P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 598; [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2006
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R Mahadevan
- Decided
- 29 Apr 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 5622/2025
- Sections
- 34, 115
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2006 : 2025 INSC 598 P. Kumarakurubaran v.
P. Narayanan & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 5622 of 2025)
29 April 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the plaint filed by the appellant under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation. Headnotes† Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.VII, R.11(d) – Limitation Act, 1963 – Art.59 – On 05.05.1974, appellant herein was assigned a vacant site by the special tahsildar – He executed a power of attorney (registered on 06.01.1978) in favour of his father for purpose of construction – Contrary to which, father of appellant executed a sale deed on 10.10.1988 in favour of second respondent/defendant no.1/grand daughter – On coming to know of the same, the appellant filed a complaint on 09.12.2011 under land grabbing cell against family of defendant no.1 – Thereafter, in 2014 appellant instituted a suit to seek declaration and other consequential reliefs – Respondents/defendants filed an application u/Or.VII, R.11 CPC and sought rejection of plaint on the ground that it was undervalued and was barred by limitation – Application was dismissed by the trial Court – However, the High Court allowed the civil revision petition and held that suit was barred by limitation – Correctness: Held: It is well-settled that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, governs suits seeking cancellation of an instrument and prescribes a period of limitation of three years from the date when the plaintiff first had knowledge of the facts entitling him to such relief – The emphasis under Article 59 is not on the date of the transaction per se, but on the accrual of the cause of action, which, in cases involving allegations of fraud or unauthorized execution of documents, hinges upon the date on which the plaintiff acquired knowledge of such facts – In the instant case, appellant specifically * Author [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2007P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors. averred in the plaint that upon becoming aware of registration of documents, he immediately lodged a land grabbing complaint on 09.12.2011 – On the other hand, the respondents/defendants stated in their application filed u/Or.VII R.11 CPC that the appellant had knowledge of the execution of the sale deed by his father in favour of defendant No.1 at the earliest point of time and hence, the suit instituted by the appellant was barred by limitation – The issue as to whether the appellant had prior notice or reason to be aware of the transaction at an earlier point of time, or whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge is credible, are matters that necessarily require appreciation of evidence – At this preliminary stage, the averments made in the plaint must be taken at their face value and assumed to be true – Once the date of knowledge is specifically pleaded and forms the basis of the cause of action, the issue of limitation cannot be decided summarily – It becomes a mixed question of law and fact, which cannot be adjudicated at the threshold stage u/Or.VII R.11 CPC – Therefore, rejection of the plaint on the ground of limitation without permitting the parties to lead evidence, is legally unsustainable. [Paras 11, 12, 12.1] Case Law Cited Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali [2020] 5 SCR 694 : (2020) 7 SCC 366; Salim D. Agboatwala & Others v. Shamalji Oddhavji Thakkar & Others [2021] 9 SCR 103 : (2021) 17 SCC 100; Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India & Another [2020] 6 SCR 538 : (2020) 17 SCC 260 – relied on.
N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board, 2024 INSC 817 : [2024] 10 SCR 952; Raghwendra Sharan Singh v. Ram Prasanna Singh (Dead) by LRs. [2019] 4 SCR 1069 : (2020) 16 SCC 601; Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Others v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another, 2024 INSC 1025 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3844; Daliben Valjibhai & Others v. Prajapati Kodarbhai Kachrabhai & Another, 2024 INSC 1049 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4105 – referred to.
List of Acts Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Limitation Act, 1963.
List of Keywords Order VII Rule 11 of CPC; Rejection of plaint; Suit barred by limitation; Article 59 of Limitation Act, 1963; Prior notice of 2008 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports transaction; Accrual of cause of action; Mixed question of law and fact; Preliminary stage; Plaint at their face value; Appreciation of evidence; Prima facie; Power of attorney; Misuse of authority. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5622 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 03.09.2020 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in CRPNPD No. 131 of 2018 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
K. K. Mani, Ms. T.archana, Rajeev Gupta.
Advs. for the Respondents:
S. Nandakumar, Sr. Adv., M/s. Ksn & Co., Siddharth Naidu, V Balachandran, Ms. Deepika Nandakumar, Viresh Kumar Bhawra, Sandhya Dutt, Aakash Elango, Naresh Kumar.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment R. Mahadevan, J.
