Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 100; [2025] 1 S.C.R. 911
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Pankaj Mithal, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah
- Decided
- 22 Jan 2025
- Case number
- SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) No. 856/2025
- Sections
- 62(5), 62, 16, 436, 43
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[2025] 1 S.C.R. 911 : 2025 INSC 100 Mohd. Tahir Hussain v.
State of NCT of Delhi (Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 856 of 2025)
22 January 2025 [Pankaj Mithal* and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether a purpose based interim bail can be granted to contest the election or for canvassing as the petitioner himself is one of the candidates.
Headnotes Interim Bail – To contest election or for canvassing/campaigning – FIRs against the petitioner inter alia for rioting and murder of an official of IB – Sought interim bail to participate and contest Delhi Assembly Elections, 2025 – Disallowed by the High Court – Challenge to:
Held: [Per Pankaj Mithal, J.] Interim bail is not permissible for contesting elections, much less for campaigning – Right to campaign or canvass is neither a fundamental right nor a constitutional or a human right or even a statutory right – There is no provision for interim bail under the law but lately it has become an acceptable mode of grant of bail in certain special contingencies – If interim bail is made permissible on the ground of contesting elections, it will open a Pandora’s box – The allegations made against the petitioner along with the chargesheet in connection with the rioting and the murder of the official of IB are serious – High Court rightly refused interim bail to the petitioner – No case made out for any indulgence. [Paras 6, 7, 9, 12] [Per Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.] Merely because a statute imposes limitations on grant of bail, the same per se does not oust the jurisdiction of a Constitutional Court to grant bail – Though, the allegations and the evidence against the Petitioner are grave and reprehensible but the magnitude and gravity of the offence alleged are no grounds to deny bail, moreso when trial is prolonged – Petitioner’s rights u/Articles 14 and 21 cannot be * Author 912 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports lost sight of – He is in custody since March, 2020 – As on date, no Court of Law has convicted the Petitioner – He has secured bail in a majority of the cases – Considering these factors, in the facts and circumstances specific of the case, Petitioner granted interim bail for a limited period subject to conditions – Impugned judgment modified to that extent – In view of difference of opinion, matter to be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India. [Paras 26, 27, 29] Case Law Cited In the Order of Pankaj Mithal, J.
Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement [2024] 7 SCR 2363 : (2024) 9 SCC 577 – distinguished.
Anukul Chandra Pradhan, Advocate Supreme Court v. Union of India and Ors. [1997] Supp. 1 SCR 641 : (1997) 6 SCC 1 – referred to. Athar Pervez v. State, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6662 – referred to. In the judgment of Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.
Union of India v. K A Najeeb [2021] 1 SCR 443 : (2021) 3 SCC 713; Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra [2024] 7 SCR 992 : (2024) 9 SCC 813 – relied on.
State of Haryana v. Dharamraj [2023] 11 SCR 705 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1085; Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote [1980] 3 SCR 15 : (1980) 2 SCC 559; Vilas Pandurang Pawar v. State of Maharashtra [2012] 8 SCR 270 : (2012) 8 SCC 795; Manik Madhukar Sarve v. Vitthal Damuji Meher [2024] 8 SCR 753 : (2024) 10 SCC 753; Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab [2024] 2 SCR 134 : (2024) 5 SCC 403; Sheikh Javed Iqbal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2024] 7 SCR 1054 : (2024) 8 SCC 293; Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India [2024] 8 SCR 633 : (2024) 10 SCC 574; Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau [2024] 7 SCR 97; Sanjay Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2023] 4 SCR 939 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 610 – referred to.
List of Acts Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Constitution of India.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 913Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi List of Keywords Interim Bail; Purpose based interim bail; Interim bail to contest election; Interim bail to canvass/campaign; Interim bail to contest Delhi Assembly Elections, 2025; Delhi riots; Murder of an official of Intelligence Bureau (IB); Right to campaign or canvass; Multiple FIRs; Constitutional Right; Trial prolonged.
