Central Bank of India & Anr. v. Smt. Prabha Jain & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 95; [2025] 2 S.C.R. 263
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R Mahadevan
- Decided
- 8 Jan 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 1876/2016
- Sections
- 34, 13(4), 17, 9, 13(3), 7, 13, 17(1), 17(2), 17(3), 13(2), 18
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[2025] 2 S.C.R. 263 : 2025 INSC 95 Central Bank of India & Anr.
v.
Smt. Prabha Jain & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 1876 of 2016)
09 January 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the jurisdiction of civil court to try a suit is completely barred by s.34 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. Headnotes† Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002-SARFAESI Act – ss.34, 17, 13(4) – Jurisdiction of the civil court to try a suit – Plaintiff-wife inherited 1/3rd share of the suit land on the death of her husband, however husband’s elder brother without any partition amongst the heirs divided the land and sold them illegally to different persons – One such buyer mortgaged the plot with the appellant-Bank for obtaining loan, and thereafter defaulted in payment – Bank took possession of the plot under the SARFAESI Act – Plaintiff then filed a suit in the civil court seeking declaration that the sale deed executed by husband’s brother as illegal; the mortgage deed executed in favour of the Bank as illegal; and sought possession of the plot – Application u/Ord.VII r.11 CPC by the Bank that the plaint be rejected as suit is barred u/s.34, and the civil court has no jurisdiction to try the same – Civil court rejected the plaint – However, the High Court holding that the civil court’s jurisdiction to decide the suit not ousted by s.34, and the Debt Recovery Tribunal-DRT had no jurisdiction to decide whether persons other than the mortgager had title in the mortgaged property, set aside the judgment and restored the suit – Correctness:
Held: First and second reliefs not in relation to any measures taken by the secured creditor u/s.13(4) – They are reliefs in relation to the actions taken prior to the secured creditor stepping into the picture and well prior to the secured creditor invoking 264 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the provisions of the SARFAESI Act – Tribunal would have no jurisdiction u/s.17 to grant the declarations sought in the first and second reliefs – SARFAESI Act has not been enacted for providing a mechanism for adjudicating upon the validity of documents or to determine questions of title finally – Jurisdiction to declare sale deed or mortgage deed being illegal, vested with the civil court u/s. 9 CPC – Civil Court has jurisdiction to finally adjudicate upon the first two reliefs – As regards the relief of possession, plaintiff could not have sought the relief from DRT – Plaintiff neither a borrower nor a person claiming under/through the borrower – Plaintiff has a claim independent of and adverse to the borrower – Plaintiff was not in possession, thus, the question of DRT “restoring” possession to plaintiff did not arise – DRT would have no jurisdiction to grant such relief to her, thus, the plaintiff’s third relief in the suit also not barred by s.34 – Even under the expression appearing at the end of s.13(3), the plaintiff cannot seek the relief of being handed over possession – Even the amended s.13(3) confers no power to hand over the property to someone who was never in possession – Plaint must survive because there cannot be a partial rejection of the plaint u/Ord. VII r. 11 – Hence, even if one relief survives, the plaint cannot be rejected u/Ord. VII r. 11 – First and second reliefs regarding illegality of the execution of sale deed and mortgage deed clearly not barred by s. 34 and within the civil court’s jurisdiction, thus, plaint cannot be rejected u/Ord. VII r. 11 – Furthermore, if civil court cannot reject a plaint partially, then by the same logic, it ought not to make any adverse observations against the other relief – Thus, no error of law committed by the High Court in passing the impugned order – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Ord.VII r.11. [Paras 16-18, 23-25, 45] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Ord.VII r.11 – Partial rejection of plaint under O.VII, r.11 – Effect:
Held: Even if one relief survives, the plaint cannot be rejected u/ Ord.VII, r.11 – Plaint must survive because there cannot be a partial rejection of the plaint u/Ord. VII, r.11 – Thus, the plaint cannot be rejected u/Ord.VII, r.11 – If the civil court is of the view that one relief is not barred by law but is of the view that the other relief is barred by law, the civil court must not make any observations to the effect that the other relief is barred by law and must leave that issue undecided in an Ord. VII, r. 11 application – This is because [2025] 2 S.C.R. 265Central Bank of India & Anr. v. Smt. Prabha Jain & Ors. if the civil court cannot reject a plaint partially, then by the same logic, it ought not to make any adverse observations against the other relief. [Paras 24, 25] SARFAESI Act, 2002 – s.17 – Application against measures to recover secured debts – Relief of possession – Power of DRT – “Restore” possession and “Handover” possession – Difference between – Stated. [Para 23] Debts Recovery Tribunal – Scope and power of:
Held: Debts Recovery Tribunal is a creature of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 and is empowered to exercise powers under that Act and the SARFAESI Act, 2002 – Tribunal cannot go beyond the four corners of the SARFAESI Act – Tribunal is bound by the powers conferred to it by the Parliament – Sub-sections (3) and (4) of s.17 respectively instructive to the level of examination that DRT can undertake, and the same is limited to the validity of the measures u/s.13(4) – Thus, DRT not permitted to examine the validity of the earlier sale deed, whereafter the mortgage was executed in favour of Bank. [Para 38] Banking/Banks – Sanctioning of loans – Inadequate title clearance reports – Approach to be adopted by the Banks: Held: Banks should remain very careful with inadequate title clearance reports, more particularly, when such reports are obtained cheaply and at times for external reasons – Concern is with the protection of public money and is in the larger public interest – Thus, essential for the Reserve Bank of India and other stakeholders to collaborate in developing a standardized and practical approach for preparing title search report before sanctioning loans and also for the purpose of determining liability (including potential criminal action) of the Officer who approves loan – Also, there should be standard guidelines for fees and costs associated with title search reports so as to ensure that they maintain high quality. [Para 44] Case Law Cited Bank of Baroda v. Gopal Shriram Panda and Another (2021) SCC OnLine Bom 466 – approved.
