Larsen and Toubro Limited v. Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. and Others
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 523; [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2811
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Pankaj Mithal
- Decided
- 21 Apr 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 2575/2016
- Sections
- 34, 37, 73, 28(1), 11, 16, 16(3), 96
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2811 : 2025 INSC 523 Larsen and Toubro Limited v.
Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. and Others (Civil Appeal No(s). 2575-2578 of 2016)
21 April 2025 [Abhay S. Oka* and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.] Issue for Consideration In petition u/s.34, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Single Judge had set aside the Arbitral Award. Division Bench in appeal thereagainst u/s.37, Arbitration Act by way of the impugned judgment, inter alia upheld the dismissal of L&T’s counter-claim and agreed with the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal that the Supplementary Agreement was a non-starter as it was vitiated by economic duress; that the Development Agreement was not novated by the Supplementary Agreement; that L&T committed fundamental breach of the Development Agreement. The operative part of the award fixing the monetary liability of L&T was set aside while leaving open the remedy of PCL for the quantification of the monetary claim. The award regarding costs was confirmed however, the Division Bench did not restore any part of the arbitral award and the parties were left to pursue the appropriate course of action. Issue as regards the correctness of the impugned judgment, challenged by both, L&T and PCL; power of the court u/s.34, Arbitration Act of partly setting aside the award; whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Division Bench modified the Award by partly setting aside the judgment u/s.34. Headnotes† Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – ss.34, 37 – Puri Construction Limited and its sister concerns (‘PCL’) were in possession of certain lands as the owner – PCL had entered into a joint venture with ITC Classic Real Estate Finance Limited (ITCREF) for the development of lands, however, ultimately, ITCREF exited from the business – L&T and PCL entered into an agreement for land development (Development Agreement) – Later, a supplementary agreement was entered into between them on the basis of which a Tripartite Agreement was entered * Author 2812 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports into between PCL, L&T and the Bank – Disputes arose – Arbitral Award was passed holding inter alia that L&T jeopardised PCL’s obligations towards ITCREF; it resiled from and went back upon its original contractual obligations and tried to effect sales without sanction under the revised development plan and without making any provision for the responsibility towards ITCREF; L&T abandoned the Development Agreement; Supplementary Agreement was tainted by economic coercion and the signatures of PCL were obtained by fraud – In petition u/s.34, Single Judge set aside the award – By the impugned judgment, Division Bench disagreed with certain findings of the Single Judge, allowing the appeals preferred by PCL to that extent and the appeal by L&T was dismissed – However, the parties were left to pursue the appropriate course of actions under law – Challenge to, by both PCL and L&T:
Held: 1.1 Powers of the Appellate Court u/s.37 of the Arbitration Act are not broader than those of the Court u/s.34 of the Arbitration Act – Therefore, what cannot be done in the exercise of the powers u/s.34 cannot be done in an Appeal u/s.37 – An Arbitral Award cannot be modified – In the present case, the Division Bench has not modified the award by partly setting aside the Judgment u/s.34 – The remedy of PCL was kept open to pursue appropriate course of action under law as there cannot be a remand to the Arbitral Tribunal for quantification of monetary claim – As the finding of the Arbitral Tribunal regarding breaches committed by L&T was affirmed, the Division Bench rightly segregated that part of the award by which, cost of arbitration was ordered to be paid to PCL by L&T – As documents of title were deposited with the Registrar, the direction to hand over the same to PCL cannot be faulted with. [Para 56] 1.2 In view of the clauses in the Supplementary Agreement, the finding recorded by the Tribunal that, as the conditions precedent in the relevant clauses were not complied with by L&T, the Supplementary Agreement was a non-starter is a possible finding which could not have been interfered with u/s.34 of the Arbitration Act – Moreover, it is a finding of fact. [Para 46] 1.3 Further, after examining the evidence, the Division Bench held that there was no patent illegality in the findings recorded by the Arbitral Tribunal that the Supplementary Agreement and the Tripartite Agreement were tainted by coercion – On facts, such a [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2813Larsen and Toubro Limited v. Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. and Others view by the Arbitral Tribunal is not contrary to justice and morality – View taken by the Division Bench, agreed with. [Para 48] 1.4 The finding recorded by the Tribunal that L&T committed fundamental breaches of the agreement cannot be interfered within the limited jurisdiction u/s.34 of the Arbitration Act. [Para 49] 1.5 Division Bench accepted the correctness of the finding recorded by the Tribunal that there was an abandonment of the project on the part of L&T – It rightly declined to find fault with the findings recorded by the Tribunal on this aspect based on evidence – Such conduct on the part of L&T caused loss to PCL, which ultimately resulted in the termination of the Development Agreement – The issues based on the rejection of the counter-claim of L&T were rightly addressed by the Division Bench on the ground that there were no submissions made on the rejection of the counter claim before the Single Judge in a petition u/s.34 of the Arbitration Act. [Para 50] 1.6 Division Bench dealt with the Tribunal’s direction to L&T to pay Rs. 50 crores to PCL on crystallization of ITCREF’s claims – It held that the type and kind of losses incurred by ITCREF would not be reasonably foreseeable for PCL to be indemnified against – Therefore, the Division Bench rightly observed that while granting a sum of Rs. 50 crores to PCL, the Tribunal went overboard – Said finding of the Division Bench cannot be faulted with. [Para 51] 1.7 As regards the damages of the sum of Rs. 35 crores to be paid by L&T to PCL on account of breach of the Development Agreement, the basis taken by the Tribunal was the figures given by L&T in its counter-claim – Division Bench held that instead of basing the findings on the figures set out by L&T in its counterclaim, the correct approach would have been to determine the prevailing market rate for sale of built-up area at the time of the breach and thereupon determine the proceeds that PCL would have received from the sale of its 25 per cent share under the Development Agreement – Therefore, the award of Rs.35 crores as damages was fundamentally contrary to s.73 of the Contract Act – Such an approach was completely contrary to substantive law in the form of s.73 – This finding cannot be disturbed – As the termination of the Development Agreement is upheld, L&T cannot deal with the property in any manner and PCL can always deal with the same. [Paras 52, 54] Practice and Procedure – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – ss.34, 37 – Limited jurisdiction of Courts in proceedings 2814 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports under – Unnecessary long oral submissions or bulky written submission in arbitration matters, matter of concern – Observation as regards the need for imposing time limit on oral submissions. [Para 58] Case Law Cited Project Director, National Highways No. 45 E and 220, National Highways Authority of India v. M. Hakeem and Another [2021] 5 SCR 368 : (2021) 9 SCC 1 – relied on.
Dyna Technologies Private Limited v. Crompton Greaves Limited [2019] 15 SCR 295 : (2019) 20 SCC 1; Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority [2014] 13 SCR 895 : (2015) 3 SCC 49; S.V. Samudram v. State of Karnataka and Another [2024] 1 SCR 281 : (2024) 3 SCC 623; McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. & Ors. [2006] Supp. 2 SCR 409 : (2006) 11 SCC 181 – referred to.
List of Acts Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Contract Act, 1872; Income Tax Act, 1961.
List of Keywords Power of the court u/s.34, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 of partly setting aside the award; Power of court to modify award u/s.34, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Powers of the Appellate Court u/s.37, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Arbitral Award cannot be modified; Supplementary Agreement; Tripartite Agreement; Development Agreement; Supplementary Agreement was a non-starter; Supplementary Agreement and Tripartite Agreement tainted by coercion; Coercion; Economic duress; Abandonment of the project; Termination of Development Agreement upheld; Rejection of counter claim; Fundamental breach of Development Agreement; Puri Construction Limited (‘PCL’); Larsen and Toubro Limited (‘L&T’); Limited jurisdiction under Section 34, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Limited jurisdiction of Courts under Sections 34 and 37, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Bulky written submissions; Long oral arguments; Lengthy judgments; Time limit on oral submissions; External Development Charges; Non-payment of External Development Charges;
Unilaterally abandoning the project; Development of lands; Novated; Agreement of indemnity; Rejection of counter-claim.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2815Larsen and Toubro Limited v. Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. and Others Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s). 2575-2578 of 2016 From the Judgment and Order dated 30.04.2015 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in FAO No. 194, 21, 22, and 23 of 2009 With Civil Appeal No(s). 2580-2581 and 2579 of 2016 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Akhil Sibal, C. A. Sundaram, Krishnan Venugopal, Sr. Advs., Saheer Parekh, Sumit Goel, Ms. Sreeparna Basak, Ms. Abhishek Thakral, Jayant Bajaj, Ishaan Nagar, Ms. Deboshree Mukherjee, Ms. Aditi Phatak, M/s. Parekh & Co., M. R. Shamshad, Aditya Samaddar, Arijit Sarkar, Ms. Nabeela Jamil, Abhimanyu Bhandari, Ms. Roohe-hina Dua, Zafar Inayat, Ms. Shreya Arora, J. Rajesh, Krishnan Agarwal, Avinash Mathur.
Advs. for the Respondents:
C. A. Sundaram, Akhil Sibal, Sr. Advs., M. R. Shamshad, Aditya Samaddar, Arijit Sarkar, Ms. Nabeela Jamil, Ms. Rohini Musa, Zaffar Inayat, Mohd. Ajmal, Shashank Singh, Saheer Parekh, Sumit Goel, Ms. Sreeparna Basak, Ms. Abhishek Thakral, Jayant Bajaj, Ishaan Nagar, Ms. Deboshree Mukherjee, Ms. Aditi Phatak, M/s. Parekh & Co.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Abhay S. Oka, J.
