Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 113; [2024] 2 S.C.R. 420
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 5 Judges: Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai, Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice Manoj Misra
- Decided
- 15 Feb 2024
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 880/2017
- Sections
- 182(1), 182(3), 182, 154, 29C, 13A, 29C(1), 31(3), 31, 87, 197, 1
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[2024] 2 S.C.R. 420 : 2024 INSC 113 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr.
V.
Union of India & Ors.
(Writ Petition (C) No. 880 of 2017)
15 February 2024 [Dr Dnhananjaya Y Chandrachud,* CJl, 8 R Gavai, J B Pardiwala, Manoj Misra and Sanjiv Khanna,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration The matter pertains to the constitutional validity of the Electoral Bond Scheme which introduced anonymous financial contributions to political parties; as also the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Finance Act 2017 which, among other things, amended the provisions of the Reserve Bank of India Act 1934, the Representation of the People Act 1951, the Income Tax Act 1961; as also whether unlimited corporate funding to political parties, as envisaged by the amendment to s. 182(1) of the Companies Act infringes the principle of free and fair elections and violates Art. 14 of the Constitution; and whether the nondisclosure of information on voluntary contributions to political parties under the Electoral Bond Scheme and the amendments to 5. 29C of the RPA, s. 182(3) of the CA and 5. 13A(b) of the IT Act are violative of the right to information of citizens u/Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
Headnotes Elections — Electoral process — Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018 - Electoral Bond Scheme introduced anonymous financial contribution to political parties — Constitutional validity of: Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya ४ Chandrachud, Cul.) (for himself and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) Electoral Bond Scheme is unconstitutional — Directions to the issuing bank to stop the issuance of Electoral Bonds — SBI to submit: details of Electoral Bonds purchased since 12 April 2019 till date to the ECI including the date of purchase of each Electoral Bond, the name of the purchaser of the bond and the denomination of the * Authors Ed. Note : Hon’ble Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Cul, pronounced the judgement of the Bench comprising his lordship, Hon’ble Mr. Justice B.R. Gavai, Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manoj Misra, while Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjiv Khanna pronounced his separate judgement. [2024] 2 S.C.R. 421 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. Electoral Bond purchased; details of political parties which have received contributions through Electoral Bonds since 12 April 2019 till date to the ECI, and each Electoral Bond encashed by political parties — SBI to submit the said information to the ECI within the period stipulated - ECI to publish the information shared by the SBI on its official website — Electoral Bonds within the validity period of fifteen days but have not been encashed by the political party yet, to be returned by the political party or the purchaser to the issuing bank — Constitution of India. [Paras 216, 219] — Held: (per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) (Concurring with Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Cul.) (Concurring with conclusions albeit with different reasonings) Electoral Bond Scheme is unconstitutional and is struck down — Directions to ECI to ascertain the details from the political parties and the State Bank of India, which issued the Bonds, and the bankers of the political parties and thereupon disclose the details and names of the donor/purchaser of the Bonds and the amounts donated to the political party - Henceforth, the issuance of fresh Bonds is prohibited — Electoral Bonds within the validity period of fifteen days but have not been encashed by the political party yet, to be returned by the political party or the purchaser to the issuing bank. [Para 79] Elections — Electoral process — Electoral Bond Scheme - Amendmentto s. 182 of the Companies Act, 2013 Act, deleting the first proviso thereunder (as amended by the s. 154 of the Finance Act, 2017) thereby permitting unlimited corporate funding to political parties — First proviso to s. 182 provided the limit of contribution by the company upto seven and a half per cent of its average net profits during the three immediately preceding financial years — Validity of:
Held: (per Dr Dnananjaya Y Chandrachud, Cul.) (for himself and for B R Gavai, J 8 Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ): Is arbitrary and violative of Art. 14 — It infringes the principle of free and fair elections — Amendment to 5. 182 is manifestly arbitrary for treating political contributions by companies and individuals alike; permitting the unregulated influence of companies in the governance and political process violating the principle of free and fair elections; and treating contributions made by profit-making and loss-making companies to political parties alike [Paras 215, 216] — Held: (per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) Amendment to s. 182 of the Companies Act, deleting the first proviso thereunder, is unconstitutional, and is 422 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports struck down — Principle of proportionality applied which would subsume the test of manifest arbitrariness — Furthermore, the claim of privacy by a corporate or a company, especially a public limited company would be on very limited grounds, restricted possibly to protect the privacy of the individuals and persons responsible for conducting the business and commerce of the company - It would be rather difficult for a public (or even a private) limited company to claim a violation of privacy as its affairs have to be open to the shareholders and the public who are interacting with the body corporate/company — Constitution of India — Art. 14 - Companies Act, 2013 - 5. 182. [Para 73] Elections - Electoral process — Electoral Bond Scheme - Non-disclosure of information on voluntary contributions to political parties under the Electoral Bond Scheme and the amendments to s. 29C of the Representation of the People Act 1951, s. 182(3) of the Companies Act and s. 13A(b) of the IT Act by the Finance Act, 2017 — If violative of Art. 19(1)(a): Held: (per Dr Dnananjaya ४ Chandrachud, CuJI.) (for himself and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) Information about funding to a political party is essential for a voter to exercise their freedom to vote in an effective manner — Electoral Bond Scheme and the impugned provisions-proviso to s. 29C(1) of the RPA, s. 182(3) of the CA, and s. 13A(b) of the ITA to the extent that they infringe upon the right to information of the voter by anonymizing contributions through electoral bonds are violative of Art 19(1)(a) and unconstitutional — Union of India was unable to establish that the measure employed in Clause 7(4) of the Electoral Bond Scheme is the least restrictive means to balance the rights of informational privacy to political contributions and the right to information of political contributions — Deletion of the mandate of disclosing the particulars of contributions in s. 182(3) violates the right to information of the voter since they would not possess information about the political party to which the contribution was made which, is necessary to identify corruption and quid pro quo transactions in governance — Such information is also necessary for exercising an informed vote - 5. 