Seetharama Shetty v. Monappa Shetty
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 650; [2024] 9 S.C.R. 166
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Hrishikesh Roy, Justice Sarasa Venkatanarayana Bhatti
- Decided
- 2 Sept 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 10039/2024
- Sections
- 2, 33, 39, 34, 37(2), 37(1), 38, 35, 42, 37, 36, 40(1)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:22 am. Original source ↗
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[2024] 9 S.C.R. 166 : 2024 INSC 650 Seetharama Shetty v.
Monappa Shetty (Civil Appeal Nos. 10039-40 of 2024)
02 September 2024 [Hrishikesh Roy and S.V.N. Bhatti,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Scope of Sections 33, 34, 37, 39 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957; whether the agreement of sale dated 29.06.1999, with a recital on delivery of possession to the appellant, conforms to the definition of conveyance under Section 2(d) read with Article 20(1) of the Schedule of the Act or not; whether in the facts and the circumstances of the case, the penalty determined by the trial Court on the instrument instead of sending the instrument to the District Registrar for determination and collection of penalty as may be applicable is legal; whether, the said order of trial court as confirmed by the impugned orders of the High Court are legal and valid or call for interference by this Court.
Headnotes† Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 – ss.33, 34, 39 – Appellant sought perpetual injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with his possession of the plaint schedule property which he claimed was given to him as part performance under the suit agreement between them – Respondent denying the execution of the aforesaid agreement of sale inter alia claimed that the document was insufficiently stamped and thus, inadmissible in evidence – Filed application u/s.33 for impounding of the suit agreement – Eventually, trial court directed the appellant to pay the deficit stamp duty and ten times penalty on the agreement of sale – Penalty determined by the Court on the instrument instead of sending the instrument to the District Registrar for determination and collection of penalty, if legal: Held: No – Before the stage of admission of the instrument in evidence, the respondent raised an objection on the deficit stamp duty – Therefore, it was the respondent who required the suit agreement to be impounded and then sent to the District Registrar to be dealt with u/s.39 – Respondent desired the impounding of the * Author [2024] 9 S.C.R. 167Seetharama Shetty v. Monappa Shetty suit agreement and collect the deficit stamp duty and penalty – The trial court is yet to exercise its jurisdiction u/s.34 – On the contrary, the trial court called for a report from the District Registrar, so for all purposes, the suit instrument is still at one or the other steps summed up in paragraph 21 of the present judgment – Therefore, going by the request of the respondent, the option is left for the decision of the District Registrar – Contrary to these admitted circumstances, though the suit instrument is insufficiently stamped, still the penalty of ten times u/s.34 was imposed through the impugned orders – The imposition of penalty of ten times at this juncture in the facts and circumstances of this case is illegal and contrary to the steps summed up in paragraph 21 – The instrument is sent to the District Registrar, thereafter the District Registrar in exercise of his jurisdiction u/s.39, decides the quantum of stamp duty and penalty payable on the instrument – The appellant is denied this option by the impugned orders – Appellant must pay what is due, but as is decided by the District Registrar and not the Court u/s.34 – The direction to pay ten times the penalty of the deficit stamp duty set aside. [Paras 22, 23] Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 – ss.33-35, 37, 39 – Scope – Insufficiently stamped instrument – Admission procedure – Steps explained and summed up. [Paras 21-21.8] Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 – s.2(d), Article 5, Article 20(1) of the Schedule of the Act – ‘conveyance’:
Held: Article 5 of the Schedule of the Act deals with an agreement of sale coupled with possession and the requirement of paying the ad valorem stamp duty – If an instrument conforms to the requirements of conveyance u/s.2(d) r/w Article 20(1) of the Schedule of the Act, the applicable stamp duty is ad valorem – In the present case, the appellant did not argue on the applicability of the clause dealing with possession in the agreement and requirement to pay ad valorem stamp duty and the relief of injunction was sought on the basis of delivery of possession by the respondent under the suit agreement. [Para 14] Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 – Object of the Act – Discussed. [Para 17] Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 – ss.34, 39 – Distinction and discretion under – Distinction in the discretion available to Every Person/Court; discretionary jurisdiction conferred on the District Registrar – Discussed.