FACTUAL ASPECTS
1. These appeals arise out of the judgment and order dated 30 th April, 2015, passed by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court on the appeals preferred under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, ‘the Arbitration Act’). The appeals before the Division Bench were preferred against the judgment dated 26 th November, 2008 of the learned Single Judge in a petition under Section 34 of 2816 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the Arbitration Act by which the award of the Arbitral Tribunal was set aside. The Division Bench, by the impugned judgment, has disagreed with some of the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge. To that extent, the appeals preferred by Puri Construction Private Limited and Mohinder Puri have been allowed. The appeal by Larsen and Toubro Limited was dismissed. However, the Division Bench observed that the parties are left to pursue the appropriate course of actions under law.
2. In these appeals, we are concerned with a company, Puri Construction Limited and its sister concerns (collectively referred to as ‘PCL’). We are also concerned with another company, Larsen and Toubro Limited (hereafter referred to as ‘L&T’). PCL was in possession of lands in the Gurgaon District, Haryana, as the owner thereof. PCL had obtained licenses from the Director Town and Country Planning, Haryana (for short, ‘the DTCP’) to develop the lands for residential group housing schemes. Earlier, PCL had entered into a joint venture with ITC Classic Real Estate Finance Limited (for short, ‘ITCREF’) under the name Florentine Estates of India Limited for the development of the lands. Ultimately, ITCREF exited from the business. An Exit Agreement dated 30th July, 1997 was made, which, inter alia, stipulated that PCL would transfer to ITCREF the built-up space of 1,95,000 sq. ft. in the project. Thereafter, L&T was introduced to complete the project.
3. L&T and PCL entered into an agreement for land development (for short ‘the Development Agreement’) on 19 th January, 1998, but the date mentioned therein was 10 th March, 1998. Subsequently, since L&T was of the opinion that there was a recessionary trend in the real estate market due to which the project was required to be down-sized, a supplementary agreement was entered into between L&T and PCL on 30 th December, 1999 (for short ‘the Supplementary Agreement’). Based on the Supplementary Agreement, a Tripartite Agreement dated 10 th January, 2000 (for short, ‘the Tripartite Agreement’) was entered into between PCL, L&T and Lord Krishna Bank (for short ‘the Bank’).
4. Broadly, in the Development Agreement, it was provided as under:
(a) L&T will develop the entire property mentioned in Schedule ‘A’ of the Agreement, including the part allocated to PCL, at its own cost;
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2817Larsen and Toubro Limited v. Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. and Others
(b) In phase-I of development, L&T will develop a portion of Schedule ‘A’ property as described in Schedule ‘B’. An area of 18.025 acres will be developed by L&T within 60 months in phase-I. In phase-II of the development, L&T was to develop the remaining portion as mutually acceptable to the parties in view of the prevailing market conditions;
(c) The ratio of division in the developed property between PCL and L&T was agreed to be 25% and 75% respectively;
(d) ITCREF was to get an area of 2,20,416 sq. ft. from the property allocated to PCL;
(e) PCL agreed to pay all External Development Charges (for short, ‘EDC’) up to the date of the development agreement. The liability to pay EDC was to be of L&T after receiving No Objection Certificate (for short ‘NOC’);
(f) L&T was to complete the construction of Phase-I in 60 months, which was subject to extension in view of prevailing market conditions; and
(g) L&T will not be deemed to be in default if performance of its obligations under the development agreement is delayed, inter alia, due to the prevailing market conditions.
5. The Supplementary Agreement incorporated the following clauses:
(a) The terms of the Development Agreement will continue to bind the parties unless otherwise agreed in the in the Supplementary Agreement, which shall come into effect after happening of the following events:
i. L&T taking over or replacing bank guarantees furnished by PCL to DTCP;
ii. The bank paying EDC amounting to Rs. 6 crores to DTCP; iii. Reimbursement of expenses incurred by PCL by L&T; and iv. Compliance with the terms and conditions of the Tripartite Agreement made by L&T by paying Rs.5.14 crores to the Lord Krishna Bank (“the Bank”).
(b) L&T will furnish bank guarantees to DTCP after approval of the term loan by the bank to PCL;
2818 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(c) L&T will pay the EDC of Rs. 6 crores paid by PCL through the bank and the remaining EDC Charges within 18 months;
(d) L&T agreed to commence construction work for 3.84 lac sq.ft. of the development, subject to achieving a confirmed booking/ selling target of 75% in phase-I area; and
(e) The Agreement would not be construed as a waiver of any right that has accrued for the extension or termination under the Development Agreement.
