Manik & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 734; [2024] 9 S.C.R. 724
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice C.T. Ravikumar, Justice Sanjay Kumar
- Decided
- 25 Sept 2024
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1614/2012
- Sections
- 34, 304, 201, 300, 302, 331, 202, 203, 164, 161, 145, 137
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:22 am. Original source ↗
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[2024] 9 S.C.R. 724 : 2024 INSC 734 Manik & Ors.
v.
The State of Maharashtra (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1614-1618 of 2012)
25 September 2024 [C.T. Ravikumar* and Sanjay Kumar,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Appellants-convicts are members of the police force and the allegation against them is misuse and abuse of their powers, in resorting to custodial torture of victim-S and tampering with evidence. Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 330, 331, 342, 343, 348, 354, 385, 387, 201, 202, 193 and 218, all r/w. s.34 – Victim-S was taken into police custody for interrogation – Allegation that he was subjected to third degree torture – Thereafter, a burnt and buried body was found in the forest – Body was unidentified – Prosecution case that appellants-convicts committed the heinous crime and concocted a case to escape the prosecution for custodial death – The Trial Court held that prosecution succeeded only in establishing charge u/s.304-II r/w. s.34 against accused A1, A2 and A3 – Other accused were found guilty under certain other charges – High Court confirmed the conviction and sentences except u/s. 201 r/w. s.34, IPC: Held: [Per C.T. Ravikumar, J.]: Criminal Appeal No.1614/2012 stood abated as the sole appellant who was the first accused (A1) died on 06.03.2022 – In the instant case, the very case of the prosecution is that body recovered from forest area was of victim-S – When once identification of the dead body as that of victim based on fingerprint test is reversed by the High Court, in the absence of appeal by the State or the victim, it could not be said that the dead body is that of victim, either for holding the appellant-convicts guilty of the offence u/s. 300, IPC punishable u/s. 302, IPC, or under Part -I / Part-II of s.304, IPC – However, in view of the findings confirming custodial torture, A2, A3, A4, A5 convicted are convicted u/ss. 330, 348 and 387 r/w. s.34, IPC – All the appellant-convicts acquitted of all the other offences for * Author [2024] 9 S.C.R. 725Manik & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra which each of them was convicted and sentenced – So, further action was required only in respect of A2 to A5 viz., appellants in Crl. Appeal Nos. 1617 of 2012, 1618 of 2012 and, 1616 of 2012, that too in case any sentence remains unserved in view of confirmation of conviction and sentence u/ss. 330, 348 and 387 r/w. s.34, IPC. [Paras 1, 31 and 53] – [Per Sanjay Kumar, J. (dissenting)]: Nothing on record to support and substantiate that Criminal Appeal No. 1614 of 2012 stands abated as accused A1 died on 06.03.2022 – There is a major point of divergence in views regarding the tracing of dead body and proving to be of that person – Permitting the premise that once the dead body is said to have been traced and not proved to be of that person, same would be fatal to the case of the prosecution, such an acceptance would mean that those in the police organization, who resort to such nefarious methods, can take this easy way out to ward off a finding of guilt – When sufficient evidence is available to conclude that victim was in no position to escape from the custody of the appellants, the inevitable corollary that follows is that he died due to their torture while in their custody – Disagreed with the conclusion drawn that in the absence of evidence regarding the homicidal death of victim-S, the appellants are entitled to be acquitted of the charge u/s. 304 Part-II IPC r/w. s.34 IPC, by granting them the benefit of doubt – On the contrary, the convictions and sentences of the appellants are maintained, as confirmed by the High Court. [Paras 2, 15, 21] Case Law Cited In the judgment of C.T. Ravikumar, J:
Central Bureau of Investigation v. Kishore Singh [2010] 14 SCR 95 : (2011) 6 SCC 369; Noor Aga v. State of Punjab and Anr. [2008] 10 SCR 379 : (2008) 16 SCC 417; V. Venkata Subbarao v. State [2006] Supp. 10 SCR 729 : (2006) 13 SCC 305; Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Daya Sapra [2009] 7 SCR 977 : (2009) 13 SCC 729; Iqbal Moosa Patel v. State of Gujarat [2011] 2 SCR 121 : (2011) 2 SCC 198; Lord Denning in Miller v. Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 All ER 372; Harendra Nath Mandal v. State of Bihar [1993] 2 SCR 137 : (1993) 2 SCC 435; Sevaka Perumal & Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu [1991] 2 SCR 711 : (1991) 3 SCC 471; Ram Chandra and Ram Bharosey v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR (1957) SC 381; Mani Kumar Thapa v. State of Sikkim (2002) 7 726 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports SCC 157; State v. Sushil Sharma (2007) SCC OnLine Del 255; State of Karnataka v. M.V. Mahesh [2003] 2 SCR 553 : (2003) 3 SCC 353; Utpal Das & Anr. v. State of West Bengal [2010] 6 SCR 495 : (2010) 6 SCC 493; Shri Gopal & Anr. v. Subhash & Ors. [2004] 1 SCR 1085 : (2004) 13 SCC 174; Paramjeet Singh v. State of Uttarakhand [2010] 11 SCR 1064 : (2010) 10 SCC 439; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra AIR (1984) SC 1622; Dr. N.G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane [1975] 3 SCR 967 : (1975) 2 SCC 326 – referred to.