29C exempts political parties from disclosing information of contributions received through Electoral Bonds whereas s. 182(3) applies to all modes of transfer - Both must be read together — Only purpose of amending s. 182(3) was to bring the provision in tune with the amendment under the [2024] 2 S.C.R. 423 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. RPA exempting disclosure requirements for contributions through electoral bonds — Amendment to s. 182(3) becomes otiose in terms of the holding that the Electoral Bond Scheme and relevant amendments to the RPA and the IT Act mandating non-disclosure of particulars on political contributions through electoral bonds is unconstitutional [Paras 104, 168, 169, 172-174, 216] — Held: (per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) On application of the doctrine of proportionality, proviso to s. 29C(1) of the RPA, s. 182(3) of the CA, 2013, and
5. 13A(b) of the ITA, as amended by the Finance Act, 2017, unconstitutional, and are struck down — Representation of the People Act, 1951 - s. 29C — Companies Act, 2013 - s. 182(3) — Income Tax Act, 1961 - 5. 13A(b) — Constitution of India — Art. 19(1)(a). [Para 74] Elections — Electoral process — Electoral Bond Scheme s. 31(3) of the RBI Act added by the Finance Act, 2017 to effectuate the issuance of the Bonds which, as envisaged, are not to mention the name of the political party to whom they are payable, and hence are in the nature of bearer demand bill or note — Challenge to:
Held: Per Sanjiv Khanna, J. Sub-section (3) to s. 31 of the RBI Act, 1934 and the Explanation thereto introduced by the Finance Act, 2017 is unconstitutional, and are struck down as it permits issuance of Bonds payable to a bearer on demand by such person — Finance Act, 2017 — Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 - s. 31(3). [Para 79] Elections — Electoral process — Electoral Bonds Scheme, 2018 — Challenge to the Electoral Bond Scheme and the statutory amendments mandating non-disclosure of information on electoral financing; and provisions permitting unlimited corporate funding to political parties - Parameters to test: Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Cul, (for himself and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ):
Courts must adopt a less stringent form of judicial review while adjudicating challenges to legislation and executive action which relate to economic policy as compared to laws relating to civil rights such as the freedom of speech or the freedom of religion — Amendments relate to the electoral process — Correspondence between the Ministry of Finance and RBI that the Bonds were introduced only to curb black money in the electoral process, and 424 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports protect informational privacy of financial contributors to political parties — Union of India itself classified the amendments as an “electoral reform” — It cannot be said that the amendments deal with economic policy [Paras 40, 42] — Held: (per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) Scheme cannot be tested on the parameters applicable to economic policy — Matters of economic policy normally pertain to trade, business and commerce, whereas contributions to political parties relate to the democratic polity, citizens’ right to know and accountability in the democracy — Primary objective of the Scheme, and relevant amendments, is electoral reform and not economic reform — To give the legislation the latitude of economic policy, it would be diluting the principle of free and fair elections. [Para 15] Elections — Electoral process — Presumption of constitutionality — Application, to electoral laws:
Held: (per Dr Dnananjaya ४ Chandrachud, Cul, (for himself and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ): Presumption of constitutionality is based on democratic accountability, that is, the legislators are elected representatives who are aware of the needs of the citizens and are best placed to frame policies to resolve them; and that they are privy to information necessary for policy making which the Courts as an adjudicating authority are not — However, the policy underlying the legislation must not violate the freedoms and rights entrenched in Part III of the Constitution and other constitutional provisions — Presumption of constitutionality is rebutted when a prima facie case of violation of a fundamental right is established - Onus then shifts on the State to prove that the violation of the fundamental right is justified — It cannot be said that the presumption of constitutionality does not apply to laws which deal with electoral process [Paras 44, 45] — Held: (per Sanjiv Khanna, J.): Doctrine of presumption of constitutionality has its limitations when the test of proportionality is applied — Structured proportionality places an obligation on the State at a higher level, as it is a polycentric examination, both empirical and normative — While the courts do not pass a value judgment on contested questions of policy, and give weight and deference to the government decision by acknowledging the legislature’s expertise to determine complex factual issues, the proportionality test is not based on preconceived notion or presumption — Standard of proof is a civil standard or a balance of probabilities; where scientific or social science evidence is [2024] 2 S.C.R. 425 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. available, it is examined; and where evidence is inconclusive or does not exist and cannot be developed, reason and logic may suffice. [Para 18] Elections — Electoral process — Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018 — Corporate donations to national parties through electoral bonds — Annual audit reports of political parties from 2017- 18 to 2022-23 as available on website of ECI - Significance — Doctrine of proportionality, application:
Held: (Per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) Data indicative of the quantum of corporate funding through the anonymous Bonds -— It clarifies that majority of contribution through Bonds has gone to political parties which are ruling parties in the Centre and the States — More than 50% of the Electoral Bonds in number, and 94% of the Electoral Bonds in value terms were for Rs.1 crore — This supports the reasoning and conclusion on the application of the doctrine of proportionality - Based on the analysis of the data available, the Scheme fails to meet the balancing prong of the proportionality test, however, the proportionality stricto sensu not applied due to the limited availability of data and evidence. [Paras 69, 74] Elections — Electoral Process - Electoral Bond Scheme - Infringement of the right to information of the voter, if satisfies the proportionality standard vis-a-vis the purposes of curbing black money; and protecting donor privacy:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Cul.) (for himself and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ)
