Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise Nashik Commissionerate
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 84; [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1987
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Pankaj Mithal
- Decided
- 20 Jan 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 5642/2009
- Sections
- 11A(1), 11AC, 4(1), 11, 4(3), 11A(2), 4, 3, 11A, 11AB
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:21 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1987 : 2025 INSC 84 Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of Central Excise Nashik Commissionerate (Civil Appeal No. 5642 of 2009 With Civil Appeal No(s). 8025-27 of 2010, Civil Appeal No. 5686 of 2014, Civil Appeal No. 9838 of 2017, Civil Appeal No. 5516 of 2019 and Civil Appeal No. 10890 of 2024)
20 January 2025 [Abhay S. Oka* and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether while computing excise duty under the Central Excise Act, 1944 on sale of petroleum products, price of the products can be considered as the sole consideration and whether the revenue was entitled to invoke extended period of limitation u/s.11A(1) of the Act and to levy a penalty u/s.11AC of the Act?
Headnotes† Central Excise Act, 1944 – Valuation of goods-price as sole consideration of goods:
Held: The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) dated 31st March 2002 by and between the Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) incorporates mutual arrangements made by MNCs for an uninterrupted supply of petroleum products so that MNCs can further sell the products to their dealers – By no stretch of the imagination, it can be said that the price fixed under the MOU was the sole consideration for the sale by one OMC to the other – Further, there is no specific finding recorded in the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. that the price was the sole consideration for the sale – The Tribunal has not adverted to the question of whether the third condition in s.4(1)(a) of the Central Excise Act was complied with – Thus, even assuming there is a merger of the said decision with the order of this court in the said case, the order of this Court does not constitute a binding decision on the issue of compliance with such condition – The finding of the fact recorded by the Tribunal in Civil * Author 1988 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Appeal No. 5642 of 2009 that price was not the sole consideration cannot be faulted with. [Paras 28-30] Central Excise Act, 1944 – Applicability of extended period of limitation under the proviso to s.11-A(1) of the 1944 Act: Held: No detailed reasons have been recorded in support of invoking the extended period of limitation under the proviso to sub-section (1) of s.11-A by the Commissioner in his order – The department was aware of the MOU even before the date on which the show cause notice was issued – MOU was referred to in the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., thus, the ground of suppression of MOU taken to support the invocation of the extended period of limitation cannot be sustained – The second ground is that BPCL made the department believe that dual pricing was adopted as per the directions of the Government – It is not alleged in the show cause notice that any such misrepresentation was made by BPCL – The reply to the show cause notice submitted by the BPCL contains no such representation – Even in the order, no specific reference has been made to any such contention raised by BPCL or other OMCs – Hence, both the grounds in support of invoking an extended period of limitation cannot be sustained, and only on that ground, the demand cannot be sustained – Therefore, the said appeal preferred by the BPCL deserves to be allowed by setting aside the entire demand on the ground that the extended period of limitation could not be invoked – The other appeals to be remanded to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication. [Paras 32-34, 38, 39] Central Excise Act, 1944 – Applicability of s.11AC:
Held: In this case, there is no allegation made by the Revenue of fraud, collusion or any wilful mis-statement on the part of the appellant – The stand taken is that the MOU was suppressed, and therefore, s.11AC will apply – In view of the findings recorded above on the issue of the invocation of the extended period of limitation, the penalty could not have been imposed. [Paras 36, 38] Case Law Cited CCE v. Grasim Industries Ltd. [2018] 6 SCR 1099 : (2018) 7 SCC 233; CCE v. Ispat Industries Ltd. [2015] 15 SCR 259 : (2016) 1 SCC 631; CCE v. CERA Boards and Doors [2020] 11 SCR 471 : [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1989Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise Nashik Commissionerate (2020) 9 SCC 662; D.J. Malpani v. CCE [2019] 6 SCR 925 : (2019) 9 SCC 120; V.M. Salgaocar and Bros. Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT [2000] 2 SCR 1169 : (2000) 5 SCC 373; Kunhayammed & Ors v. State of Kerala & Anr. [2000] Supp. 1 SCR 538 : (2000) 6 SCC 359; Commissioner of Central Excise, Hyderabad v. Detergents India Ltd. [2015] 6 SCR 886 : (2015) 7 SCC 198 – referred to. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise (2005) 187 ELT 479 (Tri-Bang); Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Nashik (2009) 242 ELT 358 (Mumbai) – referred to.