In the judgment of Sanjay Kumar, J:
State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav and Others [1985] 2 SCR 621 : (1985) 1 SCC 552; Bhagwan Singh and Another v. State of Punjab [1992] 3 SCR 180 : (1992) 3 SCC 249; Sevaka Perumal and Another v. State of Tamil Nadu [1991] 2 SCR 711 : (1991) 3 SCC 471 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited Erewhon (1872), a satire by Samuel Butler; Crisis of Indian Legal System (1982); Custodial Deaths by P. Srikrishna Deva Rao (National Law School Journal. Vol. 6, 1994); Mohammed Ghouse, “State lawlessness and Constitution of India: A study of custodial deaths”, Comparative Constitutional Law 270 (Mahendra P. Singh ed., 1989). List of Acts Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872.
List of Keywords Police Custody; Interrogation; Custodial death; Custodial torture; falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus; Destruction of evidence; Mutilation of body; Disappearance of body; Corpus delicti; Benefit of doubt; Fingerprint evidence; Identification of dead body; Escape from custody. Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.
1614-1618 of 2012 From the Judgment and Order dated 12.07.2011 of the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur in CRLA Nos.64, 65, 71,76 and 77 of 1997 [2024] 9 S.C.R. 727Manik & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra Appearances for Parties S. Nagamuthu, Sr. Adv., Shivaji M. Jadhav, Ms. Apurva, Brij Kishor Sah, Adarsh Kumar Pandey, Vighesh Singh, Advs. for the Appellants.
Shrirang B. Varma, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment C.T. Ravikumar, J.
1. In these quintuplet appeals, the appellants-convicts who stood the trial in Sessions Trial No.21 of 1996 before the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Gondia for the charge of commission of offences punishable under Section 302 and/or various other offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’) are challenging the common judgment dated 12.07.2011 in Criminal Appeal Nos. 64, 65, 71, 76, 77 and 88 of 1997 whereby and whereunder their conviction and consequential sentences, handed down by the trial Court except under Section 201 read with Section 34, IPC, were confirmed by the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench. For the sake of convenience appellants are referred to hereafter in this judgment in accordance with the order of their rank as accused before the trial Court. Criminal Appeal No.1614/2018 stood abated as the sole appellant who was the first accused and the sole appellant before the Additional Sessions Judge in Criminal Appeal No.64/1997, died on 06.03.2022 and hence, the rest of the appellants in the appeals are, at times, commonly referred to as ‘appellant-convicts’. The appellant-convicts stood the trial for offences punishable under Sections 302, 330, 331, 342, 343, 348, 354, 385, 387, 193, 201, 202, 203, and 218 read with Section 34, IPC, in connection with the death of one Shama @ Kaliya s/o Nanu Uke. Though accused No.8 (Sudhir s/o Rambhau Kayarkar) and accused No.9 (Ganesh s/o Raghuji Turkar) were acquitted of the twin offences charged against them under Sections 201 and 202, IPC, read with Section 34, IPC, 728 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the respondent State did not file an appeal against their acquittal before the High Court.
2. For the sake of convenience, the offence(s) for which each one of the appellant-convicts (accused Nos. 2 to 7) was convicted and the sentence(s) imposed therefor, by the trial Court, can be enumerated as under: - Accused Number IPC offence(s) for which conviction was entered and the consequential sentence(s)
imposed A2 (Ravindra) & A4 (Hans Raj)
Section 304 part II read with Section 34, IPC – sentenced to undergo 7 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 4,000/- each.
A2 (Ravindra), A3 (Manohar), A4 (Hans Raj) & A5 (Vishnu)
Section 331 read with Section 34, IPC – sentenced to undergo 3 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/- each.
A2 (Ravindra), A3 (Manohar), A4 (Hans Raj) & A5 (Vishnu)
Sections 330, 348, & 387 read with Section 34, IPC and sentenced to undergo one year of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/each.
