I.K. Merchants Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 418; [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2753
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R Mahadevan
- Decided
- 1 Apr 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 4560/2025
- Sections
- 34, 34(1), 208, 138(2), 3
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2753 : 2025 INSC 418 I.K. Merchants Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
v.
The State of Rajasthan & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 4560-4563 of 2025)
01 April 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose as regards the appropriate rate of interest to be awarded on the enhanced valuation of shares sold by the appellants to the Respondent No.1-State in 1973 as determined by the High Court and affirmed by Supreme Court.
Headnotes† Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.34 – Interest – Grant of appropriate rate of interest in a commercial transaction – No agreement between the parties relating to grant of interest for delayed payment – In 1973, the appellants sold their shares in Respondent No.2 to the Respondent No.1-State at Rs.11.50/- per equity share – Suit filed by appellants in the High Court inter alia for a decree for reasonable price of their shares – Preliminary decree was passed for appointment of a CA firm to ascertain the fair value of the shares when they were transferred by the appellants to Respondent No.1, which valued the shares at Rs.640/- per share – Valuation not accepted by respondents – High Court affirmed the valuation of shares at Rs.640/- per share with 5% simple interest p.a. – Issue relating to valuation of shares has become final in view of dismissal of SLP (C) Diary Nos.27115/2022 and 24887/2022 filed by Respondents – Matter remanded to High Court – By way of the impugned judgment, High Court upheld and reaffirmed the valuation of shares at Rs.640/- per share as also the grant of 5% simple interest p.a. – Challenge to – Presently, issue only as regards the appropriate rate of interest to be awarded on the enhanced valuation of shares:
Held: There has been a transaction of trade, viz. sale and purchase of goods, which clearly implies a commercial transaction between the parties – s.34 empowers the court to grant interest at three * Author 2754 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports different stages of a money decree whereunder, inter alia the court may grant interest on the total decretal amount from the date of the decree until payment, at a rate not exceeding 6% p.a unless otherwise specified in contractual agreements or statutory provisions – However, if the claim arises from a commercial transaction, courts may allow interest at a higher rate based on agreements between the parties – Courts have the authority to determine the appropriate interest rate, considering the totality of the facts and circumstances in accordance with law – They have the discretion to decide whether the interest is payable from the date of institution of the suit, a period prior to that, or from the date of the decree, depending on the specific facts of each case – In the present case, there was no agreement between the parties relating to grant of interest for the delayed payment – Respondent No. 1 agreed to pay a fair valuation for the shares to the appellants, but is yet to make the payment – Appellants having suffered a delay of five decades in receiving the payment, are entitled to be reasonably compensated by way of interest – In the peculiar facts and circumstances, simple interest at the rate of 6% per annum awarded from 8th July 1975, on the enhanced valuation of shares till the date of decree and interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of decree till the date of realisation – Impugned judgments of the High Court modified. [Paras 12, 14, 15, 17] Interest – Award of, to be guided by equitable considerations: Held: Discretion to award interest, whether pendente lite or post-decree is well recognized, its exercise must be guided by equitable considerations – The rate and period of interest cannot be applied mechanically or at an unreasonably high rate without any rationale. [Para 16] Public Interest – Commercial transactions – Terms if oppressive or one-sided, constitutional courts can under Article 14 to strike down such contracts or pass appropriate decrees or orders: Held: “Public Interest” denotes a wider concept with its genus rooted to the welfare of the public at large, with different species attributable to individual and specific impact, depending upon the concept and the subject under consideration – It deals with the impact of a policy decision on the society – Generally, public interest is anathema to commercial transactions – However, by exception, when the terms are oppressive or one-sided, they [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2755I.K. Merchants Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors. are to be termed as unconscionable, arbitrary and by application of externalities, public interest will have to lean towards the individual who has been wronged, as such contracts are deemed to take away the fairness, affecting the free consent required to culminate into a valid contract – The constitutional courts, under such circumstances will be armed with Article 14 to strike down such contracts or to pass appropriate decrees or orders – In the present case, the transaction, though commercial, is not between two businessmen or entities; the State and its instrumentality are parties to the contract with better bargaining or imposing authority; and there was no public interest in offering a lesser sum – Further, with the price fixed found to be unconscionable, this Court affirmed the enhanced price fixed by the High Court. [Para 12] Case Law Cited Alok Shanker Pandey v. Union of India [2007] 2 SCR 737 : (2007) 3 SCC 545; Clariant International Ltd. v. Securities & Exchange Board of India [2004] Supp. 3 SCR 843 : (2004) 8 SCC 524; Thazhathe Thazhathe Purayil Sarabi v. Union of India (2009) 7 SCC 372; Rampur Fertiliser Ltd. v. Vigyan Chemicals Industries [2009] 2 SCR 650 : (2009) 12 SCC 324; M/s Tomorrowland Ltd. v. Housing and Urban Development Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 205 – relied on.