168 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Case Law Cited Gangappa and another v. Fakkirappa [2018] 13 SCR 603 – relied on.
Trustees of H.C. Dhanda Trust v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others [2020] 11 SCR 268; Chilakuri Gangulappa v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Madanpalle [2001] 2 SCR 419 : (2001) 4 SCC 197; Hindustan Steel Limited v. Dilip Construction Company [1969] 3 SCR 736 : (1969) 1 SCC 597; District Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank [2004] Suppl. 5 SCR 833 : (2005) 1 SCC 496; State of Maharashtra v. National Organic Chemical Industries Limited [2024] 4 SCR 340 : (2024) SCC OnLine SC 497; Chiranji Lal v. Haridas [2005] Supp. 1 SCR 359 : (2005) 10 SCC 746; Petiti Subba Rao v. Anumala S. Narendra (2002) 10 SCC 427– referred to. Digambar Warty and others v. District Registrar Bangalore Urban District and another ILR 2013 KAR 2099; K. Amarnath v. Smt. Puttamma ILR 1999 KAR 4634; Suman v. Vinayaka and others (2013) SCC OnLine Kar 10138; Niyaz Ahmed Siddique v. Sanganeria Company Private Limited (2023) SCC OnLine Cal 1391; United Precision Engineers Private Limited v. KIOCL Limited (2016) SCC OnLine Kar 1077; Sri. K. Govinde Gowda v. Smt. Akkayamma and others ILR 2011 KAR 4719 – referred to. List of Acts Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957; Stamp Act, 1899.
List of Keywords Stamp duty; Deficit stamp duty; Deficit stamp duty and penalty; Penalty; Levy of stamp duty and penalty; Agreement of sale; Ad valorem stamp duty; Suit instrument insufficiently stamped; Ten times penalty on the agreement of sale; Delivery of possession; Conveyance; Collection of penalty; Insufficiently stamped instrument; Inadmissible in evidence; District Registrar/Deputy Commissioner; Perpetual injunction; Part performance under the suit agreement; Impounding of the suit agreement.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 10039-40 of From the Judgment and Order dated 23.08.2019 and 14.09.2021 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in WP No. 30734 of 2019 and RP No. 340 of 2019 respectively [2024] 9 S.C.R. 169Seetharama Shetty v. Monappa Shetty Appearances for Parties Ms. Liz Mathew, Sr. Adv. (Amicus Curiae), Ms. Mallika Agarwal, Ms. Bagavathy V., Advs.
Parikshit Angadi, Anirudh Sanganeria, Advs. for the Appellant. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment S.V.N. Bhatti, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The Civil Appeals arise from an order dated 14.09.2021 in Review Petition No. 340 of 2019 and Writ Petition No. 30734 of 2019.
3. In these Civil Appeals, the scope of Sections 33, 34, 37, and 39 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 (for short, ‘the Act’) arises for consideration.
I. Factual Matrix
4. The appellant filed O.S. No. 295 of 2013 for perpetual injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with the appellant’s peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property. The plaint schedule property consists of agricultural land in Kavoor village of Mangalore taluk. The prayer for injunction rests on the plea that the respondent entered into the agreement of sale dated 29.06.1999 with the appellant. The appellant claims to have been put in possession of the plaint schedule property as part performance under the agreement of sale dated 29.06.1999 by the respondent. The other clauses covered by the agreement are not adverted to as part of the narrative, for they are of little relevance for disposing of the Civil Appeals.
5. It is alleged that the respondent, contrary to the possession given as part performance under the suit agreement, tried to dispossess the appellant. This led to exchange of notices between the parties. The sheet anchor in the appellant’s narrative is that the agreement of sale dated 29.06.1999 exists between the parties, and in part performance thereunder, the appellant was put in possession of the plaint schedule property by the respondent. Contrary to the ad idem of the parties in putting the appellant in possession, the respondent was trying to dispossess the appellant from the plaint schedule property. 170 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Therefore, the suit was filed for the relief of perpetual injunction. Briefly narrated, the possession claimed under the agreement of sale is sought to be protected through the prayer for perpetual injunction.
