Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale & Anr. v. The State of Karnataka
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 221; [2025] 3 S.C.R. 158
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R Mahadevan
- Decided
- 10 Feb 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 593/2022
- Sections
- 34, 106, 161, 209, 313, 149, 120, 109
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 3 S.C.R. 158 : 2025 INSC 221 Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale & Anr.
v.
The State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 593 of 2022)
11 February 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose as regards the correctness of the order passed by the High Court reversing the acquittal of the appellants-husband and mother-in-law of the deceased-wife and held them both guilty of offences under the Penal Code, 1860 and Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 for causing the death of the deceased by setting her on fire.
Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – ss.498A, 302 and 504 rw s.34 – Common intention – Individual liability – Appellants-husband and mother-in-law of the deceased-wife charged for causing her death by setting her on fire – Dying declaration made – Acquittal by the trial court of the offence punishable u/ss. 498A, 302 and 504 rw s.34 and ss.3 and 4 of the 1961 Act – However, the High Court reversed the acquittal and held both of them guilty of the offences – Correctness:
Held: Although s.34 deals with a criminal act which is joint and an intention which is common, it cannot be said that it completely ignores or eliminates the element of personal contribution of the individual offender in both these respects – Condition precedent of s.34 that the individual offender must have participated in the offence in both these respects – He must have done something, however slight, or conduct himself in some manner, however nebulous whether by doing an act or by omitting to do an act so as to indicate that he was a participant in the offence and a guilty associate in it – He must also be individually a party to an intention which he must share in common with others – He must be a sharer both in the ‘criminal act’ as well as in the ‘common intention’ which are the twin aspects of s.34 – No cogent and reliable evidence to hold the husband-appellant guilty of the alleged offence even [2025] 3 S.C.R. 159Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale & Anr. v. T he State of Karnataka with the aid of s.34 – It is difficult for the accused to urge that owing to the mention of s.34, in the charge, he was misled or prejudiced in his defence by being persuaded to presume that all consideration of his individual liability was completely shut out as a result thereof – To implicate the husband also in the alleged crime, u/s.106 Evidence Act, the prosecution has to as a condition precedent lay the foundational facts prima facie indicating his involvement or participation in the alleged crime – His sudden disappearance after the incident not sufficient to infer common intention – Furthermore, it cannot be said that the deceased was not in a fit state of mind to give a dying declaration – Nothing to disbelieve the oral dying declaration made by the deceased before the doctor – Also pertinent to note that only the motherin-law, figures in the dying declaration as well as oral evidence of the doctor and the tehsildar – Thus, the High Court rightly held the mother-in-law-appellant no.2 guilty of the alleged crime but erred in holding the husband-appellant no.1 guilty of the offence of murder with the aid of s.34 – Conviction of appellant no.2 affirmed – Appellant no.1 acquitted of all charges – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.106 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – ss.3, 4. [Paras 37, 39, 41, 58, 63, 87-89, 91-93 ] Penal Code, 1860 – ss.34 and 149 – Common intention vis-a-vis Common object – Difference between ss.34 and 149 – Explained. [Paras 41-50 ] Penal Code, 1860 – s.34 – Common intention – Criminal act – Meaning – Explained. [52-76] Case Law Cited Om Prakash v. State, 1956 CrLJ 452; Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 1; Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghosh, AIR 1924 Cal 257 (FB); Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay (S) [1955] 1 SCR : 1177 AIR 1955 SC 287; Bashir v. State, AIR 1953 All 668; Faiyaz Khan v. Rex, AIR 1949 All 180; Aydrooss v. Emperor, AIR 1923 Mad 187; Abdul Kader v. Emperor, AIR 1946 Cal 452; Suresh Sakharam Nangare v. The State of Maharashtra [2012] 7 SCR 1186 : 2012 (9) Judgements Today 116 – referred to.
160 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports List of Acts Penal Code, 1860; Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Evidence Act 1872.
List of Keywords Dowry; Setting wife on fire; Acquittal; Dying declaration; Common intention; Principal in the first degree; Principal in the second degree; Accessories at the fact; Accessories after the fact; Accessories before the fact; Presence on the scene; Common design; Preconcerted end; Successive acts; Simultaneous acts; Special knowledge; Intention of the individual offender; Mens rea; Common object of assembly as a whole; Abetment; Presence on the spot as spectator; Criminal Act; Fit state of mind to give dying declaration; Oral dying declaration; Oral evidence; Common intention of all; Individual offender; Unlawful assembly.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
593 of 2022 From the Judgment and Order dated 06.10.2020 of the High Court of Karnataka Circuit Bench at Dharwad in CRLA No. 100168 of 2016 Appearances for Parties H. Chandra Sekhar, Adv. for the Appellants.