Central Inland Water Transport Corp. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly [1986] 2 SCR 278 : (1986) 3 SCC 156; Union of India v. Tata Chemicals Ltd. [2014] 3 SCR 298 : (2014) 6 SCC 335; Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. v. Coromandal Sacks Pvt. Ltd. [2024] 5 SCR 321 : (2024) 8 SCC 172; Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz v. Government of Karnataka [2025] 1 SCR 190 : Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2025; Manalal Prabhudayal v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. [2006] Supp. 4 SCR 666 : (2009) 17 SCC 296 – referred to.
List of Acts Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Constitution of India. List of Keywords Section 34 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Interest; Commercial Transaction; Valuation of shares; Enhanced valuation of shares; Appropriate rate of interest on enhanced valuation of shares; Reasonable price of shares; Appropriate interest rate; Grant of 2756 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports interest for the delayed payment; No agreement between parties relating to grant of interest for delayed payment; Fair Valuation; “Public Interest”; Share Valuation; Discretion to award interest; Award of interest.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s). 4560-4563 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 26.04.2022 and 02.05.2022 of the High Court at Calcutta in GA No. 6 of 2020 in APD No. 63 of 2013 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellants:
Ranjit Kumar, Gautam Narayan, Sr. Advs., Ashok Kumar Jain, Pankaj Jain, Mrs. Meenakshi Jain, Bijoy Kumar Jain. Advs. for the Respondents:
Shiv Mangal Sharma, A.A.G., Dr. Manish Singhvi, Sr. Adv., Milind Kumar, Deepak Goel, Apurv Singhvi, Ms. Shalini Haldar. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment R. Mahadevan, J.
Leave granted.
2. These appeals are filed against the judgments and orders dated 26.04.2022 and 02.05.2022 both passed by the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court1 in G.A.No.6 of 2020 and A.P.D.No.63 of 2013 in C.S.No.467 of 1978. Vide order dated 26.04.2022, the High Court, while upholding and reaffirming the valuation of shares done by M/s. Ray & Ray at Rs.640/- per share, granted simple interest at 6% per annum on the enhanced valuation of shares, however, rejected the prayer of the appellants for enhancement of interest rates, costs and damages, and accordingly, disposed of the said cases. 1 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2757I.K. Merchants Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors. Subsequently, vide order dated 02.05.2022, the High Court corrected the rate of interest from 6% to 5% per annum. Both the orders are assailed in these appeals, at the instance of the appellants herein.
3. On 25.07.2022, when the appeals were taken up for consideration by this Court, the learned counsel for the appellants confined the prayer made herein to the grant of an appropriate rate of interest, which was also recorded in the proceedings. In view of the same, we proceed to deal with these appeals only to the limited extent of grant of rate of interest for the difference in valuation of shares of Respondent No.2 viz., Rajasthan State Mines and Mineral Ltd., formerly known as Bikaner Gypsums Ltd. 2 , which shares were sold by the appellants to Respondent No.1 viz., State of Rajasthan, in 1973.
4. The relevant facts giving rise to the controversy involved herein are as follows:
4.1 Originally, the appellants preferred a suit being C.S.No.467 of 1978 before the High Court of Calcutta, and the same was subsequently amended, praying for a decree for Rs.4,34,21,553.00 against the Respondent No.1; in the alternative a decree for reasonable price of the shares of the appellants, after determination of such price by the High Court; in the further alternative, cancellation of the transfer of shares belonging to the appellants to the Respondent No.1 and restitution of the original status and retransfer of those shares to the appellants on such terms to be determined by the High Court, and also interest and costs. On 14.08.2012, the learned Single Judge of the High Court, while rejecting the valuation reports produced by the parties, passed a preliminary decree, the operative portion of which reads as follows:
“There shall be a preliminary decree directing the defendants in particular the first defendant to appoint anyone of the following firms of Chartered Accountants, namely Price Water House, Ray & Ray, Lodha and Company of its choice as the valuer for the purpose of conducting an enquiry for ascertaining the fair and proper value of the said shares of the plaintiffs 2 For short, “the Company”
2758 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports at the time when such shares were transferred to the first defendant by the plaintiffs and upon conclusion of such enquiry the plaintiffs shall be entitled to apply in this suit for obtaining a final decree for the amount, if found, due upon such enquiry.