Leave granted.
2. This Civil Appeal arises out of the final judgment and order dated 03.09.2020 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras 1 in CRP (NPD) No. 131 of 2018, whereby the High Court allowed the Civil Revision Petition filed by Respondent No.1 and rejected the plaint filed by the appellant under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 2 on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation.
3. Originally, the appellant / plaintiff instituted a suit bearing O.S. No. 310 of 2014 before the Principal District Court, Chengalpet, against the respondents / defendants and the Government authorities for the following reliefs:
1 For short, “the High Court”
2 For short, “CPC”
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2009P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors.
(i) Declaring that the appellant is the legal owner of the suit schedule property,
(ii) Issuing a permanent injunction against Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 restraining them from causing any interruption on the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property by the appellant,
(iii) Declaring the sale deed bearing No. 303/1993 dated 10.10.1988 registered in Pudukottai Sub Registration Office, Tuticorin District, in favour of Defendant No. 1 with respect to the suit schedule property as null and void,
(iv) Declaring the Settlement Deed bearing No. 1493/2012 dated 16.04.2012 registered in Alandur Sub Registration Office executed by Defendant No.1 in favour of Defendant No. 2 with respect to the suit schedule property as null and void,
(v) Declaring the General Power of Attorney Deed bearing No. 3725/2012 dated 31.12.2012 registered in Alandur Sub Registration Office executed by Defendant No. 2 in favour of Defendant No. 3 with respect to the suit schedule property as null and void,
(vi) Issuing a permanent injunction that Defendant No. 5 should not register any document created by Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 with respect to the suit schedule property except the appellant,
(vii) Issuing a permanent injunction directing Defendant No. 5 not to issue building plan permit to Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 except the appellant for the construction of new building in the suit schedule property, and
(viii) Cost of the suit to be paid by the Defendants to the appellant.
4. It was alleged in the plaint that the appellant was assigned a vacant site by the Special Tahsildar, Saidapet, Tamil Nadu, on 05.05.1974. He constructed a roof house and was in possession and enjoyment of the said property by paying tax and other charges. While so, he executed a Power of Attorney in favour of his father, K. Pothikannu Pillai, which was registered on 06.01.1978 as Document No. 04-11-101-102-3/1978 in the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Thallakulam, Madurai, for the purposes of putting up construction, entering into agreement, and performing other relevant activities. Contrary to 2010 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the same, the father of the appellant executed a sale deed on 10.10.1988, in favour of the second respondent / Defendant No.1 / granddaughter vide Document No. 303/1993 on the file of the Sub- Registrar, Pudukottai, which according to the appellant, was illegal, as the Power of Attorney did not authorize his father to alienate the property. After coming to know about the same, the appellant approached the Additional Commissioner of Police, Chennai and gave a complaint on 09.12.2011 under Land Grabbing Cell against the family of Defendant No. 1. Subsequently, the appellant applied for the individual patta to the Special Tahsildar, Alandur, on 24.02.2012 and also made a representation to Defendant No. 4 not to register any document with respect to the suit schedule property. In the meanwhile, the father of the appellant had died. Following the same, the second respondent / Defendant No.1 executed a settlement deed in favour of the third respondent / Defendant No.2 vide Document No. 1198/2012 on 16.04.2012. Subsequently, the third respondent / Defendant No.2 executed a General Power of attorney deed in favour of the first respondent / Defendant No.3 on 31.12.2012. Thereafter, the defendants made application for building permission on 05.07.2013, to which, the appellant filed his objection. In the said circumstances, the appellant came forward with the suit for the reliefs stated supra.
5. During the pendency of the aforesaid suit, the respondents / defendants filed an interlocutory application bearing I.A. No. 151 of 2015 in O.S. No. 310 of 2014 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint, on the ground that the suit was undervalued and was barred by limitation.