A3 (Manohar), A5 (Vishnu), A6 (Vishwanath) & A7 (Dilip)
Section 202 read with Section 34, IPC – sentenced to undergo 3 months of rigorous imprisonment and Rs. 500/- each.
A2 (Ravindra), A3 (Manohar), A4 (Hans Raj), A5 (Vishnu), A6 (Vishwanath) & A7 (Dilip)
Section 203, IPC. – No separate sentence was imposed.
A2 (Ravindra), A3 (Manohar), A4 (Hans Raj), A5 (Vishnu), A6 (Vishwanath) & A7 (Dilip)
Section 201 and 218 read with Section 34, IPC – sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- each.
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 729Manik & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra
3. All the corporeal punishments of rigorous imprisonment imposed on the appellant-convicts were directed to be run concurrently. Default sentences were also ordered in respect of sentences for payment of fine.
4. Against the judgment of conviction, accused Nos.6 and 7 jointly filed Criminal Appeal No.65/1997, accused Nos. 2 and 4 jointly filed Criminal Appeal No.76/1997, accused Nos. 3 and 5 separately filed Criminal Appeal No.77/1997 and 71/1997 respectively and the State filed Criminal Appeal No.88/1997 against all the convicts. Obviously, the State challenged acquittal of all the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 354 read with Section 34, IPC, while the aforesaid accused persons challenged their conviction under all the aforesaid sections for which they were convicted and sentenced.
5. As per the impugned common judgment, the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the State and partly allowed the appeals filed by the appellant-convicts. According to the appellant-convicts, the High Court acquitted all of them of the offences punishable under Section 201 read with Section 34, IPC. In other words, in respect of all the other offences for which each of them was found guilty and consequently convicted and sentenced, their appeals were dismissed. It is to be noted that despite the dismissal of Criminal Appeal No.88/1997 filed by the State and acquittal of all the appellant-convicts of the offence under Section 201 read with Section 34, IPC assigning specific reasons the State of Maharashtra did not move this Court against the said common judgment dated 12.07.2011.
6. Heard learned senior counsel Sh. Nagamuthu appearing for the appellant-convicts and Sh. Shrirang B. Varma, learned counsel for the State.
7. The case of the prosecution, in succinct, is as follows: - Deceased Shama @ Kalya, S/o Nanu Uke, a history sheeter, was taken into police custody for interrogation in connection with an incident of house-breaking at one Vijay Agrawal’s residence in Gondia and stealing properties worth more than rupees one lakh on 07.12.1995 and without duly recording the arrest he was kept in custody. The suspect Shama @ Kalya was subjected to third degree methods during interrogation, resulting in his death on 22.12.1995. On 31.12.1995, an un-identified body, which was burnt and buried, 730 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports was found in the forest within the jurisdiction of Tirodi police station in Balaghat district of the State of Madhya Pradesh. It is the further case of the prosecution that after committing heinous crime the appellant-convicts concocted a case and contrived false evidence to escape prosecution for custodial death by making one Dipak Lokhande disguised as Shama @ Kalya and taking him under cover to Bhanpur and Survai to Mulchand Radhelal and Tasanbai respectively on the night of 24.12.1995. It is also the case of the prosecution that the appellant-convicts made Dipak Lokhande to run away from the jeep to make it appear that Shama @ Kalya had escaped from custody. Thereupon, PW-38 Harne was informed about it and entry to that effect was made in the station-diary and consequently, false inquiry was made and documents were also prepared.
8. The facts narrated above would reveal that going by the case of the prosecution, it is a case of custodial torture leading to custodial death.
9. The Trial Court, after appreciating the evidence found that the prosecution had failed to establish the charge punishable under Section 302, IPC, and concluded that the prosecution had succeeded only in establishing charge under Section 304 -II read with Section 34 against accused numbers 1 to 3. True that they and the others, barring accused Nos. 8 and 9, were found guilty under certain other charged offences as well, and accordingly sentenced therefor, as mentioned hereinbefore. However, in the appeals by the appellant-convicts the High Court confirmed the conviction and sentences except under Section 201 read with Section 34 IPC. The acquittal of accused numbers 8 & 9 by the trial Court was not challenged by the State before the High Court. So also, the acquittal of the appellants under Section 201 read with Section 34, IPC by the High Court is not now under challenge. In short, the captioned appeals carry only the challenge of the convicts against their conviction under the different sections of the IPC and consequently imposed sentences therefor, as mentioned hereinbefore.
10. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants would submit that there is no serious challenge against the conviction of the appellants for custodial torture. Nonetheless, a feeble attempt was, indeed, made by the learned senior counsel to convince me that the appellants are entitled to a plain acquittal in respect of all the charges for which they were found guilty and were confirmed [2024] 9 S.C.R. 731Manik & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra by the High Court under the impugned judgment. Then, serious contentions were advanced with respect to the conviction for the custodial death under Section 304-II read with Section 34 IPC and the consequential sentence imposed on the appellants. Having heard the rival contentions and bestowing anxious consideration I am of the considered view that even otherwise, contentions in respect of the finding on the charge of custodial torture warrant no serious consideration and the conviction and consequently imposed sentences, therefore, under different sections hereinafter to be mentioned specifically invite no interference.
11. The facts that deceased Shama @ Kalya was taken into police custody on the complaint of PW-6 Vijay Kumar Rameshwarlal Agrawal in crime No. 315 of 95 registered at Gondia City Police Station and that the appellants took him to Detective Branch Room of Gondia Police Station for interrogation and in that regard detained him for days together without adhering to the legal mandate for production of the arrestee within 24 hours, since his detention, before a Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case, remain irrefragable, rather, proved and unrebutted. While the appellant-convicts contend that he is an escapado, the prosecution contends that he was subjected to custodial torture which ultimately culminated in his custodial death (The defence also put forth a case that he was arrested later by the Railway Police in connection with traveling in a train ticketless and consequently prosecuted and sentenced to pay fine, to counter the case of the prosecution that escape of Shama from police custody was nothing but a staged drama). In the contextual situation it is apposite to refer to the decision of this Court in Central Bureau of Investigation v. Kishore Singh1 wherein it was held that when a person was brought to a police station and locked up, obviously, he would be under arrest.
12. The evidence of PW-1 (Amrutabai Ukey), PW-3 and PW-16 and others as also PWs 20 and 22 who are police officials, was relied on by the trial Court and also by the High Court to hold that the deceased was in the custody of the appellants and was in the Detective Branch Room of Gondia Police Station and was subjected to torture during such custody. PW-1 is the wife of deceased Shama. 1 [2010] 14 SCR 95 : (2011) 6 SCC 369 732 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports She would depose that she found him in the Detective Branch Room of Gondia Police Station on 18.12.1995 and he was then bleeding from his legs. According to her, Shama told that police have cut off veins of his legs and hence, he might not survive. She had also deposed that on 22.12.1995, she again found him there and on 24.12.1995, police told her that Shama had escaped from their custody. I will deal with her evidence, a little later, appropriately. PW-3 turned hostile. He was examined to prove that Shama was brought to police station for interrogation and he had suffered injuries on account of torture during the interrogation. Indisputably, while being examined-in-chief, he supported the prosecution and then, prevaricated during his cross-examination. Thereupon, he was cross-examined by the prosecution after getting him declared as hostile. The impugned judgment would reveal that to a Court question, he would admit that what he had stated before the Court in the morning session, during cross-examination on behalf of the accused, was false. The demeanor of the witness as recorded by the courts below and his oscillation during his examination before the Court thus revealed the danger in accepting his version, on any count, without corroboration. Since the maxim ‘falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus’ (false in one thing, false in everything) has no application in India, his evidence was evidently taken into consideration to the extent of establishing the custody of Shama in the Station and also his sustaining injuries during such custody as they got corroboration from the oral testimonies of other witnesses. PW-4 Mulchand deposed that when he visited the police station concerned, he found swelling on the arms and legs of Shama besides bleeding from his legs. PW-16 was the mother-in-law of deceased Shama. She would depose that she was taken to the police station and was kept there for two days and simultaneously herself and deceased Shama were beaten by the police. PW-20 is a Police Officer who was on duty in the said police station between 05.11.1995 and 19.12.1995. He deposed that on 16.12.1995 at about 3 p.m. he visited the Detective Branch room of the Police Station and found Shama @ Kalya in the presence of accused numbers 1 to 6. It is to be noted that he would also depose that he found there an old woman and a girl aged about 16 years. He also deposed that a compounder by name Soni (PW-3) was called to the police station and he dressed the injuries of Shama. PW-20 would further depose that on 19.12.1995 he was shifted to [2024] 9 S.C.R. 733Manik & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra other duties. PW-21 was a lady police constable. She would depose that she was called to the Detective Branch Room and was asked to remain present when search was being conducted. According to her, she found Shama @ Kalya limping when they went to Balaghat to search his house. PW-22 is another Police Officer by name Sumanbai Bharatram Madavi. She deposed that on 20.12.1995 she was deputed to duty there and she found two female suspects sitting in the front room of the police station. She also deposed that inside the room, she found a male suspect, said to be the husband of one of the ladies, sitting there. In view of the nature of the oral testimonies of the aforesaid witnesses and the concurrency in the appreciation of their evidence on the custody and torture of Shama from the detective branch room of Gondia Police Station, I do not find any reason whatsoever requiring a further consideration in regard to the confirmation of conviction for custodial torture. But at the same time, I may hasten to add that the sustainability of conviction and sentencing for some of the offences would depend on the sustainability of the conviction under Section 304 – Part II read with Section 34, IPC. I may also hasten to add that though I decline to interfere with the finding that Shama was subjected to torture while being in custody I shall not be understood of having given imprimatur to the finding that veins of legs of Shama were cut and that ultimately caused his death as according to me, this question is intrinsically intertwined with the challenge against the conviction under Section 304 – Part II, read with Section 34, IPC. One aspect with respect to the acquittal (or conviction) for the offence under Section 201 read with Section 34, IPC also requires consideration, which I will deal with a little later.