However, the remuneration of the valuer shall be borne entirely by the defendants or rather the first defendant herein and the first defendant shall pay the remuneration of the valuer as and when such remuneration is payable or rather is agreed to be paid by the first defendant and accepted by the valuer. The plaintiffs shall be entitled to all the costs, charges and expenses of the enquiry proceedings before the valuer, certified for two counsel. Let the report of the valuer be made and published within a period of four months from the date of commencement of the enquiry.
There will also be a decree for costs of the suit assessed at Rs.1,50,000/- and the plaintiffs will be entitled to the costs over and above the court fees that the plaintiffs had to pay at the time of institution of the suit.
Needless to mention that the plaintiffs will also be entitled to interests on the final decree to be passed on the valuation to be made by the valuer appointed by the preliminary decree, if such valuation, however, goes in favour of the plaintiffs.”
4.2 Aggrieved by the aforesaid preliminary decree, the respondents herein preferred A.P.D.No.63 of 2013, in which, the appellants filed their Cross Objection. During the pendency of the appeal, the High Court, vide order dated 20.08.2019, noted that the dispute essentially was with regard to the valuation of shares, and in order to arrive at a settlement, appointed M/s. Ray & Ray Co. as valuer for the purpose of conducting an enquiry and ascertaining the proper value of the shares of the appellants as on the date, when such shares were transferred to the State Government. It was further directed that such valuation would be uninfluenced by previous valuation reports. [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2759I.K. Merchants Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors. Accordingly, the valuer M/s. Ray & Ray valued the shares at Rs.640/- per share and filed its report. However, the respondents refused to accept the said valuation. As a result of the same, the High Court proceeded to hear the matter on merits and passed a final judgment and order on 28.04.2021. The operative portion of the same reads as under:
“In those circumstances, this appeal and crossobjection are disposed of by declaring that the respondents/plaintiffs are entitled to Rs.640/- per share sold by them to the appellant and directing that each of the respondents/plaintiffs be paid by the appellant no.1 Rs.640/- per share of Bikaner Gypsums Ltd. (subsequently Rajasthan State Mines and Minerals Ltd.) sold by him to the appellant no.1 as valued by M/s. Ray and Ray less Rs.11.50/per share already received by him/her within eight weeks of communication of this order. Considering the appellant is the government of Rajasthan, the respondents/plaintiffs shall only be entitled to interest at the rate of 5% simple interest per annum without yearly rests on the said amount from 8th July, 1975 till the date of payment.
The impugned preliminary judgment and decree dated 14th August, 2012 is modified to the above extent. In the facts and circumstances, the modified preliminary judgment and decree shall be treated as the final decree. The suit is decreed accordingly. The application (GA 6 of 2020) is also disposed of by this order.”
4.3 Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order dated 28.04.2021, both Respondent Nos.1 & 2 filed two separate appeals viz., CA.Nos.6145 and 6144 of 2021 [SLP (Civil) Nos.13905/2021 and 13606/2021] respectively, and the appellants filed C.A.No.6146 of 2021 [SLP (Civil) No.14330/2021]. By a common order dated 01.10.2021, this Court allowed all the appeals by setting aside the order dated 28.04.2021 and remanding the matter to the High Court to deal with the objections and cross objections on the issue of 2760 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports valuation alone, as per the report of M/s. Ray & Ray and to take a view on the same. Pursuant to the clarification application viz., M.A.No.1840 of 2021 in C.A. No.6146 of 2021 filed by the appellants, this Court vide order dated 26.11.2021 inter alia observed as follows:
“.... On hearing learned counsel for parties, we are not inclined to open a pandora’s box once again and are clear that we have remitted on the issue of the valuation report. However, the consequences of the same would be that the applicant(s) before us would naturally have a right to agitate the issue of interest and costs which is a sequitur arising from the delay in the finalization of the amount payable to the respondent(s). ...”