6. In the Tripartite Agreement, it was provided as under:
(a) The Bank will pay a sum of Rs. 6 crores towards EDC to DTCP on behalf of PCL, which will constitute a term loan to PCL. The loan will be secured by 15 acres of land already mortgaged by PCL to the Bank;
(b) The Bank will issue a bank guarantee of Rs. 4.66 crores to DTCP on behalf of L&T; and
(c) L&T will pay the Bank a sum of Rs. 5.19 crores on behalf of PCL to discharge the loan availed for payment of EDC on or before 19th January, 2000.
7. We may note here that there was an arbitration to which ITCREF and PCL were parties. A consent award was passed on 13 th May, 2000, in favour of ITCREF requiring PCL to allot 1,06,200 sq. ft. to ITCREF.
8. PCL by letter dated 18th December, 2000, terminated the Development Agreement with L&T inter alia, on the grounds of:
(a) Failure to allocate area to ITCREF;
(b) Non-sanctioning of funds towards the development; and
(c) Non-payment of EDC; and
(d) Other breaches in relation of non-commencement of work.
9. Delhi High Court referred the dispute between PCL and L&T to a Sole Arbitrator. Broadly, the following were the prayers made by PCL before the Arbitral Tribunal:
(a) Direct L&T to satisfy the loan availed from the Bank and to obtain the release of the title-deeds in respect of 15 acres of land placed by PCL with the Bank as security;
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2819Larsen and Toubro Limited v. Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. and Others
(b) Direct L&T to return the title-deeds of the rest of the lands to PCL;
(c) Direct L&T to return the sanctioned development plans and other documents, including licences, permits, permissions etc;
(d) Issue a permanent injunction against L&T restraining it from interfering with any of PCL’s rights to develop the property; and
(e) For grant of compensation and damages to the tune of Rs. 300 crores and Rs. 100 crores respectively.
10. L&T filed a counter-claim before the Arbitral Tribunal, making the following prayers:
(a) Declare that PCL has no authority to rescind the contract;
(b) Grant compensation and damages to L&T to the tune of Rs. 280 crores due to the wrongful rescission of the agreement by PCL. Rs. 280 crores were claimed as the reimbursement amount of profit which L&T would have received by developing 75% of the area; and
(c) Grant reimbursement to L&T of Rs. 8,31,53,968/- as the amount spent by it towards fulfilling the obligations under the Development Agreement.
11. The Arbitral Award was made on 28th December, 2002. The Arbitral Tribunal held that:
(a) L&T jeopardised PCL’s obligations towards ITCREF;
(b) L&T resiled from and went back upon its original contractual obligations and tried to effect sales without sanction under the revised development plan and without making any provision for the responsibility towards ITCREF;
(c) L&T had consciously decided to abandon the Development Agreement and omitted to pay EDC and also defaulted in the fulfilment of its obligation to the statutory authorities, ITCREF, as well as the Bank;
(d) The object of the Supplementary Agreement was unlawful as it sought to defeat the beneficial interest of ITCREF, which was a signing party to the Development Agreement; and
(e) The Supplementary Agreement was tainted by economic coercion, and the signatures of PCL were obtained by fraud. 2820 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
12. The operative award is as follows:
“ I. An Award in favour of the Claimants directing the Respondent to pay Rs. 35 Crores to the Claimants on account of damages suffered by the Claimants within four weeks from the date of the award;
II. An Award in favour of the Claimants, directing the Respondent to settle the claim of Lord Krishna Bank within 4 weeks of the Award by repayment of loan of Rs. 6 Crores with such interest that may be due and payable to Lord Krishna Bank and further directing the Respondent to secure the release of title deeds from the said bank and to reimburse the claimant’s interest charges paid by Puri Construction Ltd. to Lord Krishna Bank in interregnum; within a period of four weeks from the date of this award. In default thereof, the Respondent will pay to the Claimants a sum of Rs. 75 Crores for loss of saleable area in respect of 15 acres of land placed in mortgage with the said bank within a period of four weeks from the date of this Award.; III. An Award in favour of the claimants directing the Respondent to return licences permits and permissions obtained by the Claimants from the statutory authorities in respect of the lands covered by the Development Agreement dated 10.3.1998 within 4 weeks of this Award to the Managing Director of Puri Construction Ltd. and obtain a certificate of discharge to that effect granted by the said Puri Construction Ltd. or in lieu thereof the Respondent will pay to the Claimants a sum of Rs. 5 Crores by way of damages within a period of four weeks from the date of this Award;
IV. An Award in favour of the Claimants directing that the Respondent or anybody claiming under the Respondent is permanently injuncted by restraining them from interfering in any way or manner with the rights of the claimants to develop the property covered under the said Agreement dated 10.3.1998;
V. An Award in favour of the Claimants, directing the Respondent to indemnify the Claimants in terms of [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2821Larsen and Toubro Limited v. Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. and Others Clauses 4(b) and 25 of the Development Agreement dated 10.3.1998 for any action or decree or settlement to be enforced by ITCREF against the Claimants or in lieu thereof shall pay to the Claimants a sum of Rs. 50 Crores on such date as such action or decree or settlement to be enforced by ITCREF against the Claimants becomes crystallized;
VI. An Award in favour of the Claimants, directing the Respondent to pay cost of the Arbitration proceedings quantified at Rs. 30 lakhs within a period of four weeks from the date of the Award;
VII. An Award in favour of the Claimants, directing the Respondent to pay interest to the Claimants @ 12% p.a.
on the sums awarded hereinabove commencing on four weeks from the date of this Award till actual payment made by the Respondent.”