Purpose of curbing black money is not traceable to any of the grounds in Art 19(2) — Electoral trusts are an effective alternative through which the objective of curbing black money in electoral financing can be achieved — Electoral Bond Scheme not being the least restrictive means to achieve the purpose of curbing black money in electoral process, there is no necessity of applying the balancing prong of the proportionality standard — Electoral Bond Scheme is not the only means for curbing black money in Electoral Finance — There are other alternatives which substantially fulfill the purpose and impact the right to information minimally when compared to the impact of electoral bonds on the right to information — Constitution of India — Art. 19(1) (a) and 19(2). [Paras 116, 121, 124, 129, 130] 426 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports Elections — Electoral process - Right to informational privacy, if extends to financial contributions to a political party: Held : (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CuI.) (for himself and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) If the right to informational privacy extends to financial contributions to a political party, this Court needs to decide if the Electoral Bond Scheme adequately balances the right to information and right to informational privacy of political affiliation — Informational privacy to political affiliation is necessary to protect the freedom of political affiliation and exercise of electoral franchise — As regards, right to informational privacy if can be extended to the contributions to political parties, Electoral Bond Scheme has two manifestations of privacy, informational privacy by prescribing confidentiality visa-vis the political party; and informational privacy by prescribing non-disclosure of the information of political contributions to the public — Financial contributions to political parties are usually made because they may constitute an expression of support to the political party and that the contribution may be based on a quid pro quo — Law permits contributions to political parties by both corporations and individuals — Huge political contributions made by corporations and companies should not be allowed to conceal the reason for financial contributions made by another section of the population: a student, a daily wage worker, an artist, or a teacher — When the law permits political contributions and such contributions could be made as an expression of political support which would indicate the political affiliation of a person, it is the duty of the Constitution to protect them — Contributions made as quid pro quo transactions are not an expression of political support — However, to not grant the umbrella of informational privacy to political contributions only because a portion of the contributions is made for other reasons would be impermissible — Constitution does not turn a blind eye merely because of the possibilities of misuse. [Paras 131, 138, 139, 142] Doctrines/Principles — Principle of proportionality - Proportionality standard test — Four prongs — Explanation of: Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CuI.) (for himself and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ)
Proportionality standard is laid down to determine if the violation of the fundamental right is justified — Proportionality standard is-the [2024] 2 S.C.R. 427 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. measure restricting a right must have a legitimate goal (legitimate goal stage); the measure must be a suitable means for furthering the goal (Suitability or rational connection stage); the measure must be least restrictive and equally effective (necessity stage); and the measure must not have a disproportionate impact on the right holder (balancing stage) — At the legitimate goal stage, the Court is to analyze if the objective of introducing the law is a legitimate purpose for the infringement of rights — Second prong of the proportionality analysis requires the State to assess whether the means used are rationally connected to the purpose - At this stage, the court is required to assess whether the means, if realised, would increase the likelihood of the purpose - It is not necessary that the means chosen should be the only means capable of realising the purpose — Next stage is the necessity stage, wherein the Court is to determine if the means adopted is the least restrictive means to give effect to the purpose — The Court is to see, whether there are other possible means which could have been adopted by the State; whether the alternative means identified realise the objective in a ‘real and substantial manner’; whether the alternative identified and the means used by the State impact fundamental rights differently; and whether on an overall comparison (and balancing) of the measure and the alternative, the alternative is better suited considering the degree of realizing the government objective and the impact on fundamental rights — In the last stage, the Court undertakes a balancing exercise to analyse if the cost of the interference with the right is proportional to the extent of fulfilment of the purpose — It is in this step that the Court undertakes an analysis of the comparative importance of the considerations involved in the case, the justifications for the infringement of the rights, and if the effect of infringement of one right is proportional to achieve the goal [Paras 105, 106, 117, 119, 156] — Held: (per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) Four steps of test of proportionality are: first step is to examine whether the act/measure restricting the fundamental right has a legitimate aim, second step is to examine whether the restriction has rational connection with the aim, third step is to examine whether there should have been a less restrictive alternate measure that is equally effective, and last stage is to strike an appropriate balance between the fundamental right and the pursued public purpose. [Para 25] 428 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports Doctrines/Principles — Principle of proportionality — Test of proportionality — Proportionality standard to balance two conflicting fundamental rights — Foreign vis-a-vis Indian jurisprudence:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Cul, (for himself and for 8 R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ):
