The Correspondence, Rbanms Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar & Another
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 490; [2025] 5 S.C.R. 94
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R Mahadevan
- Decided
- 15 Apr 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 5200/2025
- Sections
- 54, 269ST, 271, 52, 53, 41, 3, 91, 40, 5, 17, 7
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[2025] 5 S.C.R. 94 : 2025 INSC 490 The Correspondence, RBANMS Educational Institution v.
B. Gunashekar & Another (Civil Appeal No. 5200 of 2025)
16 April 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose as regards the correctness of the order passed by the High Court and the trial court rejecting the application filed by the appellant u/Ord.VII r.11(a) and (d) CPC for the rejection of plaint. Headnotes† Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Ord.VII r.11 – Rejection of plaint – Appellant Institute in possession of suit property since 1905 – Respondents filed suit seeking permanent injunction restraining appellant from creating any third-party interest over the property based on an alleged agreement to sell executed by respondents with a third party – Respondents paid Rs.75,00,000/- in cash as advance – Appellant filed application u/Ord.VII r.11 seeking rejection of plaint – Both the trial court and the High Court rejected the same – Correctness:
Held: Agreement for sale does not confer any right to the purchaser to file a suit against a third party who is either the owner or in possession, or who claims to be the owner and to be in possession – Respondents’ claim suffered from multiple fatal defects – No privity between the respondents and the appellant – Suit at the instance of the respondents not maintainable and only the vendors could have approached the court for a relief of declaration – Respondents had no legal right that could be enforced against the appellant as their claim impliedly barred by virtue of s.54 of TPA – Respondents not in possession and the appellant in settled possession for over a century, suit for bare injunction by proposed transferee not maintainable – Respondents, being mere agreement holders, had no personal interest in the suit schedule property that could be enforced against third parties – No declaratory relief was sought – Respondents sought only relief of permanent injunction restraining * Author [2025] 5 S.C.R. 95The Correspondence, RBANMS E ducational Institution v. B . G unashekar & Another the appellant from alienating the property, without a declaration affirming the title of their vendors – Without possession and without seeking a declaration of title, not only the suit is barred but the cause of action also fictitious – High Court without noticing the said defects in the plaint, dismissed the application filed by the appellant – When the defects go to the root of the case, barred by law with fictitious allegations and are incurable, no amount of evidence can salvage plaintiffs’ case – Furthermore, public interest implications of the instant case are significant consideration – Such institutions must be protected from speculative litigation that can drain their resources and impede their charitable work – Allowing suits like the instant one to proceed to trial, would waste judicial time and resources, and encourage similar speculative and extortionate litigations – Respondents having paid Rs.75,00,000/- by cash, despite the introduction of s.269ST IT Act and the amendment to s.271 DA, not only creates suspicion on the transaction, but also displays violation of law – Ignorance in fact is excusable but not the ignorance in law – Thus, the plaint ought to have been rejected u/Ord. VII r.11(a) and (d) – Orders passed by the High Court as well as trial court rejecting the application filed by the appellant, cannot be sustained in law and is set aside – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – s.52, 53-A, 54. [Paras 15.1-20] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Ord.VII r.11 – Rejection of plaint – Scope:
Held: Ord. VII r.11 serves as a crucial filter in civil litigation, enabling courts to terminate proceedings at the threshold where the plaintiff’s case, even if accepted in its entirety, fails to disclose any cause of action or is barred by law, either express or by implication – There is a bounden duty on the Court to discern and identify fictitious suit, which on the face of it would be barred, but for the clever pleadings disclosing a cause of action, that is surreal – Generally, sub-clauses (a) and (d) are stand alone grounds, that can be raised by the defendant in a suit – However, it cannot be ruled out that under certain circumstances, clauses
(a) and (d) can be mutually inclusive – When clever drafting veils the implied bar to disclose the cause of action; it then becomes the duty of the Court to lift the veil and expose the bar to reject the suit at the threshold – Power to reject a plaint under this provision is not merely procedural but substantive, aimed at preventing abuse of the judicial process and ensuring that court 96 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports time is not wasted on fictitious claims failing to disclose any cause of action to sustain the suit or barred by law – Merely including a paragraph on cause of action not sufficient but rather, on a meaningful reading of the plaint and the documents, it must disclose cause of action – Plaint should contain such cause of action that discloses all necessary facts required in law to sustain the suit and not mere statements of fact which fail to disclose a legal right of the plaintiff to sue and breach or violation by the defendant(s). [Paras 14-15] Constitution of India – Art. 141 – Applicability of the ratio laid down by this Court, irrespective of the stage at which it is relied upon:
Held: Ratio laid down by this court, is applicable irrespective of the stage at which it is relied upon – Ratio is relevant and not the stage – Once a ratio is laid down, the courts have to apply the ratio, considering the facts of the case and once, found to be applicable, irrespective of the stage, the same has to be applied, to throw out frivolous suits. [Para 15.2.3] Income Tax Act, 1961 – s.269ST – Penalty on cash receipt of more than 2 lakh – Purpose and application of s.269ST – Issuance of directions by the Supreme Court:
Held: s.269ST was introduced to curb black money by digitalising the transactions above Rs.2,00,000/- – Most times, such transactions go unnoticed or not brought to the knowledge of the income tax authorities – Ignorance in fact is excusable but not the ignorance in law – Thus, issuance of directions that whenever suit filed with claim that Rs. 2,00,000/- and above is paid by cash towards any transaction, the courts must intimate the same to the jurisdictional Income Tax Department to verify the transaction and the violation of s.269ST, if any’ – Income Tax authority to take appropriate steps if such cases come to their notice – Whenever, a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- and above is claimed to be paid by cash towards consideration for conveyance of any immovable property in a document presented for registration, the jurisdictional Sub- Registrar to intimate the same to the jurisdictional Income Tax Authority – Whenever, it comes to the knowledge of any Income Tax Authority that a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- or above has been paid by way of consideration in any transaction relating to any immovable property from any other source or during the course of search or [2025] 5 S.C.R. 97The Correspondence, RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar & Another assessment proceedings, the failure of the registering authority to be brought to the knowledge of the Chief Secretary of the State/ UT for initiating appropriate disciplinary action against such officer who failed to intimate the transactions. [Para 18.1] Case Law Cited Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra Dead throught LRs. & Anr. [2004] Supp. 3 SCR 817 : (2004) 8 SCC 614; Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Another [2011] 11 SCR 848 : (2012) 1 SCC 656; K. Basavarajappa v. Tax Recovery Commissioner, Bangalore & Others [1996] Supp. 7 SCR 523 : (1996) 11 SCC 632; Jharkhand State Housing Board v. Didar Singh & Another (2019) 17 SCC 692; Premji Ratansey Shah & Others v. Union of India & Others [1994] Supp. 2 SCR 117 : (1994) 5 SCC 547; T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal & Another [1978] 1 SCR 742 : (1977) 4 SCC 467; P.V. Guru Raj Reddy v. P. Neeradha Reddy & Others [2015] 1 SCR 1108 : (2015) 8 SCC 331; Soumitra Kumar Sen v. Shyamal Kumar Sen & Others (2018) 5 SCC 644; Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) dead through legal representatives [2020] 5 SCR 694 : (2020) 7 SCC 366; Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India & Another [2006] Supp. 3 SCR 803 : (2006) 6 SCC 207; Cosmos Co. Operative Bank Ltd v. Central Bank of India & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 352; Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs and others [2008] 5 SCR 331 : AIR 2008 SC 2033 – referred to.
List of Acts Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Specific Relief Act, 1963; Income Tax Act, 1961; Contract Act, 1872; Registration Act, 1908. List of Keywords Agreement to sell immovable property; Consideration in cash; Rejection of plaint; Suspicious circumstances surrounding the agreement; Title; Fictitious suit; Abuse of judicial process; Privity between parties; Relief of declaration; Vendors not parties to suit; Personal interest; Right to sue; Incurable defects in case; Fictitious cause of action; Public interest implications; Impeding charitable work; Curbing black money; Digital economy; Budget speech 2017; Dark economy; Finance Bill 2017; Cap on cash transactions; Ignorance in law.
98 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5200 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 02.06.2022 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRP No. 130 of 2021 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Ms. Asmita Singh, Tushar Nair.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Abraham Mathews, S Shivaprasad, Nishe Rajen Shonker.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment R. Mahadevan, J.
Leave granted.
2. The present appeal challenges the order dated 02.06.2022 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru 1 in Civil Revision Petition No.130 of 2021, whereby the High Court dismissed the revision petition filed by the appellant against the order of the trial Court dated 11.06.2021 rejecting their application filed under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 2 for rejection of the plaint.
3. On 12.08.2022, when the matter was taken up for consideration, this Court has passed the following order:
“Issue notice, returnable in six weeks.
There will be stay of the operation of proceedings in OS No.25968 of 2018 pending before the Court of XIII Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge, MayoHall Unit, Bengaluru (CCH-22) till the next date of hearing.”