6. The respondent denies the execution of the agreement of sale dated 29.06.1999. The appellant, since claims possession through the agreement of sale, the suit agreement shall be treated as a conveyance. The suit agreement is insufficiently stamped. Therefore, the document is inadmissible in evidence unless the document is made compliant with the requirements of the Act.
6.1. The respondent filed an application before the trial court under Section 33 of the Act to impound the suit agreement to collect the deficit stamp duty and penalty in accordance with the Act. By order dated 10.11.2016, the trial court sent the agreement of sale dated 29.06.1999 to the District Registrar for determination of requisite stamp duty and penalty payable on the agreement of sale. The record discloses that the District Registrar expressed inability to determine the deficit stamp duty and penalty payable on the suit agreement for want of the name of the village, hence, returned the instrument to the trial court. Thereafter, the appellant filed a memo dated 26.04.2017 purporting to clarify the name of the village in the schedule of the agreement of sale. The said effort was opposed by the respondent, namely ex-postfacto incorporation of material details into the suit agreement; gaps in the agreement are not filled up by the appellant to the detriment of the respondent. The trial court, agreeing with the respondent’s objection, rejected the memo dated 26.04.2017. The appellant filed Writ Petition No. 8506 of 2018 challenging the trial court’s order dated 12.08.2017 before the High Court of Karnataka. On 10.08.2018, the Writ Petition was disposed of, and the operative portion reads thus:
“Accordingly, in modification of the impugned order dated 12.08.2017, it is directed that a copy of the memo filed by the plaintiff may be sent by the Trial Court to the office of the District Registrar for appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.
However, it is made clear that the order and proposition with reference to the name of the village mentioned by the plaintiff/petitioner shall have relevance only [2024] 9 S.C.R. 171Seetharama Shetty v. Monappa Shetty for the purpose of calculation of deficit stamp duty and other charges but shall have no bearing on the merit consideration of the submissions of the parties, including the submissions of the defendant/ respondent about the genuineness and the validity of the document in question and the corresponding right of the plaintiff/petitioner to contest such objections.”
7. The District Registrar, through report dated 10.11.2016, determined the deficit stamp duty payable on the instrument at Rs. 71,200/-. The trial court, by order dated 23.01.2019, directed the appellant to pay the deficit stamp duty of Rs. 71,200/- and ten times penalty on the agreement of sale dated 29.06.1999. Thus, the total levy of stamp duty and penalty is Rs. 7,83,200/-. The appellant assailed the order dated 23.01.2019 in O.S. NO. 295 of 2013 in Writ Petition No. 30734 of 2019 before the High Court. The Writ Petition was dismissed, and the appellant was granted four months’ time for payment of deficit stamp duty and the penalty. The appellant filed Review Petition No. 340 of 2019, and through the impugned order dated 14.09.2021, the Review Petition was dismissed. Hence, the Civil Appeals have been filed questioning the orders dated 23.01.2019 and 14.09.2021.
8. The learned Single Judge has, in great detail, referred to all the attending circumstances, appreciated their implication vis-à-vis the statutory obligation under the Act to pay ad valorem stamp duty on an agreement of sale satisfying the definition of a conveyance under the Act and dismissed the Review Petition. The findings, in brief, are as follows:
8.1. Section 33 of the Act requires the adjudicating authorities to impound and determine the duty payable on the suit agreement.
8.2. Section 34 of the Act provides for levy of deficit stamp duty and penalty. The Section employs the expression “ten times the amount of the proper duty or deficit portion thereof.” Therefore, there is no discretion granted to the adjudicating authorities to waive or reduce the penalty.
8.3. Only on the payment of deficit stamp duty along with ten times penalty, the suit agreement is relied in evidence.
8.4. The text used in Sections 34 and 39 of the Act cannot be linguistically approximated, as the legislature has not vested 172 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the discretion given to the Deputy Commissioner under Section 39 of the Act in the same way to the adjudicating authorities under Section 34 of the Act.
