Dani Wooltex Corporation & Ors. v. Sheil Properties Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 433; [2024] 6 S.C.R. 761
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Pankaj Mithal
- Decided
- 16 May 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 6462/2024
- Sections
- 32, 25, 32(2), 14(2), 14, 23, 24, 11, 33, 34
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* Author [2024] 6 S.C.R. 761 : 2024 INSC 433 Dani Wooltex Corporation & Ors.
v.
Sheil Properties Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 6462 of 2024)
16 May 2024 [Abhay S. Oka* and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.] Issue for Consideration When can the power under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 32 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 be exercised; Is it the Arbitral Tribunal’s duty to fix a meeting for hearing; Whether the failure of the claimant to request the Arbitral Tribunal to fix a date for hearing, per se, is the ground to conclude that the proceedings have become unnecessary; Whether abandonment of claim by a claimant can be a ground to invoke clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 32.
Headnotes Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Clause (c) of subsection (2) of section 32 – When can the power under clause
(c) of sub-section (2) of section 32 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 be exercised:
Held: The power under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 32 of the Arbitration Act can be exercised only if, for some reason, the continuation of proceedings has become unnecessary or impossible – Unless the Arbitral Tribunal records its satisfaction based on the material on record that proceedings have become unnecessary or impossible, the power under clause (c) of subsection (2) of Section 32 cannot be exercised – If the said power is exercised casually, it will defeat the very object of enacting the Arbitration Act. [Para 21(a)] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Is it the Arbitral Tribunal’s duty to fix a meeting for hearing:
Held: It is the Arbitral Tribunal’s duty to fix a meeting for hearing even if parties to the proceedings do not make such a request – It is the duty of the Arbitral Tribunal to adjudicate upon the dispute referred to it – If, on a date fixed for a meeting/hearing, the parties 762 [2024] 6 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports remain absent without any reasonable cause, the Arbitral Tribunal can always take recourse to the relevant provisions of the Arbitration Act, such as Section 25. [Para 21(b)] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Whether the failure of the claimant to request the Arbitral Tribunal to fix a date for hearing, per se, is the ground to conclude that the proceedings have become unnecessary:
Held: The failure of the claimant to request the Arbitral Tribunal to fix a date for hearing, per se, is no ground to conclude that the proceedings have become unnecessary. [Para 21(c)] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Clause (c) of subsection (2) of section 32 – Whether abandonment of claim by a claimant can be a ground to invoke clause (c) of sub-section
(2) of section 32:
Held: The abandonment of the claim by a claimant can be a ground to invoke clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 32 – The abandonment of the claim can be either express or implied – The abandonment cannot be readily inferred – There is an implied abandonment when admitted or proved facts are so clinching that the only inference which can be drawn is of the abandonment – Only if the established conduct of a claimant is such that it leads only to one conclusion that the claimant has given up his/her claim can an inference of abandonment be drawn – Even if it is to be implied, there must be convincing circumstances on record which lead to an inevitable inference about the abandonment – Only because a claimant, after filing his statement of claim, does not move the Arbitral Tribunal to fix a date for the hearing, the failure of the claimant, per se, will not amount to the abandonment of the claim. [Para 21 (d)] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Clause (c) of subsection (2) of section 32 – A part of first appellant’s (D) property was permitted to be developed by S under Development agreement – A MOU was also executed between the first appellant and M, by which first appellant agreed to sell another portion of property to M – Dispute arose – A consensus was reached between all the three parties to appoint a Arbitrator – Arbitral Tribunal had to deal with claims filed by both S and M – M’s claim culminated in an award on 06.05.2017 – [2024] 6 S.C.R. 763Dani Wooltex Corporation & O r s . v . Sheil P r o p e r t i e s P v t . L t d . & A n r . However, arbitral proceedings based on claim filed by S did not proceed – First Appellant filed an application invoking the Arbitral Tribunal power under Clause (c) of sub-section
(2) of section 32 of the Arbitration Act contending that S had abandoned arbitral proceedings – Following, the Arbitral Tribunal terminated arbitral proceedings – However, the Single Judge of the High Court directed the tribunal to continue with the proceedings – Propriety:
Held: The question is whether S abandoned its claim filed before the Arbitrator – S had regularly attended meetings held to hear M’s claim – During the period during which the claim of M was heard, at no stage, the Arbitrator suggested that the claim of S could be heard simultaneously – On the contrary, from the conduct of the parties and the Arbitrator, an inference can be drawn that M’s claim was given priority – In any case, there is no express abandonment – Even if it is to be implied, there must be convincing circumstances on record which lead to an inevitable inference about the abandonment – In the facts of the case, there was no abandonment either express or implied – In a case where the claim is abandoned, the Arbitrator can take the view that it would be unnecessary to continue the proceedings based on the already abandoned claim – In this case, the inference of the abandonment has been drawn by the Arbitrator only on the grounds that S did not challenge the M award and took no steps to convene the meeting of the Arbitral Tribunal – The failure to challenge the award on M’s claim will not amount to abandonment of the claim filed by S – In the claim submitted by S, a prayer was made in the alternative for passing an award in terms of money against the first appellant – Therefore, there was absolutely no material on record to conclude that S had abandoned its claim or, at least, the claim against the first appellant. [Para 20] Case Law Cited NRP Projects Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Hirak Mukhopadhyay & Anr., 2012 SCC OnLine Cal 10496; Kothari Developers v. Madhukant S Patel, Arbitration Petition (L) No.29362 of 2022; Lalitkumar V Sanghavi & Anr. v. Dharamdas V Sanghavi & Ors. [2014] 3 SCR 558 : 2014
(7) SCC 255; Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Company Limited v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. [2023] 6 SCR 56 : 2023 SCC Online 592 – referred to.
