Union of India Rep. By the Inspector of Police National Investigation Agency Chennai Branch v. Barakathullah Etc.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 452; [2024] 5 S.C.R. 1011
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Bela M. Trivedi, Justice Pankaj Mithal
- Decided
- 22 May 2024
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2715/2024
- Sections
- 120, 13, 43D, 173, 18, 15, 43, 6, 8, 161, 120B, 16
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:23 am. Original source ↗
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* Author [2024] 5 S.C.R. 1011 : 2024 INSC 452 Union of India Rep. by The Inspector of Police National Investigation Agency Chennai Branch v.
Barakathullah etc.
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 2715 - 2719 of 2024)
22 May 2024 [Bela M. Trivedi* and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.] Issue for Consideration The respondents-accused were arrested for the alleged offences under section 120(b), 153(A), 153(AA) of IPC and Section 13, 17, 18, 18(B), 38 and 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1957. The High Court released the respondents on bail subject to the conditions. Whether from the perusal of the chargesheet and other material/documents produced against the respondents, there are reasonable grounds for believing that accusations against the respondents are prima facie true, as contemplated in the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43D of UAPA.
Headnotes † Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1957 – ss. 13, 17, 18, 18(B), 38, 39 and 43D – National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 – An FIR came to be registered on 19.09.2022 against the present respondents and other members and office bearers of PFI for the offences u/ss. 120(b), 153(A), 153(AA) of IPC and ss. 13, 17, 18, 18(B), 38 and 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1957 – The respondents-accused were arrested for the alleged offences – They filed their respective bail applications before the Special Court under the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (Sessions Court for Exclusive Trial of Bomb Blast Cases) and the same were dismissed – However, the High Court released the respondents on bail subject to the conditions – Correctness:
Held: It is quite well settled position of law that the chargesheet need not contain detailed analysis of the evidence – It is for the concerned court considering the application for bail to assess the material/evidence presented by the investigating authority along 1012 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports with the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. in its entirety, to form its opinion as to whether there are reasonable grounds for believing the accusation against the accused is prima facie true or not – The investigation disclosed that the activities and undeclared objectives of PFI had strong communal and anti-national agenda to establish an Islamic rule in India by radicalization of Muslims and communalization of issues – After recruitment as members of PFI, they were motivated towards violent terrorist activities by providing training through beginners course and advanced training courses – During the training courses, physical education classes were conducted in which members were taught to attack, assault, maim and murder with bare hands – The training was also given as to how to use weapons like knives and swords and how to hurl bombs – There is no need to elaborate on the allegations made by the protected/listed witnesses stating the role and involvement of each of the respondents, who were either members or the office bearers of the PFI – Suffice it to say that, there is sufficient material in the form of statements of witnesses and other incriminating evidence in the form of digital devices, books, photographs etc. collected during the course of investigation and relied upon by the appellant as recorded in the chargesheet, to form an opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the respondents-accused are prima facie true – The Court at the stage of considering the bail applications of the respondentsaccused is merely required to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the respondents in the commission of the alleged offences – The High Court has committed gross error in not considering the material/evidence in its right and proper perspective – The alleged offences are under Section 18, 18A, 18B etc. – For the purpose of considering the offence under Section 18, the commission of terrorist act as contemplated in Section 15 of UAPA is not required to be made out – In the instant case, this Court is satisfied from the chargesheet as also the other material/documents relied upon by the appellant that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the respondents are prima facie true and that the mandate contained in the proviso to Section 43(D)(5) would be applicable for not releasing the respondents on bail – Thus, the impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside and respondents directed to surrender themselves before the appellant-NIA. [Paras 13, 16, 17, 18, 22] [2024] 5 S.C.R. 1013Union of India Rep. by The Inspector of Police National Investigation Agency Chennai Branch v. Barakathullah etc.
Case Law Cited National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali [2019] 5 SCR 1060 : (2019) 5 SCC 1; Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab and Another [2024] 2 SCR 134 : (2024) SCC OnLine SC 109 – relied on.
Vernon v. State of Maharashtra and Another [2023] 10 SCR 867 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 885; Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra and Another [2024] 4 SCR 270 : (2024) 4 SCALE 709 – held inapplicable.
K. Veeraswami v. Union of India and Others [1991] 3 SCR 189 : (1991) 3 SCC 655; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [2021] 1 SCR 443 : (2021) 3 SCC 713 – referred to.