6. After hearing both sides, the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kancheepuram District at Chengalpet, by order dated 04.10.2017, dismissed the aforesaid application, observing that the grounds raised by the defendants can only be addressed after conducting a detailed trial based on the material facts, records, and other related issues, and therefore, the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold. Challenging the same, the appellant / plaintiff preferred a Civil Revision Petition bearing No. 131 of 2018 before the High Court.
7. By order dated 03.09.2020, the High Court allowed the aforesaid Civil Revision Petition after having held that the suit was barred by limitation. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant / plaintiff is before us with the present appeal.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2011P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court erred in allowing the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and in rejecting the plaint on the ground of limitation, particularly while exercising its revisional jurisdiction. Adding further, it is submitted that the question of limitation - especially in matters involving the knowledge or notice of the impugned transaction- is a mixed question of law and fact, which cannot be conclusively determined without a full-fledged trial. The Additional District Judge, upon a careful consideration of the pleadings, rightly held that the suit raised triable issues requiring evidence, and therefore, correctly declined to reject the plaint at the preliminary stage. It is also submitted that the plaint contains specific averments challenging the alienation of the suit property by the appellant’s father, who had no authority to do so; and that, the appellant, being a third party to the document, has duly and correctly valued the suit in accordance with the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955; and hence, the rejection of the plaint either on the ground of limitation or valuation, without affording the appellant an opportunity to adduce evidence, is contrary to the settled principles of law.
8.1. It is also submitted that a suit seeking a declaration along with a consequential relief of injunction cannot be construed as a suit for declaration simpliciter. Such a suit is one for declaration with further relief as contemplated under section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Therefore, it cannot be dismissed solely on the basis that one of the prayers may not be maintainable or barred. The dismissal of the entire suit on the strength of a single prayer without examining the merit and maintainability of the consequential relief is legally untenable. In this regard, reliance was placed on the decision of this court in N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board3 in which, it was held that the suit for a declaration of a right cannot be held to be barred so long as right to property subsist.
8.2. The learned counsel submitted that the power of attorney relied upon is specific in nature and is confined solely to matters relating to construction and obtaining necessary approvals. It did not confer any authority upon the appellant’s father to
3 2024 INSC 817
2012 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports execute a sale deed or enter into a sale agreement. In the absence of such authority, the execution of the sale deed and the settlement deed by the respondents is wholly without jurisdiction and stands vitiated by fraud.
8.3. The learned counsel further pointed out that the appellant has sought the relief of declaration of title and permanent injunction by expressly disputing the right, title, and possession claimed by the respondents. The plaint contains specific allegations regarding fraudulent alienation, subsequent encumbrance, and the absence of authority on the part of the appellant’s father to effect the transfer of the suit property. These are serious and contested issues that necessitate a detailed adjudication based on oral and documentary evidence. At the threshold stage, it is impermissible for the Court to assess the truth or falsity of these averments or to summarily reject the suit on the ground of limitation. Furthermore, the Additional District Judge, in declining the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC committed no jurisdictional error, as the plaint disclosed triable issues requiring full-fledged trial. However, the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction, has erroneously interfered with the order of the trial Court and proceeded to reject the suit at the preliminary stage.
8.4. Stating so, the learned counsel prayed to allow this appeal by setting aside the order passed by the High Court.
9. Per contra, the learned counsel for Respondent No.1, at the outset, submitted that the present appeal is liable to be dismissed as per the judgment of the High Court, which rightly held that the suit filed by the appellant was hopelessly barred by limitation. Continuing further, it is submitted that in the plaint, the appellant failed to establish the date of knowledge of the alleged transaction, which was a significant and material fact necessary to corroborate the cause of action for filing the suit. On the other hand, the certified copy of the sale deed dated 10.10.1978 executed by the power of attorney holder, namely, the father of the appellant, was alleged to have been received by the appellant on 28.07.2011. If the said date is construed as the date of knowledge, the suit ought to have been instituted within a period of three years therefrom i.e., on or before 27.07.2014, in accordance with Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963. However, the plaint [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2013P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors. came to be filed only on 03.12.2014. Consequently, the High Court upheld the maintainability of the interlocutory application filed by the respondents under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the plaint.
