Ishwar (Since Deceased) Thr. LRs & Ors. v. Bhim Singh & Anr.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 651; [2024] 9 S.C.R. 1
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice Manoj Misra
- Decided
- 3 Sept 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 10193/2024
- Sections
- 28, 37, 28(1)
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[2024] 9 S.C.R. 1 : 2024 INSC 651 Ishwar (Since Deceased) Thr. Lrs & Ors.
v.
Bhim Singh & Anr.
Civil Appeal No. 10193 of 2024 03 September 2024 [J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose as to whether the execution court had jurisdiction to deal with the application for rescission of contract and extension of time to deposit the balance sale consideration; and if execution court had the jurisdiction, whether those applications ought to have been decided as one in the suit on original side, if yes, then, whether, in the facts of the case, on that ground alone, the impugned order warrants interference in exercise of jurisdiction Art 136 of the Constitution.
Headnotes† Specific Relief Act, 1963 – s. 28 – Rescission in certain circumstances of contracts for the sale or lease of immovable property, the specific performance of which has been decreed – Application for rescission of contract and extension of time to deposit the balance sale consideration – Jurisdiction of the execution court:
Held: Bare reading of s. 28 gives an impression that the power to extend time to deposit, or to rescind the contract on failure of deposit vests in the Court which passed the decree – Expression “may apply in the same suit in which the decree is made” as used in u/s. 28 must be accorded an expansive meaning so as to include the court of first instance even though the decree under execution is passed by the appellate court, because the decree is in the same suit – Thus, an application u/s. 28, either for rescission of contract or for extension of time, can be entertained and decided by the execution court, provided it is the court which passed the decree in terms of s. 37 CPC – On facts, the Court of first instance, (where the civil suit was instituted) and the execution application was filed before the Court of Additional Civil Judge * Author 2 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports (Senior Division) – Application u/s 28 was disposed of by the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division) – Thus, by virtue of s. 37 CPC, the execution court being the Court of first instance with reference to the suit in which the decree was passed had jurisdiction to deal with the application u/s. 28 of the Act – Thus, the objection as regards the jurisdiction of the execution court to deal with the application for extension of time/rescission of the court u/s. 28(1) is rejected. [Paras 15, 18, 19] Specific Relief Act, 1963 – s. 28 – Rescission in certain circumstances of contracts for the sale or lease of immovable property, the specific performance of which has been decreed – Execution court to decide the application u/s. 28 as an application on the original side (as an application in the suit) or on the execution side (as an application in the execution proceedings):
Held: Application seeking rescission of contract, or extension of time, u/s. 28 (1), must be decided as an application in the original suit wherein the decree was passed even though the suit has been disposed of – Thus, even if the execution court is the Court of first instance with reference to the suit wherein the decree under execution was passed, it must transfer the application filed u/s. 28 to the file of the suit before dealing with it. [Para 22] Constitution of India – Art. 136 – Jurisdiction under – Exercise of – Suit for specific performance of agreement by respondents against appellants, partly decreed, directing the appellants to refund the earnest money – Appeal thereagainst, allowed by the appellate court, directing the appellants to execute the sale deed in favour of the respondent on payment of balance sale consideration within the stipulated period, failing which the respondents could get the sale deed executed through the court – Application for execution of the decree and deposit of balance sale price by the respondents – During pendency, appellants filed second appeal which was dismissed – Respondent’s then filed application before the execution court seeking permission to deposit the balance consideration in the court, whereas the appellant filed application u/s. 28 to rescind the contract – However, the execution court rejected the appellant’s application and permitted the respondents to deposit the balance consideration – Aggrieved appellant, then filed revision which was dismissed – Interference with: [2024] 9 S.C.R. 3Ishwar (Since Deceased) Thr. Lrs & Ors. v. Bhim Singh & Anr. Held: Not called for – Court does not exercise its jurisdiction u/Art. 136 only because it is lawful to do so – For the purpose of doing complete justice to the parties, the Court may not interfere with the order even if it suffers from some legal error – Court may deny relief to a party having regard to its conduct and may, in a given situation, mould the relief to do complete justice to the parties – On facts, the respondents had all throughout shown their intention to pay the balance consideration for execution of the sale deed whereas the appellants appeared interested only in challenging the decree before higher Courts – Execution court justifiably exercised its discretion in favour of the decree holder by allowing them to deposit the balance consideration – Thus, substantial justice has been done to the parties and if the impugned order is interfered with only on the technical ground that the application was not dealt with as one on the original side, grave injustice would be caused to the decree holder – More so, when the judgment-debtor themselves applied to the execution court for rescinding the contract, and raised no such jurisdictional issue either before the Execution Court or the High Court – Furthermore, the plea that there was no proper prayer for condonation of delay in making the deposit of the balance consideration, or that there was no proper application for extension of time to make deposit cannot be accepted because, in the execution application itself, which was promptly filed after expiry of 60 days from the date of the appellate court decree, the decree holder had sought permission to make deposit; and the application filed after dismissal of second appeal also sought permission to make deposit – Prayer to extend the time to make deposit was thus implicit in the prayer to permit the decree holder to make deposit of the balance consideration. [Paras 24, 27-30] Case Law Cited Ramankutty Guptan v. Avara [1994] 1 SCR 542 : (1994) 2 SCC 642; V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar Firm v. C. Alagappan and Anr [1999] 1 SCR 349 : (1999) 4 SCC 702; Sanjay Shivshankar Chitkote v. Bhanudas Dadarao Bokade (Died) through L.Rs Civil Appeal No. 8022 of 2023 @ SLP (C) No. 24720 of 2023 decided on 08.12.2023; Chanda v. Rattni [2007] 4 SCR 402 : (2007) 14 SCC 26; Lajpat Rai Mehta v. Govt. of Punjab (Deptt. of Irrigation & Power) [2008] 17 SCR 657 : (2009) 3 SCC 260 – referred to. 4 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports List of Acts Specific Relief Act, 1963; Constitution of India.