List of Acts Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1957; National Investigation Agency Act, 2008; Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords Bail; Application for bail; Investigation; Incriminating evidence; Sufficient material; Reasonable grounds for believing the accusations; Prima facie true; Proviso to Section 43(D)(5) of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1957; Assessment of the material/evidence presented by the investigating authority; Communal and anti-national agenda; Violent terrorist activities; Section 18 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1957; Section 15 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1957.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos.
2715-2719 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 19.10.2023 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in CRLA Nos. 98, 114 and 116 of 2023 and CRLMP Nos. 11595 and 8094 of 2023 Appearances for Parties Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Suryaprakash V Raju, A.S.G., Rajat Nair, Ms. Srishti Mishra, Mrs. Satvika Thakur, Raman Yadav, Mrs. Sakshi Kakkar, Sarthak Karol, Annam Venkatesh, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.
1014 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Ms. Mukta Gupta, Ms. Rebecca John, Sr. Advs., S. Balakrishnan, Rizwan Ahmad, A. Nowfal, Nitya Gupta, Javed R Shaikh, Abdul Shukoor, Shereef Ka, Ms. Anushka Baruah, Devansh A. Mohta, A. Selvin Raja, A. Raja Mohamed, V. S. Banu, Khalid Akthar, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Bela M. Trivedi, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The Central Government in Ministry of Home Affairs, CTCR Division having received a credible information that the office bearers, members and cadres of Popular Front of India (PFI), an extremist Islamic organization have been spreading its extremist ideology across Tamil Nadu, by establishing State Headquarters at Purasaiwakkam, Chennai and also offices in various districts of Tamil Nadu and that through their frontal Organizations like Campus Front of India, National Women’s Front, Social Democratic Party of India etc., they conspire for committing terrorist acts, raise funds for committing terrorist activities and recruit members for furthering their extremist ideology, and that the frontal organizations and PFI were involved in the recruitment of members to various prescribed terrorist organizations, passed an order on 16th September 2022, in exercise of the powers conferred under sub-section (5) of Section 6 read with Section 8 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘NIA Act’), directing the National Investigation Agency to take up investigation of the said case. In view of the said order, an FIR being RC-42/2022/NIA/DLI came to be registered on 19.09.2022 against the present respondents and other members and office bearers of PFI for the offences under Section 120(b), 153(A), 153(AA) of IPC and Section 13,17,18,18(B), 38 and 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the “UAPA”).
3. During the course of investigation, the respondents-accused herein came to be arrested on 22.09.2022 for the alleged offences. They filed their respective bail applications before the Special Court under the NIA Act (Sessions Court for Exclusive Trial of Bomb Blast Cases). The Special Court after considering the case diary, the documents and material produced before it, and after having been satisfied about [2024] 5 S.C.R. 1015Union of India Rep. b y The Inspector o f P o l i c e National Investigation A g e n c y Chennai B r a n c h v . B a r a k a t h u l l a h e t c . the prima facie case made out against the respondents-accused as also considering the provisions of Section 43D of the UAPA in the light of the position of law settled by this Court in various decisions, dismissed the said bail applications filed by the respondents.
4. Being aggrieved by the said orders, the respondents filed Criminal Appeals being CRLA Nos. 98, 114 and 116 of 2023 before the High Court of Judicature at Madras. It appears that some of the respondents-accused had also filed Cr.L.M.P Nos. 11595 and 8094/2023 seeking interim bail pending the said appeals. During the pendency of the said Appeals, the chargesheet came to be filed by the appellant-NIA against all the respondents alongwith other accused on 17.03.2023 for the offences under Sections 120B, 121A, 122, 153A, 505(1)(b), (c), (2) of IPC and Sections 13,18, 18A, 18B of UAPA. The High Court after taking into consideration the submissions made by the learned Counsels for the parties and materials placed on record including the Chargesheet, allowed the said Appeals by the common impugned order dated 19.10.2023, releasing the respondents on bail subject to the conditions mentioned therein. Being aggrieved by the said order, the present set of appeals have been filed by the Union of India through NIA, Chennai Branch.