Case Arising From EXTRA ORDINARY JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 856 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 14.01.2025 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in BA No. 4819 of 2024 Appearances for Parties Siddharth Aggarwal, Sr. Adv., Rajiv Mohan, Ms. Tara Narula, Ms. Sonal Sarda, Ms. Shivangi Sharma, Ms. Noyonika Deori, Rishabh Bhati, Ms. A. Mitra, Karan Dhalla, Ms. Vismita Diwan, Sujoy Chatterjee, Advs. for the Petitioner.
Suryaprakash V. Raju, ASG, Annam Venkatesh, Zoheb Hussain, Rajat Nair, Hitarth Raja, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Order Pankaj Mithal, J.
1. Heard Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. S. V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the respondent-State.
2. The petitioner is in custody in connection with FIR No. 65 of 2020 dated 26.02.2020 registered at Police Station Dayalpur, District North East, Delhi in connection with rioting and murder of one Ankit Sharma, an official of the Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. Apart from the aforesaid case, several other cases relating to riots in Delhi which took place in the month of February, 2020 and one under PMLA are pending consideration and the petitioner is allegedly involved in all of them.
914 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
3. The petitioner so far has not been successful in getting bail in the above case and some other cases, so he applied to the High Court for grant of interim bail from 14.01.2025 to 09.02.2025 simply to participate and contest Delhi Assembly Election, 2025 from Mustafabad Constituency, Delhi. It may be remembered that the petitioner was earlier a councilor from the ticket of the Aam Aadmi Party. However, subsequently he left the said party and was given ticket to contest the Assembly Elections by the All India Majlise-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM). He took the ticket to contest the Assembly Elections fully knowing that he is in jail in connection with several cases in some of which he may have been granted bail but continues to languish therein and so he has to participate in the election remaining behind the bars.
4. The interim bail application moved by the petitioner was considered by the High Court and was ultimately disallowed by the order impugned dated 14.01.2025 but he was granted conditional custody parole for subscribing oath and to complete formalities in respect of filing his nomination papers to contest the Assembly Elections. In this way, though the petitioner has no fundamental right to contest the elections but his statutory right to that effect was duly protected.
5. The petitioner is not satisfied by the grant of custody parole for filing his nomination enabling him to participate in the election and has thus preferred this Special Leave Petition contending inter alia that permitting filing of nomination is meaningless if he is not allowed to campaign and canvass.
6. It is important to note here that right to campaign or canvass is neither a fundamental right nor a constitutional or a human right. It is not even a right recognized under any statute. However, the petitioner is an Indian citizen and we are conscious that his rights as a citizen are to be protected. Nonetheless, the involvement of the petitioner in as many as eleven cases including the present one, one pertaining to PMLA and nine in relation to Delhi riots of 2020, dilutes and erodes his position as a law-abiding citizen.
7. The allegations against the petitioner in the present case are not only in connection with the rioting but also of the murder of the official of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. The allegations made against the petitioner, if considered cumulatively along with the chargesheet which has been submitted on 02.06.2020 reveals [2025] 1 S.C.R. 915Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi the seriousness of the charges levelled against the petitioner. The allegations against the petitioner are also to the effect that his house/office was being used as the epicenter for the commission of the aforesaid offences in which murder of one Ankit Sharma is a sequel. On the rooftop of petitioner’s house/building objects like stones, bricks, petrol bombs, acid drums etc. were recovered which were used during the riots, as per material on record. It has come on record in the order impugned that many material witnesses, especially in connection with the present FIR No. 65 of 2020 are yet to be examined.
8. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances and keeping in mind the submissions of Sh. Siddharth Aggarwal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, who has limited/confined his arguments to the grant of interim bail only, as the regular bail remains pending for consideration before the High Court, the limited issue before this Court is whether a purpose based interim bail can be granted to contest the election or for canvassing as the petitioner himself is one of the candidates.
9. There is no provision for interim bail under the law but lately it has become an acceptable mode of grant of bail in certain special contingencies.