1 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
2 For short, “CPC”
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 99The Correspondence, RBANMS E ducational Institution v. B . G unashekar & Another
3.1. On 22.11.2024, the aforesaid interim order was extended by this Court and is in force till date.
BRIEF FACTS
4. The appellant viz., R.B.A.N.M.S. Educational Institution, was established in the year 1873 as a public charitable trust, dedicated to serving firstgeneration learners from marginalized communities in urban Bangalore. In 1905, a significant parcel of land, then known as ‘the Sappers Practice Ground,’ was leased to the appellant. Subsequently, in 1929, this property was formally conveyed to the appellant by the Municipal Commissioner of Civil and Military Station of Bangalore. Since then, the appellant has been in continuous possession of the said property, utilizing it for various educational purposes including Pre-University Colleges, first-grade degree colleges, and sporting facilities serving both their institutions and the youth of Bangalore.
5. The respondents filed a suit bearing O.S.No.25968 of 2018 against the appellant, before the City Civil Court and Sessions Judge at Bangalore, seeking permanent injunction restraining the appellant from creating any third-party interest over the suit schedule property, based on an alleged agreement to sell executed by the respondents and Ramesh S. Reddy with one Maheshwari Ranganathan and others, in respect of the suit schedule property, on 10th April, 2018 for a sale consideration of Rs.9,00,00,000/-, for which, they claim to have paid Rs.75,00,000/as an advance payment. It was alleged in the plaint that the appellant was trying to manipulate the title deeds of the suit schedule property with an intention to alienate or dispose of the same to third parties.
6. After service of summons, the appellant filed an application bearing I.A. No. 3 of 2018 under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) CPC, seeking rejection of the plaint, inter alia stating that the respondents are only agreement holders and not owners of the suit schedule property and that, mere execution of an agreement to sell does not create or confer any right or interest in the property in favour of the proposed purchasers.
7. The respondents filed their objections to the aforesaid application filed by the appellant.
8. Upon hearing both sides, the trial Court rejected the aforesaid application seeking rejection of the plaint on 03.06.2020. Challenging 100 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the same, the appellant preferred C.R.P. No. 205 of 2020, which was allowed in part, by the High Court vide order dated 19.11.2020. The operative portion of the order reads as under:
“The petition is allowed in part. The impugned order dated 3.6.2020 in O.S.No.25968/2018 on the XIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Mayohall Unit, Bengaluru is set aside. The petitioner’s application filed under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of Code of Civil Procedure is restored for reconsideration calling upon the Civil Court to decide on merits of the application in accordance with law in the light of the grounds urged in an expedited manner but within an outer limit of three months from the date of first hearing after this order.”
9. Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the trial Court reconsidered the application filed under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) CPC and ultimately, rejected the same, on 11.06.2021. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant preferred Civil Revision Petition No. 130 of 2021 before the High Court and the same also ended in dismissal by the order impugned herein. Therefore, the appellant is before us with the present appeal.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
10. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the alleged agreement to sell, which forms the fundamental basis of the suit, cannot create any interest in the suit schedule property as per Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. In this regard, the learned counsel relied on the judgment in Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra Dead throught LRs. & Anr.,3 wherein, this Court held that a mere agreement to sell does not create any interest in the property. This position was further reinforced in the judgment in Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Another 4, which reiterated that a contract for sale merely confers a limited right under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The learned counsel also highlighted the practical application of this principle in K. Basavarajappa v. Tax Recovery Commissioner,
3 (2004) 8 SCC 614
4 (2012) 1 SCC 656
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 101The Correspondence, RBANMS E ducational Institution v. B . G unashekar & Another Bangalore & Others, 5 in which, it was held by this Court that a proposed vendee with an agreement to sell lacks locus standi to challenge third-party rights.
10.1. The learned counsel emphasized the suspicious circumstances surrounding the alleged agreement to sell i.e., the purported vendors have not been made parties to the suit, their addresses were conspicuously absent in the plaint, and the entire advance payment of Rs.75 lakhs was claimed to have been made in cash without any documentary proof. Additionally, the learned counsel invited our attention to the respondents’ pattern of filing similar suits in respect of the other valuable properties in Bangalore, suggesting a systematic attempt at land grabbing through dubious agreements to sell.