List of Acts The Central Excise Act, 1944.
List of Keywords Section 11A(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944; Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944; Sale of Petroleum Products; Price of the products; Valuation of goods; Extended period of limitation; Proviso to s.11-A(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944; Penalty. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5642 of 2009 From the Judgment and Order dated 17.06.2009 of the West Zonal Bench at Mumbai of the Customs Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No. E/240/2008/MUM With Civil Appeal No(s). 8025-27 of 2010, Civil Appeal No. 5686 of 2014, Civil Appeal No. 9838 of 2017, Civil Appeal No. 5516 of 2019 and Civil Appeal No. 10890 of 2024 Appearances for Parties S.K. Bagaria, Sr. Adv., Parijat Sinha, Ms. Pallak Bhagat, Kumar Ajit Singh, Ms. Reshmi Rea Sinha, Devesh Mishra, B. Krishna Prasad, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Advs. for the Appellant.
Balbir Singh, A.S.G., Arijit Prasad, Sr. Adv., Mrs. B. Sunita Rao, Rupesh Kumar, H.R. Rao, Shyam Gopal, Vivek Chaudhuri, Bhaskar Sundaram, Aditya Rathore, Naman Tandon, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, 1990 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports V. Lakshmikumaran, Ms. Apeksha Mehta, Ms. Neha Choudhary, Ms. Falguni Gupta, Umang Motiyani, E.C. Agrawala, Mahesh Agarwal, Rishi Agrawala, M.S. Ananth, Abhinabh Garg, Abhinav Agrawal, Kartik Sharma, Parijat Sinha, Advs. for the Respondent. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Abhay S. Oka, J.
FACTUAL CONTROVERSY
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5642 OF 2009
1. The appellant in Civil Appeal No. 5642 of 2009 is Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (for short, ‘BPCL’). It is a public-sector undertaking. BPCL has a refinery in Mumbai and an extensive network of installations and depots nationwide. Similarly, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (for short, ‘IOCL’), Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (for short, ‘HPCL’) and Indo-Burma Petroleum Company Ltd. (for short, ‘IBP’) also have refineries, installations and depots at different places in the country. Later on, IBP merged with IOCL. We refer to BPCL, IOCL and HPCL as the Oil Marketing Companies (for short, ‘the OMCs’) for convenience.
2. On 30th June 2000, the Central Board of Excise & Customs, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Government of India (for short, ‘the Board’), issued a circular clarifying the meaning of the expression ‘transaction value’ as defined under clause (d) of Section 4(3) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (for short, ‘the 1944 Act’). Up to 31 st March 2002, the price of petroleum products was fixed based on the Administered Price Mechanism (for short, ‘APM’). This system was done away with effect from 1 st April 2002. On 31 st March 2002, a Memorandum of Understanding (for short, ‘the MOU’), which was named as the Multilateral Product Sale-Purchase Agreement, was executed by and between the OMCs at the behest of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas for a period of two years commencing from 1 st April 2002. Under the MOU, it was mutually agreed that the OMCs should sell and purchase petroleum products among themselves and/or to one another at the Import Parity Price (for [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1991Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise Nashik Commissionerate short, ‘IPP’), which is defined as the landed cost of the products at the nearest port, plus the cost of transportation from the said port to the storage point of the selling OMC. IPP also includes terminal charges. Purchase and sale transactions of petroleum products between OMCs were to be made based on the MOU. The receiving OMC would further sell the petroleum products to their own dealers. The price fixed in accordance with the IPP was lower than the price at which the selling OMC sold its petroleum products directly to its own dealers. It was alleged that the purpose of the said MOU was to ensure the smooth supply and distribution of petroleum products, to avoid any disruption in supply all over India, and to save on transportation costs of the OMCs, when compared with procuring petroleum products solely from their respective refineries.
3. Between 2002 and 2005, the Department issued several show-cause notices to the OMCs. The show cause notices proposed to arrive at the excise duty payable under the 1944 Act by referring to the price at which an OMC sold petroleum products to its own dealers rather than the price at which the OMCs sold petroleum products to one another and/or among themselves, i.e., the IPP. The appellant contends that some show cause notices were dropped, and some were confirmed. In those cases where show cause notices were dropped, the Commissioners accepted the IPP as the ‘transaction value’, and the Department did not challenge the same.