764 [2024] 6 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports List of Acts Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
List of Keywords Exercise of power under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 32 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Abandonment of claim; Arbitral proceeding becoming unnecessary and impossible; Express and implied abandonment of claim; Absence in arbitral proceedings; Fixing of date of hearing by Arbitral Tribunal. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.6462 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 03.07.2023 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in ARBP No.472 of 2021 Appearances for Parties Nakul Divan, Sr. Adv., Gaurav Agarwal, Mahesh Agarwal, Rishi Agrawala, Ankur Saigal, Gaurav Mehta, Ms. S. Lakshmi Iyer, Vikrant Shetty, Ms. Vidisha Swarup, Ms. Tansi Fotedar, Ms. Soumil Jhanwar, E. C. Agrawala, Advs. for the Appellants.
Shekhar Naphade, Sr. Adv., Vikas Mehta, Farah Hashmi, Ms. Aishwarya Dash, Prashant Pratap, Adith Nair, Vinayak Sharma, Sahil Gandhi, Ruben Vakil, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Abhay S. Oka, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. In this appeal, the issue involved is about the legality and validity of the order of termination of the arbitral proceedings under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 32 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, ‘the Arbitration Act’) passed by the Arbitral Tribunal.
FACTUAL ASPECTS
3. A brief reference to the factual aspects will be necessary to appreciate the issue. The first appellant, Dani Wooltex Corporation, is a partnership firm that owned certain land in Mumbai. The first [2024] 6 S.C.R. 765Dani Wooltex Corporation & Ors. v. Sheil Properties Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. respondent, Sheil Properties (for short, ‘Sheil’), a private limited company, was engaged in real estate development. The second respondent, Marico Industries (for short, ‘Marico’), is also a limited company in the consumer goods business. A part of the first appellant’s property was permitted to be developed by Sheil under the Development Agreement dated 11 th August 1993 (for short, ‘the Agreement’). A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was executed by and between the first appellant and Marico, by which the first appellant agreed to sell another portion of its property to Marico. Under the MOU, Marico was given the benefit of a certain quantity of FSI/TDR. Marico issued a public notice inviting objections, to which Sheil submitted an objection and stated that any transaction between the first appellant and Marico would be subject to the Agreement. The dispute between the first appellant and Sheil led Sheil to institute a suit (Suit no.2541 of 2006) for the specific performance of the MOU as modified by the alleged consent terms. The first appellant and Marico were parties to the said suit. Marico also filed a suit (Suit no.2116 of 2011) against the first appellant herein, and Sheil was also made a party defendant to the suit. A consensus was reached amongst the three parties, and a senior Member of the Bar was appointed as the sole Arbitrator. The order of appointment of the sole Arbitrator was passed on 13 th October 2011 in the suit filed by Marico. The order records that the dispute in the suit was referred to the arbitration. On 17 th November 2011, the suit filed by Sheil was disposed of by referring the dispute in the said suit to the same sole Arbitrator. Thus, the Arbitral Tribunal had to deal with the claims filed by Sheil and Marico, both against the first appellant. Both Sheil and Marico filed their respective statements of claim. It appears that the arbitral proceeding based on Marico’s claim was heard earlier, culminating in an award on 6 th May 2017. For whatever reasons, the arbitral proceeding based on the claim filed by Sheil did not proceed.
4. The first appellant addressed a communication to the Arbitral Tribunal on 26th November 2019, followed by another communication dated 7th January 2020 requesting the Arbitral Tribunal to dismiss the claim of Sheil on the ground that the company had abandoned the claim. In response, the Arbitral Tribunal fixed a meeting on 11th March 2020. As Sheil did not attend the meeting, the next meeting was fixed on 18 th March 2020. The meeting scheduled for 18 th March 2020 was not held. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the next meeting 766 [2024] 6 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports could be held only on 12 th August 2020, when the Arbitral Tribunal directed the first appellant to file a formal application for dismissal of the claim of Sheil and permitted Sheil to file a reply. Accordingly, on 27th August 2020, the first appellant filed an application invoking the Arbitral Tribunal’s power under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 32 of the Arbitration Act. The contention raised by the first appellant in the said application was that Sheil’s conduct of not taking any steps for eight years shows that the said company abandoned the arbitral proceedings. Sheil filed an affidavit and specifically contended that no ground was made out to act under Section 32(2)
(c) of the Arbitration Act. Sheil also raised other factual contentions and denied the allegation of abandonment.