4.4 In light of the aforesaid orders, the matter was reheard by the High Court and the impugned judgment and order came to be passed on 26.04.2022, the operative portion of which, reads as under:
“I am of the view that the valuer has given a very reasonable opinion.
I uphold and reaffirm the valuation.
With regard to the claim of the respondents for interest, because of the long pendency on the matter, the interest burden on the Government of Rajasthan is for a period of about 50 years on the above valuation. Taking this length of time and the total interest burden on the appellant No.1, in my view, 6% per annum simple interest on the enhanced valuation of the shares will more than adequately compensate the respondents. We reject the prayer for enhancement of the interest rate.
The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
The judgment and decree of this Court dated 28th April 2021 is reaffirmed.”
Subsequently, the interest portion was corrected from 6% to 5% per annum, by order dated 02.05.2022.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2761I.K. Merchants Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors. 4.5 With the above background, the appellants have come up with these appeals before us.
5. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, payment of interest owing to the delay in remittance of the fair value of the shares to the appellants is a right recognized in law. Further, the principle underlying the award of interest on the monies entitled to be recovered by a party is simply compensation for the time value of money i.e., compensation for interdicting the investment of that sum at the time when it was due to be paid. In support of the same, the learned counsel relied on the following decisions of this court:
(i) Union of India v. Tata Chemicals Ltd3 , wherein it was held that the obligation to refund money received and retained without right implies and carried with it the right to interest.
(ii) Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd and others v. Coromandal Sacks Private Ltd4 , in which, it was held that ‘neither a penalty nor a punishment but the normal accretion on capital, due to the wilful withholding of the payment towards the claim, resulting in continuous injury until such payment is made or in other words, until the claim is realized’; and
(iii) Civil Appeal No.17 of 2025 in SLP(C) No.10338 of 2023 titled as ‘Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and others v. Government of Karnataka and others’, it was observed as follows:
“…it cannot be gainsaid that the appellants have been deprived of their legitimate dues for almost 22 years ago. It can also not be controverted that money is what money buys. The value of money is based on the idea that money can be invested to earn a return, and that the purchasing power of money decreases over time due to inflation. What the appellants herein could have bought with the compensation in 2003 cannot do in 2025. It is, therefore, of utmost importance that the determination of the award and disbursal of compensation in case of acquisition of land should be made with promptitude”.
3 (2014) 6 SCC 335
4 (2024) 8 SCC 172
2762 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports 5.1 It is further submitted that the appellants were deprived of the fair value of their shares, which were compulsorily acquired by the State Government for a period of more than 50 years due to the faulty valuation commissioned by it. Therefore, payment of interest on the valuation which has been upheld till this Court, follows as a matter of course.
5.2 The learned counsel also submitted that Section 34(1) of the Civil Procedure Code explicitly provides that a rate higher than 6% can be granted in case of a money decree arising out of commercial transactions. Explanation I to section 34(1) defines a “commercial transaction” as one connected with industry, trade or business of the party incurring the liability. In the present case, the liability has arisen on account of compulsory acquisition by the state Government of the shares of the appellants in Bikaner Gypsums, which was renamed as Respondent No.2 and has consistently earned revenues for the State Government being a profit-making company between 1974 till 2020. However, without any justification, the High Court awarded only simple interest at the rate of 5% per annum, which will not compensate the appellants for the time value of the cost of shares, and is hence, whimsical and arbitrary.
5.3 It is further submitted that despite giving assurance to the appellants that they will be allowed to make a representation before the valuer by letters dated 27.04.1973 and 06.08.1973, the Respondent No.1 rescinded on this assurance vide letter dated 03.07.1974 and that, a copy of the valuation report dated 28.08.1974 was not supplied to the appellants and their objections thereto were not invited. Though appellant no.1 requested to return the shares if a fair valuation was not possible vide letter dated 10.04.1975, the respondents neither conducted a fair valuation nor returned the shares. Further, the respondents failed to comply with the order dated 20.08.2019 of this Court, as a result of which, the time granted by this court for submission of the report had to be extended on two occasions. Even after dismissal of the appeals of the respondents by this Court, the appellants have not been paid the principal sum, till date. Thus, the respondents have not only breached the contract, but also caused delay at every stage of proceedings in making payment of sums legally due to the appellants. [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2763I.K. Merchants Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors. 5.4 It is also submitted that had the money payable by the Respondent No. 1 been invested in any other shares, gold, fixed deposit or land in the year 1973, the said money would have been enhanced manifold. Since 1973-74 till 2020, the Respondent No. 2, which is a profit-making company, earned several thousand rupees as gross profit and hence, they are not entitled to any sympathy on the ground of being State. Thus, according to the learned counsel, there is no justification for award of a rate of interest lower than commercial rates for the fair value of the share of the appellants.