4. In the case of the show cause notices which were not dropped, demands were confirmed, which led to the OMCs approaching the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (for short, ‘the Tribunal’) after confirmation of the demands. In one such appeal in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise1, by judgment dated 28th February 2005, the Tribunal set aside the Order-in-Original. This judgment was carried before this Court by way of a civil appeal, which was summarily dismissed vide order dated 3rd January 2006.
5. On 12 th March 2007, the Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs, Nashik, issued a show cause notice to BPCL alleging that provisions of the 1944 Act and Central Excise Rules, 2002 have been contravened. The differential duty payable from 1 st April 2002 1 (2005) 187 ELT 479 (Tri-Bang)
1992 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports to 5th September 2004 was quantified at Rs. 119,11,49,418/- (Rupees one hundred nineteen crores, eleven lakhs, forty-nine thousand, four hundred and eighteen only). Demand for education cess, interest, and penalty was also raised in the show cause notice. BPCL filed its reply to the show cause notice.
6. The demand was confirmed by the Commissioner vide order dated 8th December 2007. The extended period of limitation was invoked, and a penalty was also imposed under Section 11AC of the 1944 Act. Being aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner, the appellant preferred an appeal before the West Zonal Bench of the Tribunal. The Tribunal upheld the order dated 8 th December 2007. That is how BPCL has preferred Civil Appeal No. 5642 of 2009.
Civil Appeal Nos. 8025-8027 of 2010
7. Civil Appeal Nos. 8025-8027 of 2010 have been preferred by the Revenue. The respondent is IOCL. In this case, a show cause notice was issued on 30 th March 2007 alleging that the assessee had adopted two different assessable values for the same product to compute excise duty. The first value taken was the price used for sale to their own dealers, and the second was the IPP used for sale to other OMCs. It was alleged that IOCL had suppressed the MOU. The Commissioner invoked the extended period of limitation and confirmed the demand. Being aggrieved by the demand, IOCL preferred an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal interfered with the demand by the impugned judgment. The Tribunal relied upon its own decision in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. 1 It was pointed out that this Court summarily dismissed an appeal preferred by the Revenue against the decision in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.1 Therefore, in this case, the Revenue is in appeal.
Civil Appeal No.5686 of 2014
8. Civil Appeal No.5686 of 2014 is also preferred by the Revenue. The respondent is again IOCL. Even in this case, a similar order was passed by the Commissioner where the extended period of limitation was invoked, and the Commissioner confirmed the demand. The Tribunal set aside the order of the Commissioner on the basis of the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd1. Therefore, the Revenue is in appeal.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1993Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise Nashik Commissionerate Civil Appeal No. 9838 of 2017
9. As far as Civil Appeal No. 9838 of 2017 is concerned, the assessee is BPCL. Three show cause notices were served upon BPCL, and the demand in the show cause notices was made absolute by the Commissioner. It is to be noted that the Commissioner invoked the extended period of limitation for one such show cause notice bearing Sl. No. 10/2004 dated 26.10.2004. The Tribunal interfered by observing that in the facts of the case, the adjudication on the basis of show cause notice has travelled beyond the show cause notice. As the Tribunal interfered, the Revenue is in appeal. Civil Appeal No.5516 of 2019
10. Civil Appeal No.5516 of 2019 is again preferred by the Revenue. A similar show-cause notice was issued to IOCL. The demand in the show cause notice was made absolute under Section 11A(2) of the 1944 Act, i.e., without invoking the extended period of limitation. The Tribunal interfered in an appeal preferred by IOCL again by relying upon its own decision in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd1. Therefore, the Revenue is in appeal.
Civil Appeal No.10890 of 2024
11. In Civil Appeal No.10890 of 2024, IOCL is the respondent, and Revenue is the appellant. In this case, the Commissioner did not confirm the demand under the show cause notices against which the Revenue preferred an appeal before the Tribunal. While the Commissioner did not adjudicate on the question of limitation, it appears that the extended period of limitation was invoked in the show cause notices for only parts of the demand. The order of the Commissioner was confirmed by the Tribunal by relying upon the decision in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. 1 and other similar decisions. Therefore, the Revenue is in appeal.
12. We may note here that the MOU that is the subject matter of these appeals is the same.
SUBMISSIONS
13. The learned senior counsel, Shri S.K. Bagaria, argued on behalf of BPCL. Shri V. Lakshmikumaran appeared for OMCs, and Shri Balbir Singh, ASG, represented the Revenue.