13. The learned Single Judge in a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act had set aside the Arbitral Award. The Division Bench by the impugned judgment upheld the dismissal of L&T’s counter-claim. The Division Bench upheld the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal that the Supplementary Agreement was a non-starter as it was vitiated by economic duress. The Division Bench also upheld the Arbitral Tribunal’s finding that the Development Agreement was not novated by the Supplementary Agreement. Division Bench also upheld the Tribunal’s finding that conditions to be fulfilled by L&T, subject to which the Supplementary Agreement was to come into force, were not fulfilled. However, the Tribunal’s quantification of damages for breach of contract, amounting to a sum of Rs. 35 crores, and compensation in lieu of securing title deeds with respect to 15 acres of land, amounting to Rs. 75 crores, as well as compensation for default in returning licences and permits, amounting to Rs. 5 crores, was set aside. The permanent injunction granted in favour of PCL, restraining L&T from interfering with PCL’s development of the Schedule ‘A’ property under the Development Agreement, was upheld. Even the relief granted of indemnification in favour of PCL for ITCREF’s claim was set aside without prejudice to the indemnification for ITCREF’s claim relating to the transfer of 2,20,416 sq. ft of land to the extent envisaged under the Development Agreement. The Division Bench 2822 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports upheld the Arbitral Tribunal’s order to the extent that it awarded the cost of arbitration to PCL. The title deeds deposited with the Registrar of the High Court were ordered to be released to PCL. In the light of the above directions and conclusions, the parties were allowed to pursue their appropriate course of action. The Division Bench allowed three appeals preferred by PCL in part and dismissed the appeal preferred by L&T. Both PCL and L&T, aggrieved by the Division Bench’s decision, preferred the present Civil Appeals.
SUBMISSIONS
14. Very detailed submissions have been made on behalf of both parties. We are reproducing the gist of the submissions made by the counsel appearing for the parties.
15. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of L&T has made detailed submissions after inviting our attention to the findings recorded by the Arbitral Tribunal and by the courts under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act. The learned senior counsel submitted that though Division Bench of the High Court has referred to the decision of this court in the case of Project Director, National Highways No. 45 E and 220, National Highways Authority of India v. M. Hakeem and Another 1, which holds that the court dealing with a petition under Section 34 cannot modify the award, the Division Bench purported to modify the award. He submitted that it is not permissible for the court to uphold a part of the award and remand the remaining part back to the Tribunal. He submitted that the decision of the Division Bench is akin to setting aside the decree for upholding judgment. He submitted that the reasoning in the award and its operative part are intrinsically linked and the same cannot be severed. Moreover, this is not a case where there are distinct and severable claims. He submitted that the effect of the impugned judgment of the Division Bench is that PCL would get a chance to improve upon the pleadings by initiating fresh arbitration before the Tribunal. But, L&T’s doors would be closed for a fresh adjudication in view of the findings rendered in the award.
16. According to the learned senior counsel, the Division Bench has set aside the award directing payment of Rs. 35 crores as damages
1 (2021) 9 SCC 1
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2823Larsen and Toubro Limited v. Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. and Others to PCL. He pointed out that the award contains a direction to L&T to settle the claim of the Bank by repayment of the loan of Rs. 6 crores and to secure release of the title deeds from the Bank; in default, L&T was directed to pay PCL a sum of Rs. 75 crores. The first part of the relief for payment of Rs. 6 crores has been upheld by the Division Bench, but the portion of the award in respect of Rs. 75 crores has been set aside. The award contains a direction against L&T to return licences, permits and permissions obtained by PCL from statutory authorities in respect of the lands. On failure to return the documents, L&T was directed to pay Rs. 5 crores to PCL. However, the Division Bench has upheld the award directing return of the documents, but has rejected the award to the extent of payment of Rs. 5 crores. Moreover, an award-granting injunction against L&T from interfering in any manner with the rights of PCL to develop the property has been upheld. The award directed L&T to indemnify PCL for any action, decree, or settlement to be enforced by ITCREF or, in lieu thereof, to pay to PCL Rs. 50 crores. The Division Bench has set aside this part of the award in its entirety. There was an order of costs of arbitration to the tune of Rs. 30 lakhs in favour of PCL, which has been confirmed. He submitted that, in fact, no licences, permits, or permissions obtained from statutory authorities were in possession of L&T. Moreover, the award in favour of the Bank is perverse as L&T has sought specific performance of the contract; there was no need to grant an injunction.