5. At the outset, the learned counsels for the respondents raising preliminary objection had submitted that the appellant having failed to mention about the SLP (Crl.) No.9384/2023 which was preferred by the appellant against the co-accused for cancellation of the bail arising out of the same FIR, the present appeal was liable to be dismissed under Order XXII, Rule 2(3) of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. The said submission cannot be accepted. Rule 2(2) of Order XXII mandates inter alia that no petition shall be entertained by the Registry unless it contains a statement as to whether the petitioner had filed any petition for special leave to appeal against the impugned judgment or order earlier, and if so with what result. Rule 2(3) thereof states that the Court shall, if it finds that the petitioner has not disclosed the fact of filing a similar petition earlier and its dismissal by the Court, dismiss the second petition if it is pending. It may be noted that earlier no special leave to appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment and order dated 19.10.2023 passed by the High Court and hence question of filing Second Petition does not arise. Though, the SLP (Crl.) No. 9384/2023 was filed earlier by the appellant seeking cancellation of bail granted to the co-accused in 1016 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports respect of the same FIR, the same has already been referred to in the impugned order by the High Court. This set of appeals cannot be treated as Second Petition as sought to be canvassed by the learned counsels for the respondents.
6. So far as the merits of the Appeals are concerned, the learned advocate Mr. Rajat Nair for the appellant has vehemently submitted that the High Court had miserably failed to comprehend the correct import of Section 18 read with the definition of terrorist act contemplated under Section 15 of the UAPA for releasing the respondents on bail who have been charged with very serious offences. According to him, the High Court had fallen into patent and manifest error in not appreciating the overt acts and commission of alleged offences by the respondents, as stated by the listed witnesses/protected witnesses. Mr. Nair placing heavy reliance on the statements of the protected witnesses/listed witnesses had taken the court to the said statements to show the role and involvement of each of the respondents in the commission of the alleged offences under the IPC and UAPA. According to him, though some of the witnesses whose statements were recorded under Section 161/164 Cr.P.C. and relied upon by the appellant, were the members of the PFI when it was not banned by the Government of India, they had not participated in the alleged unlawful activities, and hence their statements till they are rebutted or contradicted could be relied upon. He further submitted that the High Court has committed grave error in trivializing the serious allegations made against the respondents by holding that except the witnesses having stated about respondents organizing weapon training for using knives and swords and to train members to throw beer bottles filled with water on targets, there is no material to suggest commission of any offence which falls under Section 15 of UAPA, whereas all these alleged acts were part of the preparation of committing terrorist acts, particularly when the respondents were imparting training as to how to hurl bombs by using water filled beer bottles and how to use weapons like knives and swords to strike terror in the mind of people. Mr. Nair has also placed heavy reliance on the latest decision of this Court in case of Gurwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another 1 which has relied upon the earlier decision in National 1 [2024] 2 SCR 134 : (2024) SCC OnLine SC 109 [2024] 5 S.C.R. 1017Union of India Rep. by The Inspector of Police National Investigation Agency Chennai Branch v. Barakathullah etc.
Investigation Agency vs. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali 2 to submit that the special provision of Section 43(D) of UAPA applies right from the stage of registration of FIR for the offences under Chapter IV and VI of the UAPA until the conclusion of the trial thereof, and that the court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offences or otherwise. Terming the impugned order as perverse, he submitted that the High Court had failed to appreciate that the oral statements of the witnesses and the recoveries made during the course of investigation clearly made out a prima facie case against the respondents regarding their involvement of the alleged offences.
7. The learned Senior Counsels, Mrs. Rebecca John appearing for respondent nos. 2, 3 and 4 (accused no. 1, 3 and 4), Mr. Devansh A. Mohta appearing for respondent No.1 (accused No.7), Mrs. Mukta Gupta appearing for respondent no. 5, 7 and 8 (accused No. 5, 8, 9) and Mr. S. Balakrishnan appearing for R-6 (accused no.6) had emphatically submitted that the reliance of the appellant on the statements made by the protected/listed witnesses was highly improper as the said witnesses themselves had participated in the alleged commission of offences. According to them, the vague allegations made by the said witnesses, could not be relied upon, more particularly when there was no material brought on record to show any preparatory work done by the respondents to prima facie make out the case against the respondents. They also relied upon the observations made by the High Court in the impugned order to submit that the High Court had in detail considered the evidence collected by the appellant during the course of the investigation and having not found substance in the same has released the respondents on bail which order should not be interfered with. Relying upon various decisions of this Court, they submitted that the impugned order having been passed by the High Court exercising its discretion, could neither be said to be illegal nor unjust.