Avishkar Singhvi, A.A.G., V. N. Raghupathy, Vivek Kumar Singh, Naved Ahmed, Ms. Sakshi Raman, Advs. for the Respondent. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Order
1. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 100168 of 2016 dated 6 th October 2020 by which the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the State of Karnataka and thereby quashed and set aside the judgment and order passed by the VIth Additional District & Sessions Judge, Belagavi in S.C. No. 151 of 2013 acquitting the appellants herein of the offence punishable under Sections 498A, 302 and 504 read with Section 34 respectively of the Indian Penal [2025] 3 S.C.R. 161Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale & Anr. v. T he State of Karnataka Code, 1860 (for short “the IPC”) and Sections 3 and 4 respectively of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
2. It is the case of the prosecution that the deceased named Geetha was married to the appellant no.1 herein viz. Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale past 8 years from the date of the incident. In the wedlock three children were born. It is alleged that after a period of one year from the date of marriage the husband and his family members started harassing the deceased. The deceased was being harassed for dowry and in connection with the domestic house hold work.
3. On the date of the incident at around 8.00 p.m. while the deceased was at her matrimonial home, her mother-in-law i.e. the appellant no.2 herein is alleged to have poured kerosene on her body and set her on fire. The deceased suffered extensive burn injuries.
4. The neighbours residing in the vicinity rushed to the place of the incident and immediately shifted her to the hospital. The deceased succumbed to the burn injuries after a period of one week. The cause of death as usual is septicemia.
5. The mother of the deceased Tippavva Chandru Patil, lodged an FIR dated 03-01-2013 which came to be registered as crime No. 2 of 2013 in Mudalagi Police Station, Mudalagi Circle, District Belagavi, Karnataka. The first information report reads thus:- “The accused persons mentioned herein are the husband, mother-in-law and father-in-law of Geetha, daughter of the complainant and the said accused persons looked after Geetha cordially for 1 year after marriage but then they have not only ill-treated her physically and mentally by insisting her to wake up early in the morning and do the household chores and to go to the house of others to work but also pressurized her to bring an amount of Rs.5,000/- from her maternal house and since she did not bring money from her maternal house, the accused person had the intention to kill her and poured kerosene on her and set fire and tried to kill her and thereby committed offence.”
6. On the FIR being registered the investigation started. The Tehsiladar of the area was requested to reach the hospital for the purpose of recording of the dying declaration of the deceased. The Tehsildar 162 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports within four hours of the incident reached the hospital and recorded the dying declaration Exhibit-46.
7. The statements of various witnesses, more particularly, the neighbours who had brought the deceased to the hospital were recorded under Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973(for short “the Cr.P.C.”). After the deceased passed away her body was sent to post mortem examination. The other articles collected in the course of the investigation like clothes etc. were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for the purpose of chemical analysis.
8. At the end of the investigation, Police filed charge-sheet against the husband and mother-in-law respectively for the offence enumerated above. The case being exclusively triable by the Sessions Court came to be committed to the Court of Sessions Under Section 209 of the Cr.P.C.
9. The trial court proceeded to frame the charge against the accused persons under Sections 498-A, 302, 114, 323 and 504 r/w Sec.34 of IPC respectively and Sections 3 and 4 respectively of Dowry Prohibition Act to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
10. The prosecution examined the following witnesses in support of its case:- “PW1 Anand Shankar Sanawale PW2 Laxman Ramappa Sanawale.
PW3 Sushila Dilip Sanawale.
PW4 Shabbir Samsher Sanawale.
PW5 Latha Shashikant Sanawale.
PW6 Julekha Gulabsab Sanawale.
PW7 Smt. Yallawwa Ramu Karale.
PW8 Krishna Mukappa Shivalli.
PW9 Malik Chandru Patil.
PW10 Prakash Shankar Sanawale.
PW11 Smt. Tippavva Chandru Patil.
PW12 Hanumanth Bhima Nayak.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 163Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale & Anr. v. T he State of Karnataka PW13 Dastagir Abdulsab Inamdar.