17. Now, coming to the interplay between the Development Agreement, Supplementary Agreement and the Tripartite Agreement, he submitted that the rights and obligations of the parties under the said agreements have been decided by the Arbitral Tribunal without recording reasons. He submitted that even PCL admitted that the conditions contained in Sub-clauses (a) to (d) of Clause I of the Supplementary Agreement were conditions precedent. However, the Tribunal misread the plain terms of the Supplementary Agreement contrary to the pleadings and without assigning any reason, has held that conditions precedent in Clauses (I), (II) and (III) of the Supplementary Agreement have not been fulfilled and therefore, the Supplementary Agreement was a non-starter. He relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Dyna Technologies Private Limited v. Crompton Greaves Limited2.
2 (2019) 20 SCC 1
2824 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
18. The learned senior counsel further submitted that in Section 34 proceedings, reasons cannot be supplanted to the reasons recorded in the award. He invited our attention to sub-clauses (a) to (d) of Clause I of the Supplementary Agreement. His submission is that the terms of the Supplementary Agreement were totally disregarded by the Tribunal and relied on the original terms of the Development Agreement. He submitted that the award is vitiated due to lack of reasons. He submitted that the award made was contrary to the pleadings. The learned senior counsel invited our attention to the findings of the learned Single Judge in a petition under Section 34. He submitted that the Division Bench supplanted its own reasons to uphold the award. Further, the Division Bench tried to rewrite the contract by including other clauses as conditions precedent. His submission is that the Tribunal mixed up various unrelated issues with issue no. 2 which pertains to economic coercion. He submitted that the entire focus was on the alleged breach committed by L&T of the Development Agreement and abandonment of the site. Unreasoned finding has been given that the Supplementary Agreement and the Tripartite Agreement were entered under compulsion. The Tribunal failed to note that in the Statement of Claim as well as in the rejoinder filed by PCL, there was assertion regarding the binding nature of the Supplementary Agreement. One Mr. Mohinder Puri on behalf of PCL filed an affidavit which was not only beyond the pleadings, but also contrary to the same as he, for the first time, alleges exercise of coercion to enter into Supplementary Agreement. Learned counsel relied upon several documents to show that there was no coercion and submitted that the Tribunal ignored the documents. He would, therefore, submit that the award was vitiated in view of Section 28(1)
(a) of the Arbitration Act. He relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority 3. Learned counsel submitted that the view taken by the Tribunal is not even a plausible view.
19. Learned senior counsel submitted that a finding was recorded by the learned Single Judge in the Section 34 petition that the Arbitral Tribunal could not have ignored all the correspondence and evidence showing why the Supplementary Agreement was signed. The learned Single Judge held that the award was self-contradictory and the
3 (2015) 3 SCC 49
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2825Larsen and Toubro Limited v. Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. and Others findings were mutually destructive inasmuch as while holding that the Supplementary Agreement was entered into by compulsion, the Tribunal, thereafter, purported to enforce the Tripartite Agreement. Learned senior counsel pointed out that the Division Bench rejected the objection of L&T that the plea of coercion was not taken by holding that the Statement of Claim is not specific on the point of coercion, but the plea taken in paragraph 136(5)(a) of the Statement of Claim can be deemed sufficient. In fact, what is quoted was part of PCL’s letter dated 18 th December, 2000, in response to L&T’s letter dated 10 th July, 2000. It was urged that the above allegation has nothing to do with economic coercion to compel PCL to enter into Supplementary Agreement. It is submitted that Division Bench has supplied reasons to justify the award which reasons were not there in the award itself. In fact, the Division Bench went to the extent of converting the plea of coercion into undue influence even when there was no pleading to that effect.
20. The Arbitral Tribunal has rendered a contradictory finding that the Supplementary Agreement was not operative, but, L&T cannot be relieved of its obligations under the Tripartite Agreement and thus, is bound to pay the Bank. Learned counsel reiterated that the Tripartite Agreement flows from the Supplementary Agreement. He pointed out that the Arbitral Tribunal held that L&T was bound by the Tripartite Agreement and at the same time observed that the Supplementary Agreement and the Tripartite Agreement were signed by PCL under compulsion and in dire need of funding of EDC payment. He submitted that the learned Single Judge has rightly held that when the Supplementary Agreement was a non-starter, as per the Tribunal, no relief could have been granted under the Tripartite Agreement. Unfortunately, this argument has not been dealt with by the Division Bench.
