M/S Ferro Concrete Construction (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. The State of Rajasthan
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 429; [2025] 4 S.C.R. 529
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, Justice Joymalya Bagchi
- Decided
- 1 Apr 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 4723/2025
- Sections
- 31(7), 3, 29, 34
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[2025] 4 S.C.R. 529 : 2025 INSC 429 M/s Ferro Concrete Construction (India) Pvt. Ltd.
v.
The State of Rajasthan (Civil Appeal No. 4723 of 2025)
02 April 2025 [Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha* and Joymalya Bagchi, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the contractual clause that bars the appellant/contractor from claiming any interest on any payment, arrears or balance due to it amounts to an express bar on the arbitrator’s power to grant pendente lite interest as per the law under the Arbitration Act, 1940. Headnotes† Arbitration Act, 1940 – Appellant was awarded a works contract by the respondent – A Clause 22 of the agreement barred the appellant from claiming interest on any payment or arrears or balance due to him – Disputes arose between the parties – Arbitration invoked – Arbitral award came out in favour of appellant – Arbitrator granted 15% pendente lite interest – However, the District Judge granted 9% simple interest on the Principal sum – Same was upheld by the High Court – Correctness:
Held: Both the decisions in Reliance Cellulose and the First Ambica case emphasise the need for an express contractual bar on the payment of pendente lite interest to create a bar on the arbitrator from awarding interest – They also emphasise that a bar on the arbitrator’s power would depend on the phraseology of the contractual clause in that case – In the instant case, the Clause 22 prohibits the appellant (contractor) from claiming interest on any payment, arrears or balance, which may be found due to him at any time – Applying the above-stated law, this Court finds that this clause does not expressly bar the award of pendente lite interest in the event of disputes, differences, or misunderstandings between the parties, or on delayed payment, or in any other respect whatsoever – Under the 1940 Act, this Court has not readily inferred a bar on the arbitrator from clauses that merely bar the * Author 530 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports contractor from claiming interest, and the same will apply to this case as well – In view thereof, the judgment of the High Court is set aside – However, considering that the arbitrator entered reference in 1991 and the award was made in 1995, along with the passage of time in litigation as well as the amounts already paid by the respondent including post-award interest @ 9%, this Court deems it appropriate to grant 9% pendente lite interest, instead of 15% as granted by the arbitral tribunal, from 18.12.1991 till 07.03.1995 (date of the arbitral award). [Paras 14, 15, 16] Arbitration Act, 1940 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Position of law on the grant of interest – Discussed.
Case Law Cited Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa v. G.C. Roy [1991] Supp. 3 SCR 417 : (1992) 1 SCC 508; Executive Engineer, Dhenkanal Minor Irrigation Division v. N.C. Budharaj [2001] 1 SCR 264 : (2001) 2 SCC 721 – followed.
Reliance Cellulose Products Ltd v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited [2018] 6 SCR 618 : (2018) 9 SCC 266; Union of India v. Ambica Construction [2016] 2 SCR 810 : (2016) 6 SCC 36 – relied on.
Pam Developments Private Limited v. State of West Bengal [2024] 8 SCR 615 : (2024) 10 SCC 715; M.B. Patel & Co. v. ONGC [2008] 8 SCR 35 : (2008) 8 SCC 251; Union of India v. Krafters Engg. & Leasing (P) Ltd. [2011] 8 SCR 196 : (2011) 7 SCC 279; Board of Trustees For The Port of Calcutta v. Engineers-De-Space-Age [1995] Supp. 6 SCR 327 : (1996) 1 SCC 516; Sayeed Ahmed & Co. v. State of U.P. [2009] 10 SCR 841 : (2009) 12 SCC 26; Sree Kamatchi Amman Constructions v. Railways [2010] 10 SCR 487 : (2010) 8 SCC 767; Union of India v. Bright Power Projects (India) (P) Ltd. [2015] 6 SCR 488 : (2015) 9 SCC 695; Chittaranjan Maity v. Union of India [2017] 11 SCR 722 : (2017) 9 SCC 611; Garg Builders v. BHEL (2022) 11 SCC 697; Madnani Construction Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [2009] 16 SCR 216 : (2010) 1 SCC 549; Tehri Hydro Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Jai Prakash Associates Ltd. [2012] 8 SCR 813 : (2012) 12 SCC 10 – referred to. List of Acts Arbitration Act, 1940; Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. [2025] 4 S.C.R. 531M/s Ferro Concrete Construction (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. The State of Rajasthan List of Keywords Grant of interest under Arbitration Act, 1940; Contractual clauses; Payment of interest; Pendente lite interest on arbitral sum; Phraseology of the agreement; Clauses conferring powers relating to arbitration; Power to award interest; Express contractual bar on payment of pendente lite interest.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4723 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 06.01.2023 of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur in SBCMA No. 3175 of 2006 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Vinayak Mehrotra, Ms. Sonali Jain, Ms. Nandini.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Ms. Sansriti Pathak, AAG, Aman Prasad, Milind Kumar.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. It is just as necessary to follow a precedent as it is to make a precedent.