Foreign case *Campbell v MGM Limited judgment adopts a double proportionality standard — It employed a three step approach to balance fundamental rights, first step to analyse the comparative importance of the actual rights claimed, second step to lay down the justifications for the infringement of the rights, and third to apply the proportionality standard to both the rights — Said approach must be slightly tempered to suit Indian jurisprudence on proportionality — Indian Courts adopt a four prong structured proportionality standard to test the infringement of the fundamental rights — In the last stage, the Court undertakes a balancing exercise, wherein the Court undertakes an analysis of the comparative importance of the considerations involved in the case, the justifications for the infringement of the rights, and if the effect of infringement of one right is proportional to achieve the goal — Thus, the first two steps laid down in Campbell case are subsumed within the balancing prong of the proportionality analysis. [Paras 154, 156] — Held: (per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) Test of proportionality employed by courts in various jurisdictions like Germany, Canada, South Africa, Australia and the United Kingdom, however, no uniformity on application of test of proportionality or the method of using the last two prongs — In the third prong, courts examine whether the restriction is necessary to achieve the desired end, wherein they consider whether a less intrusive alternative is available to achieve the same ends, aiming for minimal impairment — As regards, the fourth prong, the balancing stage, some jurists believe that balancing is ambiguous and value-based, which stems from the premise of rule-based legal adjudication, where courts determine entitlements rather than balancing interests — However, proportionality is a standard-based review rather than a rule-based one — Balancing stage enables judges to consider various factors by analysing them against the standards proposed by the four prongs of proportionality — This ensures that all aspects of a case are carefully weighed in decision-making — While balancing is integral to the standard of proportionality, such an exercise should be rooted in empirical [2024] 2 S.C.R. 429 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. data and evidence as adopted by most of the countries — In the absence of data and figures, there is a lack of standards by which proportionality stricto sensu can be determined — However many of the constitutional courts have employed the balancing stage ‘normatively’ by examining the weight of the seriousness of the right infringement against the urgency of the factors that justify it — Findings of empirical legal studies provide a more solid foundation for normative reasoning and enhance understanding of the relationship between means and ends — Proportionality analyses would be more accurate and would lead to better and more democratic governance. [Paras 29, 31-33, 35] Doctrines/Principles — Doctrine of proportionality - Proportionality standard test to balance fundamental rightsright to information and the right to informational privacy: Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CuI.) (for himself and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) Proportionality standard is an effective standard to test whether the infringement of the fundamental right is justified — It would prove to be ineffective when the State’s interest in question is also a reflection of a fundamental right — Proportionality standard is by nature curated to give prominence to the fundamental right and minimize the restriction on it— If the single proportionality standard were employed to the considerations in the instant case, at the suitability prong, the Court would determine if non-disclosure is a suitable means for furthering the right to privacy — At the necessity stage, the Court would determine if non-disclosure is the least restrictive means to give effect to the right to privacy — At the balancing stage, the Court would determine if non-disclosure has a disproportionate effect on the right holder — In this analysis, the necessity and the suitability prongs would inevitably be satisfied because the purpose is substantial: it is a fundamental right — Balancing stage will only account for the disproportionate impact of the measure on the right to information (the right) and not the right to privacy (the purpose) since the Court is required to balance the impact on the right with the fulfillment of the purpose through the selected means — Thus, the Court while applying the proportionality standard to resolve the conflict between two fundamental rights preferentially frames the standard to give prominence to the fundamental right which is alleged to be violated by the petitioners (in this case, the right to information). [Paras 152-153] 430 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports Doctrines/Principles — Double proportionality standard - Application of, to both the rights-right to informational privacy of the contributor and the right to information of the voter: Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya ४ Chandrachud, CuI.) (for himself and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) Double proportionality standard is the proportionality standard to both the rights (as purpose) to determine if the means used are suitable, necessary and proportionate to the fundamental rights — First prong of the analysis is whether the means has a rational connection with both the purposes, that is, informational privacy of the political contributions and disclosure of information to the voter — Further, while applying the suitability prong to the purpose of privacy of political contribution, the court must consider whether the nondisclosure of information to the voter and its disclosure only when demanded by a competent court and upon the registration of criminal case has a rational nexus with the purpose of achieving privacy of political contribution — Undoubtedly, the measure by prescribing non-disclosure of information about political funding shares a nexus with the purpose — Non-disclosure of information grants anonymity to the contributor, thereby protecting information privacy — It is certainly one of the ways capable of realizing the purpose of informational privacy of political affiliation — Suitability prong must next be applied to the purpose of disclosure of information about political contributions to voters — There is no nexus between the balancing measure adopted with the purpose of disclosure of information to the voter — According to Clause 7(4) of the Electoral Bond Scheme and the amendments, the information about contributions made through the Electoral Bond Scheme is exempted from disclosure requirements — This information is never disclosed to the voter — Purpose of securing information about political funding can never be fulfilled by absolute non-disclosure — Measure adopted does not satisfy the suitability prong vis-a-vis the purpose of information of political funding - The next stage is the necessity prong, wherein the Court determines if the measure identified is the least restrictive and equally effective measure — Court must determine if there