13. While considering the question of sustainability of the conviction under Section 304-II read with Section 34, IPC, in view of the position obtained in this case, I am of the considered view that the observation of this Court in Noor Aga v. State of Punjab and Anr., 2 as also the principles enunciated by this Court in the decisions in V. Venkata Subbarao v. State 3 and in Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Daya Sapra 4 cannot go in oblivion. In Noor Aga’s case, this Court 2 [2008] 10 SCR 379 : (2008) 16 SCC 417 3 [2006] Supp. 10 SCR 729 : (2006) 13 SCC 305 4 [2009] 7 SCR 977 : (2009) 13 SCC 729 734 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports observed and held that superficially a case might have an ugly look and thereby, prima facie, shaking the conscious of any court. But it is well settled that suspicion, however high it might be, could under no circumstances be held to be substitute for legal evidence.
14. There can be little doubt with respect to the position that a Court is bound to appreciate the defence evidence in the same manner as it is to appreciate the prosecution evidence, in a criminal case. In V. Venkata Subbarao’s case, this Court held that the burden as an accused did not have to meet the same standards of proof as is required to be met by the prosecution. In Vishnu Dutt Sharma’s case, this Court held that the prosecution is bound to prove the commission of the offence on the part of the accused beyond any reasonable doubt. Certainly, the requirement to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt does not mean that the degree of proof on the part of the prosecution must be one beyond a shadow of doubt (see the decision in Iqbal Moosa Patel v. State of Gujarat 5).
15. The principle as to what degree of proof is required, is stated by Lord Denning in Miller v. Minister of Pensions,6 thus: - “…that degree is well settled. It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with sentence, “of course it is possible, but not in the least probable” the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice.”
16. The reasons for my remarks, as above, would be unravelled by the following critical examination of the impugned common judgment and also appreciation of evidence, in that regard.
17. The judgment of the trial Court would reveal that the finger print test conducted for identification of the dead body was accepted and acted upon. The trial Court held in paragraph 59 of its judgment 5 [2011] 2 SCR 121 : (2011) 2 SCC 198 6 (1947) 2 All ER 372 [2024] 9 S.C.R. 735Manik & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra that the finger prints of Shama @ Kalya are identical with the finger prints of unknown dead body, is acceptable. “Had Shama @ Kalya not been criminal, whose record slips would not have been available, there was no chance of identification of dead body”, the trial Court further held thus in paragraph 101 of its judgment. However, a bare perusal of the impugned common judgment would disclose that even while confirming the conviction under Section 304 part-II read with Section 34, IPC and also the consequently imposed sentence therefor, the High Court had reversed the twin foundational findings of the trial Court for the conviction under Section 304 part-II read with Section 34, IPC. Furthermore, the High Court assigned its own reason for finding the appellants not guilty for the offence committed under Section 300, IPC, punishable under Section 302, IPC. It is to be noted that the Trial Court despite the absence of medical evidence as to the injury of cutting off veins on the legs took that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing that the deceased Shama @ Kalya had sustained such injuries and at the same time, held that the said injuries would not attract clause (3) of Section 300, IPC that speaks of causing bodily injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Based on such opinion and holding that in the circumstances obtained accused Nos.1, 2 and 4 should be clothed with the knowledge that the injuries which Shama @ Kalya had so sustained were likely to cause death, found them guilty for having committed the offence falling squarely under Section 304 part-II with the aid of Section 34, IPC. As already noted, the trial Court did so after accepting the opinion on finger print test and the consequent identification of the dead body as that of Shama @ Kalya.