5.5 Referring to the decision of this court in Alok Shanker Pandey v. Union of India 5, it is submitted that during the relevant point of time, the rate of interest was 15% and hence, the appellants are entitled to receive interest at least @ 15%.
5.6 Thus, the learned counsel submitted that the appellants are entitled to receive the principal of Rs.3,46,79,373/- with interest @ 15% on monthly rest basis; and interest @ 15% on monthly rest basis on the aforesaid amount till the date of realization of the claim. In case, the respondents fail to pay the principal amount and interest @ 15% on monthly rest basis, the Respondent No.1 may be directed to pay a further interest at the rate of 15% as penal interest over and above the amounts to be paid in terms of the above till the payment is made.
6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Respondent No. 1 / State of Rajasthan, submitted that the facts would clearly indicate that the amount was neither in debt nor for any damages, which normally entails interest. Due to gross mismanagement, the Respondent No. 2 (company) was going down, and it ultimately got merged with the State Government. The shareholders, who were responsible for the mismanagement of the Company, are now going to get a very handsome amount in terms of the valuation on 31.03.1973 at a huge sum of Rs.640/- per share for a subscribed share price of Rs.10/- per share against the original claim of Rs.70.50 per share. 6.1 Adding further, it is submitted that in the suit, the appellants initially claimed only for Rs.70.50 per share, in 1978. Subsequently, they
5 (2007) 3 SCC 545
2764 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports sought amendment with regard to enhancement of valuation of share, which was ordered in 2001, i.e., 23 years later. Thus, the exorbitant interest sought in 2001 cannot be said to be computed from the year 1973. It is also submitted that the appellants / shareholders, who did not subscribe at Rs.10/- per share for fresh infusion of capital, have now got the valuation of Rs.640/- per share, on the same date and therefore, they have not been prejudiced in any manner.
6.2 Denying the allegation that the shares of the appellants had been compulsorily acquired by the State Government, the learned counsel submitted that the events as unfolded during 1969 to 1973 would amply demonstrate that it is owing to mismanagement of the Company that the State had to intervene and infuse further capital in the Company. The State had infused sufficient funds, but still the company could not be revived or sustained by the then management. It is in this context that the shares were acquired by the State. Therefore, it is not a case of compulsory acquisition of shares, but a case of infusion of capital, and getting equity in return just to keep the company afloat; and the rate of interest has to be determined in the said background only.
6.3 It is submitted that the second part of Section 34 states that the interest from the date of decree till the date of payment cannot exceed 6%. The Explanation states that the rate of interest may exceed 6% p.a. if it is a ‘Commercial transaction’. According to the learned counsel, the State was not engaged in any industry, trade or business and there was complete absence of motive of profit in the action taken by them. In fact, it was incurring losses, and the investment made to keep the lossmaking Company unit afloat cannot be termed as a ‘Commercial transaction’. Therefore, the interest rate should not exceed @ 5% as determined by the High Court.
6.4 Referring to the decision of this Court in Manalal Prabhudayal v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.6 , it is submitted that Appellate Courts should not interfere with the discretion exercised by the lower Courts to award interest unless the same is arbitrary
6 (2009) 17 SCC 296
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2765I.K. Merchants Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors. and capricious. Hence, the High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction to award simple interest at 5% per annum, which does not suffer from any infirmity.
6.5 It is also submitted that the High Court has reaffirmed the judgment and decree dated 28.04.2021 which was set aside by this court by order dated 01.10.2021, without any modification and the same does not have any legal sanctity. Thus, the High Court has not passed any specific order with regard to the interest from the date of the institution of the suit till the date of decree, and from the date of decree till the date of the payment. It has merely stated that 5% p.a. shall be calculated. Therefore, the order of the High Court relating to rate of interest is reasonable and the same need not be interfered with by this court.
