Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi Alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr. Etc.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 420; [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1407
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra
- Decided
- 26 Mar 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1713/2025
- Sections
- 319, 3191, 161, 2, 173, 299, 300(5), 398, 319(1), 319(4), 319CR, 273CR
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
Preview: first 50% of the document.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1407 : 2025 INSC 420 Yadwinder Singh v.
Lakhi Alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr. Etc.
(Criminal Appeal No(s). 1713-1720 of 2025)
26 March 2025 [Ahsanuddin Amanullah* and Prashant Kumar Mishra,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the order of the Trial Court issuing summons u/s.319, CrPC against the private respondents.
Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.319 – Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence – Murder of the appellant-informant’s brother, political rivalry alleged – FIR filed – SIT set up, no evidence found against the private respondents – Trial Court issued summons to the private respondents – High Court set aside the summons issued – Interference with:
Held: Though, the SIT found no evidence against the private respondents however, this by itself puts no fetters on the powers conferred u/s.319 – Moreover, eye-witnesses named the private respondents as persons present on the site of occurrence – Absolving the private respondents based on the SIT’s findings alone is not in the interests of justice – A case is made out to summon the private respondents – On facts, discretion exercised by the Trial Court neither capricious, nor arbitrary or mechanical – Impugned order set aside – Trial Court to issue fresh summons. [Paras 16-18] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.319 – Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence – Exercise of – Scope and ambit, discussed. [Paras 11-15] Case Law Cited Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab [2014] 2 SCR 1 : (2014) 3 SCC 92; Ramesh Chandra Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2021] * Author 1408 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports 6 SCR 219 : (2021) 12 SCC 608; Sukhpal Singh Khaira v. State of Punjab [2022] 10 SCR 156 : (2023) 1 SCC 289; Ramkrishna Forgings Limited v. Ravindra Loonkar [2023] 16 SCR 672 : (2024) 2 SCC 122 – relied on.
Brijendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan [2017] 3 SCR 374 : (2017) 7 SCC 706; Jamin v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 506; Shishupal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2019) 8 SCC 682; Yashodhan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2023] 10 SCR 1196 : (2023) 9 SCC 108 – referred to.
List of Acts Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords Section 319 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Murder; Issuance of summons; Other persons appearing to be guilty of offence; Special Investigation Team (SIT); Political rivalry; Sitting Sarpanch; Additional accused; Persons present on the site of occurrence; Doctrine judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitor.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No(s). 1713-1720 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 18.07.2024 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRMM Nos. 44097, 20532 and 25310 of 2022 and CRR Nos. 1204, 1474, 1513, 1558 and 1695 of 2022 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Jitesh Malik, Ms. Anisha Dahiya, Jatin Hooda, Ms. Anjana Sharma, Abhay Singh, Satish Kumar.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Sr. Adv., Saurabh Singh Chauhan, Rajeev Kumar Dubey, Diggaj Pathak, Ms. Shweta Sharma, Naveen Gaur, Ms. Vaibhavi Pathak, B. Abishek, Pradyut Kashyap, Ms. Shreya Nair, Shivam Harsana, Karan Kapoor, Manik Kapoor, Shrey Kapoor.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1409Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi Alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr. Etc. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Ahsanuddin Amanullah & Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.
Leave granted. By way of extraordinary indulgence to the respondents, we have taken up the matter(s) de novo. The instant Judgment be, therefore, read and contextualised in conjunction with our Order dated 19.03.2025.
2. Heard learned counsel and learned senior counsel for the parties.
3. The present appeals are directed against the Impugned Order dated 18.07.2024 [2024 SCC OnLine P&H 11673] passed by a learned Single Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh by which summons issued under Section 3191 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’) by the learned Trial Court against the private respondents in connection with First Information Report No.50 of 2020 (hereinafter referred to as ‘FIR’) registered at Police Station Passiana, District Patiala, Punjab were set aside.
APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS:
4. Learned counsel for the appellant, Mr Jitesh Malik, submits that the appellant is the complainant/informant and his brother had died. It was submitted that in the FIR itself, all the respondents/accused were identified ‘in the light of the car’ 2 and it was a brutal murder where 1 ‘319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence.—(1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed.
(2) Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid.
(3) Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed.
(4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under sub-section (1) then—
(a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses re-heard;
(b) subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced.’ 2 We take it that this means that the identity of the accused was discernible to the appellant-complainant despite it being 8.30pm in the night.