3. The short issue arising for consideration in this appeal is whether the contractual clause that bars the appellant/contractor from claiming any interest on any payment, arrears or balance due to it amounts to an express bar on the arbitrator’s power to grant pendente lite interest as per the law under the Arbitration Act, 1940 1 . While the arbitrator granted 15% pendente lite interest, the same was set aside by the District Judge while deciding objections against the award, and upheld by the High Court by order dated 06.01.2023, which is impugned 1 Hereinafter “1940 Act”.
532 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports herein. By relying on settled case-law on the grant of interest under the 1940 Act and the interpretation of contractual clauses barring payment of interest, we have allowed the present appeal and have directed payment of pendente lite interest on the arbitral sum.
4. The relevant facts are that the appellant was awarded a works contract by the respondent, and they entered into an agreement dated 06.02.1988 that contains the following clause barring the appellant from claiming interest on any payment or arrears or balance due to him at any time:
“22. Payments :-
(i) Payments will be made to the contractor within one month of the issuing of the corresponding bills. The contractor shall comply with the procedure that may be prescribed for all operations from the recording of progress measurements upto payment of bills.
(ii) All materials and work for which payment is made in part or full shall become the sole property of the Govt, but this provision shall not relieve the contractor of his responsibility for the care and protection of the materials and works at his own cost nor his liability to make good the damage if any unless and until the whole work has been deemed to have been completed and handed over to the Government.
The contractor shall not be entitled to claim any interest upon any payment, any arrears or upon any balance, which may be found due to him at any time.”
(emphasis supplied)
5. When disputes arose under the contract, the appellant invoked arbitration and filed its claim, resulting in arbitral award dated 07.03.1995 for a sum of Rs. 1,78,17,146 in its favour. The arbitrator also directed payment of 15% interest p.a. on all dues payable from 18.12.1991 (when the arbitrator entered reference) till payment or the date of decree, whichever is earlier. The respondent filed an application to set aside the award, which was decided by the District Judge’s order dated 16.08.2005 that only set aside the interest awarded by the arbitrator, and instead granted 9% simple interest [2025] 4 S.C.R. 533M/s Ferro Concrete Construction (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. The State of Rajasthan on the principal sum from that date till the date of payment. The other objections against the award were rejected and the rest of the award was upheld. It was held that the arbitrator did not consider that Clause 22 of the contract is widely worded and prohibits the appellant from claiming interest at any time. Both parties preferred appeals against this order, which were dismissed by the High Court by order dated 06.01.2023, impugned herein.
6. While issuing notice on 24.04.2023 in the present special leave petition converted to a civil appeal, this Court passed the following order: “1. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner relies upon paragraph 24 of the decision of this Court in Reliance Cellulose Products Ltd Vs Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited.2 He urges that Clause 22 of the agreement does not specifically exclude either the power of the arbitrator to grant pendente lite interest or rule out the claimant from claiming interest pendente lite in the course of arbitration.
2. Issue notice returnable in four weeks.”
7. We have heard Mr. Vinayak Mehrotra, learned counsel for the appellant, and Ms. Sansriti Pathak, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent State on the issue of whether Clause 22 amounts to a bar on the arbitrator from awarding pendente lite interest under the 1940 Act.
7.1 Mr. Mehrotra submits that the present issue is covered by this Court’s decision in Reliance Cellulose (supra). He submits that the contractual clause in the present case does not clearly and expressly bar the arbitrator from awarding interest on the arbitral sum. He has also referred to this Court’s decision in Pam Developments Private Limited v. State of West Bengal3 in support of his argument.