10. In Arvind Kejriwal vs. Directorate of Enforcement 1 this Court quoted with approval from Athar Pervez 2 case which reads as under: “20. The expression “interim” bail is not defined in the Code. It is an innovation by legal neologism which has gained acceptance and recognition. The terms, “interim”
bail/”interim” suspension of sentence, have been used and accepted as part of legal vocabulary and are well- known expressions. The said terms are used in contradistinction and to distinguish release on regular bail during pendency of trial or appeal till final adjudication. Applications for “interim” suspension or bail are primarily moved and prayed for, when the accused or convict is not entitled to or cannot be granted regular bail or suspension of sentence, or the application for grant of regular bail is pending consideration and is yet to be decided. “Interim”
1 (2024) 9 SCC 577
2 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6662 916 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports bail entailing temporary release can be granted under compelling circumstances and grounds, even when regular bail would not be justified. Intolerable grief and suffering in the given facts, may justify temporary release, even when regular bail is not warranted. Such situations are not difficult to recount, though making a catalogue would be an unnecessary exercise.”
11. The reasons and factors whereunder interim bail may be permitted may include cases where there is death in the family of the accused and the cremation has to take place; to attend the wedding of son/ daughter or of any close relative of the accused but such a right has not been recognized on the plea of contesting or canvassing for the election.
12. In the event interim bail is made permissible on the ground of contesting elections, it will open a Pandora’s box inasmuch as in this country election in some form takes place throughout the year and the accused persons in jail may take undue benefit of it and even if they are not serious in contesting elections, they would move interim bail application for the purposes of participating in the election knowing fully well they are likely to lose or are not serious contenders. This will open a flood gate of litigation which ought not to be permitted so as to widen the scope of grant of interim bail, more particularly when the regular bail application is pending consideration.
13. Secondly, if right to participate, canvassing and contesting in election is allowed to be treated as a ground for interim bail, then the necessary sequel of the same would be that the accused person ought to be allowed to vote in the election as well. Such a sequel would be in conflict with the provision Section 62(5) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 which circumscribe the right to vote by laying down that no person shall vote in any election, if he is confined in a prison or is in lawful custody of the police. The grant of interim bail for contesting elections would mean permitting the accused to cast his/her vote, which would be antithesis to the provisions of Section 62(5) of the Representation of People Act, 1951.
14. In the case of Anukul Chandra Pradhan, Advocate Supreme Court Vs. Union of India and Ors.: 1997 (6) SCC 1, the three Judges Bench of this Court has observed as under:
“8. There are other reasons justifying this classification. It is well known that for the conduct of free, fair and [2025] 1 S.C.R. 917Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi orderly elections, there is need to deploy considerable police force. Permitting every person in prison also to vote would require the deployment of a much larger police force and much greater security arrangements in the conduct of elections. Apart from the resource crunch, the other constraints relating to availability of more police force and infrastructure facilities are additional factors to justify the restrictions imposed by sub-section (5) of Section 62. A person who is in prison as a result of his own conduct and is, therefore, deprived of his liberty during the period of his imprisonment cannot claim equal freedom of movement, speech and expression with the others who are not in prison. The classification of persons in and out of prison separately is reasonable. Restriction on voting of a person in prison results automatically from his confinement as a logical consequence of imprisonment. A person not subjected to such a restriction is free to vote or not to vote depending on whether he wants to go to vote or not; even he may choose not to go and cast his vote. In view of the restriction on movement of a prisoner, he cannot claim that he should be provided the facility to go and vote. Moreover, if the object is to keep persons with criminal background away from the election scene, a provision imposing a restriction on a prisoner to vote cannot be called unreasonable.”
15. One of the basic submissions of Sh. Siddharth Aggarwal is that permitting filing of nomination alone is of no use unless the person is allowed to campaign and canvass. The argument appears to be attractive, but, has no force.
16. Canvassing in an election can be done in many ways such as through newspapers, social media, pamphlets, writing letters and it is not necessary that it should be in the physical form such as by holding meetings and by personal contact. Permitting the petitioner to be released on interim bail for the purpose of canvassing would amount to permitting the petitioner to hold meetings and to undertake door to door canvassing. This would necessarily involve interaction of the petitioner with the people of the locality on personal basis. Since, the incident mentioned in the FIR took place in the locality from where the petitioner is contesting, if the petitioner is permitted to move around freely, there is a very high possibility of 918 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports his tampering with the witnesses who are or local people living in that locality alone.