1410 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the deceased was pulled out from the car and then done to death. Learned counsel submitted that the issuance of summons was on the basis of the tentative view formed by the Trial Court, being that of likely involvement of the private respondents in the crime and ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court at such a preliminary stage, especially when the Trial Court had found sufficient material to summon the private respondents/accused. Prayer was made to allow the appeals.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ SUBMISSIONS:
5. Per contra, the private respondents led by Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, learned senior counsel, submit that the instant is not a fit case where this Court should interfere. It was contended that power to summon a person as accused under Section 319 of the Code, though exists on the statute-book but is to be sparingly used and under very fitting circumstances. It was submitted that the Courts have consistently held that the test would be higher than at the stage of framing of charge and just short of holding a person guilty of the charge. It was submitted that in the present case, as per the allegation in the FIR itself, 24 persons had come on three different vehicles, which, to begin with, was highly improbable and impractical. Further, it was submitted that the complainant’s initial version is that he along with the deceased were travelling in the car, whereas in his deposition before the Court, it is stated that three persons were travelling in the car i.e., PW1 (who is the informant himself) alongwith the deceased and their other brother i.e., PW2. It was urged that this was not a minor and natural variation but a clear building-up of a case against others and to get additional eye-witnesses created, since there was no other independent corroboration of the incident in question.
6. Learned senior counsel submitted that in the present case, after the lodging of the FIR, a Special Investigation Team (hereinafter referred to as ‘SIT’) was set up to verify the facts because of the sensitive nature of the incident. It was advanced that the SIT found that the respondents could not have been at the place of occurrence for cogent reasons both on the basis of witnesses supporting their presence at some other place(s) and also on the basis of CCTV 3 3 Abbreviation for Closed Circuit Television.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1411Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi Alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr. Etc. footage, which is electronic evidence. Learned senior counsel submitted that the fall-out was due to political rivalry as the deceased was a sitting Sarpanch. In support of his contentions, he relied upon Brijendra Singh v State of Rajasthan, (2017) 7 SCC 706 to contend that the power to summon under Section 319 of the Code has been circumscribed by the conditions laid down by this Court from timeto-time. Going by the same, in the present case where only two prosecution witnesses, that too close relatives of the deceased, have been examined, without being subjected to any cross-examination, the repetition of the version in the FIR with the addition that the other eye-witness viz. PW-2 has been introduced as being present in the car in which the deceased and PW1/informant were travelling was not sufficient to fulfil the requirement for invoking power under Section 319 of the Code. In the present case, learned senior counsel contended that from Paragraph 15 of Brijendra Singh (supra), the following law emerges, which was a case where witnesses had been examined and after that summons under Section 319 of the Code were issued, and the Court held:
‘15. This record was before the trial court. Notwithstanding the same, the trial court went by the deposition of complainant and some other persons in their examinationin-chief, with no other material to support their so-called verbal/ocular version. Thus, the ‘evidence’ recorded during trial was nothing more than the statements which was already there under Section 161 Cr.P.C. recorded at the time of investigation of the case. No doubt, the trial court would be competent to exercise its power even on the basis of such statements recorded before it in examination-inchief. However, in a case like the present where plethora of evidence was collected by the IO during investigation which suggested otherwise, the trial court was at least duty bound to look into the same while forming prima facie opinion and to see as to whether ‘much stronger evidence than mere possibility of their (i.e. appellants) complicity has come on record. There is no satisfaction of this nature. Even if we presume that the trial court was not apprised of the same at the time when it passed the order (as the appellants were not on the scene at that time), what is more troubling is that even when this material on record 1412 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports was specifically brought to the notice of the High Court in the Revision Petition filed by the appellants, the High Court too blissfully ignored the said material. Except reproducing the discussion contained in the order of the trial court and expressing agreement therewith, nothing more has been done. Such orders cannot stand judicial scrutiny.’
7. The private respondents also cited Jamin v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 506. The private respondents, collectively, sought dismissal of these appeals.
APPELLANT’S REJOINDER:
8. By way of rejoinder, learned counsel for the appellant submits that though there has been consistency in the stand of the appellant with regard to presence of all the private persons concerned i.e., that they came in three cars and that their presence has also been supported by two eye-witnesses, including the appellant, the SIT for obvious reasons, as the case has a political nature, shielded the private respondents. It was submitted that during trial, when in deposition, persons claiming to be eye-witnesses take the name of the private respondents as being present on the spot, it is always in the interest of justice that at the earliest point of time possible, they are called upon, so that the trial does not linger or has to revert back to an early stage, to enable the persons so summoned to go through the paraphernalia of cross-examining all the witnesses, which has to be in their presence. It was submitted that in the recent judgment in Jamin (supra), the foundational facts were different inasmuch as the persons who were summoned under Section 319 of the Code were still under investigation by the police. Thus, in that view, the Court held there was no occasion for the Court to jump the gun and issue summons under Section 319 of the Code.