Madhav Prasad Aggarwal & Anr. v. Axis Bank Limited & Anr. [2019] 8 SCR 1058 : (2019) 7 SCC 158; Bank of Baroda v. Moti Bhai & 266 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Ors. [1985] 2 SCR 784 : (1985) 1 SCC 475; Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. v. VCK Shares & Stock Broking Services Ltd. [2022] 17 SCR 567 : (2023) 1 SCC 1; Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (Dead) by LRs. & Anr. v. Ramesh Chander Agarwal & Ors. [2003] Supp. 1 SCR 376 : (2003) 6 SCC 220; Mardia Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [2004] 3 SCR 982 : (2004) 4 SCC 311; Jagdish Singh v. Heeralal & Ors. [2013] 12 SCR 232 : (2014) 1 SCC 479; State Bank of Patiala v. Mukesh Jain & Anr. [2016] 8 SCR 427 : (2017) 1 SCC 53; Robust Hotels Private Limited & Ors. v. EIH Limited & Ors. [2016] 8 SCR 437 : (2017) 1 SCC 622; SBI v. Allwyn Alloys Private Limited & Ors. [2018] 4 SCR 477 : (2018) 8 SCC 120; Sree Anandhakumar Mills Ltd. v. Indian Overseas Bank & Ors. (2019) 14 SCC 788; Electrosteel Castings Ltd. v. UV Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. & Ors. [2021] 7 SCR 532 : (2022) 2 SCC 573; Harshad Govardhan Sondagar v. International Assets Reconstruction Co. Ltd. [2014] 11 SCR 605 : (2014) 6 SCC 1; M.P. Wakf Board v. Subhan Shah (Dead) by LRs. [2006] Supp. 8 SCR 85 : (2006) 10 SCC 696; Om Prakash Gupta v. Dr. Rattan Singh & Anr. 1962 SCC OnLine SC 111 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited Cambridge English dictionary – referred to.
List of Acts Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002; Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. List of Keywords Jurisdiction of civil court to try suit barred by s.34 of SARFAESI Act; Civil court not to have jurisdiction; Jurisdiction of Debt Recovery Tribunal or civil court to try suit; Rejection of plaint; Secured creditor; Validity of documents; Determination of title; Partial rejection of plaint u/Ord. VII r. 11 CPC; Execution of sale deed and mortgage deed; Adverse observations against other relief; Civil court’s jurisdiction; Sanctioning of loans; Inadequate title clearance reports; Title search reports; “Restore” possession; “Handover” possession; Suit barred by SARFAESI Act; Measures taken by secured creditor; Relief of possession; Jurisdiction of Debt Recovery Tribunal; Jurisdiction of civil court. [2025] 2 S.C.R. 267Central Bank of India & Anr. v. Smt. Prabha Jain & Ors. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1876 of 2016 From the Judgment and Order dated 30.10.2012 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior in FA No. 408 of 2012 With Civil Appeal Nos. 1877, 1896, 1893, 1897, 1915, 1907, 1913, 1900, 1898, 1916, 1914, 1892, 1910, 1899 and 1917 of 2016 Appearances for Parties O. P. Gaggar, Sachindra Karn, Advs. for the Appellants. Umesh Babu Chaurasia, Ms. Prity Kumari, Ms. Manjula Chaurasia, Maneesh Pathak, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Ms. Pragati Neekhra, Aditya Bhanu Neekhra, Atul Dong, Aniket Patel, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Order Since the issues raised in all the captioned appeals are the same, those were taken up for hearing analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order.
2. The Civil Appeal No.1876 of 2016 is treated as the lead matter. The disposal of this appeal shall govern the disposal of all connected appeals.
3. This appeal arises from the judgment and order dated 30.10.2012 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in First Appeal No.408 of 2012 by which the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the respondents herein-original plaintiffs and thereby, set aside the order passed by the 5 th Additional District Judge, Bhopal in Civil Suit No.25A/2011 rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, “the CPC”).
4. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarised as under:- Respondent no.1 namely, Smt. Prabha Jain instituted Civil Suit No.25A/11 praying for the following reliefs:- 268 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports “a. It be declared that the disputed sale deed and the mortgage deed described in para 6 above are a nullity and it be declared that the defendant numbers 4 and 5 had no right to sell the disputed plot, to the defendant number 3 and the possession taken by the defendant number 2 is against the law and the grant of loan by the defendant number 1 on the security of the plot is against the law. b. That the possession of the plot of land shown in slanted red lines in the plan attached to the suit may be given to the plaintiff after demolishing the construction.
c. That the plaintiff may be awarded damages of Rs. 7200/- for period from December 2009 to December 2010. d. That the mesne profit from the date of institution of the suit till possession may be granted to the plaintiff at the rate of Rs. 600/- p.m.”
5. It is the case of the plaintiff that the suit land was purchased by her late father-in-law vide sale deed dated 19.06.1967 and after his death on 15.08.2005, the same was inherited in equal shares by her late husband Mahendra Kumar Jain, husband’s elder brother Sumer Chand Jain (defendant no.4) and mother-in-law. After the death of Mahendra Kumar, his 1/3rd share was inherited by the plaintiff. However, Sumer Chand Jain without any partition amongst the heirs divided the land into several plots and sold them off illegally to different persons. One such plot was sold to defendant no.3 (Parmeshwar Das Prajapati) vide registered sale deed dated 03.07.2008 who in turn, mortgaged the same with the Central Bank of India (defendant no.1) for the purpose of obtaining loan.
6. It seems that the person who obtained loan defaulted and that is how the Bank decided to proceed further in accordance with the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short, “the SARFAESI Act”).
7. It is a case of the plaintiff that the sale deed as well as the mortgage could be said to be a nullity. She claimed possession of the suit land in the suit.
8. It appears that the appellant-Bank herein preferred an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC and prayed that the plaint be [2025] 2 S.C.R. 269Central Bank of India & Anr. v. Smt. Prabha Jain & Ors. rejected as the civil court has no jurisdiction to try the same in view of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The trial court rejected the plaint. The original plaintiff carried the matter in appeal before the High Court. The High Court allowed the First Appeal holding in paras (9) and (10) respectively, as under:- “9. From the scheme of the SARFAESI Act narrated above, it is apparent that the Debts Recovery Tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide the question whether persons other than the mortgager had title in the mortgaged property. In that context the validity of the sale deed of a property mortgaged with the Central Bank of India cannot be decided by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. If the sale deed is held to be wholly or partially invalid it will immediately affect the validity of the mortgage of that property. The jurisdiction of civil court is ousted in respect of matters which the Debts Recovery Tribunal is empowered to decide. Absence of a provision to enable the Debts Recovery Tribunal for holding an enquiry on a particular question is indicative that jurisdiction of civil courts on that question is not excluded. The above question relating to the validity of the sale deed and its consequent effect on the mortgage are matters which the Debts Recovery Tribunal is not empowered to decide. The provision for appeal under section 17 of the SARFAESI Act by “any person” does not oust the jurisdiction of civil court on matters which cannot be decided by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide these matters cannot be held to be ousted under section 34 of the SARFAESI Act.
10. We also disagree, with the finding of the trial court that proper Court fee has not been paid by the plaintiff. The plaintiff is not a signatory or party in the sale deed as well as in the mortgage deed. She is, therefore, not required to claim the consequential relief of the cancellation of these documents. And for the relief claimed by her for the declaration of sale deed and mortgage as illegal, she has paid the proper Court fee. The consequential relief which the plaintiff has claimed and which is appropriate in the 270 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports circumstances of the case is possession of the suit land/ plot. The suit land/plot is assessed to the land revenue at Rs.l/-. She has valued this relief at Rs.20/- and paid Rs.lOO/- Court fee as required under section 7 (v)(a) of the Court Fees Act, 1870. The plaintiff has thus paid the proper Court fee.”
9. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant-Bank is here before this Court with the present appeal. We have heard Mr. O. P. Gaggar, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Bank and Mr. Umesh Babu Chaurasia, the learned counsel appearing for respondent no.1 i.e. the original plaintiff. The only argument canvassed before us on behalf of the Bank is that in view of Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, the civil court has no jurisdiction to try the suit.
10. Having regard to the importance of the issue raised before us, we proposed to consider it in detail.
PLAINTIFF’S CASE IN THE PLAINT AS BORNE OUT FROM THE
IMPUGNED JUDGEMENT
19.06.1967: Plaintiff’s father-in-law purchased the suit land by way of a sale deed.