17. The argument that the petitioner is entitled to interim bail on the ground that he has suffered long incarceration for around four years and that despite submission of chargesheet way back on 20.06.2020 itself, the trial has not progressed and very few witnesses till date have been examined, is of no assistance for the petitioner for seeking interim bail. The said argument may be appreciated better while considering the regular bail, but not an interim bail which is limited only to the ground whether he should be allowed to be released temporarily for the purpose of contesting or participating in the election.
18. This apart, the thrust of the argument is that an interim bail for canvassing is necessary for effectively contesting the election. It is well known that a person contesting election has to nurture his constituency for years together and canvassing for ten or fifteen days would not suffice the purpose. If he has earned a good reputation and his services are recognized by the people, the canvassing in the last days would not be very material. It is also well accepted that a large number of people in the past have contested elections sitting behind the bars and they have won without being released for the purposes of canvassing. Therefore, there is no special circumstance in the case of the petitioner to grant him interim bail for that purpose. Most of the times, the campaigning is done by the party or its workers and if one person in the party or the leader or even the candidate is debarred from canvassing, it does not in any way affect the legal right.
19. Reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Arvind Kejriwal (supra) cuts no ice inasmuch as it is distinguishable on facts. There the petitioner was holding the post of Chief Minister and was the President of a national party and therefore, the Court opined that he is one of the main campaigners, which is not the situation in the case at hand.
20. It may not be out of context to mention that the petitioner is in jail not only in connection with the case at hand i.e., FIR No. 65 of 2020 but also in two other cases, including a PMLA case, and a case arising out of FIR No. 59 of 2020. In those two cases, the petitioner has not been granted bail. His bail application/interim bail application in those cases are pending in different courts but the fact remains that [2025] 1 S.C.R. 919Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi he is not on bail in those two cases, meaning thereby that even if the petitioner is granted interim bail in the present case, he would not be out of prison for the purpose of canvassing and campaigning. Therefore, the entire exercise in this regard will prove to be academic and futile in nature.
21. It is high time that the citizens of India deserve a clean India, which means clean politics as well and for the said purpose, it is necessary that people with tainted image, especially those who are in custody and had not been granted bail and those who are undertrial, even if out of jail, be restricted in some way or the other from participating in the election. The people of India should be given a choice to elect people with clean image and antecedents.
22. In the case at hand, as stated earlier, the Court is confined as to whether interim bail for the purposes of election ought to be allowed or not. The petitioner, on the ground of his long custody or the trial not being completed for long, may argue for regular bail but that is not the subject-matter for consideration before this Court today. We do not intend to usurp the jurisdiction of the High Court, where the regular bail of the petitioner is pending consideration.
23. In the facts and circumstances of the case, long incarceration of the petitioner or the fact that some of the other co-accused have been released on bail or that upon evidence, the entire case of prosecution will fall to the ground are not relevant, and therefore, I am of the opinion that the High Court has not committed any error of law in exercising its decision in refusing the interim bail to the petitioner and permitting him only custodial parole for the purposes of subscribing oath and filing of his nomination papers.
24. In simple words, interim bail is not permissible for the purposes of contesting elections, much less for campaigning.
25. In this view of the matter no case is made out for any indulgence in exercise of discretionary power of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and the Special Leave Petition is dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to pursue his regular bail application before the High Court where he may seek an advancement of the date of hearing fixed in the matter concerned, if so advised.
26. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed as aforesaid. 920 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Judgment Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.
1. With great reverence for the erudite opinion expressed by learned Brother Pankaj Mithal, J., I express my inability to concur therewith.
2. The factual matrix has been noted by Brother Mithal. I see no need to repeat the same, except to refer thereto where required.
PRELUDE:
3. The Petitioner seeks interim bail to contest in and canvass for the upcoming General Elections to the Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi. The Petitioner is an accused in cases relating to the unfortunate riots that took place in Delhi in February/March, 2020. It is averred that except for three cases i.e., 2 FIR1 s (including the present one) and ECIR2 No.05/STF/2020, the Petitioner has secured bail in all the other cases, whereas one FIR has been quashed by the Delhi High Court.