STATE IN ABSENTIA:
9. Regrettably, despite service of notice, none appeared for the State of Punjab. In this case, before the High Court, the stand of the State was that the private respondents ‘have rightly been declared innocent.’ The State should not forget that in criminal matters, it acts as investigator and prosecutor and must be available to assist the Courts when called upon so to do. Let a copy of this Judgment be [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1413Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi Alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr. Etc. despatched to the Legal Remembrancer and Principal Secretary, Department of Legal and Legislative Affairs, Government of Punjab by the Registry, for information and appropriate remedial steps.
ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
10. Having thoughtfully considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and upon going through the materials available on record, we find that the order impugned requires interference. Let us first survey the legal position pertaining to Section 319 of the Code.
11. In Hardeep Singh v State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92, a 5-Judge Bench explained:
‘12. Section 319 CrPC springs out of the doctrine judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur (Judge is condemned when guilty is acquitted) and this doctrine must be used as a beacon light while explaining the ambit and the spirit underlying the enactment of Section 319 CrPC.
13. It is the duty of the court to do justice by punishing the real culprit. Where the investigating agency for any reason does not array one of the real culprits as an accused, the court is not powerless in calling the said accused to face trial. The question remains under what circumstances and at what stage should the court exercise its power as contemplated in Section 319 CrPC?
xxx
16. It is at this stage that the comparison of the words used under Section 319 CrPC has to be understood distinctively from the words used under Section 2(g) defining an inquiry other than the trial by a Magistrate or a court. Here the legislature has used two words, namely, the Magistrate or court, whereas under Section 319 CrPC, as indicated above, only the word “court” has been recited. This has been done by the legislature to emphasise that the power under Section 319 CrPC is exercisable only by the court and not by any officer not acting as a court. Thus, the Magistrate not functioning or exercising powers as a court can make an inquiry in a particular proceeding other than a trial but the material so collected would not be by a court 1414 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports during the course of an inquiry or a trial. The conclusion therefore, in short, is that in order to invoke the power under Section 319 CrPC, it is only a Court of Session or a Court of Magistrate performing the duties as a court under CrPC that can utilise the material before it for the purpose of the said section.
17. Section 319 CrPC allows the court to proceed against any person who is not an accused in a case before it. Thus, the person against whom summons are issued in exercise of such powers, has to necessarily not be an accused already facing trial. He can either be a person named in Column 2 of the charge-sheet filed under Section 173 CrPC or a person whose name has been disclosed in any material before the court that is to be considered for the purpose of trying the offence, but not investigated. He has to be a person whose complicity may be indicated and connected with the commission of the offence.
18. The legislature cannot be presumed to have imagined all the circumstances and, therefore, it is the duty of the court to give full effect to the words used by the legislature so as to encompass any situation which the court may have to tackle while proceeding to try an offence and not allow a person who deserves to be tried to go scot-free by being not arraigned in the trial in spite of the possibility of his complicity which can be gathered from the documents presented by the prosecution.
19. The court is the sole repository of justice and a duty is cast upon it to uphold the rule of law and, therefore, it will be inappropriate to deny the existence of such powers with the courts in our criminal justice system where it is not uncommon that the real accused, at times, get away by manipulating the investigating and/or the prosecuting agency. The desire to avoid trial is so strong that an accused makes efforts at times to get himself absolved even at the stage of investigation or inquiry even though he may be connected with the commission of the offence. xxx [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1415Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi Alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr. Etc.
55. Accordingly, we hold that the court can exercise the power under Section 319 CrPC only after the trial proceeds and commences with the recording of the evidence and also in exceptional circumstances as explained hereinabove. xxx
78. It is, therefore, clear that the word “evidence” in Section 319 CrPC means only such evidence as is made before the court, in relation to statements, and as produced before the court, in relation to documents. It is only such evidence that can be taken into account by the Magistrate or the court to decide whether the power under Section 319 CrPC is to be exercised and not on the basis of material collected during the investigation.