1994 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
14. In support of Civil Appeal no.5642 of 2009, learned senior counsel pointed out that this Court is concerned with Section 4 of the 1944 Act as amended with effect from 1 st July 2000. He relied upon the interpretation put by this Court to Section 4 in the case of CCE v. Grasim Industries Ltd. 2 , CCE v. Ispat Industries Ltd. 3 , and CCE v. CERA Boards and Doors 4. He submitted that by virtue of the substitution of Section 4 with effect from 1 st July 2000, the concept of ‘normal value’ has given way to the concept of ‘transaction value’. He submitted that the actual price paid or payable on each removal of goods becomes a transaction value, as defined in sub-section 3(d) of Section 4. It means the price actually paid or payable for the goods. The submission of the learned senior counsel is that Section 4 permits the assessee to charge different prices from different buyers. He submitted that if different prices were charged for different removals, prices actually paid or payable for each removal become the value for the levy of excise duty. Further submission of the learned senior counsel is that it is lawful for BPCL to charge different prices to OMCs for sales made to them vis-à-vis their own dealers.
15. The learned senior counsel relied upon the terms of the MOU, which incorporate a price fixation formula in MOU based on IPP, which is defined to mean the landed cost of a product at a particular port, which would include all applicable elements.
16. The learned senior counsel relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of D.J. Malpani v. CCE 5 in the context of putting narrow construction. The learned counsel submitted that, in addition to the price actually paid or payable for the goods, transaction value includes any additional amount the buyer is liable to pay to the assessee. He submitted that in the instant case, over and above the invoice price actually charged, no amount, either in cash or otherwise, was paid or payable by the OMCs to the appellant, and the price charged was always the sole consideration for the sale. He submitted that the sales to OMCs were made for
2 (2018) 7 SCC 233
3 (2016) 1 SCC 631
4 (2020) 9 SCC 662
5 (2019) 9 SCC 120
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1995Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise Nashik Commissionerate delivery at the time and place of removal. He submitted that the parties to the MOU were not related to each other, and therefore, Section 4(1)(a) was squarely applicable. He also relied upon a Circular dated 30 th June 2000 issued by the Board. He submitted that the MOU was entered into based on a letter dated 21 st August 2001 from the Additional Secretary, Government of India. He also relied upon a Circular dated 14 th February 2007 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, which records that the MOU was entered into between different PSUs, i.e., OMCs herein, at the behest of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. He submitted that the decision in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd 1 , was affirmed by this Court by summary dismissal of appeal preferred by Revenue by a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges by order dated 3 rd March 2006. He submitted that in view of the judgment of this Court in the case of V.M. Salgaocar and Bros. Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT 6, the decision of the Tribunal has merged into the order of this Court. Hence, the Tribunal could not have made a departure from the view taken in the said case as the Tribunal was bound by it. He pointed out that the decision in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd 1 has been followed by the Tribunal in several cases.
17. He submitted that the decision to invoke an extended period of limitation under proviso to Section 11A (1) of the 1944 Act was completely erroneous. He submitted that the instructions of the Board dated 14 th February 2007 referred to the MOU, and therefore, there was no question of withholding the MOU from the Department. He submitted that this was not a case of fraud, collusion or any wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts and, therefore, the extended period of limitation could not be invoked. Hence, there was no reason to impose a penalty under Section 11 AC.
18. The learned counsel appearing for IOCL in Civil Appeal Nos. 8025-27 of 2010 has also made detailed arguments. He also argued the issue of the merger of the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd 1 with the order of this Court summarily dismissing the appeal. In support of his contention
6 (2000) 5 SCC 373
1996 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports based on the merger, he relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Kunhayammed & Ors v. State of Kerala & Anr. 7.
19. He submitted that the sale price based on IPP when the petroleum products are sold to OMC should be taken as transaction value, especially when the transaction is on a principal-to-principal basis at arm’s length. In his submission, this would show that the price is the sole consideration for the sale. He pointed out that as provided in Article 4 of the MOU, there was, in fact, a sale of petroleum products. He submitted that the IPP is not a notional price but an arm’s length price. Relying upon a decision of this Court in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Hyderabad v. Detergents India Ltd. 8, he submitted that it is permissible to sell the same product at different prices to different parties. In such a case, the actual sale value will be taken as transaction value. He submitted that apart from the fact that no extra-commercial consideration flows from the MOU, the same has been executed as per the directions of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. He also submitted that recourse could not have been taken to the extended period of limitation as there was no suppression of material facts by IOCL.
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