4. The Petitioner approached the High Court which granted ‘Custody Parole for subscribing the Oath and to complete the formalities in respect of filing his Nomination Papers’, subject to conditions as enumerated in the Impugned Judgment3.
5. It is clear that the Petitioner has been permitted to file his nomination and, consequent thereof, contest in the Election. Therefore, what this Court is required to consider as to whether or not, in the attendant facts and circumstances, he can be granted interim bail to campaign/ canvass.
6. The contours on which to examine the grant of bail are no longer res integra. I may gainfully refer to State of Haryana v Dharamraj, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1085, where this Court cancelled the grant of anticipatory bail to an accused by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, but revisited the precedents on grant/cancellation of bail as under:
1 First Information Report.
2 Enforcement Case Information Report.
3 2025 SCC OnLine Del 111 [2025] 1 S.C.R. 921Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi ‘7.…. This Court considered the factors to guide grant of bail in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002)
3 SCC 598 and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496, the relevant principles were restated thus:
‘9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.’ xxx
11. The contours of anticipatory bail have been elaborately dealt with by 5-Judge Benches in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 and Sushila Aggarwalv.
922 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1. Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 is worthy of mention in this context, despite its partial overruling in Sushila Aggarwal (supra). We are cognizant that liberty is not to be interfered with easily. More so, when an order of pre-arrest bail already stands granted by the High Court.
12. Yet, much like bail, the grant of anticipatory bail is to be exercised with judicial discretion. The factors illustrated by this Court through its pronouncements are illustrative, and not exhaustive. Undoubtedly, the fate of each case turns on its own facts and merits. In Vipan Kumar Dhir v. State of Punjab, (2021) 15 SCC 518, taking note of Dolat Ram (supra) and X v. State of Telangana (supra), the Court cancelled the anticipatory bail granted to the accused therein. Keeping all the aforesaid in mind, we turn our attention to the facts in praesenti.’ (emphasis supplied)
7. I consciously refrain from discussing in detail the evidence or my view thereon, following, inter alia, Niranjan Singh v Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote, (1980) 2 SCC 559; Vilas Pandurang Pawar v State of Maharashtra, (2012) 8 SCC 795, and; Manik Madhukar Sarve v Vitthal Damuji Meher, (2024) 10 SCC 753. However, in view of the elaborate submissions advanced at the Bar, reference somewhat to the materials on record is necessitated.
8. Yet, before forming an opinion as to whether the prayer for grant of interim bail, for the purpose presently sought for i.e., to campaign for the Election for which his Nomination Papers stand submitted, can be granted, this Court would have to go into the broader merits of the case, subject to the caveat afore-recorded.
THE PETITIONER’S SUBMISSIONS:
9. Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal, learned senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner has submitted that he would be confining himself, at this stage, to attempting to persuade the Court as to whether in the particular facts and circumstances, the Petitioner would, due to the non-grant of interim bail, be seriously prejudiced and his Fundamental [2025] 1 S.C.R. 923Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi Rights as a citizen under the Constitution of India would also be compromised if he only takes part in the Election as a formality, inasmuch as even after filing his Nomination Papers and being declared fit to contest, he would not be allowed to connect with the people of the constituency concerned, and to satisfy the electorate as to why he should be elected.
10. The thrust of Mr. Aggarwal’s argument was that the Petitioner has been in custody for almost 5 years now (reckoned from March, 2020) which is a long period and the democratic process requires that a candidate should go before the electorate from whom he seeks votes to represent them in the body for which elections are going to be held.
11. It was submitted that the Petitioner had an unblemished record as a Ward Councillor and only because of the unfortunate incidents which took place in February/March, 2020, the Petitioner due to certain circumstances was named as an accused in as many as 11 FIRs, out of which in 8, he has been granted bail. What remains are the instant case and two other cases, including one under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘PMLA’). It was submitted that in all the cases, the basic allegation is that the Petitioner was chiefly an instigator and that he may be the person who was also instrumental in logistics for the rioters. However, on identical facts, in the 8 other cases, the Petitioner has been granted bail and in the remaining cases, his applications for interim bail as well as regular bail are still pending, without having been finally considered on merits.
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