are other possible means which could have been adopted to fulfill the purpose, and whether such alternative means realize the purpose in a real and substantial manner; impact fundamental rights differently; and are better suited on an overall comparison of the degree of realizing the purpose [2024] 2 S.C.R. 431 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. and the impact on fundamental rights - On an overall comparison of the measure and the alternative, the alternative is better suited because it realizes the purposes to a considerable extent and imposes a lesser restriction on the fundamental rights — Having concluded that Clause 7(4) of the Scheme is not the least restrictive means to balance the fundamental rights, there is no necessity of applying the balancing prong of the proportionality standard. [Paras 160-164, 168] Doctrine/Principles — Doctrine of proportionality, when applied: Held: (Per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) Proportionality principle is applied by courts when they exercise their power of judicial review in cases involving a restriction on fundamental rights — It is applied to strike an appropriate balance between the fundamental right and the pursued purpose and objective of the restriction. [Para 24] Doctrine/Principles — Doctrine of proportionality — Application of proportionality test to Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018 - Legitimate purpose prong — Retribution, victimisation or retaliation, if can be treated as a legitimate aim:
Held: (Per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) Retribution, victimisation or retaliation cannot by any stretch be treated as a legitimate aim — This would not satisfy the legitimate purpose prong of the proportionality test — Neither the Scheme nor the amendments to the Finance Act, 2017, rationally connected to the fulfilment of the purpose to counter retribution, victimisation or retaliation in political donations — It will also not satisfy the necessity stage of the proportionality even if the balancing stage is ignored - Retribution, victimisation or retaliation against any donor exercising their choice to donate to a political party is an abuse of law and power - This has to be checked and corrected — As it is a wrong, the wrong itself cannot be a justification or a purpose — Cloak of secrecy, leads to severe restriction and curtailment of the collective’s right to information and the right to know — Transparency and not secrecy is the cure and antidote. [Para 39] Doctrine/Principles — Doctrine of proportionality — Application of proportionality test to Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018 - Rational nexus prong:
Held: (Per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) Donor may like to keep his identity anonymous is a mere ipse dixit assumption — Plea of infringement 432 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports of the right to privacy has no application at all if the donor makes the contribution, that too through a banking channel, to a political party — Identity of the purchaser of the Bond can always be revealed upon registration of a criminal case or by an order/direction of the court — Thus, the fear of reprisal and vindictiveness does not end — So-called protection exists only on paper but in practical terms is not a good safeguard even if it is accepted that the purpose is legitimate — Under the Scheme, political parties in power may have asymmetric access to information with the authorised bank — They also retain the ability to use their power and authority of investigation to compel the revelation of Bond related information — Thus, the entire objective of the Scheme is contradictory and inconsistent — Rational connection test fails since the purpose of curtailing black or unaccounted-for money in the electoral process has no connection or relationship with the concealment of the identity of the donor - Payment through banking channels is easy and an existing antidote — On the other hand, obfuscation of the details may lead to unaccounted and laundered money getting legitimised. [Paras 41, 42, 44] Doctrine/Principles — Doctrine of proportionality — Application of proportionality test to Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018 - Necessity prong:
Held: (Per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) As per the Electoral Trust Scheme, contributions could be made by a person or body corporate to the trust which would transfer the amount to the political party — Trust is thus, treated as the contributor to the political party and guidelines were issued by the ECI to ensure transparency and openness in the electoral process - When the necessity test is applied, the Trust Scheme achieves the objective of the Union of India in a real and substantial manner anc is also a less restrictive alternate measure in view of the disclosure requirements, viz. the right to know of voters — Trust Scheme is in force and is a result of the legislative process — In a comparison of limited alternatives, it is a measure that best realises the objective of the Union of India in a real and substantial manner without significantly impacting the fundamental right of the voter to know. [Paras 50-51] Doctrine/Principles — Doctrine of proportionality — Application of proportionality test to Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018 — Fourth prong-the balancing prong of proportionality:
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 433 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. Held: (Per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) On application of the balancing prong of proportionality, the Electoral Bond Scheme falls foul and negates and overwhelmingly disavows and annuls the voters right in an electoral process as neither the right of privacy nor the purpose of incentivising donations to political parties through banking channels, justify the infringement of the right to voters — Voters right to know and access to information is far too important in a democratic set-up so as to curtail and deny ‘essential’ information on the pretext of privacy and the desire to check the flow of unaccounted money to the political parties — While secret ballots are integral to fostering free and fair elections, transparency-not secrecy-in funding of political parties is a prerequisite for free and fair elections — Confidentiality of the voting booth does not extend to the anonymity in contributions to political parties. [Para 57] Constitution of India — Balancing of conflicting fundamental rights-right to information and the right to informational privacy — Standard to be followed:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, ७३.) (for himself and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) First exercise that the Court must undertake while balancing two fundamental rights is to determine if the Constitution creates a hierarchy between the two rights in conflict, if yes, then the right which has been granted a higher status would prevail over the other right involved — And if not, the following standard must be employed from