10.2. The learned counsel further pointed out impropriety of maintaining a pure injunction suit where title itself is in dispute. Citing the decision of this court in Jharkhand State Housing Board v. Didar Singh & Another,6 the learned counsel contended that when there is a cloud over title, a suit merely for injunction without seeking declaration of title is not maintainable. Referring to the decision in Premji Ratansey Shah & Others v. Union of India & Others,7 the learned counsel contended that Section 41(h) and (j) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, bars grant of injunction when equally efficacious relief is available through other means and when the plaintiffs have no personal interest in the property. Ultimately, the learned counsel submitted that applying the ratio laid down in the decision in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal & Another 8 to the facts of the present case, the plaint is barred by law and does not disclose a right to sue against the appellant herein on the basis of an agreement to sell executed by the respondents, with third parties.
10.3. With these submissions and case laws, the learned counsel prayed that this appeal will have to be allowed and the suit filed by the respondents deserves to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
5 (1996) 11 SCC 632
6 (2019) 17 SCC 692
7 (1994) 5 SCC 547
8 (1977) 4 SCC 467
102 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
11. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that at the stage of considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the court must confine itself to the averments in the plaint without examining the defense or other external materials. Placing reliance on the decisions in P.V. Guru Raj Reddy v. P. Neeradha Reddy & Others9 and Soumitra Kumar Sen v. Shyamal Kumar Sen & Others, 10 the learned counsel proceeded to argue that the plaint’s averments must be accepted as true at this stage, and the defendant’s objections are immaterial.
11.1. According to the learned counsel, the suit was filed to protect the respondents’ legitimate interests over the property in question under the agreement to sell, apprehending alienation of the property by third parties. Further, the learned counsel distinguished the decisions cited by the appellant, particularly that in Rambhau Namdeo Gajre (supra) and contended that it was decided after full trial and examination of evidence, unlike the present case where the cause of action stems from the agreement itself. The learned counsel also sought to differentiate the decision in T. Arivandandam (supra) noting that unlike that case which involved vexatious litigation following lost eviction proceedings, the present matter involved genuine rights under a registered agreement to sell. The learned counsel further submitted that rejection of plaint is a drastic remedy that should be exercised sparingly, only when the plaint is manifestly vexatious and meritless; and that, the proper course would be for the appellant to file a written statement and contest the suit on merits, rather than seeking rejection of the plaint at the threshold.
11.2. It is further submitted that both the Courts below have examined the plaint in the light of Order VII Rule 11 (a) CPC to ascertain that it does indeed make out a valid cause of action, i.e., that the Respondents have acquired an interest in the property by virtue of the agreement to sell dated 10.04.2018 and hence, if the claim of the appellant is that they hold a valid title to the property, it is for them to prove the same during trial.
9 (2015) 8 SCC 331
10 (2018) 5 SCC 644
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 103The Correspondence, RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar & Another
11.3. The learned counsel also submitted that the appellant is misguided in asserting that the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 act as a bar against parties or interlopers who are not party to the transaction envisaged in that section. That apart, the decision in K. Basavarajappa (supra) does not apply to the facts of the present case, for that the same was about whether an agreement to sell will stand in the way of the property being sold under auction for tax recovery purposes and the same cannot and should not be used as a device to defeat the suit at the threshold.
11.4. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the impugned order of the High Court does not require any interference at the hands of this court.
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
12. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for both sides and perused the materials available record.
13. Seemingly, the appellant institution’s journey began nearly 150 years ago, and its possession of the disputed property dates back to 1905, when it was initially leased and subsequently conveyed by the Commissioner of Civil and Military Station of Bangalore. The present dispute arose when the respondents filed a suit in O.S. No. 25968 of 2018 seeking permanent injunction against the appellant. The respondents’ claim rests entirely on an agreement to sell dated 10.04.2018, purportedly executed by certain individuals who, notably, are not parties to the suit. The appellant, confronted with this litigation, filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) CPC seeking rejection of the plaint. Both the trial court and the High Court rejected the said application filed by the appellant. Hence, this appeal came to be filed by the appellant before us.
14. Let us first examine the scope and purpose of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 11 This Court in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali 11 “11. Rejection of plaint.– The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases–
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed in undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
104 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports (Gajra) dead through legal representatives12 , explained in detail the applicable law for deciding the application for rejection of the plaint. The relevant paragraphs of the said decision are reproduced below: “23.1 …
23.2. The remedy under Order VII Rule 11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the Court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision.
23.3. The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d), the Court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted.