18. The evidence on record would reveal that what was traced from Garra Chowky, within the jurisdiction of Tirodi Police Station, on 31.12.1995 was an unidentified, burnt body. Taking note of the said position, in paragraph 102 of the impugned common judgment the High Court held thus: - “102. In view of the fact that the dead body was beyond identification and recognition, by patent identification marks, only sources of identification left to the prosecution were: [a] DNA test [b] Comparison of finger print marks.”
736 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
19. Upon finding that no DNA test was done and then holding that even if it was done it would not have the value of a conclusive proof as to the contents thereof, the High Court went on to consider the sustainability of the finding on the finger print test by the Trial Court. Contextually, it is worthy to refer to paragraphs 105 to 108 of the impugned common judgment. They read thus: - “105. In so far as the aspect of finger prints is concerned, prosecution has made efforts to demonstrate that finger prints, subject-matter, match with those of the dissected fingers of corpse, and do prove that those are of one and the same person.
106. Prosecution has proved that the finger prints of the dissected fingers, which were used, were of the dead body, subject-matter.
107. The evidence of PW 41 - Sharad Dayaram Girhepunje at pages 1471 onwards of the paper-book, however, fails to positively prove that the finger prints, which were used as a basic document to be the finger prints of Shyama, were not so proved to be that of Shyama taken by a particular person with maintenance of due record thereof, and the purpose for which those were taken by proving those to have been recorded in relation to a particular crime.
108. In the result, reliance of the prosecution to prove that the dead body, subject-matter, was that of Shyama is based on guess work than on positive evidence. Result is that unless it is proved that the dead body was that of Shyma, the evidence in relation to efforts made by the accused persons to mutilate the said body and thereby destroy the evidence are rendered like a hazy picture, and do not constitute proof of charge under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, and, therefore, charge to destroy evidence of murder is not proved to that extent.”
20. A scanning of the afore-extracted paragraphs would show that the High Court had clearly arrived at the conclusion that even if it could take that the prosecution had succeeded in proving that the finger prints kept in the police station would match with the dissected [2024] 9 S.C.R. 737Manik & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra fingers of the corpse, it had failed to establish that the finger prints, which were used as basic document to be the finger print of Shama and thereby, that the recovered dead body was that of deceased Shama. Evidently, the High Court held that the evidence of PW-41, Sharad Dayaram Girhepunje failed to prove positively that the finger prints that were used as a basic document to be the finger prints of Shama, taken by a particular person entrusted with the duty of maintenance of due record thereof. It is such cumulative consideration that constrained the High Court to reverse the conclusion of the Trial Court and ultimately to hold that the finding that the dead body was that of Shama was based on guess work than on positive evidence. The aforesaid paragraphs would show that after appreciating the evidence, the High Court held that unless it is proved that the dead body is that of Shama, the evidence in relation to efforts made by the accused persons to mutilate the said body and to destroy the evidence would not constitute the proof of charge under Section 302, IPC. In short, assigning specific reasons the High Court reversed the finding of the trial Court that the opinion on the fingerprint test is acceptable and the prosecution had thus succeeded in proving the identity of the recovered body as that of Shama. After holding thus, it was further held that unless it is proved that the dead body was that of Shama, the evidence in relation to efforts made by the accused persons to mutilate the said body could not be taken as proof for destruction of evidence of murder of Shama. At this juncture, I will refer to the other aspect of acquittal (or conviction) for the offence under Section 201 read with Section 34, IPC, referred to earlier by me as one that also requires consideration.
21. In paragraph 77 of the judgement of the trial Court it was observed thus: - “Whatever be reason, but there is no direct evidence in this case, that all the accused No.1 to 9 had caused disappearance of the dead body of deceased Shama @ Kalya by nothing it to fire”.
22. After making such observation, the trial Court held that there was no other alternative except to hold the accused Nos.1, 2 and 4 guilty for causing the disappearance of the body by mutilating it and accordingly guilty of the offence under Section 201 read with 738 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Section 34, IPC. In the above circumstances, the observations and findings at paragraph 108 of the impugned judgment of the High Court can only be qua accused Nos.1, 2 and 4.
23. Now, it is to be noted that on another count, the Trial Court held accused Nos.3, 5, 6 and 7 guilty of the offence under Section 201, IPC. In paragraph 85 of the judgment of trial Court it was observed and held: - “……A false record came to be prepared about escape of Shama @ Kalya. Apart from that even the arrest of Shama @ Kalya and taking him for the purpose of investigation itself was a false preparation of the record and thus false information. All the accused No. 1 to 7 seem to have been involved in this drama played in the night on 24.12.1995 right from showing of arrest of Shama @ Kalya. Therefore, so far as offence U/s. 201 of IPC is concerned I hold the accused No. 3,5 to 7 guilty for giving false information which they knew it to be false.”
