Suresh v. State Rep. By Inspector of Police
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 318; [2025] 3 S.C.R. 317
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah
- Decided
- 3 Mar 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 540/2013
- Sections
- 302, 307
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 3 S.C.R. 317 : 2025 INSC 318 Suresh v.
State Rep. By Inspector of Police (Criminal Appeal No. 540 of 2013)
04 March 2025 [Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court was correct to uphold the conviction and life imprisonment granted by the Trial Court.
Headnotes† Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Whether High Court correctly appreciated the facts and upheld the conviction of the accused — Correctness:
Held: While convicting, the Trial Court mainly relied upon the evidence given by parents of the deceased and the dying declaration, which was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate — Dying declaration is an important piece of evidence and a conviction can be made by relying solely on a dying declaration alone as it holds immense importance in criminal law – However, such reliance should be placed after ascertaining the quality of the dying declaration and considering the entire facts of a given case — The deceased had given two statements which are totally different from her subsequent statement made before the Judicial Magistrate, which casts serious doubts on the veracity of the deceased’s subsequent statement, where the deceased had blamed the accused for the incident — No other evidence corroborates the deceased’s statement that the appellant had poured kerosene on her and then set her on fire — The doctor, who had examined the deceased immediately after the incident, denied the presence of the smell of kerosene in the body of the deceased when she was brought to the hospital — Reliance of prosecution on Observation Mahazar is not correct, which is itself doubtful as the seizure witness to the said Mahazar has turned hostile and there had been an inordinate delay in sending the Mahazar to Court — Where the deceased has been changing her stance and has completely * Author 318 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports turned around her statements, such a dying declaration cannot become the sole basis for the conviction in the absence of any other corroborative evidence — Total reliance on subsequent dying declaration would be misplaced – Thus, the accused deserves to be given the benefit of doubt, therefore acquitted. [Paras 11-17] Case Law Cited Uttam v. State of Maharashtra [2022] 5 SCR 863 : (2022) 8 SCC 576 – relied upon.
List of Acts Penal Code, 1860; Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
List of Keywords Dying declaration not the sole basis for conviction; Failure of justice. Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
540 of 2013 From the Judgment and Order dated 28.02.2012 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Crl.A. (MD) No. 178 of 2011 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Abhimanyu Singh, Amicus Curiae (Assisted by: Deepak Raj, Aravindh S.).
Advs. for the Respondent:
V. Krishnamurthy, A.A.G., Sabarish Subramanian, Vishnu Unnikrishnan, Ms. Azka Sheikh, Ms. Jahnavi Taneja, Danish Saifi. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.
1. The appellant before us has challenged the order dated 28.02.2012 by which the High Court of Madras has upheld the appellant’s [2025] 3 S.C.R. 319Suresh v. State Rep. By Inspector of Police conviction and life sentence for an offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (‘IPC’).
2. The brief case of the prosecution is that on 12.09.2008 at around 6 pm, the appellant caused the death of his wife (‘deceased’) by pouring kerosene on her body and setting her on fire, which ultimately resulted in her death after a period of approximately three weeks in a hospital. The appellant used to reside in his house at Narayanachetti Street, Tuticorin with his wife and a 2 ½ year old son. The Motherin-law (PW-1) and Father-in-law (PW-2) of the appellant used to reside in the street next to the appellant’s street. On the fateful day i.e., 12.09.2008 when the child of the deceased was crying, the deceased called her mother (PW-1) to pacify the child and the child was taken away by her mother (PW-1) to her house which was in the neighbourhood. Meanwhile, PW-1 and PW-2 were informed by a neighbourhood child that their daughter Sumathi (deceased) had caught fire. She was then immediately taken to a nearby hospital, and then to another hospital (American Hospital) and eventually admitted in a Government Hospital at Thoothukudi.
3. At around 9:30 pm, when police received the information, PW-9 (Head Constable) reached the hospital and recorded the statement of the deceased. In her statement to PW-9, the deceased stated that she caught fire while working in the kitchen. She also states that at the time of the incident, the appellant was sleeping and when she screamed, the appellant woke up and tried to put off the fire. On the basis of this statement, a general diary entry was made by police on 12.09.2008.
4. Thereafter, on 15.09.2008, a case for accidental fire was registered. On the same day, PW-15 (Sub-Inspector) visited the scene of the occurrence and seized a kerosene can and matchstick. On this day, police recorded another statement of the deceased where she stated that her husband had set her on fire by pouring kerosene and she did not state so in her earlier statement as her husband was present while PW-9 recorded her statement on 12.09.2008. On 15.09.2008, the accidental fire case was converted to a case under section 307 of IPC against the appellant. Finally, upon the death of the deceased on 02.10.2008, section 307 of IPC was modified to section 302 of IPC.
5. Before the death of the deceased, on 18.09.2008, a Judicial Magistrate recorded a statement of the deceased and this statement was used by the prosecution as the dying declaration. In this statement, the 320 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports deceased stated before the Judicial Magistrate (PW-12) that it was the appellant who had poured kerosene on her and set her on fire on 12.09.2008.
6. The Trial Court treated this statement given to PW-12 as the dying declaration and convicted the appellant under section 302 of IPC. In appeal before the High Court, the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment, imposed by the Trial Court, have been affirmed by the impugned order dated 28.02.2012. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant is here before us.
7. We have heard both sides and perused the material before us.
8. Before coming to the issue of dying declaration, we would like to go through the evidence of other witnesses who were there before the Trial Court. There were as many as 17 witnesses from the side of the prosecution. PW-1 and PW-2, who are the mother and father of the deceased respectively, had both deposed that when they reached the house of the deceased, they found the deceased was burnt and also deposed that PW-3 (neighbour) had already reached there and tried to douse the fire. PW-1 and PW-2 also deposed that they were the ones who had taken the deceased to the hospital.
9. PW-1 and PW-2 also tried to suggest that the appellant had set the deceased on fire and neither did he make any attempt to douse the fire nor did he accompany them when they took the deceased to the hospital. On the other hand, it is to be noted that PW-3 and PW-4 deposed that they were the first to reach the deceased’s house and they deposed that the appellant was the one who informed PW-1 and PW-2 about the incident. PW-3 also deposed that she and her father (PW-4), as well as, the appellant tried to extinguish the fire. However, these two prosecution witnesses i.e. PW-3 and PW-4 were declared hostile. Moreover, PW-13 (doctor) had deposed that when the deceased was brought to the hospital, the appellant was with the deceased. Here, it is to be noted that the appellant suffers from 40% physical disability resulting from a polio attack. Also, the version that the appellant had not made any attempt to take the deceased to the hospital is not only in contradiction with the deposition of PW-13 but would also be fatal for the prosecution case itself as the prosecution case mainly relies on the story that the deceased had made a false statement due to the presence of the appellant in the hospital, in other words, appellant was there in the hospital with the deceased [2025] 3 S.C.R. 321Suresh v. State Rep. By Inspector of Police when her statement was recorded by the Police, immediately on the arrival of the deceased in the hospital.
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