21. He invited our attention to Clause 26 of the Development Agreement which provided that L&T was entitled to extension of time for completing the construction in case of adverse market conditions. As per Clause 34, L&T could not be treated in default of performance of its obligation if it is delayed or prevented due to adverse market conditions. He submitted that there were enough documents on record to show that land prices were falling and prevailing market conditions did not encourage development of land. He submitted that though there was a specific pleading to that effect, the Arbitral 2826 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Tribunal did not record any finding in the award with regard to the market conditions and in fact, Clauses 26 and 34 of the Development Agreement have been completely ignored. However, the learned Single Judge noticed that there was material on record with respect to the fall in real estate market and held that Arbitrator could not have ignored all those correspondences and evidence showing why the Supplementary Agreement was signed. The Division Bench recorded the submission that the Tribunal has ignored Clauses 26 and 34 of the Development Agreement, but, has not dealt with the submission and tried to supply its own reasons which were not found in the award. Thus, the Division Bench acted beyond the scope of Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.
22. The Arbitral Tribunal committed an error by directing L&T to make payment to the Bank on the ground that L&T cannot be relieved of its obligation to the Bank under the Tripartite Agreement. It is submitted that the Bank was not a party to the proceedings and therefore, the claim by the Bank was not before the Arbitral Tribunal. In fact, in the affidavit in lieu of evidence filed by PCL, it was contended that the Bank is a third party and any action by the Bank can be tried only by the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Therefore, the submission is that the award in favour of the Bank is vitiated under Section 28(1)(a)(iv). He submitted that the said argument of L&T was accepted by the learned Single Judge on the ground that the Bank was not a party before the Tribunal and the Tripartite Agreement did not have an arbitration clause. On this aspect, he pointed out the finding of the Division Bench that the principal amount of Rs. 6 crores with interest was an amount payable by L&T to the bank under the Development Agreement. He submitted that, in fact, the said obligation can be read only in the Tripartite Agreement.
23. Learned senior counsel submitted that L&T has suffered a loss of Rs. 5.44 crores towards EDC. Though, the Tribunal had noted that the EDC payment would normally be reimbursed, but it failed to offset the same. Learned counsel pointed out that the sum of Rs. 8.10 crores was deposited under an interim order dated 24th January, 2003 passed by the learned Single Judge in Section 34 petition subject to the outcome of the proceedings. An application for restitution was filed by L&T in Section 34 proceedings. By order dated 8th January, 2011, it was directed to be listed along with the appeal before the Division Bench. However, the Division Bench has not dealt with the same. A [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2827Larsen and Toubro Limited v. Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. and Others prayer was made that L&T may be permitted to file an appropriate application for restitution before the High Court.
24. The submission of the learned senior counsel is that the order of the learned Single Judge in the Section 34 petition deserves to be upheld.
25. The learned senior counsel appearing for PCL pointed out that basically two issues arise for consideration. The first is whether there was a breach committed by L&T as held by the Arbitral Tribunal, and the second question is whether, if the finding of breach committed by L&T is upheld, the finding of the Arbitral Tribunal regarding damages can be revived.
26. The learned senior counsel submitted that the scope of interference in a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is now well settled. He relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of S.V. Samudram v. State of Karnataka and Another 4. If the Arbitral Tribunal’s view is a plausible view, it ought not be interfered with. To arrive at a decision as to whether a plausible view has been taken, the court would consider whether the Arbitrator has considered the material forming part of the record and arrived at a plausible view in an overall sense and not expect the Arbitrator to deal with the matter and render a judgment with the detailed reasoning as is normally found in decisions of the civil courts.
27. Learned senior counsel submitted that to examine the award in supervisory jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the court must be cautious and should defer to the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal even if the reasoning provided in the award is implied. If the reasons recorded by the Arbitral Tribunal are intelligible, the award cannot be set aside just because there were gaps in the reasoning of conclusions reached by the Arbitral Tribunal. The submission is that the award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the present case is intelligible and contains adequate reasons. He pointed out several findings recorded by the Arbitral Tribunal with reasons.
28. He submitted that L&T’s submission that Clause 26 read with Clause 34 of the Development Agreement permitted it to seek extension of time is wholly misplaced considering the fact that L&T abandoned the project because a decision was taken by L&T to do so. Only in
4 (2024) 3 SCC 623
2828 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports case L&T had paid EDC and there was no risk of losing the licences, L&T could have invoked Clauses 26 and 34 of the Development Agreement for delayed completion of construction. Admittedly, no request was made by L&T for the grant of extension of time for completing the construction with the undertaking of making payment of EDC in terms of Clauses 19 and 25 of the Development Agreement, which were never modified. Learned senior counsel submitted that L&T was holding title deeds in relation to 25 acres of land and did not return the title deeds. The title deeds in respect of the remaining 15 acres of land were with the Bank for securing the loan availed for payment of EDC. The payment of EDC was the liability of L&T as per the Development Agreement. He also pointed out that L&T did not lead any of the evidence. The stand of L&T in considerations of the overall findings of the learned Tribunal on breach of contract, abandonment etc. is completely out of place and without any basis. In fact, no issues were framed on the basis of Clauses 26 and 34 of the Development Agreement.