24. The judgement of the trial Court would further reveal that on 17.02.1997 when it was brought to notice that while typing the final order, conviction in respect of the offences under Sections 201, 218 read with Section 34, IPC were not typed due to oversight and bona fide mistake, a corrigendum of the order of conviction was issued on 17.02.1997 on the following lines: - “Accused No. 1 to 7 are convicted of the offence under Section 201, 218 R/w Section 34 of IPC and are sentenced to suffer R.I. for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/each in default to suffer further S.I. for four months on each count”.
25. Thus, it can be seen that though on different counts the trial Court held accused Nos.1 to 7 guilty under Section 201, IPC the High Court acquitted accused 1, 2 and 4 of the charge under Section 201 read with Section 34, IPC only in respect of causing disappearance of body by mutilating it. Therefore, the question is whether the acquittal of the accused Nos. 1, 2 and 4 under Section 201 read with Section 34, IPC by the High Court got any impact on accused Nos. 2 and 4 as also accused Nos.3 and 5 to 7 in relation to the other count, referred hereinbefore.
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 739Manik & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra
26. Now, in the impugned common judgment, the High Court after reversing the finding of the trial Court on the evidence based on fingerprint test held that the charge in relation to the screening of evidence by mutilating the dead body of Shama @ Kalya was not proved but failure of prosecution in identification of dead body of Shama would not exonerate the accused from the charge of the screening evidence and other charges. Thereafter, upon considering the evidence on the charge of offence under Section 201, IPC read with Section 34, IPC, the High Court held in paragraphs 111 – 113 of the impugned common judgment thus: - “111. In the result, this Court concludes that based on facts proved by the prosecution, it has succeeded in proving all charges, except the proof of destruction of evidence as regards dead body.
112. Prosecution has failed to prove offence punishable under Section 201 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code for causing disappearance of evidence by destroying the dead body of Shyama, incorporated in sixth part of charge framed against accused persons.
113. Based on findings and conclusions recorded in para 112, the accused are acquitted of those charges.”
27. In view of the afore-extracted paragraphs from the impugned common judgment of the High Court as also what is referred from the judgment of the trial Court, it is evident that the contention of the appellant-convicts that there is wholesome acquittal of their conviction under Section 201, read with Section 34 IPC cannot be the correct position. As specifically made clear in paragraph 112 as extracted above, the acquittal under Section 201, IPC was with respect to causing disappearance of evidence by destroying the dead body of Shyama. Therefore, the question as to whether the appellant-convicts concerned still stand convicted on the other count.
28. In the light of the observations and findings in paragraphs 105 to 108 and 112 of the impugned common judgment, and the reversal thereunder of the aforesaid twin foundational findings of the trial Court, the main question to be considered is whether any evidence was available to hold the appellants guilty under Section 304 part-II read with Section 34, IPC. Certainly, the answer to the aforementioned 740 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports question qua Section 201, IPC also would depend upon the outcome of its consideration. Before continuing with such consideration, it is relevant to note that despite such reversal of the findings and observations by the High Court which are fatal to the case of the prosecution regarding custodial death, neither the State nor any relative, who falls within the expression ‘victim’, did not prefer any appeal against the impugned common judgment.
29. There can be no doubt that it is imperative, firstly, to prove homicidal death of the very person whose death was allegedly caused by the accused concerned to hold the accused concerned guilty, either under Section 300, IPC punishable under Section 302, IPC or under Section 304, IPC. In the decision of Harendra Nath Mandal v. State of Bihar,7 this Court held that before an accused is held guilty and punished under first part or second part of Section 304, IPC, a death must have been caused by the assailant under any of the circumstances mentioned in the five exceptions to Section 300, IPC. I shall not be understood to have held that recovery of the dead body of the particular person whose death was allegedly caused by the accused is always required to sustain a charge of murder or that of commission of offence under Section 304, IPC.