List of Keywords Execution court; Application for rescission of contract; Application for extension of time to deposit the balance sale consideration; Suit on original side; Jurisdiction of the execution court; Court of first instance; Suit for specific performance of agreement; Refund the earnest money; Payment of balance sale consideration; Discretionary jurisdiction; Condonation of delay.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 10193 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 11.01.2017 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CR No. 8105 of 2016 Appearances for Parties B. S Bedi, Ms. Simar Bedi, Dinesh Verma, Subhasish Bhowmick, Advs. for the Appellants.
Sanchar Anand, Devendra Singh, Anant K Vatsya, Dr. Ravinder Kumar Anand, Aman Kumar Thakur, Arjun Rana, Mrs. Rita Vasisth, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Manoj Misra, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal impugns an order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh 1 dated 11.01.2017 passed in Civil Revision No. 8105 of 2016, whereby the revision preferred by the appellant(s) against the order of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kaithal 2 dated 03.11.2016 was dismissed.
1 High Court 2 Execution Court [2024] 9 S.C.R. 5Ishwar (Since Deceased) Thr. Lrs & Ors. v. Bhim Singh & Anr.
FACTUAL MATRIX
3. A suit for specific performance was instituted by the respondents against the appellant(s) (which would include their predecessor in interest) for enforcement of an agreement to sell dated 18.05.2005. In the plaint, inter alia, it was alleged that the appellant(s) had agreed to sell the property in dispute at a total consideration of Rs.18 lacs, out of which Rs. 9.77 lacs was paid in advance, yet, despite service of notice requesting execution of sale deed, the appellants failed to execute the same.
4. The trial court (i.e., the Court of Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kaithal), vide judgment and decree dated 28.02.2011, decreed the suit in part whereunder the appellant(s) were directed to refund the earnest money with interest, etc.
5. Aggrieved by rejection of the prayer for specific performance of the agreement, the respondents went in appeal. The appellate court (i.e., the Court of Additional District Judge, Kaithal (for short ADJ)) allowed the appeal vide judgment and decree dated 12.01.2012 and accepted the prayer for specific performance of the agreement. While doing so, it directed the appellants herein to execute the sale deed in favour of the respondents herein on payment of balance sale consideration within a period of two months from the date of the decree, failing which, liberty was given to the decree holder(s) to get the sale deed executed through Court.
6. On 20.03.2012, the respondents (i.e. decree holders) filed an execution application before the Court of first instance (i.e., the trial court) praying thus:
“It is therefore, prayed that the sale deed as per the decree passed in Civil Appeal No. 53 of 2011 may kindly be got executed and registered in favour of the decree holders by the appointment of the local commissioner and possession may kindly be got delivered to the decree holder and the balance sale price may kindly be got deposited in the Court for payment to the J.Ds and cost for the suit and the appeal and this execution may also be got recovered from the J.Ds.”
7. While the application for execution of the decree was pending, the appellant(s) (i.e., the judgment debtor(s)) challenged the appellate 6 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports court decree by filing Second Appeal No. 3730 of 2012 before the High Court, which came to be dismissed on 07.11.2013.
8. Upon dismissal of the Second Appeal, the respondents (i.e., decreeholders) filed an application before the Execution Court on 24.03.2014 seeking permission to deposit the balance consideration in Court. Opposing this prayer of the decree holder, in the execution proceeding itself, the appellant(s) (i.e. the judgment-debtors) submitted an application under Section 28 3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (in short “the 1963 Act”) to rescind the contract on the ground that decree-holder(s) had failed to make deposit within two months, as directed by the first appellate court.