79. The inquiry by the court is neither attributable to the investigation nor the prosecution, but by the court itself for collecting information to draw back a curtain that hides something material. It is the duty of the court to do so and therefore the power to perform this duty is provided under CrPC.
xxx
83. It is, therefore, not any material that can be utilised, rather it is that material after cognizance is taken by a court, that is available to it while making an inquiry into or trying an offence, that the court can utilise or take into consideration for supporting reasons to summon any person on the basis of evidence adduced before the court, who may be on the basis of such material, treated to be an accomplice in the commission of the offence. The inference that can be drawn is that material which is not exactly evidence recorded before the court, but is a material collected by the court, can be utilised to corroborate evidence already recorded for the purpose of summoning any other person, other than the accused. This would harmonise such material with the word “evidence” as material that would be supportive in nature to facilitate the exposition of any other accomplice whose complicity in the offence may have either been suppressed or escaped the notice of the court.
1416 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
84. The word “evidence” therefore has to be understood in its wider sense both at the stage of trial and, as discussed earlier, even at the stage of inquiry, as used under Section 319 CrPC. The court, therefore, should be understood to have the power to proceed against any person after summoning him on the basis of any such material as brought forth before it. The duty and obligation of the court becomes more onerous to invoke such powers cautiously on such material after evidence has been led during trial. xxx
89. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the diverse views expressed in the aforementioned cases. Once examination-in-chief is conducted, the statement becomes part of the record. It is evidence as per law and in the true sense, for at best, it may be rebuttable. An evidence being rebutted or controverted becomes a matter of consideration, relevance and belief, which is the stage of judgment by the court. Yet it is evidence and it is material on the basis whereof the court can come to a prima facie opinion as to complicity of some other person who may be connected with the offence.
90. As held in Mohd. Shafi [Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafiq, (2007) 14 SCC 544 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 889: AIR 2007 SC 1899] and Harbhajan Singh [(2009) 13 SCC 608: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1135], all that is required for the exercise of the power under Section 319 CrPC is that, it must appear to the court that some other person also who is not facing the trial, may also have been involved in the offence. The prerequisite for the exercise of this power is similar to the prima facie view which the Magistrate must come to in order to take cognizance of the offence. Therefore, no straitjacket formula can and should be laid with respect to conditions precedent for arriving at such an opinion and, if the Magistrate/court is convinced even on the basis of evidence appearing in examination-in-chief, it can exercise the power under Section 319 CrPC and can proceed against such other person(s). It is essential to note that the section also uses the words “such person could be tried” [2025] 3 S.C.R. 1417Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi Alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr. Etc. instead of should be tried. Hence, what is required is not to have a mini-trial at this stage by having examination and cross-examination and thereafter rendering a decision on the overt act of such person sought to be added. In fact, it is this mini-trial that would affect the right of the person sought to be arraigned as an accused rather than not having any cross-examination at all, for in light of sub-section (4) of Section 319 CrPC, the person would be entitled to a fresh trial where he would have all the rights including the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and examine defence witnesses and advance his arguments upon the same. Therefore, even on the basis of examination-inchief, the court or the Magistrate can proceed against a person as long as the court is satisfied that the evidence appearing against such person is such that it prima facie necessitates bringing such person to face trial. In fact, examination-in-chief untested by cross-examination, undoubtedly in itself, is an evidence.
91. Further, in our opinion, there does not seem to be any logic behind waiting till the cross-examination of the witness is over. It is to be kept in mind that at the time of exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC, the person sought to be arraigned as an accused, is in no way participating in the trial. Even if the cross-examination is to be taken into consideration, the person sought to be arraigned as an accused cannot cross-examine the witness(es) prior to passing of an order under Section 319 CrPC, as such a procedure is not contemplated by CrPC. Secondly, invariably the State would not oppose or object to naming of more persons as an accused as it would only help the prosecution in completing the chain of evidence, unless the witness(es) is obliterating the role of persons already facing trial. More so, Section 299 CrPC enables the court to record evidence in absence of the accused in the circumstances mentioned therein.
92. Thus, in view of the above, we hold that power under Section 319 CrPC can be exercised at the stage of completion of examination-in-chief and the court does not need to wait till the said evidence is tested on cross- 1418 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports examination for it is the satisfaction of the court which can be gathered from the reasons recorded by the court, in respect of complicity of some other person(s), not facing the trial in the offence.
xxx
Continue reading
Sign in and become a member to continue reading this judgment and every other document in the library.
Members read the full text, download where permitted, and keep notes and bookmarks.