30. Contextually, it is only apposite to note that the expression ‘corpus delicti’ got no reference to corpses. Virtually, it means that before seeking to prove that accused is the author of the crime concerned, it must be established that the crime charged has been committed. In fact, the said Latin expression is used with reference to the establishment of the fact that an offence has been committed, as opposed to the proof that a given person has committed it. I may hasten to add that, at times, the said expression is found to be used in the sense “dead body of the victim of alleged homicide”. In the decision of Sevaka Perumal & Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu,8 it was laid down that it would not be essential to establish corpus delicti, but the factum of death of the deceased concerned must be established like any other fact. In the decision of Ram Chandra and Ram Bharosey v. State of Uttar Pradesh,9 it was held that in 7 [1993] 2 SCR 137 : (1993) 2 SCC 435 8 [1991] 2 SCR 711 : (1991) 3 SCC 471
9 AIR 1957 SC 381
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 741Manik & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra law, a conviction for an offence did not necessarily depend upon the corpus delicti, i.e., the dead body, is being found. However, there must be reliable evidence, direct or circumstantial, of commission of murder, though corpus delicti is not traceable. In the decision of Mani Kumar Thapa v. State of Sikkim,10 it was held that in a trial for murder it is neither an absolute necessity nor an essential ingredient to establish corpus delicti, but the factum of death of the deceased concerned must be established like any other fact. Furthermore, it was held that in some cases it would not be possible to trace or recover corpus delicti owing to a number of possibilities such as dead body might have been disposed of without trace. Taking into account such possibilities it was furthermore held that if the recovery of dead body is to be held to be mandatory to convict an accused, in many cases, the accused would manage to see that the dead body is destroyed, which would have afforded the accused a complete immunity from being held guilty or from being punished. It was therefore held that what is required in law to base a conviction for an offence of murder is that there should be reliable and plausible evidence, like any other fact, that death was committed and it could be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence albeit the dead body could not be traced. Thus, the law laid down in the aforesaid decisions, which was consistently being followed, would reveal that conviction of an offence referred above did not depend upon whether the dead body is found, if reliable evidence, direct or circumstantial, of the commission of homicide is established despite the non-tracing of the dead body. Having held thus, I may hasten to add that the same cannot be the position, rather, the position would be different, when prosecution itself got a case that the dead body was recovered. Indisputably, it is one thing to say that the dead body is not traceable and another thing to say and claim that the dead body is traced and it is of that person allegedly murdered by the accused. Once the dead body is traced and subjected to autopsy and necrotomic and other evidences are adduced to bring out the cause of death, failure to prove that the dead body is of that very person allegedly done to death by the very accused, must have fatal and adverse consequence on the prosecution case. As noted
10 (2002) 7 SCC 157
742 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports earlier, a case that dead body is untraceable and a case where it is traced and evidence is adduced in a bid to prove the identity of the deceased are different and distinct. In the latter case, upon failure to prove, the prosecution cannot be permitted to advance a case that the dead body is untraceable. In the decision of State v. Sushil Sharma,11 a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held that there would be absolutely no room, in a criminal case, for conjectures and surmises and the prosecution is supposed to establish its case as is put forth by it and if the case is disbelieved on any aspect by the Court, then the Court could not make out a new case on its own for the prosecution. I am in full agreement with the law thus laid.
31. In the case on hand, evidently the very case of the prosecution is that the body recovered from forest area within jurisdiction of Tirodi Police Station is that of the deceased Shama @ Kalya, and it is to prove the same that the fingerprint test was conducted and relied on. I have already found that though trial Court accepted and acted upon the opinion of the fingerprint test and that the said finding was reversed by the High Court. In categoric terms, the High Court held that the reliance of prosecution to prove that the dead body, subject matter, was that of Shama is based on guess work than on positive evidence. I have already taken note of the fact that the trial Court after accepting the opinion of the fingerprint test held that but for the availability of record slips, Shama @ Kalya being a criminal, there would not have been any chance of identification of the dead body. In such circumstances when once identification of the dead body as that of Shama @ Kalya based on fingerprint test is reversed by the High Court, in the absence of appeal by the State or the victim, it could not be said that the dead body is that of Shama @ Kalya, either for holding the appellant-convicts guilty of the offence under Section 300, IPC punishable under Section 302, IPC, or under Part-I / Part-II of Section 304, IPC.
32. Though, I have already held that upon failure to prove the case put forth that the recovered dead body is that of the person allegedly murdered by the accused, the prosecution cannot be permitted to raise a contention that the dead body is not traceable or that in such eventuality the Court also cannot make out a new case on its 11 2007 SCC OnLine Del 255 [2024] 9 S.C.R. 743Manik & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra own for the prosecution, I think it only proper to proceed with further consideration of the present case.
33. In the contextual situation, it is also relevant to refer to the decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. M.V. Mahesh. 12 Even in the absence of corpus delicti, it is possible to establish in an appropriate case commission of murder on appropriate material being made available to the court, it was held therein. Therefore, the question is when the opinion on the fingerprint test is eschewed from the evidence, what survives to sustain the finding of guilt of appellant-convicts concerned under Section 304, Part-II, IPC, in the case on hand.
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