15.8.2005 Plaintiff’s father-in-law died. Thereupon, the suit land was inherited by 3 persons in equal proportions:
1. Plaintiff’s husband Mahendra Kumar Jain (1/3rd)
2. Plaintiff’s husband’s elder brother Sumer Chand Jain (1/3rd)
3. Mother-in-law (1/3rd)
Upon the death of the Plaintiff’s husband, the Plaintiff inherited her husband’s 1/3rd share.
Plaintiff’s brother-in-law Sumer Chand Jain without any partition divided the suit land into plots and illegally sold off the plots.
03.7.2008 By a sale deed, Sumer Chand Jain sold one of the plots to Parmeshwar Das Prajapati.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 271Central Bank of India & Anr. v. Smt. Prabha Jain & Ors. Parmeshwar Das Prajapati executed a mortgage deed mortgaging the said plot (“subject plot”) to the Central Bank of India (“bank”) for obtaining a loan. From para 2 of the impugned judgement of the High Court, it appears that some construction was also raised on the land at some stage.
The bank took over possession of the subject plot under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act and published an advertisement for the purpose of putting it to auction.
The Plaintiff filed a suit in a civil court praying inter alia for the following reliefs:
1. For a declaration that the sale deed executed by Sumer Chand Jain in favour of Parmeshwar Das Prajapati is illegal (“first relief”)
2. For a declaration that the mortgage deed executed by Parmeshwar Das Prajapati in favour of the Bank is illegal (“second relief”)
3. For being handed over the possession (“third relief”) In the suit, the bank filed an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC raising the following contentions:
a) Suit is barred under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act.
b) Plaint is written on insufficiently stamped paper. 10.2.2012 The Civil Court rejected the plaint on the following grounds:
1. The suit is barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act.
2. The plaintiff has not paid the proper court fee. 09.04.2012 The Plaintiff filed First Appeal before the High Court challenging the judgement dated 10.2.2012.
272 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports 30.10.2012 The High Court set aside the judgement and restored the suit on the following grounds:
1. The Civil Court’s jurisdiction to decide the suit is not ousted by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act.
2. The Plaintiff has paid the proper court fee.
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE SARFAESI ACT
11. Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act reads thus:- “34. Civil court not to have jurisdiction.— No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993).”
12. Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act provides that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding “in respect of any matter which Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine…” Hence, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction is only ousted in respect of those matters which the Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under the SARFAESI Act to determine. The SARFAESI Act confers certain powers upon the Debts Recovery Tribunal by virtue of the following sections: Sections 5(5), 13(10), 17 and 19. Except for Section 17, as such none of the other sections referred to above are relevant for the purposes of this matter.
13. Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act is as follows:
Under Section 17(1) of the Act, “Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in subsection (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, may make an application… to the Debts Recovery Tribunal..”. From Section 17(2), (3) and (4) of the SARFAESI Act, it is clear that the Tribunal has the power to examine [2025] 2 S.C.R. 273Central Bank of India & Anr. v. Smt. Prabha Jain & Ors. whether “..any of the measures referred to in sub-section
(4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor are in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder.” The Tribunal has the power to pass consequential orders as provided in Section 17(3).
14. From Section 17, it is clear that it is only the Tribunal that has the jurisdiction to determine whether “any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor” are in accordance with the Act or Rules thereunder.
15. The plaintiff in her suit has prayed for 3 reliefs: a) The first relief is in relation to a sale deed executed by Sumer Chand Jain in favour of Parmeshwar Das Prajapati.
b) The second relief is in relation to a mortgage deed executed by Parmeshwar Das Prajapati in favour of the bank.
c) The third relief is for being handed over the possession of the suit property.
16. So far as the first and second reliefs are concerned, they are not in relation to any measures taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. Rather, they are reliefs in relation to the actions taken prior to the secured creditor stepping into the picture and well prior to the secured creditor invoking the provisions of the SARFAESI Act.
17. Therefore, the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act to grant the declarations sought in the first and the second reliefs.
18. Further, the SARFAESI Act is enacted essentially to provide a speedy mechanism for recovery of debts by banks and financial institutions. The SARFAESI Act has not been enacted for providing a mechanism for adjudicating upon the validity of documents or to determine questions of title finally. The DRT does not have the jurisdiction to grant a declaration with respect to the mortgage deed or the sale deed as sought by the Plaintiff. The jurisdiction to declare a sale deed or a mortgage deed being illegal is vested with the civil court under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the civil Court has the jurisdiction to finally adjudicate upon the first two reliefs.
274 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
19. In the aforesaid context, we may give few illustrations of the kind of disputes that can crop up. These illustrations would indicate that DRT can never have the jurisdiction to decide such civil disputes of title between a third person and a borrower. Two illustrations may be considered:
Illustration 1: A and B are sons of X. On X’s death, A claims that X made a will bequeathing a particular parcel of land (“Land 1”) exclusively to A. A mortgages Land 1 to a bank and the bank initiates proceedings under the SARFAESI Act. The other son i.e. B claims that father X had made a will bequeathing Land 1 exclusively to B. Hence, there are two conflicting wills propounded by each son. B files a suit praying for a declaration that he is the exclusive owner of the land on the basis of the will and other reliefs. The civil court will have jurisdiction to decide which of the two wills is valid. It is inconceivable that DRT would have the jurisdiction to decide which will is valid.