9. The Execution Court, however, rejected the application of the judgment-debtor(s) for rescission of the contract vide order dated 03.11.2016 and, simultaneously, permitted the decree-holder(s) to make deposit of the balance consideration.
10. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Execution Court, the appellant(s) (i.e., the judgment-debtors) filed a Civil Revision before the High Court, which came to be dismissed by the impugned order. 3 28. Rescission in certain circumstances of contracts for the sale or lease of immovable property, the specific performance of which has been decreed.—
(1) Where in any suit a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property has been made and the purchaser or lessee does not, within the period allowed by the decree or such further period as the court may allow, pay the purchase money or other sum which the court has ordered him to pay, the vendor or lessor may apply in the same suit in which the decree is made, to have the contract rescinded and on such application the court may, by order, rescind the contract either so far as regards the party in default or altogether, as the justice of the case may require.
(2) Where a contract is rescinded under sub-section (1), the court—
(a) shall direct the purchaser or the lessee, if he has obtained possession of the property under the contract, to restore such possession to the vendor or lessor, and
(b) may direct payment to the vendor or lessor of all the rents and profits which have accrued in respect of the property from the date on which possession was so obtained by the purchaser or lessee until restoration of possession to the vendor or lessor, and, if the justice of the case so requires, the refund of any sum paid by the vendee or the lessee as earnest money or deposit in connection with the contract.
(3) If the purchase or lessee pays the purchase money or other sum which he is ordered to pay under the decree within the period referred to in sub-section (1), the court may, on application made in the same suit, award the purchaser or lessee such further relief as he may be entitled to, including in appropriate cases all or any of the following reliefs, namely:—
(a) the execution of a proper conveyance or lease by the vendor or lessor;
(b) the delivery of possession, or partition and separate possession, of the property on the execution of such conveyance or lease.
(4) No separate suit in respect of any relief which may be claimed under this section shall lie at the instance of a vendor, purchaser, lessor or lessee, as the case may be.
(5) The costs of any proceedings under this section shall be in the discretion of the court. [2024] 9 S.C.R. 7Ishwar (Since Deceased) Thr. Lrs & Ors. v. Bhim Singh & Anr.
11. We have heard Shri Subhasish Bhowmick for the appellant(s); Mr. Devendra Singh for the respondents; and have perused the materials on record.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT(S)
12. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted:
(i) The Execution Court held no jurisdiction to extend the time for depositing the balance consideration as the decree under execution was passed by the appellate court.
(ii) The decree was executable on payment of balance sale consideration within two months. No application for extension of time to make deposit was made within the aforesaid period, therefore the Court had no power to extend the time for deposit.
(iii) The Execution Court committed grave error in extending the time to make deposit of the balance amount after four years of the appellate court’s decree, when, otherwise, it was to be paid within two months from the date of the decree.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS
13. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted:
(i) The execution application was filed in the same Court where the original suit was instituted, therefore, the Court had jurisdiction to extend the time to make deposit;
(ii) The decree under execution did not specifically fix the mode of payment and there was no direction to deposit the balance consideration in Court, therefore, except to file for execution of the decree and seek permission of the Court to deposit the balance consideration, there was no other method by which decree holder could have paid the balance amount, more so, when the judgment debtor was not interested in abiding by the decree;
(iii) The judgment – debtor(s) were offered balance consideration within time, and the execution application was also filed within time, but, instead of executing the sale deed, the judgment– debtor(s) chose to prefer a second appeal before the High Court. Not only that, after the second appeal was dismissed, the judgment-debtor(s) preferred a Special Leave Petition (in short 8 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports SLP) before this Court, which, too, was dismissed on 07.11.2016. Thus, it is clear that the decree-holders were throughout ready and willing to perform their part under the contract / decree whereas the judgment-debtor(s) avoided execution of the sale deed. In these circumstances and having regard to the facts of the case, the Execution Court was justified in allowing the application for extension of time and rejecting the application for rescission of the contract.
ISSUES
14. Having noticed the rival contentions, in our view, the following issues arise for our consideration:
(i) Whether the Execution Court had jurisdiction to deal with the application(s) for (a) recission of contract and (b) extension of time to deposit the balance sale consideration?
(ii) If Execution Court had the jurisdiction, whether those applications ought to have been decided as one in the suit (i.e., original side)? If yes, then, whether, in the facts of the case, on that ground alone, the impugned order warrants interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India?
ANALYSIS
A. The Execution Court had jurisdiction
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