5. The Arbitral Tribunal passed an order on 1 st December 2020 terminating the arbitral proceedings in the exercise of power under Section 32(2)(c) of the Arbitration Act. The Arbitral Tribunal relied upon a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of NRP Projects Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Hirak Mukhopadhyay & Anr1. Sheil filed an application before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay to challenge the legality and validity of the order of the Arbitral Tribunal by taking recourse to Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act. By the impugned judgment and order, the learned Single Judge set aside the order of termination of the proceedings passed by the Arbitral Tribunal and directed the Arbitral Tribunal to continue the proceedings. We may note here that I.A. no.180843 of 2023 reveals that on 26 th July, 2023, the learned sole Arbitrator informed the parties of his unwillingness to continue as the sole Arbitrator.
SUBMISSIONS
6. Mr Nakul Divan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the first appellant, pointed out that the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in her judgment dated 13 th January 2023 in the case of Kothari Developers v. Madhukant S Patel 2 held that the Arbitral Tribunal was entitled to invoke its power under Section 32(2)(c) of the Arbitration Act if it is proved that the proceedings have become unnecessary due to the claimant’s inaction. He submitted 1 2012 SCC OnLine Cal 10496 2 Arbitration Petition (L) No.29362 of 2022 [2024] 6 S.C.R. 767Dani Wooltex Corporation & O r s . v . Sheil P r o p e r t i e s P v t . L t d . & A n r . that Section 14 of the Arbitration Act does not empower the Court to second-guess the Arbitral Tribunal, especially when the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal is based on the appreciation of facts and a plausible view has been taken. The learned senior counsel further pointed out that the Arbitral Tribunal attempted to ensure Sheil’s participation in Marico’s arbitration. After the award in the case of Marico, Sheil declined to attend the meeting held on 11 th March 2020 by the Arbitral Tribunal. It is submitted that there is nothing on record to indicate that the arbitration based on Sheil’s claim was to proceed after Marico’s arbitration, and there is no material placed on record to that effect. He submitted that the Arbitral Tribunal had rendered a finding of fact on the stand taken by Sheil, which cannot be disturbed by the Court. He submitted that Sheil’s plea that it was awaiting the decision in the Marico arbitration could not be accepted as the Arbitral Tribunal never indicated that the arbitration based on Sheil’s claim would proceed only after the Marico arbitration was over. He submitted that Sheil took no interest in moving the Arbitral Tribunal for a long time since 2012. He submitted that the word “unnecessary” used in Section 32(2)(c) of the Arbitration Act will have to be widely or liberally interpreted.
7. Mr Shekhar Naphade, the learned senior counsel appearing for Sheil, contended that without recording a positive finding that it is either unnecessary or impossible to continue the proceedings, the power under Section 32(2)(c) of the Arbitration Act cannot be exercised. Relying upon the decision on this Court in the case of Lalitkumar V Sanghavi & Anr. v. Dharamdas V Sanghavi & Ors.3 , the learned senior counsel submitted that the Court, while exercising the power under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, is required to go into the issue of the legality of the termination of mandate by the Arbitral Tribunal. He submitted that the abandonment cannot be inferred. He relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Company Limited v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors4 . He submitted that suits filed by Marico and Sheil were separate suits, and, therefore, arbitral proceedings were also separate. Marico and Sheil had not sought any relief 3 [2014] 3 SCR 558 : (2014) 7 SCC 255 4 [2023] 6 SCR 56 : 2023 SCC Online 592 768 [2024] 6 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports against each other. However, as there was an overlap between the two references concerning the enforceability of the consent terms, the parties agreed to proceed with Sheil’s reference after Marico’s reference was decided. He further submitted that after preliminary directions were issued on 8 th November 2011 regarding the filing of pleadings, no further directions were issued by the sole Arbitrator in the reference of Sheil. He submitted that the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of NRP Projects Pvt. Ltd. 1 is confined to the facts of the case before it. He submitted that Marico’s reference took six years, and that is the reason for postponing Sheil’s reference. The learned senior counsel would, therefore, submit that the interference made by the High Court in the arbitral proceedings under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act was certainly justified.
CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS
8. Chapter V of the Arbitration Act contains provisions regarding the conduct of arbitral proceedings. If parties do not agree on the timelines for filing statements of claim and defence, under subsection (1) of Section 23, the Arbitral Tribunal has the power to determine the timelines for filing pleadings. Sub-section (4) of Section 23, incorporated with effect from 23rd October 2015, provides that the filing of pleadings (statements of claim and defence) shall be completed within six months from the date the learned Arbitrator or all the learned Arbitrators, as the case may be, receive notice of their appointment in writing.
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