PW14 Dr. Adam Allasab Nadaf.
PW15 Dr.Gopal Ramu Wagamude.
PW16 Shivanand Basavanthappa Dhulai.
PW17 Suresh Shankar Murgod.
PW18 Maruti Yallappa Padadalli.
PW19 Anil Balappa Padedar.
PW20 Lakkappa Durgappa Taddi.
PW21 Oudram Hammabba Beary PW22 Sureshbabu Rudrappa Bandiwaddar.
PW23 Sharanappa.M.Olekar.
PW24 Mrthunjay Irayya Mathapati.
PW25 Dr.N.Sujatha Nanjegouda”
11. The prosecution also led the following pieces of documentary evidence:- “(i) Ex.P.8 Mahazar of place of occurrence
(ii) Ex.P.27 Post Mortem Report
(iii) Ex.P.30 Opinion of the Doctor before recording the Dying Declaration (PW15)
(iv) Ex.P.30 Opinion of the Doctor before recording the Dying Declaration (PW25)
(v) Ex.P.46 Dying Declaration
(vi) Ex.P.54 FSL Report”
12. Upon closure of the recording of the evidence, the trial court recorded the further statement of both the accused persons under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which both the accused said that they were innocent and had been falsely implicated.
13. Upon appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence on record, the trial court recorded a finding that the prosecution had failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly acquitted both the accused.
164 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
14. The State being dissatisfied with the judgement and order of acquittal passed by the trial court went in appeal before the High Court. The High Court reversed the finding of acquittal and held both the accused guilty of the alleged offence. The High Court ultimately sentenced them to life imprisonment with fine.
15. In such circumstances, referred to above, the appellants are here before this Court with the present appeal.
16. Mr Faeek-ul-Farooq, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants vehemently submitted that the High Court committed an egregious error in reversing a well-reasoned judgement of the acquittal. According to him, even if a different view is possible on the evidence on record, the High Court as an Appellate Court should be slow in reversing the acquittal unless the High Court comes to the conclusion that the findings recorded by the trial court are perverse or contrary to the evidence on record.
17. He would submit that the High Court committed a serious error in relying upon the dying declaration of the deceased recorded by the Tehsildar. According to him having regard to the medical evidence on record the dying declaration should be discarded as the deceased at the relevant point of time was not in a fit condition of mind to speak anything.
18. He submitted that so far as the appellant no.1 i.e. the husband is concerned, there is no case at all against him.
19. He would submit that the deceased neither in the oral dying declaration made before the Doctor nor in the dying declaration recorded by the Tehsildar has said anything against the husband. On the contrary, according to the learned counsel the deceased in the dying declaration before the Tehsildar has said that the husband poured water on her to extinguish the fire.
20. In such circumstances, referred to above, the learned counsel prayed that there being merit in his appeal the same may be allowed and the accused persons be acquitted.
21. On the other hand, Mr.Singhvi, the learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that no error not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the High Court in reversing the acquittal and holding the appellants herein guilty of the offence of [2025] 3 S.C.R. 165Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale & Anr. v. T he State of Karnataka murder. He would submit that the only thing that weighed with the trial court in disbelieving the dying declaration is the fact that all other witnesses, more particularly, the neighbours had turned hostile and failed to support the case of the prosecution.
22. According to Mr. Singhvi, the oral dying declaration made by the deceased before PW-15 Dr.Gopal Ramu Wagamude and the dying declaration before the Tehsildar exhibit P-21 is sufficient enough to at least hold the appellant no.2 guilty of the alleged crime.
23. In the last Mr. Singhvi tried to develop an argument that although the husband may not be directly involved or in other words has not been directly implicated in the alleged crime still it is established that he was present in the house and it was expected of the husband to take all necessary precautions or steps to save his wife and the failure or omission on his part would indicate the common intention shared by him along with his mother.
24. Mr. Singhvi also tried to invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act arguing that something within the personal knowledge of the husband should have been disclosed by the husband in his further statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. In the absence of any plausible explanation the High Court rightly held the husband also guilty with the aid of Section 34 of the IPC.
25. In such circumstances, referred to above, Mr. Singhvi prayed that there being no merit in this appeal, the same may be dismissed.
ANALYSIS:
26. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any error in passing the impugned judgement?