the perspective of both the rights where rights A and B are in conflict, whether the measure is a suitable means for furthering right A and right B, whether the measure is least restrictive and equally effective to realise right A and right B, and whether the measure has a disproportionate impact on right A and right B — Courts have used the collective interest or the public interest standard, the single proportionality standard, and the double proportionality standard to balance the competing interests of fundamental rights — There is no constitutional hierarchy between the right to information and the right to informational privacy of political affiliation. [Paras 145-146, 157, 159] Constitution of India —- Fundamental right —- Breach of — Burden of proof:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Cul, (for himself and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ): Courts 434 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports cannot carve out an exception to the evidentiary principle which is available to the legislature based on the democratic legitimacy which it enjoys — In the challenge to electoral law, like all legislation, the petitioners would have to prima facie prove that the law infringes fundamental rights or constitutional provisions, upon which the onus would shift to the State to justify the infringement [Para 45] — Held: (per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) Once the petitioners are able to prima facie establish a breach of a fundamental right, then the onus is on the State to show that the right limiting measure pursues a proper purpose, has rational nexus with that purpose, the means adopted were necessary for achieving that purpose, and lasily proper balance has been incorporated. [Para 17] Constitution of India — Art. 14 — Doctrine of manifest arbitrariness — Application of:
Held: (per Dr Dnhananjaya ४ Chandrachud, Cul.) (for himself and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) Doctrine of manifest arbitrariness can be used to strike down a provision where the legislature fails to make a classification by recognizing the degrees of harm; and the purpose is not in consonance with constitutional values — Legislative action can also be tested for being manifestly arbitrary — There is, and ought to be, a distinction between plenary legislation and subordinate legislation when they are challenged for being manifestly arbitrary — Manifest arbitrariness of a subordinate legislation has to be primarily tested vis-a-vis its conformity with the parent statute — Doctrines/Principles. [Paras 198, 209] Constitution of India — Art 19(1)(a) - Right to information, scope of — Evolution of jurisprudence on right to information: Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya ४ Chandrachud, Cul.) (for himself and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) Right to information can be divided into two phases - In the first phase, the right to information is traced to the values of good governance, transparency and accountability — In the second phase, the importance of information to form views on social, cultural and political issues, and participate in and contribute to discussions is recognised — Crucial aspect of the expansion of the right to information in the second phase is that right to information is not restricted to information about state affairs, that is, public information — It includes information which would be necessary to further [2024] 2 S.C.R. 435 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. participatory democracy in other forms — Right to information has an instrumental exegesis, which recognizes the value of the right in facilitating the realization of democratic goals — Beyond that, it has an intrinsic constitutional value; one that recognizes that it is not just a means to an end but an end in itself. [Paras 60, 64, 65] Constitution of India — Art. 19(1)(a) - Right to vote - Right to know — Significance:
Held: (Per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) Right to vote is a constitutional and statutory right, grounded in Art 19(1)(a), as the casting of a vote amounts to expression of an opinion by the voter — Citizens’ right to know stems from this very right, as meaningfully exercising choice by voting requires information — Representatives elected as a result of the votes cast in their favour, enact new, and amend existing laws, and when in power, take policy decisions — Access to information which can materially shape the citizens’ choice is necessary for them to have a say — Thus, the right to know is paramount for free and fair elections and democracy — Denying voters the right to know the details of funding of political parties would lead to a dichotomous situation — Funding of political parties cannot be treated differently from that of the candidates who contest elections - Democratic legitimacy is drawn not only from representative democracy but also through the maintenance of an efficient participatory democracy — In the absence of fair and effective participation of all stakeholders, the notion of representation in a democracy would be rendered hollow. [Paras 19, 21, 22] Constitution of India - Fundamental rights — Conflict of - Voter’s right to know vis-a-vis right to privacy:
Held: (Per Sanjiv Khanna, J.) Fundamental rights are not absolute, legislations/policies restricting the rights may be enacted in accordance with the scheme of the Constitution — Thread of reasonableness applies to all such restrictions — Furthermore, Art. 14 includes the facet of formal equality and substantive equality — Thus, the principle ‘equal protection of law’ requires the legislature and the executive to achieve factual equality — This principle can be extended to any restriction on fundamental rights which must be reasonable to the identified degree of harm - If the restriction is unreasonable, unjust or arbitrary, then the law should be struck down - Further, it is for the legislature to identify the degree of 436 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports harm — Voters right to know and access to information is far too important in a democratic set-up so as to curtail and deny ‘essential’ information on the pretext of privacy and the desire to check the flow of unaccounted money to the political parties. [Paras 56, 57] Elections — Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018 — Clause 7(4), 2(a) — Features of the Scheme:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya ४ Chandrachud, CuI.) (for himself and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) Scheme defines electoral bond “as a bond issued in the nature of promissory note which shall be a bearer banking instrument and shall not carry the name of the buyer or payee” — The Scheme also stipulates that the information furnished by the buyer shall be treated as confidential which shall not be disclosed by any authority except when demanded by a competent court or by a law enforcement agency upon the registration of criminal case — While it is true that the law prescribes anonymity as a central characteristic of electoral bonds, the de