8. It is trite to say that the consideration applicable for cancellation of bail and consideration for challenging the order on the grant of bail on the ground of arbitrary exercise of discretion are different. 2 [2019] 5 SCR 1060 : (2019) 5 SCC 1 1018 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports While considering the application for cancellation of bail, the Court ordinarily looks for some supervening circumstances like tampering of evidence either during the investigation or during the trial, threatening of witness, accused likely to abscond and the trial getting delayed on that account etc. whereas in an order challenging the grant of bail on the ground that it has been granted illegally, the consideration would be whether there was improper or arbitrary exercise of discretion in the grant of bail or the findings recorded were perverse. The instant appeals have been filed by the appellant challenging the impugned order passed by the High Court granting bail to the respondentsaccused on the ground that not only the High Court has arbitrarily exercised the discretion in favour of the respondents, but also has recorded perverse findings while exercising such discretion.
9. Before we appreciate the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, it would be apt to refer to some of the provisions of the UAPA particularly with regard to the offences alleged against the respondents. As per the chargesheet, the offences alleged against the respondents are under Section 120B, 153A, 153AA of IPC and Section 13, 17, 18, 18A,18B, 38 and 39 of UAPA. So far as the offences under the UAPA are concerned, Section 13 pertains to the punishment for unlawful activities, Section 15 defines what is “terrorist act” and Section 16 prescribes punishment for the commission of the terrorist act. Section 17 pertains to the punishment for raising funds for terrorist act, Section 18 pertains to the punishment for conspiracy, etc. Section 18A pertains to the punishment for organizing terrorist camps and Section 18B pertains to the punishment for recruiting of person or persons for terrorist act. All these offences fall under Chapter IV of the Act. However, Section 38 which pertains to the offence relating to membership of a terrorist organization and Section 39 which pertains to the offence relating to support given to terrorist organization, fall under Chapter VI of the said Act. Section 43D which was inserted by Act 35 of 2008, pertains to the modified application of certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section
(5) of Section 43D being relevant for the purpose of these appeals, the same is reproduced hereunder:
“43D. Modified application of certain provisions of the Code
(1) to (4)…… [2024] 5 S.C.R. 1019Union of India Rep. by The Inspector of Police National Investigation Agency Chennai Branch v. Barakathullah etc.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release:
Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true….”
10. Since all offences alleged against the respondents are covered under Chapter IV and VI of the UAPA, the rigors and restrictions of subsection (5) of Section 43D would apply to the facts of this case. It may be noted that this Court in case of National Investigation Agency vs. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra), had an occasion to deal with the sub-section (5) of Section 43D and in similar fact situation, after comparing the similar provisions under the Special enactments such as TADA, MCOCA, NDPS as also the earlier decisions of this court, had held as under:
“23. ……By its very nature, the expression “prima facie true” would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the investigating agency in reference to the accusation against the accused concerned in the first information report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence. It must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. In one sense, the degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that the accusation is “prima facie true”, as compared to the opinion of the accused “not guilty” of such offence as required under the other special enactments. In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the Court for opining that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is 1020 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports prima facie true, is lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for considering a discharge application or framing of charges in relation to offences under the 1967 Act……”
11. It was further observed: - “24. A priori, the exercise to be undertaken by the Court at this stage—of giving reasons for grant or non-grant of bail—is markedly different from discussing merits or demerits of the evidence. The elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage. The Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise.
25. From the analysis of the impugned judgment [Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali v. NIA, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 11185], it appears to us that the High Court has ventured into an area of examining the merits and demerits of the evidence. For, it noted that the evidence in the form of statements of witnesses under Section 161 are not admissible. Further, the documents pressed into service by the investigating agency were not admissible in evidence. It also noted that it was unlikely that the document had been recovered from the residence of Ghulam Mohammad Bhatt till 16-8-2017 (para 61 of the impugned judgment). Similarly, the approach of the High Court in completely discarding the statements of the protected witnesses recorded under Section 164 CrPC, on the specious ground that the same was kept in a sealed cover and was not even perused by the Designated Court and also because reference to such statements having been recorded was not found in the charge-sheet already filed against the respondent is, in our opinion, in complete disregard of the duty of the Court to record its opinion that the accusation made against the accused concerned is prima facie true or otherwise. That opinion must be reached by the Court not only in reference to the accusation in the FIR but also in reference to the contents of the case diary and including the charge-sheet (report [2024] 5 S.C.R. 1021Union of India Rep. b y The Inspector o f P o l i c e National Investigation A g e n c y Chennai B r a n c h v . B a r a k a t h u l l a h e t c . under Section 173 CrPC) and other material gathered by the investigating agency during investigation.”
26. ……….