29. The conditions precedent in the Supplementary Agreement may be read with their true intent and purport. Condition precedent no.1 also contains the binding nature of the Development Agreement, except as agreed otherwise. Under the Supplementary Agreement, payment of EDC, as per Clause 19 read with Clause 27 of the Development Agreement, was continued. The developer was liable to pay EDC over a period of 18 months in terms of the licence. Condition precedent no. 1(a) expressly requisited the ‘replacing or taking over’ of the bank guarantee furnished by PCL. He pointed out the letter dated 15 th March, 2000, addressed by PCL to the Bank, where the request was made to continue with the bank guarantee of PCL. However, at the same time, the request was made to the bank to forthwith release the margin money of PCL. Learned counsel submitted that L&T has made a false statement on oath that the bank guarantee of PCL, with margin money and interest, was released. Altogether, a new case was made out by L&T before this court, as it was not pleaded before the Tribunal that the margin money had been refunded and bank guarantees had been released. In fact, PCL by letter dated 12th April, 2000 reminded L&T that fresh bank guarantees were to be served as PCL’s guarantee was not released. According to the specific pleading of PCL in the Statement of Claims, a condition precedent for the coming into effect of the said [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2829Larsen and Toubro Limited v. Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. and Others agreement was replacing and taking over the bank guarantee. In the Statement of defence-cum-counterclaim of L&T, it was claimed that L&T had executed a counter bank guarantee. It was submitted that attributing insufficient reasons in relation to non-satisfaction of the condition precedent of the Supplementary Agreement is incorrect. On 07 th October, 1999, L&T had taken a clear stand that the report submitted by the consultant was not favourable to pursue the project and hence, they shall not pay EDC. Reliance was placed by learned counsel on the Statement of Claims of L&T. He invited our attention to the fact that on 26 th October, 1999, PCL was again constrained to put L&T on notice that there were serious defaults of the terms of licences and the Development Agreement. It was submitted that L&T was in possession of title deeds of area of 25 acres from 15 th and 16 th October, 1998. A submission was made that there were sufficient facts pleaded in the pleadings to show coercion. He submitted that non-payment of EDC as per Clause 19(b) of the Development Agreement led to issuance of notice for cancellation of licences of PCL. In the letter dated 07 th October, 1999, L&T had taken a clear stand that they will not pay EDC. Initially, on 8 th December, 1998, L&T’s stand was that it was their responsibility to pay EDC from 01 st July, 1998. Thereafter, a stand was taken on 02 nd April, 1999 that they will pay EDC only after launch of the project. L&T did not pay Rs. 5 crores refundable advance to PCL. L&T instructed PCL not to collect any cheque and on 08 th April, 1999, L&T internally instructed to demobilize resources from the site. The title deeds were in possession of L&T and the same was pleaded in the Statement of Claims. Learned counsel submitted that these all facts constituted coercion. He also pointed out that with the consent of the parties, the issue was framed on the plea of coercion being an issue no. 2, and in fact, L&T accepted that there could be no grievance with the procedure followed by the Arbitral Tribunal in framing issues. In fact, in the final submission before the Arbitral Tribunal, L&T admitted that the plea of economic duress was pleaded by PCL by pointing out that the Supplementary Agreement was signed out of economic duress and coercion.
30. He submitted that on the question whether the condition precedent for the Supplementary Agreement was satisfied, L&T did not lead evidence and evidence of PCL remained uncontroverted.
2830 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
31. As regards the contention that the relief granted in the award was beyond the jurisdiction, learned counsel submitted that the arbitration clause in the Development Agreement even covered disputes in connection with the agreement. In fact, the Supplementary Agreement refers to the fact that parties to the Development Agreement have agreed to enter into a tripartite agreement with the Bank. In turn, the tripartite agreement records that L&T and PCL had entered into Development Agreement on 10 th March 1998. The notice invoking the arbitration clause refers to the three agreements, and even in the petition filed under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, the disputes were set out in relation to the three agreements. By consent of the parties, vide order dated 14 th February, 2001, the disputes in relation to all three agreements, including the determination of the liability of ITCREF and the Bank, were referred to the Arbitral Tribunal. Before the Arbitral Tribunal, L&T took the stand that it was its liability to ensure payment to the Bank. Also, L&T took a stand through its counsel that the obligation was cast upon L&T with respect to the liability of ITCREF. Moreover, L&T did not take recourse to Section 16 of the Arbitration Act for challenging the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal.
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