jure anonymity of the contributors does not translate to de facto anonymity — The Scheme is not fool-proof — There are sufficient gaps in the Scheme which enable political parties to know the particulars of the contributions made to them — Electoral bonds provide economically resourced contributors who already have a seat at the table selective anonymity vis-a-vis the public and not the political party. [Paras 102, 103] Elections — Electoral process - Focal point of the electoral process-candidate or political party:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya ४ Chandrachud, CuI.) (for himself and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) Statutory provisions relating to elections accord considerable importance to political parties, signifying that political parties have been the focal point of elections — ‘Political party’ is a relevant political unit in the democratic electoral process in India — Voters associate voting with political parties because of the centrality of symbols and its election manifesto in the electoral process — Form of government where the executive is chosen from the legislature based on the political party or coalition of political parties which has secured the majority — Prominence accorded to political parties by the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution — Law recognises the inextricable link between a political party and the candidate though vote is cast for a candidate — Voters casts their votes based on two considerations: [2024] 2 S.C.R. 437 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. the capability of the candidate as a representative and the ideology of the political party. [Paras 80, 86, 89, 94] Elections — Electoral democracy in India - Basis of:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya ४ Chandrachud, CuI.) (for himself and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ)
Electoral democracy in India is premised on the principle of political equality, guaranteed by the Constitution in two ways - Firstly, by guaranteeing the principle of “one person one vote” which assures equal representation in voting, and secondly, the Constitution ensures that socio-economic inequality does not perpetuate political inequality by mandating reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Parliament and State Assemblies — Constitution guarantees political equality by focusing on the ‘elector’ and the ‘elected’ — However, political inequality continues to persist in spite of the constitutional guarantees — Difference in the ability of persons to influence political decisions because of economic inequality is one of the factors — Economic inequality leads to differing levels of political engagement because of the deep association between money and politics — It is in light of the nexus between economic inequality and political inequality, and the legal regime in India regulating party financing that the essentiality of the information on political financing for an informed voter must be analyzed. [Paras 96-100] Elections — Electoral process in India - Nexus between money and electoral democracy:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya ४ Chandrachud, CuI.) (for himself and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) Law does not bar electoral financing by the public — Both corporates and individuals are permitted to contribute to political parties which is crucial for the sustenance and progression of electoral politics — Primary way through which money directly influences politics is through its impact on electoral outcomes — One way in which money influences electoral outcomes is through vote buying — Another way in which money influences electoral outcomes is through incurring electoral expenditure for political campaigns — Enhanced campaign expenditure proportionately increases campaign outreach which influences the voting behavior of voters - Money also creates entry-barriers to politics by limiting the kind of candidates and political parties which enter the electoral fray — Challenge to the 438 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports statutory amendments-provisions dealing with electoral finance and the Electoral Bond Scheme cannot be adjudicated in isolation without a reference to the actual impact of money on electoral politics. [Paras 46-51, 55] Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 - Allotment of symbols to political parties — Significance: Held: (per Dr Dnananjaya ४ Chandrachud, CUI.) (for himself and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) In terms of the provisions of the Symbols Order, the ECI shall allot a symbol to every candidate contesting the election - Symbols Order classifies political parties into recognised political parties and unrecognised political parties — Difference in the procedure under the Symbols Order for allotting symbols to recognised political parties, registered but unrecognised political parties and independent candidates indicates both the relevance and significance of political parties in elections in India — Purpose of allotting symbols to political parties is to aid voters in identifying and remembering the political party — Law recognises the inextricable link between a political party and the candidate though the vote is cast for a candidate — Most of the voters identified a political party only with its symbol and this still continues to the day — Symbols also gain significance when the names of political parties sound similar. [Paras 81, 84, 86, 87] Words and Phrases — Privacy — Definition:
Held : (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, 3.) (for himself and for B R Gavai, J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ) Privacy is not limited to private actions and decisions — Privacy is defined as essential protection for the exercise and development of other freedoms protected by the Constitution, and from direct or indirect influence by both State and non-State actors — Viewed in this manner, privacy takes within its fold, decisions which also have a ‘public component’. [Para 133] Case Law Cited In the Judgment of Dr Dhananjaya ४ Chandrachud, Cul Roger Mathew v. South Bank of India, CA No. 8588/2019;
PUCL v. Union of India, [2003]2 SCR 1136 : (2003) 4 SCC 399; ADR v. Union of India, [2002]3 SCR 696 :
(2002) 5 SCC 294; Anjali Bhardwaj v. Union of India, [2024] 2 S.C.R. 439 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. [2019]2 SCR 199 : (2019) 18 SCC 246; Kanwar Lal Gupta v. Amar Nath Chawla, [1975]2 SCR 259 : 1975 SCC
(3) 646; Subash Chandra v. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board, [2009]12 SCR 978 : (2009) 15 SCC 458; Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha ५ State of Gujarat, [2020] 13 SCR 886 : (2020) 10 SCC 459; Ramesh Chandra Sharma ५४ State of Uttar Pradesh, [2023]2 SCR 422 :
(2023) SCC OnLine SC 162; Shayara Bano v. Union of India, [2017]9 SCR 797 : (2017) 9 SCC 1; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper ५ Union of India, [1970]3 SCR 530 :
(1970) 1 SCC 248; A.K Garg v. Union of India, [1982]_ 1 SCR 947 : (1981) 4 SCC 675; Premium Granites v.