7.2 On the other hand, Ms. Pathak has made detailed submissions regarding the interpretation of the contractual clause, which are as follows: First, the interpretation of an ouster clause is the
2 (2018) 9 SCC 266.
3 (2024) 10 SCC 715, para 23.
534 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports same under the 1940 Act and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19964 . Under both statutes, the arbitrator can award interest unless the agreement provides otherwise. The key difference between the statutes is that the 1996 Act contains an express statutory provision for the grant of interest in Section 31(7), but this is based on the principle in G.C. Roy 5 that recognised the arbitrator’s power to award interest under the 1940 Act. Further, that Section 31(7)(a) of the 1996 Act does not differentiate prereference and pendente lite interest. However, these differences do not have any bearing on the interpretation of contractual clauses. Second, by referring to various decisions of this Court, she submits that narrower contractual clauses have been treated as ouster clauses that bar the arbitrator from awarding pendente-lite interest. 6 Third, she submits that paragraph 24 of Reliance Cellulose (supra), which is relied on by the appellant, is based on this Court’s decision in Board of Trustees For The Port of Calcutta v. Engineers-De-Space-Age,7 which has been doubted in several cases. A 3-judge bench of this Court in Union of India v. Ambica Construction8 (First Ambica case) held that the observations in Engineers-De-Space-Age (supra) cannot be considered as general observations and each contractual clause barring payment of interest must be interpreted by the words used therein. Fourth, in the facts of the present case, the respondent has already paid a sum of Rs. 4.65 crores to the appellant, of which Rs. 2.83 crores is the interest component. Hence, a further award of pendente lite interest is not warranted in the present case.
8. The position of law on the grant of interest under the 1940 Act and the 1996 Act is well-settled. The constitution bench decisions of this Court in GC Roy (supra) and NC Budharaj 9 recognised the arbitrator’s power to grant pre-reference, pendente lite, and post-award interest on an arbitral award made under the 1940 Act unless there is a 4 Hereinafter “1996 Act”.
5 Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa v. G.C. Roy, (1992) 1 SCC 508. 6 Relied on M.B. Patel & Co. v. ONGC, (2008) 8 SCC 251; Union of India v. Krafters Engg. & Leasing (P) Ltd., (2011) 7 SCC 279 under the 1940 Act.
7 (1996) 1 SCC 516.
8 (2016) 6 SCC 36.
9 Executive Engineer, Dhenkanal Minor Irrigation Division v. N.C. Budharaj, (2001) 2 SCC 721. [2025] 4 S.C.R. 535M/s Ferro Concrete Construction (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. The State of Rajasthan contractual bar. 10 The question that falls for our consideration is whether the contractual bar in the present case prohibits the arbitrator from granting pendente lite interest, which necessarily entails an interpretation of the clause.
9. This Court has, on multiple occasions, noted that a contractual clause which bars the payment of interest is interpreted differently under the 1940 Act and the 1996 Act. In fact, while deciding cases under the 1996 Act, this Court has been slow to rely on the principles laid down under the 1940 Act, considering the legislative incorporation of the arbitrator’s power to grant interest through Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act.11 The difference in the interpretative approach has been expounded by this Court in Reliance Cellulose (supra) as follows: “24. A conspectus of the decisions that have been referred to above would show that under the 1940 Act, an arbitrator has power to grant pre-reference interest under the Interest Act, 1978 as well as pendente lite and future interest. However, he is constricted only by the fact that an agreement between the parties may contain an express bar to the award of pre-reference and/or pendente lite interest. Since interest is compensatory in nature and is parasitic upon a principal sum not having been paid in time, this Court has frowned upon clauses that bar the payment of interest. It has therefore evolved the test of strict construction of such clauses, and has gone on to state that unless there is a clear and express bar to the payment of interest that can be awarded by an arbitrator, clauses which do not refer to claims before the arbitrators or disputes between parties and clearly bar payment of interest, cannot stand in the way of an arbitrator awarding pre-reference or pendente lite interest. Thus, when one contrasts a clause such as the clause in Second Ambica Construction case with the clause in Tehri Hydro Development Corpn. Ltd., it becomes clear that 10 GC Roy (supra), para 45.
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