7. In addition to the above submissions made on the side of the Respondent No.1, the learned counsel for the Respondent No.2 / Rajasthan State Mines and Minerals Ltd., submitted that the transfer of shares to the State by the company in the year 1973 was for the reason as the company was facing financial difficulties to run its business and further, the shareholders were not possessing faith in the company and therefore, the company decided to bring the public issue at Rs.10/- per equity share, but the appellants were not ready to purchase the shares even at such rate. Thereafter, the litigation to decide the fair price of the share was initiated by the appellants in 1978 by demanding a sum of Rs.70.50 per equity share, but later, on the basis of valuation by a private valuer M/s. Naresh Lakhotia & Company, amended their plaint and claimed Rs.874/- per share. It is worth mentioning that the valuer M/s.Naresh Lakhotia & company and M/s.Ray and Ray are not the valuer appointed by the ICAI. Thus, the appellants are only entitled to the fair price of the share as on April 1973 and not the interest thereon.
7.1 It is further submitted that there was no contract in respect of payment of interest between the parties. In such circumstances, section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code would govern the field, which does not provide for any compound interest of any kind. That apart, Section 34 clearly mandates interest @6% per annum for the principal sum adjudged (both during pendency and till date of payment). Therefore, the question of compound interest does not arise.
2766 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports 7.2 It is ultimately submitted that the appellants have already got the price of their share at Rs.11.50 per equity share and they are only entitled for the difference of amount as upheld by this Court and therefore, the appellants are not entitled to higher rate of interest than 5% awarded by the High Court.
8. As a riposte, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the Respondent No. 1 has attempted to make out a new case for the first time through their reply, alleging that there was mismanagement by the shareholders of the Respondent No. 2; that, the appellants after a period of 23 years, claimed an exorbitant sum towards value of shares, Respondent No. 2 was a loss-making company, etc. 8.1 The learned counsel further submitted that the respondents never challenged the order dated 15.09.2001 granting leave to the appellants to amend their plaint in CS No.467 of 1978, but sought to urge that the proceedings were delayed due to amendment. That apart, the contention that the Respondent No. 2 was a loss making one, is utterly false and contrary to the record; and the appellants have placed on record the profit made by Respondent No.2 between 1974 till 2000, which comes to Rs.40,165,790,819. It is also an incorrect statement that the Government infused lots of fund during management of the company by the shareholders including the appellants. According to the appellants, other than giving one or two bank guarantees, the Respondent No.1 had never funded the company. Thus, according to the learned counsel, such new allegations are not maintainable. All the issues between the parties had attained finality except the issue of interest payable to the appellants, which has been raised in the present appeals.
8.2 It is also submitted that the High Court vide order dated 28.04.2021 specifically directed that interest will be paid from 08.07.1975 till the date of payment. Therefore, the learned counsel prayed this court to allow these appeals and grant appropriate rate of interest to the appellants.
9. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the records carefully and meticulously.
10. The genesis of the case arises from a five-decade long litigation concerning the valuation of shares of Respondent No. 2 which were [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2767I.K. Merchants Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors. sold by the appellants to Respondent No.1. The issue relating to valuation of shares has become final in view of dismissal of SLP (C) Diary Nos. 27115/2022 and 24887/2022 filed by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively, vide orders dated 05.12.2022 and 12.12.2022 passed by this court.
11. As already stated, the only issue remains to be considered by us in the present round of litigation is the rate of interest on the enhanced valuation of shares as determined by the High Court and affirmed by this court.