9.1. It is also submitted that the appellant and the respondents are closely related, as the power of attorney holder was the father of the appellant, and the respondents are the appellant’s sister, nephew, and niece. Therefore, the appellant’s contention that he remained unaware of the alleged transaction for a period of 26 years is untenable in law.
9.2. Further, the learned counsel referred to the power of attorney and submitted that the terms ‘signing and filing of all applications and agreement and Indemnity Bonds’ clearly indicate that the appellant’s father, acting as the power of attorney holder, was duly authorized to execute lawful agreements. Accordingly, he executed the sale deed dated 10.10.1988 in favour of the second respondent / Defendant No.1 under the authority of the said document.
9.3. The learned counsel also submitted that a bare perusal of the averments in the plaint reveals that the suit is barred by limitation. In this regard, reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali 4 and Raghwendra Sharan Singh v. Ram Prasanna Singh(Dead) by LRs5 wherein, it was held that when the foundational facts, as pleaded, squarely attract the bar of limitation, no trial is warranted and the suit is liable to be dismissed at the threshold. That apart, the learned counsel referred to the decision of this Court in Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Others v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another6 , wherein, it was clearly held that the spirit and intention of Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC is only for the courts to nip at its bud when any litigation ex-facie appears to be a clear abuse of process.
9.4. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the respondents / defendants being the absolute owners of the property, have been in peaceful possession and enjoyment thereof. However,
4 (2020) 7 SCC 366
5 (2020) 16 SCC 601
6 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3844 2014 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the appellant, having suppressed material facts, deliberately instituted the suit after an inordinate delay of 26 years. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the High Court rejecting the plaint does not warrant any interference by this Court.
10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and upon careful perusal of the pleadings, the material on record, and the impugned judgment, we find it necessary to examine whether the rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC was justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is to be pointed out at this juncture that though the respondents / defendants sought to reject the plaint on two grounds - valuation of the suit and limitation - the High Court rejected the plaint solely on the ground that it was timebarred. Accordingly, we shall confine our consideration in this appeal to the issue of limitation.
11. It is well-settled that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, governs suits seeking cancellation of an instrument and prescribes a period of limitation of three years from the date when the plaintiff first had knowledge of the facts entitling him to such relief. The emphasis under Article 59 is not on the date of the transaction per se, but on the accrual of the cause of action, which, in cases involving allegations of fraud or unauthorized execution of documents, hinges upon the date on which the plaintiff acquired knowledge of such facts.
12. In the present case, the appellant has specifically averred in the plaint that upon becoming aware of registration of documents allegedly carried out among the defendants in relation to the suit property, he immediately approached the Additional Commissioner of Police, Chennai and lodged a land grabbing complaint on 09.12.2011 against the family of Defendant No.1. Subsequently, he applied for patta in his favour on 24.02.2012, and raised objections on 05.03.2012 to Defendant No. 4 stating that the suit property belonged to the plaintiff and that no registration concerning the same should be carried out. He has also submitted an objection petition to Defendant No. 5 requesting that no planning permit be granted to anybody except the appellant in respect of the suit property. Thereafter, the appellant instituted the suit on 03.12.2014 seeking a declaration and consequential reliefs. On the other hand, the respondents / defendants stated in their application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC that the appellant had knowledge of the execution of the sale deed by his father in favour of Defendant No.1 at the earliest point of time and hence, [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2015P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors. the suit instituted by the appellant was barred by limitation. While the trial Court rejected the said application holding that the issue of limitation involved a mixed question of law and fact, the High Court in revision, took a contrary view and allowed the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and rejected the plaint solely on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation.
12.1. However, we are of the considered view that the issue as to whether the appellant had prior notice or reason to be aware of the transaction at an earlier point of time, or whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge is credible, are matters that necessarily require appreciation of evidence. At this preliminary stage, the averments made in the plaint must be taken at their face value and assumed to be true. Once the date of knowledge is specifically pleaded and forms the basis of the cause of action, the issue of limitation cannot be decided summarily. It becomes a mixed question of law and fact, which cannot be adjudicated at the threshold stage under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Therefore, rejection of the plaint on the ground of limitation without permitting the parties to lead evidence, is legally unsustainable.
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