8.5. Relying on case law, the impugned order noted that the adjudicating authorities do not have the discretion to disobey the legislative command to waive or reduce the penalty in any circumstance. The discretion however extends to the grant of a reasonable time for the payment of duty and penalty.
8.6. Thus, through the Impugned Order, the Learned Single judge concluded that the Review Petition fails, and the appellant was granted a period of six months’ time to pay the deficit stamp duty along with ten times penalty.
9. Hence, the Civil Appeals.
10. We have heard the learned counsel and also Ms. Liz Mathew, who was appointed as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court.
II. Submissions
11. Learned counsel for the appellant firstly contends that the suit document conforms to the requirements of the Act and the suit was for injunction. Considering the total circumstances, it is argued that even if the suit document is not stamped correctly but having regard to the orders dated 12.08.2017 and 10.08.2018, the trial court ought not to have decided the deficit stamp duty and penalty under Section 34 of the Act. Instead, the trial court ought to have sent the impounded instrument to the District Registrar for determining the stamp duty and the penalty. Thereupon, the District Registrar would have exercised his discretionary jurisdiction under Section 39 of the Act and determined the quantum of penalty payable by the appellant. In the case on hand, the dispute arose on the application filed by the respondent requesting to send the suit document to the District Registrar for determination of duty and penalty. The District Registrar has sent a report on the stamp duty payable but has not collected the deficit stamp duty or levied the penalty on the suit agreement. It is argued that the case falls under Section 37(2) of the Act, and the impugned orders have denied the appellant the option to have the penalty decided by the District Registrar. Therefore, the trial court and the High Court have committed an illegality by exercising the jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act.
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 173Seetharama Shetty v. Monappa Shetty
12. The learned Amicus Curie places reliance on Gangappa and another v. Fakkirappa,1 Trustees of H.C. Dhanda Trust v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others,2 Digambar Warty and others v. District Registrar, Bangalore Urban District and another,3 K. Amarnath v. Smt. Puttamma,4 Suman v. Vinayaka and others,5 Niyaz Ahmed Siddique v. Sanganeria Company Private Limited,6 United Precision Engineers Private Limited v. KIOCL Limited,7 Chilakuri Gangulappa v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Madanpalle,8 and Sri. K. Govinde Gowda v. Smt. Akkayamma and others,9 and contends that the scope of jurisdiction in receiving in evidence insufficiently stamped instruments by every person, having by law or consent of parties, authority to receive evidence and every person in charge of a public office on the one hand and the Deputy Commissioner/District Registrar on the other hand, is fairly wellsettled by the binding precedents. The scope of discretion available in two distinct forums covered by Sections 34 and 39 of the Act is fairly well settled and defined.
12.1. It is further argued that the ratio in Chilakuri Gangulappa (supra) is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. The trial court while considering the prayer for an injunction by relying on the suit document, exercised its jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act. The procedure under Section 37(2) of the Act arises in the cases not attracting Section 37(1) of the Act. The discretionary jurisdiction under Section 39 of the Act is exclusive to the District Registrar/ Deputy Commissioner while exercising the powers under the Act. Thus, expecting the court to exercise the discretion of Section 39 of the Act is untenable.
1 [2018] 13 SCR 603 : (2019) 3 SCC 788 2 [2020] 11 SCR 268 : (2020) 9 SCC 510
3 ILR 2013 KAR 2099
4 ILR 1999 KAR 4634
5 (2013) SCC OnLine Kar 10138 6 (2023) SCC OnLine Cal 1391 7 (2016) SCC OnLine Kar 1077 8 [2001] 2 SCR 419 : (2001) 4 SCC 197
9 ILR 2011 KAR 4719
174 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports III. Analysis
13. We have perused the record and noted the rival submissions. The following points arise in the Civil Appeals:
I. Whether the agreement of sale dated 29.06.1999, with a recital on delivery of possession to the appellant, conforms to the definition of conveyance under Section 2(d) read with Article 20(1) of the Schedule of the Act or not?
II. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the order dated 23.01.2019 of trial court, as confirmed by the impugned orders dated 23.08.2019 and 14.09.2021, are legal and valid or call for interference by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India?
Point I
14. Agreement of sale dated 29.06.1999, among other clauses, refers to the alleged delivery of possession in favour of the appellant by the respondent. Article 5 of the Schedule of the Act deals with an agreement of sale coupled with possession and the requirement of paying the ad valorem stamp duty. If an instrument conforms to the requirements of conveyance under Section 2(d) read with Article 20(1) of the Schedule of the Act, the applicable stamp duty is ad valorem. In other words, ad valorem stamp duty is paid on such instruments. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has not argued on the applicability of the clause dealing with possession in the agreement and requirement to ad valorem pay stamp duty. The relief of injunction is sought on the basis of delivery of possession by the respondent under the suit agreement. The following Judgments are relevant and are close in circumstance to the case on hand and are referred to.
14.1. Gangappa’s case (supra), analysed a situation on an insufficiently stamped document produced before a court, and compared Sections 34 and 39 of the Act and held that the discretion conferred by the provision is different by the text and the context of these provisions. This Court upheld the ratio laid in Digambar Warty (supra) and held that even though no discretion was provided to the court to impose a reduced penalty, Section 38 of the Act empowered the Deputy Collector to refund the duty so collected. In paragraph 18 of the Judgment, it is recorded that:
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 175Seetharama Shetty v. Monappa Shetty “18. The above view of the Karnataka High Court that there is no discretion vested with the authority impounding the document in the matter of collecting duty under Section 33, is correct. The word used in the said proviso is “shall”. Sections 33 and 34 clearly indicate that penalty imposed has to be 10 times. The Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Digambar Warty [Digambar Warty v. Bangalore Urban District, 2012 SCC OnLine Kar 8776 : ILR 2013 KAR 2099] has rightly interpreted the provisions of Sections 33 and 34 of the Act. We, thus, are of the view that the High Court in the impugned judgment [Fakkirappa v. Gangappa, 2014 SCC OnLine Kar 12775] did not commit any error in relying on the judgment of the Division Bench in Digambar Warty [Digambar Warty v.
Bangalore Urban District, 2012 SCC OnLine Kar 8776 :
ILR 2013 KAR 2099]. We thus have to uphold the above view expressed in the impugned judgment [Fakkirappa v.
Gangappa, 2014 SCC OnLine Kar 12775].
However, as a one-time measure, this Court allowed closing the matter by confirming the payment of deficit duty with the double penalty as imposed by the trial court. The precedent interpreted the discretionary limits under Section 34 of the Act.
14.2. In United Precision Engineers Private Limited (supra), the question arose as to the extent of power exercised by Deputy Commissioner under Section 37(2) of the Act. The Court observed that the phrase “in every other case” contained in Section 37(2) of the Act will have to be understood to include not only an instrument which is merely impounded and referred but also an instrument impounded, relating to which duty and penalty determined but not paid by the party. The court observed that as per the combined reading of the sections, if the impounding authority determined the penalty under Section 37(1) of the Act, and thereafter, sends the document to Deputy Commissioner under Section 37(2) of the Act, then the Deputy Commissioner will have the power to reduce the penalty under Section 38 of the Act. The ratio deals with the interplay between Sections 37 and 38 of the Act.
176 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
15. The impugned order, in fact, refers to these judgments. The High Court has correctly distinguished the jurisdiction vested in every person or a person in the public office on the one hand and on the other hand the District Registrar in determining the penalty payable on insufficiently stamped instrument. The ratio in all fours is applicable to the circumstances of the case. Therefore, by relying on the above judgments, it is held that the appellant, with a view to produce in evidence the agreement of sale in the suit, must pay the deficit stamp duty and penalty. We are confirming the findings of the High Court in this behalf. The next question for consideration is whether in the facts and the circumstances of the case, the penalty determined by the Court on the instrument instead of sending the instrument to the District Registrar for determination and collection of penalty as may be applicable is legal.
Point II
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