Illustration 2: X was married to Y (wife). They did not have any biological children. Hence, in 1985, the couple adopted Q. In 1990, Y died and left her entire estate to X by way of a will. X died in 1995 without making a will. The adopted child Q (claiming to be sole owner by intestate succession) mortgaged one of the lands in favour of the bank which initiated SARFAESI proceedings. However, X’s only brother Z made a claim that the “adoption” of Q was not as per law and that there being no adoption in law, Q was not entitled to the estate of X. X filed a suit inter alia praying for the following declarations:
1. The adoption of Q was void and ineffective.
2. Z being the only heir as per intestate succession, Z was exclusively entitled to the land.
3. The Mortgage by Q in favour of the bank was invalid as it was a mortgage by Q who had no title.
20. The answer to the aforesaid would depend on whether Q’s adoption was valid or not. If the adoption is valid, Q had title and the mortgage in favour of the bank would be valid. If the adoption was invalid, Z would be the owner & Q’s mortgage would be invalid. The civil court will have jurisdiction to decide upon the validity of the adoption, not the DRT.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 275Central Bank of India & Anr. v. Smt. Prabha Jain & Ors.
21. By way of third relief, the plaintiff is seeking possession.
22. The suit is of 2011. Hence, the SARFAESI Act as applicable prior to the 2016 Amendment will have to be examined. Section 17 (as it stood prior to the 2016 amendment) is reproduced below: “17. Right to appeal.—(1) Any person (including borrower) aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in subsection (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, may make an application along with such fee, as may be prescribed, to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measure had been taken:
Provided that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower.
Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under this sub-section.
(2) The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider whether any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security are in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder.
(3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, and require restoration of the management of the business to the borrower or restoration of possession of the secured assets to the borrower, it may by order, declare the recourse 276 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports to any one or more measures referred to in sub-section
(4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditors as invalid and restore the possession of the secured assets to the borrower or restore the management of the business to the borrower, as the case may be, and pass such order as it may consider appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the recourse taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of Section 13.
(4) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal declares the recourse taken by a secured creditor under sub-section (4) of Section 13, is in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the secured creditor shall be entitled to take recourse to one or more of the measures specified under sub-section (4) of Section 13 to recover his secured debt.
(5) Any application made under sub-section (1) shall be dealt with by the Debts Recovery Tribunal as expeditiously as possible and disposed of within sixty days from the date of such application:
Provided that the Debts Recovery Tribunal may, from time to time, extend the said period for reasons to be recorded in writing, so, however, that the total period of pendency of the application with the Debts Recovery Tribunal, shall not exceed four months from the date of making of such application made under sub-section (1).
(6) If the application is not disposed of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the period of four months as specified in subsection (5), any part to the application may make an application, in such form as may be prescribed, to the Appellate Tribunal for directing the Debts Recovery Tribunal for expeditious disposal of the application pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal may, on such application, make an order for expeditious disposal of the pending application by the Debts Recovery Tribunal.
(7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Debts Recovery Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of [2025] 2 S.C.R. 277Central Bank of India & Anr. v. Smt. Prabha Jain & Ors. the application in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and the rules made thereunder.” (emphasis supplied)
23. Unamended Section 17(3) of the SARFAESI Act as applicable to the present case:
I. Section 17(3) as it stood prior to the 2016 amendment, provides that where the DRT finds that the measures taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act are not in accordance with the Act or Rules, it has the power to “restore the possession of the secured assets back to the borrower”. In this context, there are two significant points that deserve to be considered:
1. While it is true that Section 17(1) uses the words “any person (including the borrower) aggrieved”, Section 17(3) does not explicitly empower the DRT to restore the possession to anyone other than the borrower. Yes, in a given case, if the borrower has put someone else in possession, then perhaps, it could be contended that under Section 17(3), the DRT’s power to restore possession to the “borrower” would include the power to restore possession to the person who was holding it on behalf of the borrower or claiming through the borrower.
However, it cannot be contended that under Section 17(3), the DRT can hand over possession to someone whose claim is adverse to that of the borrower.
2. What is even more important is that in the unamended Section 17(3), the word used is “restore” and not “hand over”. As per Cambridge English dictionary, word “restore” means “to return something or someone to an earlier good condition or position”. Under Section 17(3), the DRT has the power to “restore” possession which would mean that it has the power to return possession to the person who was in possession when the bank took over possession. DRT only has power to “restore” possession; it has no power to “hand over” possession to a person who was never in possession when the bank took over possession. 278 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports The word “restore” has been very rightly used by the Parliament. It is one thing to empower the DRT to hold that the actions of the secured creditor are not in accordance with the Act and to empower the DRT to give directions to the secured creditor to reverse its actions and to direct it to restore the property back to where it was. However, it would be quite illogical for the Parliament to empower the DRT to direct the secured creditor to hand over possession to some third party who was never in possession in the first place.