23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi 13 this Court held that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the court, in the following words : (SCC p.324, para 12)
“12. …The whole purpose of conferment of such power is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the Court, and exercise the mind
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9: Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevent by any cause of exceptional nature for correction the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.” 12 (2020) 7 SCC 366 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 562 13 1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC OnLine Guj 281 : (1998) 2 GLH 823 [2025] 5 S.C.R. 105The Correspondence, RBANMS E ducational Institution v. B . G unashekar & Another of the respondent. The sword of Damocles need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or purpose. Even in an ordinary civil litigation, the Court readily exercises the power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action.”
23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order VII Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to.
23.6. Under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on the Court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint 14 read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law.
23.7. Order VII Rule 14(1) provides for production of documents, on which the plaintiff places reliance in his suit, which reads as under:
“14. Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies.– (1)Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint.
(2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is.
(3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit. 14 Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. V. M.V. Sea Success I (2004) 9 SCC 512 106 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced for the cross examination of the plaintiff’s witnesses, or, handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.”
(emphasis supplied)
23.8. Having regard to Order VII Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed alongwith the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11(a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint.
23.9. In exercise of power under this provision, the Court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out.
23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration 15 .
23.11. The test for exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V.Sea Success I which reads as : (SCC p.562, para 139)
“139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed.”
15 Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr. (2004) 3 SCC 137 [2025] 5 S.C.R. 107The Correspondence, RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar & Another
23.12. In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. 16 the Court further held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact. D.Ramachandran v. R.V.Janakiraman 17 .
23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11
CPC.
23.14. The power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial, as held by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra 18 . The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain (supra).
23.15. The provision of Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states that the plaint “shall” be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clause (a) to (e) are made out. If the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the Court has no option, but to reject the plaint.
24. “Cause of action” means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment. It consists of a bundle of material facts, which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in the suit.
16 (2007) 5 SCC 614
17 (1999) 3 SCC 267
18 (2003) 1 SCC 557
108 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
24.1. In Swamy Atmanand v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam19 this Court held:
“24. A cause of action, thus, means every fact, which if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove an order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act, no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded”
(emphasis supplied)
24.2. In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal 20 this Court held that while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC what is required to be decided is whether the plaint discloses a real cause of action, or something purely illusory, in the following words: (SCC p. 470, para 5) “5. …The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful – not formal – reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing …” (emphasis supplied)
24.3. Subsequently, in I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal 21 this Court held that law cannot permit clever drafting which creates illusions of a cause of action. What is required is that a clear right must be made out in the plaint.
19 (2005) 10 SCC 51
20 (1977) 4 SCC 467
21 (1998) 2 SCC 170
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 109The Correspondence, RBANMS E ducational Institution v. B . G unashekar & Another
24.4. If, however, by clever drafting of the plaint, it has created the illusion of a cause of action, this Court in Madanuri Sri Ramachandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal22 held that it should be nipped in the bud, so that bogus litigation will end at the earliest stage. The Court must be vigilant against any camouflage or suppression, and determine whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the court.
…..
28. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh 23 held that the Court must examine the plaint and determine when the right to sue first accrued to the plaintiff, and whether on the assumed facts, the plaint is within time. The words “right to sue” means the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. The right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises. The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the suit is infringed, or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe such right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. Order VII Rule 11(d) provides that where a suit appears from the averments in the plaint to be barred by any law, the plaint shall be rejected.”
14.1. Thus, it is clear that the above provision viz., Order VII Rule 11 CPC serves as a crucial filter in civil litigation, enabling courts to terminate proceedings at the threshold where the plaintiff’s case, even if accepted in its entirety, fails to disclose any cause of action or is barred by law, either express or by implication. The scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC and the authority of the courts is well settled in law. There is a bounden duty on the Court to discern and identify fictitious suit, which on the face of it would be barred, but for the clever pleadings disclosing a cause of action, that is surreal. Generally, sub-clauses (a) and (d) are stand alone grounds, that can be raised by the defendant in a suit. However, it cannot be ruled out that under certain circumstances, clauses (a) and (d) can be mutually
22 (2017) 13 SCC 174
23 (1991) 4 SCC 1 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 1082
110 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports inclusive. For instances, when clever drafting veils the implied bar to disclose the cause of action; it then becomes the duty of the Court to lift the veil and expose the bar to reject the suit at the threshold. The power to reject a plaint under this provision is not merely procedural but substantive, aimed at preventing abuse of the judicial process and ensuring that court time is not wasted on fictitious claims failing to disclose any cause of action to sustain the suit or barred by law. Therefore, the appeal before us requires careful consideration of the scope of rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, particularly, in the context of the suit filed based on an agreement to sell against third parties in possession.
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