27. We first start with the dying declaration recorded by the Tehsildar.
28. The dying declaration exhibit-46 recorded by the Tehsildar reads thus:- “Question No.1: Are you conscious and in a sound state of mind? Answer: Yes Question No.2: Are. you in a state to speak?
Answer: Yes 166 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Question No.3: Where are you now?
Answer: General Hospital, Gokak.
Question No.4: When and who brought you here and by what means?
Answer: The people belonging to my lane brought me here yesterday in ambulance at about 8~30 p.m.
Question No.5: Who attacked you?
Answer: My mother-in-law poured kerosene on me and my mother-in-law Jaitunabi lit matchstick and threw on me and set fire.
Question No.6: Give their name and address?
Answer: Jaitunabi Sanavale Question No. 7: How do you identify her?
Answer: I identify her.
Question No.8: How did you sustain injury?
Answer: I have sustained injuries by fire.
Question No.9: What are the weapons used and describe the shapes?
Answer: Kerosene and matchstick.
Question No.10: In which place you are attacked?
Answer: In the house situated in Mudalagi.
Question No.11: Can you identify wounds on your body?
Answer: Yes.
Question No.12: How and in what manner you have sustained injuries?
Answer: Burnt by pouring kerosene.
Question No.13: What was the intention behind the attack? Answer: I was in house and in the evening there was quarrel due to my children and at that time my mother-in-law Jaitunabi Sanavale got enraged due to quarrel and poured kerosene [2025] 3 S.C.R. 167Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale & Anr. v. T he State of Karnataka on me and when I was going to bathroom, my mother-in-law Jaitunabi lit matchstick and threw it on me. My husband Vasant splashed water on me but the fire did not extinguish and at that time the residents of the lane gathered and took me in ambulance to General Hospital at about 8.30 p.m.”
29. In the aforesaid context we shall now look into the oral evidence of the Tehsildar. The Tehsildar PW-21 namely Oudram in his examination in chief has deposed thus:- “On 3-1-2013 when I was discharging my duty as Tahsildar Gokak. I, received requisition from Mudalagi police station as per Ex.P.42 which was received in my said office.
On the same day I went to Govt. hospital Gokak and wrote a letter to Medical Officer, Govt hospital Gokak as per Ex.P.32 seeking his opinion whether Geeta was able to give any statement, which bears my signature Ex.P. 32 (b). The said Medical Officer in Ex.P.32 has endorsed that patient was able to give oral statement.
Accordingly, I have recorded dying declaration of the said Geeta. She for questioning who, when and how she was brought to hospital, she answered that the residents of her lane brought her on previous night at 8.30 pm by ambulance.
For questing who assaulted her, she replied her mother-in-law had poured kerosene and aunt, namely- Jaitunabi, set her fire my matchstick.
For questioning whether she could identify her, she replied that she could. For questioning how she sustained injuries, she replied she sustained burn injuries. For questioning where crime was committed, she replied that at home at Mudalagi. For questioning the intention of the crime she replied when she was there in house in the evening, there was quarrel because of her children. Her mother-in-law enraged by the said quarrel poured kerosene on her. When she was going to bathroom her mother-in-law Jaitunabi, lighted match stick and threw on her. Her husband, Vasant, splashed water on her. The fire did not extinguish. At that time the people from her lane gathered and took her to hospital at 8.30 pm by an ambulance.
168 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Since her palms were burned I took finger impression of her left toe on the said dying declaration.
Afterwards I have signed said dying declaration and the Medical Officer has also signed the same. On 4-2-2013 I received requisition, marked Ex.P. 44, seeking to issue true copy of dying declaration of deceased Geeta. On 4-2-2013 I sent a letter, with one true copy of dying declaration and one sealed envelope containing original dying declaration to CPI, marked, Ex.P.45, which bears my signature Ex.P.45(a)
(In the open court a sealed cover received from Addl. JMFC, Gokak is opened.)
The dying declaration of Geeta is Ex.P.46;my signature is Ex P.46(a)(b);The left toe impression of Geeta there-in is Ex.P.46(c); The signature of medical officer there-in is Ex.P.46(d). I have recorded the dying declaration of Geeta on 3-1-2013 from 12.15 p.m. to 12.25 p.m.”