II. Now, the question that arises is this: whether the Plaintiff being not in possession could have sought for from the DRT under the unamended Section 17(3)? In our considered view for the following two reasons, the plaintiff could not have sought from DRT the relief of being given possession:
1. Plaintiff is neither a borrower nor a person claiming under/ through the borrower. Plaintiff has a claim independent of and adverse to the borrower.
2. Plaintiff was not in possession. Hence, the question of DRT “restoring” possession to Plaintiff did not arise. III. Hence, Plaintiff could not have sought from DRT, the relief of being handed over the possession. DRT would have no jurisdiction to grant such relief to her. Hence, the Plaintiff’s third relief in her suit is also not barred by Section 34 of the
SARFAESI ACT.
IV. IV. The bank may contend that even if the plaintiff cannot seek the relief of being handed over possession under the expression “restore the possession…. to the borrower”, she can still seek that relief under the widely worded expression appearing at the end of Section 13(3): “and pass such order as it may consider appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the recourse taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of Section 13” appearing at the end of Section 13(3). We are of the view that even under such expression, the Plaintiff cannot seek the relief of being handed over possession for the following reasons:
1. Under the last phrase of Section 13(3), the civil court has the power to pass other orders as it may consider [2025] 2 S.C.R. 279Central Bank of India & Anr. v. Smt. Prabha Jain & Ors. appropriate and necessary “in relation to any of the measures taken by the secured creditor under sub-section
(4) of Section 13”.
2. The measures taken by the secured creditor are of taking over possession from the borrower and not from the plaintiff. Hence, the Plaintiff’s prayer to hand over possession is not at all “in relation to any of the measures taken by…” The passing of an order to hand over possession to Plaintiff is, therefore, not an order “in relation to any of the measures taken by the secured creditor”.
3. Hence, even under the last phrase of Section 13(3), DRT has no power to pass an order directing the secured creditor to hand over possession to Plaintiff. Hence, Plaintiff could not have sought that relief from DRT.
V. Although Section 13(3) as amended by the the SARFAESI Act, 2016 does not arise for our consideration in this matter, yet it is pertinent to note that even the amended Section 13(3) uses the expression “restore the possession of secured assets”. The expression “or such other aggrieved person” have been inserted after the word “borrower” in sub-clause (a). However, there is no power conferred to hand over the property to someone who was never in possession. The amended Section 13(3) is reproduced below:
“(3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in sub-section
(4) of section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, and require restoration of the management or restoration of possession, of the secured assets to the borrower or other aggrieved person, it may, by order,—
(a) declare the recourse to any one or more measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor as invalid; and 280 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
(b) restore the possession of secured assets or management of secured assets to the borrower or such other aggrieved person, who has made an application under sub-section (1), as the case may be; and
(c) pass such other direction as it may consider appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the recourse taken by the secured creditor under subsection (4) of section 13.”
24. Even if we would have been persuaded to take the view that the third relief is barred by Section 17(3) of the SARFAESI Act, still the plaint must survive because there cannot be a partial rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC. Hence, even if one relief survives, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC. In the case on hand, the first and second reliefs as prayed for are clearly not barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI ACT and are within the civil court’s jurisdiction. Hence, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.
25. If the civil court is of the view that one relief (say relief A) is not barred by law but is of the view that Relief B is barred by law, the civil court must not make any observations to the effect that relief B is barred by law and must leave that issue undecided in an Order VII, Rule 11 application. This is because if the civil court cannot reject a plaint partially, then by the same logic, it ought not to make any adverse observations against relief B.
PRECEDENTS OF THIS COURT ON SECTION 34
26. This Court, in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2004) 4 SCC 311, held that a meaningful reading of Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act indicates that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in respect of matters which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or an Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine i.e., in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred under this Act. This Court also carved out an exception in the case where allegations of fraud are made. The relevant observations are as under:
“50. It has also been submitted that an appeal is entertainable before the Debts Recovery Tribunal only [2025] 2 S.C.R. 281Central Bank of India & Anr. v. Smt. Prabha Jain & Ors. after such measures as provided in sub-section (4) of Section 13 are taken and Section 34 bars to entertain any proceeding in respect of a matter which the Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine. Thus before any action or measure is taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13, it is submitted by Mr Salve, one of the counsel for the respondents that there would be no bar to approach the civil court. Therefore, it cannot be said that no remedy is available to the borrowers. We, however, find that this contention as advanced by Shri Salve is not correct. A full reading of Section 34 shows that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in respect of matters which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or an Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine in respect of any action taken “or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred under this Act”. That is to say, the prohibition covers even matters which can be taken cognizance of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal though no measure in that direction has so far been taken under sub-section (4) of Section
13. It is further to be noted that the bar of jurisdiction is in respect of a proceeding which matter may be taken to the Tribunal. Therefore, any matter in respect of which an action may be taken even later on, the civil court shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding thereof. The bar of civil court thus applies to all such matters which may be taken cognizance of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, apart from those matters in which measures have already been taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13.