27. For that, the totality of the material gathered by the investigating agency and presented along with the report and including the case diary, is required to be reckoned and not by analysing individual pieces of evidence or circumstance. In any case, the question of discarding the document at this stage, on the ground of being inadmissible in evidence, is not permissible. For, the issue of admissibility of the document/evidence would be a matter for trial. The Court must look at the contents of the document and take such document into account as it is.”
12. The ratio of the said judgment has been consistently followed by this Court in many cases, and recently in Gurwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another (supra), in which this court has culled out following guidelines from Watali’s Case:
“34. In the previous section, based on a textual reading, we have discussed the broad inquiry which Courts seized of bail applications under Section 43D(5) UAP Act r/w Section 439 CrPC must indulge in. Setting out the framework of the law seems rather easy, yet the application of it, presents its own complexities. For greater clarity in the application of the test set out above, it would be helpful to seek guidance from binding precedents. In this regard, we need to look no further than Watali’s case which has laid down elaborate guidelines on the approach that Courts must partake in, in their application of the bail limitations under the UAP Act. On a perusal of paragraphs 23 to 29 and 32, the following 8-point propositions emerge and they are summarised as follows:
• Meaning of ‘Prima facie true’ [para 23] : On the face of it, the materials must show the complicity of the accused in commission of the offence. The materials/evidence must be good and sufficient to establish a given fact or chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted by other evidence.
1022 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports • Degree of Satisfaction at Pre-Chargesheet, Post Chargesheet and Post-Charges - Compared [para 23] : Once charges are framed, it would be safe to assume that a very strong suspicion was founded upon the materials before the Court, which prompted the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused, to justify the framing of charge. In that situation, the accused may have to undertake an arduous task to satisfy the Court that despite the framing of charge, the materials presented along with the charge-sheet (report under Section 173 CrPC), do not make out reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against him is prima facie true. Similar opinion is required to be formed by the Court whilst considering the prayer for bail, made after filing of the first report made under Section 173 of the Code, as in the present case.
• Reasoning, necessary but no detailed evaluation of evidence [para 24] : The exercise to be undertaken by the Court at this stage--of giving reasons for grant or non-grant of bail--is markedly different from discussing merits or demerits of the evidence. The elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage.
• Record a finding on broad probabilities, not based on proof beyond doubt [para 24]:“The Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise.” • Duration of the limitation under Section 43D(5)
[para 26] : The special provision, Section 43-D of the 1967 Act, applies right from the stage of registration of FIR for the offences under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act until the conclusion of the trial thereof. • Material on record must be analysed as a ‘whole’;
no piecemeal analysis [para 27] : The totality of the [2024] 5 S.C.R. 1023Union of India Rep. by The Inspector of Police National Investigation Agency Chennai Branch v. Barakathullah etc.
material gathered by the investigating agency and presented along with the report and including the case diary, is required to be reckoned and not by analysing individual pieces of evidence or circumstance.
• Contents of documents to be presumed as true [para 27] : The Court must look at the contents of the document and take such document into account as it is.
• Admissibility of documents relied upon by Prosecution cannot be questioned [para 27] :
The materials/evidence collected by the investigation agency in support of the accusation against the accused in the first information report must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence……. In any case, the question of discarding the document at this stage, on the ground of being inadmissible in evidence, is not permissible.”
13. In the light of the above, let us consider whether from the perusal of the chargesheet and other material/documents produced against the respondents, there are reasonable grounds for believing that accusations against the respondents are prima facie true, as contemplated in the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43D of UAPA. It is quite well settled position of law that the chargesheet need not contain detailed analysis of the evidence.* It is for the concerned court considering the application for bail to assess the material/evidence presented by the investigating authority along with the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. in its entirety, to form its opinion as to whether there are reasonable grounds for believing the accusation against the accused is prima facie true or not.
14. So far as the instant appeals are concerned, the chargesheet contains a narration of the organisational structure of PFI, the objective of the PFI, the activities of PFI and the identification of the physical education instructors and masters as identified by the protected witnesses/listed witnesses. For better appreciation, the relevant part of the chargesheet is reproduced as under:
* K. Veeraswami vs. Union of India and Others (1991) 3 SCC 655 1024 [2024] 5 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports “17.10 The investigation disclosed that many Muslim youth were recruited as PFI Cadres (Categorized as “Protected witnesses) -B” (LW-8) were sent to Periyapattinam, Ramanathapuram to attend beginners camp where he attended Tharbiya classes in which PFI functionaries/ preachers sermonized that Muslims who were ruling India have been relegated as second grade citizens.
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