30. Unfortunately, there is no cross examination worth the name of the Tehsildar. Nothing substantial could be elicited through the cross examination thereby to disbelieve that the deceased was not in a fit state of mind to give a dying declaration
31. We now proceed to look into the evidence of Dr. Gopal Ramu Wagamude Exhibit 17 (PW-15). Dr. Gopal Waghmude in his examination-in-chief as deposed as under:- “I have been serving as Senior Specialist in General Hospital, Gokak, since 2011. On 02.01.2013 at about 9.30 p.m., Anand S. Sanavale had brought Geetha Vasant Sanavale, aged about 28 years; R/o Mudalagi, to our Hospital requiring treatment for burn injuries. As per the information given by Geetha; her mother-in-law poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze. She also informed that this incident occurred on the same day at about 8.00 p.m. On examining her, she was in conscious state. She was telling that she was feeling thirsty. When she was examined, her B.P was 90/70 and her pulse was palpitating and kerosene smell was coming out of her body. On examining her, normal burn injuries were found on her face and neck, Deep burn injuries were [2025] 3 S.C.R. 169Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale & Anr. v. T he State of Karnataka found on her right hand, left hand, right leg and left leg. Deep burn injuries were found on abdomen and back and all these injuries appeared reddish in colour. All these injuries were grievous in nature and also fresh in nature. Nearly 90% of burn injuries were found. I have given treatment to the said as in-patient. I have also given treatment to her on 03.01.2013. Except me, General Surgeon has also provided treatment to this patient.
On 03.01.2013, A.S.I of Mudalagi Police station gave a requisition requesting to know whether the patient is in the condition to give statement or not. The document which is shown to me now is the office copy of the requisition which was given to me on that day. It has been marked as Ex.P.30. Ex.P.30 bears my signature about receiving it. In Ex.P.30, I have written my opinion that the patient is in the condition to give statement. It has been marked as Ex.P.30 (a). I have furnished wound certificate about the injuries. The document which is shown to me now is the wound certificate that I have furnished. It has been marked as Ex.P.31. The signature of witness has been marked as Ex.P.31 (a). The document which is shown to me now is the office copy of the requisition given by the Tahsildar to N. Sujatha, Junior Specialist of our Hospital. The said requisition bears signature of N. Sujatha. The said document has been marked as Ex.P.32. In Ex.P.32, Junior Specialist Sujatha has given opinion and affixed signature by stating that the patient is in the condition to give statement. It has been marked as Ex.P.32 (a).
When a person pours kerosene on another person, there are chances of sustaining injuries found in Ex.P.31. The above-mentioned patient was referred to KIMS Hospital, Hubballi from our hospital for further treatment.”
32. Again, there is no cross examination of Dr. Wagamude. N o t h i n g substantial could be elicited through the cross examination of the Dr. so as to disbelieve the oral dying declaration made by the deceased before him.
33. However, what is pertinent for us to note is that nowhere the husband figures. It is only the mother-in-law, who figures in the dying declaration as well as oral evidence of the Doctor and the Tehsildar. 170 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
34. We also looked into the evidence, so as to ascertain whether the deceased was in a fit condition to make the dying declaration or not. There is nothing on record to indicate that she was unable to talk or was not conscious.
35. To a very pertinent question put by us to Mr. Singhvi as to what weighed with the High Court in holding the husband guilty of the alleged offence, he invited the attention of this Court to para 30 of the impugned judgement. In para 30, the High Court has observed thus:-
30. From the very statement of Geetha, cruelty to her in the hands of the accused persons is established invariably and without iota of doubt. The cause of death is burn injuries and the burn injuries are established to have been inflicted by accused Nos.1 and 2, they are charged with common intention. If the accused No.1 was really about to save his wife, he could have done it when she was in murderous condition by sustaining injuries to the extent of 90-95% inflicted in his person in his presence and in the presence of hostility of himself and his wife, he never bothered even to take her to treatment. He wanted to ensure that she dies. In this connection, the offence may be with respect of commission or omission.”
36. The plain reading of para 30 referred to above would indicate that what weighed with the High Court in holding the husband-appellant guilty is the fact that he never bothered to take his wife to the hospital as he wanted to ensure that she does not survive. Therefore, according to the High Court, the husband could be said to be guilty having shared common intention with his mother. We have not been able to understand exactly what the High Court wants to convey.
37. Be that as it may, we have reached the conclusion that there is no cogent and reliable evidence to hold the husband-appellant guilty of the alleged offence even with the aid of Section 34 of the IPC. Section 34 of the IPC reads thus:- “34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.—When a criminal act is done by several persons, in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.”
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