51. However, to a very limited extent jurisdiction of the civil court can also be invoked, where for example, the action of the secured creditor is alleged to be fraudulent or his claim may be so absurd and untenable which may not require any probe whatsoever or to say precisely to the extent the scope is permissible to bring an action in the civil court in the cases of English mortgages. We find such a scope having been recognized in the two decisions of the Madras High Court which have been relied upon heavily by the learned Attorney General as well appearing for the Union of India, namely, V. Narasimhachariar [AIR 282 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports 1955 Mad 135] , AIR at pp. 141 and 144, a judgment of the learned Single Judge where it is observed as follows in para 22: (AIR p. 143)
“22. The remedies of a mortgagor against the mortgagee who is acting in violation of the rights, duties and obligations are twofold in character. The mortgagor can come to the court before sale with an injunction for staying the sale if there are materials to show that the power of sale is being exercised in a fraudulent or improper manner contrary to the terms of the mortgage. But the pleadings in an action for restraining a sale by mortgagee must clearly disclose a fraud or irregularity on the basis of which relief is sought: Adams v. Scott [(1859) 7 WR 213, 249]. I need not point out that this restraint on the exercise of the power of sale will be exercised by courts only under the limited circumstances mentioned above because otherwise to grant such an injunction would be to cancel one of the clauses of the deed to which both the parties had agreed and annul one of the chief securities on which persons advancing moneys on mortgages rely. (See Ghose, Rashbehary: Law of Mortgages, Vol. II, 4th Edn., p. 784.)”
(emphasis supplied)
27. This Court, in Jagdish Singh v. Heeralal & Ors. reported in (2014) 1 SCC 479, had held in the facts of the said case that the Civil Suit was barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. In the said case, the Civil Suit was filed after the original borrowers purchased the properties mortgaged with the Bank. This led to an auction and the subsequent dismissal of the applications before the DRT. Furthermore, the plaintiffs, who sought title, partition, and possession, did not raise any objections at any stage. In this case, the auction was conducted in 2005, the original borrowers lost before the DRT in 2006, and the Civil Suit was filed in 2007. In these peculiar circumstances, the Civil Suit was held to be barred under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. At the same time, this Court reiterated that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in respect of any matter that the DRT alone can decide. Thus, the crucial question that is supposed to be asked and [2025] 2 S.C.R. 283Central Bank of India & Anr. v. Smt. Prabha Jain & Ors. answered is as to whether the DRT would be able to determine the prayers made in the Civil Suit. The relevant paragraphs are as follows: “10. Bank of India had advanced a loan of Rs 25 lakhs to M/s Guru Om Automobiles, Respondent 10 herein, through its proprietor, Respondent 6 on 17-2-2000. The loan was secured by equitable mortgage executed by Respondents 7 to 9 in respect of the land measuring one acre in Khasra Nos. 104/3 and 105/2, Patwari Halka No. 5, Village Seagon, Anjad Road, Barwani, M.P. Respondents 6 to 8 had also created equitable mortgage on three houses, which were in their respective names. Original title deeds of all the abovementioned properties were duly deposited with the Bank at the time of availing of the loan.
11. Since they committed default in re-paying the loan, the Bank issued notice under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation Act and took steps under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation Act in respect of properties on 1-3-2004. Auction notice was duly published in the newspapers on 30-9-2005. No objection was raised by the plaintiffs and the suit land was auctioned on 8-11-2005, which was settled in favour of the highest bidder, the appellant herein. The entire auction price was paid by the auction-purchaser and the sale in his favour was duly confirmed. Respondents 7 to 9 challenged the sale notice, as already indicated, by filing Application No. 19 of 2005 before the DRT, Jabalpur, which was dismissed on 21-7-2006. No appeal was preferred against that order and that order has attained finality.
12. We notice, at this juncture, Respondents 1 to 5 filed Civil Suit No. 16A/07 in the Court of the District Judge, Barwani against the appellant, as well as the Bank and Respondents 6 to 9, alleging that the family members Respondents 1 to 9 herein being sons/grandsons of deceased Premji, constituted a HUF engaged in agriculture. It was stated that the said properties were purchased in the names of Respondents 7 to 9 out of the funds of HUF and House Nos. 41/1, 42/3 and 42/2 were also purchased in the names of Respondents 6 to 8 respectively, out of the funds of HUF and, therefore, 284 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports were the properties of HUF. But, the facts would clearly indicate that the properties referred to above were purchased by Respondents 6 to 8 in their individual names, long after the death of Premji and that too by registered sale deeds and no claim was ever made at any stage by any member of the HUF that the suit land was a HUF property and not the individual property. Respondents 7 to 9 had purchased those lands vide sale deed dated 14-9-1999 and Respondent 6 had also purchased in his individual name House No. 42/1 on 31- 3-1998 vide registered sale deed. Similarly, Respondent 7 had also purchased House No. 42/3 in his individual name. No claim, whatsoever, was made at any stage by any member of the family that those properties and buildings were HUF properties and not the individual properties of Respondents 6 to 8 herein.
