, including any request by a party that the conciliator hear oral statements, and the need for a speedy settlement of the dispute.
(4) The conciliator may, at any stage of the conciliation proceedings, make proposals for a settlement of the 16 Section 7 defines an arbitration agreement and sets out the mandatory requirements of an arbitration agreement. The relevant portion is:
“7. Arbitration agreement.— (1) In this Part, “arbitration agreement” means an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.” [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1161M/s Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Maharashtra State Electricity Board, Mumbai & Ors. dispute. Such proposals need not be in writing and need not be accompanied by a statement of the reasons therefor.”
15. Sections 68 to 72 deal with the procedural aspects of conciliation, such as administrative assistance, communication, disclosure of information, cooperation of parties, and submission of suggestions. Section 73 provides for a signed and written settlement agreement, which shall be final and binding on the parties. It reads: “73. Settlement agreement.— (1) When it appears to the conciliator that there exist elements of a settlement which may be acceptable to the parties, he shall formulate the terms of a possible settlement and submit them to the parties for their observations. After receiving the observations of the parties, the conciliator may reformulate the terms of a possible settlement in the light of such observations.
(2) If the parties reach agreement on a settlement of the dispute, they may draw up and sign a written settlement agreement. If requested by the parties, the conciliator may draw up, or assist the parties in drawing up, the settlement agreement.
(3) When the parties sign the settlement agreement, it shall be final and binding on the parties and persons claiming under them respectively.
(4) The conciliator shall authenticate the settlement agreement and furnish a copy thereof to each of the parties.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. Section 74 provides that such settlement agreement shall have the same status and effect as an arbitral award on agreed terms on the substance of the dispute rendered by an arbitral tribunal under Section 30 of the ACA.
17. Finally, Section 76 provides for termination of the conciliation proceedings in various circumstances: (i) signing of the settlement agreement by the parties, (ii) written declaration by the conciliator that 1162 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports efforts at conciliation are no longer justified, (iii) written declaration of the parties to the conciliator that conciliation proceedings are terminated, or (iv) written declaration of a party to the other party and conciliator that conciliation proceedings are terminated. Hence, conciliation is terminated when the parties arrive at and sign the settlement agreement. It can also be terminated at the behest of the conciliator or one or both parties, when there is no settlement, by way of a written declaration. Section 76 of the ACA reads: “76. Termination of conciliation proceedings.— The conciliation proceedings shall be terminated—
(a) by the signing of the settlement agreement by the parties, on the date of the agreement; or
(b) by a written declaration of the conciliator, after consultation with the parties, to the effect that further efforts at conciliation are no longer justified, on the date of the declaration; or
(c) by a written declaration of the parties addressed to the conciliator to the effect that the conciliation proceedings are terminated, on the date of the declaration; or
(d) by a written declaration of a party to the other party and the conciliator, if appointed, to the effect that the conciliation proceedings are terminated, on the date of the declaration.”
18. Finally, Chapter V of the MSMED Act that deals with delayed payments to Micro and Small Enterprises is relevant for our purpose. Section 15 imposes obligations on the buyer 17 in respect of timelines for payment to the supplier 18 as follows- on or before the date agreed 17 Buyer is defined under Section 2(d) of the MSMED Act as: “2. Definitions.— In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— ***
(d) “buyer” means whoever buys any goods or receives any services from a supplier for consideration;” 18 Supplier is defined under Section 2(n) of the MSMED Act as: “2. Definitions.— In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— ***
(n) “supplier” means a micro or small enterprise, which has filed a memorandum with the authority referred to in sub-section (1) of section 8, and includes,—
(i) the National Small Industries Corporation, being a company, registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956);
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1163M/s Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Maharashtra State Electricity Board, Mumbai & Ors. upon between the parties in writing, provided that the same does not exceed 45 days from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance 19 , or where there is no agreement in this behalf, before the “appointed day” 20 . Section 15 of the MSMED Act reads: “15. Liability of buyer to make payment.— Where any supplier, supplies any goods or renders any services to any buyer, the buyer shall make payment therefor on or before the date agreed upon between him and the supplier in writing or, where there is no agreement in this behalf, before the appointed day:
Provided that in no case the period agreed upon between the supplier and the buyer in writing shall exceed forty-five days from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance.”
19. Section 16 of the MSMED Act provides that when the buyer fails to make the payment as required under Section 15, he shall be liable to pay compound interest with monthly rests for the period stipulated therein, at 3 times the bank rate notified by the Reserve Bank. The rate of interest prescribed under Section 16 shall override any agreement with the supplier in this behalf and any other law in force for the time being. Section 16 of the MSMED Act reads:
(ii) the Small Industries Development Corporation of a State or a Union territory, by whatever name called, being a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956);
(iii) any company, co-operative society, trust or a body, by whatever name called, registered or constituted under any law for the time being in force and engaged in selling goods produced by micro or small enterprises and rendering services which are provided by such enterprises;” 19 See Section 2(b) of the MSMED Act.
20 Appointed day is defined under Section 2(b) of the MSMED Act as: “2. Definitions.— In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— ***
(b) “appointed day” means the day following immediately after the expiry of the period of fifteen days from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance of any goods or any services by a buyer from a supplier.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause,—
(i) “the day of acceptance” means,—
(a) the day of the actual delivery of goods or the rendering of services; or
(b) where any objection is made in writing by the buyer regarding acceptance of goods or services within fifteen days from the day of the delivery of goods or the rendering of services, the day on which such objection is removed by the supplier;
Continue reading
Sign in and become a member to continue reading this judgment and every other document in the library.
Members read the full text, download where permitted, and keep notes and bookmarks.