12. Taking note of the interest burden on the State for 50 years on the valuation of shares, the High Court had granted simple interest @ 5% per annum, by judgments and orders dated 26.04.2022 and 02.05.2022 which are impugned herein. According to the appellants, the transactions viz., transfer of shares were commercial in nature. Whereas, the respondents stated that they were not engaged in any industry, trade or business for profit purposes and the investment made was only to keep the loss-making Company unit afloat, and hence, the transactions cannot be treated as commercial transactions. Here, it cannot be disputed that there has been a transaction of trade, viz. sale and purchase of goods, which clearly implies a commercial transaction between the parties. The term “Public Interest” denotes a wider concept with its genus rooted to the welfare of the public at large, with different species attributable to individual and specific impact, depending upon the concept and the subject under consideration. It deals with the impact of a policy decision on the society. Generally, public interest is anathema to commercial transactions. However, by exception, when the terms are oppressive or one-sided, they are to be termed as unconscionable, arbitrary and by application of externalities, public interest will have to lean towards the individual who has been wronged, as such contracts are deemed to take away the fairness, affecting the free consent required to culminate into a valid contract. The constitutional courts, under such circumstances will be armed with Article 14 to strike down such contracts or to pass appropriate decrees or orders. It will be useful to refer to the judgment of this court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and another v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another 7, wherein, it was held as follows:
7 (1986) 3 SCC 156 : MANU/SC/0439/1986 2768 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports “82. The position under the American Law is stated in “Reinstatement of the Law- Second” as adopted and promulgated by the American Law Institute, Volume II xx which deals with the law of contracts, in Section 208 at page 107, as follows:
“Section 208. Unconscionable Contract or Term If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.”
In the Comments given under that section it is stated at page 107:
“Like the obligation of good faith and fair dealing (S 205), the policy against unconscionable contracts or terms applies to a wide variety of types of conduct. The determination that a contract or term is or is not unconscionable is made in the light of its setting, purpose and effect. Relevant factors include weaknesses in the contracting process like those involved in more specific rules as to contractual capacity, fraud and other invalidating causes; the policy also overlaps with rules which render particular bargains or terms unenforceable on grounds of public policy. Policing against unconscionable contracts or terms has sometimes been accomplished by adverse construction of language, by manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or by determinations that the clause is contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose of the contract’. Uniform Commercial Code $ 2-302 Comment 1.... A bargain is not unconscionable merely because the parties to it are unequal in bargaining position, nor even because the inequality results in an allocation of risks to the weaker party. But gross inequality of bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably favourable to the stronger party, may confirm indications that the transaction involved elements of deception or compulsion, or may show that the weaker party had no meaningful choice, no real [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2769I.K. Merchants Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors. alternative, or did not in fact assent or appear to assent to the unfair terms.”
There is a statute in the United States called the Universal Commercial Code which is applicable to contracts relating to sales of goods. Though this statute is inapplicable to contracts not involving sales of goods, it has proved very influential in, what are called in the United States, “non-sales” cases. It has many times been used either by analogy or because it was felt to embody a general accepted social attitude of fairness going beyond its statutory application to sales of goods. In the Reporter’s Note to the said Section 208, it is stated at page 112: “It is to be emphasized that a contract of adhesion is not unconscionable per se, and that all unconscionable contracts are not contracts of adhesion. Nonetheless, the more standardized the agreement and the less a party may bargain meaningfully, the more susceptible the contract or a term will be to a claim of unconscionability.”
The position has been thus summed up by John R. Pedan in “The Law of Unjust Contracts” published by Butterworths in 1982, at pages 28-29:
“...Unconscionability represents the end of a cycle commencing with the Aristotelian concept of justice and the Roman law iaesio enormis, which in turn formed the basis for the medieval church’s concept of a just price and condemnation of usury. These philosophies permeated the exercise, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, of the Chancery court’s discretionary powers under which it upset all kinds of unfair transactions. Subsequently the movement towards economic individualism in the nineteenth century hardened the exercise of these powers by emphasizing the freedom of the parties to make their own contract. While the principle of pacta sunt servanda held dominance, the consensual theory still recognized exceptions where one party was overborne by a fiduciary, or entered a contract under duress or as the result of fraud. However, these exceptions were limited and had to be strictly proved. It is suggested that the judicial 2770 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports and legislative trend during the last 30 years in both civil and common law jurisdictions has almost brought the wheel full circle. Both courts and parliaments have provided greater protection for weaker parties from harsh contracts. In several jurisdictions this included a general power to grant relief from unconscionable contracts, thereby providing a launching point from which the courts have the opportunity to develop a modern doctrine of unconscionability. American decisions on Article 2. 302 of the UCC have already gone some distance into this new arena. The expression “laesio enormous used in the above passage refers to “laesio ultra dimidium vel enormous which in Roman law meant the injury sustained by one of the parties to an onerous contract when he had been overreached by the other to the extent of more than one-half of the value of the subject-matter, as for example, when a vendor had not received half the value of property sold, or the purchaser had paid more then double value. The maxim “pacta sunt servanda” referred to in the above passage means “contracts are to be kept”.
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