13. We find that the Bank had advanced loans on the strength of the abovementioned documents which stood in the names of Respondents 6 to 9. Due to non-repayment of the loan amount, the Bank can always proceed against the secured assets.
XXX XXX XXX
18. Any person aggrieved by any order made by the DRT under Section 17 may also prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the Act.
19. The expression “any person” used in Section 17 is of wide import and takes within its fold not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by action taken under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation Act. Reference may be made to the judgment of this Court in Satyawati Tondon case [United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260] .
20. Therefore, the expression “any person” referred to in Section 17 would take in the plaintiffs in the suit as well. Therefore, irrespective of the question whether the civil suit is maintainable or not, under the Securitisation Act itself, a remedy is provided to such persons so that they can [2025] 2 S.C.R. 285Central Bank of India & Anr. v. Smt. Prabha Jain & Ors. invoke the provisions of Section 17 of the Securitisation Act, in case the Bank (secured creditor) adopt any measure including the sale of the secured assets, on which the plaintiffs claim interest.
XXX XXX XXX
22. The scope of Section 34 came up for consideration before this Court in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. [Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311] and this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 349, para 50)
“50. It has also been submitted that an appeal is entertainable before the Debts Recovery Tribunal only after such measures as provided in sub-section
(4) of Section 13 are taken and Section 34 bars to entertain any proceeding in respect of a matter which the Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine. Thus before any action or measure is taken under sub-section
(4) of Section 13, it is submitted by Mr Salve, one of the counsel for the respondents that there would be no bar to approach the civil court. Therefore, it cannot be said that no remedy is available to the borrowers. We, however, find that this contention as advanced by Shri Salve is not correct. A full reading of Section 34 shows that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in respect of matters which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or an Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine in respect of any action taken ‘or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred under this Act’. That is to say, the prohibition covers even matters which can be taken cognizance of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal though no measure in that direction has so far been taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13. It is further to be noted that the bar of jurisdiction is in respect of a proceeding which matter may be taken to the Tribunal. Therefore, any matter in respect of which an action may be taken even later on, the civil court shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding thereof. The bar of civil court thus applies to all such 286 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports matters which may be taken cognizance of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, apart from those matters in which measures have already been taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13.”
23. Section 13, as already indicated, deals with the enforcement of the security interest without the intervention of the court or tribunal but in accordance with the provisions of the Securitisation Act.
24. Statutory interest is being created in favour of the secured creditor on the secured assets and when the secured creditor proposes to proceed against the secured assets, sub-section (4) of Section 13 envisages various measures to secure the borrower’s debt. One of the measures provided by the statute is to take possession of secured assets of the borrowers, including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or realising the secured assets. Any person aggrieved by any of the “measures” referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 has got a statutory right of appeal to the DRT under Section
17. The opening portion of Section 34 clearly states that no civil court shall have the jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding “in respect of any matter” which a DRT or an Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under the Securitisation Act to determine. The expression “in respect of any matter” referred to in Section 34 would take in the “measures” provided under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act. Consequently, if any aggrieved person has got any grievance against any “measures” taken by the borrower under sub-section (4) of Section 13, the remedy open to him is to approach the DRT or the Appellate Tribunal and not the civil court. The civil court in such circumstances has no jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of those matters which fall under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act because those matters fell within the jurisdiction of the DRT and the Appellate Tribunal. Further, Section 35 says, the Securitisation Act overrides other laws, if they are inconsistent with the provisions of that Act, which takes in Section 9 CPC as well.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 287Central Bank of India & Anr. v. Smt. Prabha Jain & Ors.
25. We are of the view that the civil court jurisdiction is completely barred, so far as the “measures” taken by a secured creditor under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act, against which an aggrieved person has a right of appeal before the DRT or the Appellate Tribunal, to determine as to whether there has been any illegality in the “measures” taken. The Bank, in the instant case, has proceeded only against secured assets of the borrowers on which no rights of Respondents 6 to 8 (sic Respondents 1 to 5) have been crystallised, before creating security interest in respect of the secured assets.
26. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the High Court was in error in holding that only civil court has the jurisdiction to examine as to whether the “measures” taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act were legal or not. In such circumstances, the appeal is allowed and the judgment [Heeralal Kulmi v. Govind Kulmi, First Appeal No. 130 of 2008, order dated 5-8-2010 (MP)] of the High Court is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.”
(emphasis supplied)
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