State of Tamil Nadu, [1994]1 SCR 579 : (1994) 2 SCC 691; Peerless General Finance and Investment Co v.
RBI, [1992]1 SCR 406 : (1992) 2 SCC 343; BALCO Employees Union v. Union of India, [2001] Suppl. 5 SCR. 511 : (2002) 2 SCC 333; DG of Foreign Trade v. Kanak Exports, [2015]15 SCR 287 : (2016) 2 SCC 226; Swiss Ribbons v. Union of India, [2019]3 SCR 535 : (2019) 4 SCC 17; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Limited v. Union of India, [2019]10 SCR 381 : (2019) 8 SCC 416; State of Bombay v. FN Balsara, [1951]1 SCR 682;
Dharam Dutt v. Union of India, [2003] Suppl. 6 SCR_ 151 : AIR 2004 SC 1295; Ramlila Maidan Incident, In re, [2012]4 SCR 971 : (2012) 5 SCC 1; Ameerunissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum, [1953]1 SCR 404 : (1952)
2 SCC 697; Vatal Nagaraj v. R Dayanand Sagar, [1975] 2 SCR 384 : (1975) 4 SCC 127; P Nalla Thampy Terah v. Union of India, [1985]Supp. 1 SCR 622 : (1985) Supp SCC 189; Common Cause (A Registered Society) v.
Union of India, [1996]3 SCR 1208 : (1996) 2 SCC 752;
State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, [1961]2 SCR_ 371; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, [1975]3 SCR_ 333 : (1975) 4 SCC 428; SP Gupta v. Union of India, (1981) Supp SCC 87; Dinesh Trivedi v. Union of India, [1997]3 SCR 93 : (1997) 4 SCC 306; Secy., Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Govt. of India v. Cricket Assn. of Bengal, [1995]1 SCR 1036 : (1995) 2 SCC 161;
Indian Express Newspapers ५ Union of India, [1985]2 SCR 287 : AIR 1986 SC 515; Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, [1950]1 SCR 594 : AIR 1950 SC 124; DC Saxena v. Hon’ble The Chief Justice of India, [1996]_ 440 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports Suppl.3 SCR 677 : (1996) 5 SCC 216; Supriyo v. Union of India, 2023 INSC 920; Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms, [2002]3 SCR 696 : (2002) 5 SCC 294; Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India, [2006]1.
SCR 562 : (2006) 2 SCC 1; Kihoto Hollohon v. Zachilfhu, [1992]1 SCR 686 : (1992) Supp (2) SCC 651; Ravi S Naik v. Union of India, [1994]1 SCR 754 : AIR 1994 SC 1558; Subash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra, WP (C) No. 493 of 2022; Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2016]3 SCR 575 : (2016) 4 SCC 346; Media One ४ Union of India, Civil Appeal No. 8129 of 2022; Sakal Papers v. The Union of India, [1962]3 SCR 842 : AIR 1962 SC 305; Express Newspapers v. Union of India, [1959]1 SCR 12 : AIR 1958 SC 578; Sodhi Shamsher v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1954 SC 276; Kaushal Kishor v.
State of Uttar Pradesh, Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 113 of 2016; Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Dr Ram Manohar Lohia, [1960]2 SCR 821 : AIR 1960 SC 633; Justice KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India, [2017] 10° SCR 569 : (2017) 10 SCC 1; In Re Noise Pollution, [2005] Suppl.1 SCR 624 : (2005) 5 SCC 733; Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, [2016]3 SCR 865 : (2016) 7 SCC 221; Asha Ranjan v. State of Bihar, [2017]1 SCR_ 945 : (2017) 4 SCC 397; Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India, [2018]11 SCR 586 : (2018) 17 SCC 324; Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v.
Securities and Exchange Board of India, [2012]12 SCR_ 256 : (2012) 10 SCC 603; Justice KS Putiaswamy v. Union of India, [2018]8 SCR 1 : (2019) 1 SCC 1; Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subash Chanara Agarwal, [2010]13 SCR 1120 : Civil Appeal No.
10044 of 2010; Aishat Shifa v. State of Karnataka, [2022] 5 SCR 426 : (2023) 2 SCC 1; Jayantilal Ranchhoddas Koticha ५ Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., AIR 1958 Bom 155; Basheshar Nath v. CIT, [1959]Supp 1 SCR 528;
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952]1 SCR_ 284 : (1951) 1 SCC 1; Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, [1952]1 SCR 435 : (1952) 1 SCC 215;
Budhan Chowdhury v. State of Bihar, [1955]1 SCR 1045;
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S R Tendolkar, [1959]SCR 279;
E P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1974]2 SCR 348 :
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 441 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. ५. Union of India & Ors. (1974) 4 SCC 3; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Seheravardi, [1981]2 SCR 79 : (1981) 1 SCC 722; Sharma Transport v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, [2001] Suppl. 5 SCR_ 390 : (2002) 2 SCC 188; State of Tamil Nadu v. Ananthi Ammal, [1994]Suppl.5 SCR 666 : (1995) 1 SCC 519;
Dr. K R Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1996]1_ SCR 395 : (1996) 2 SCC 226; State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co., [1996]3 SCR 721 : (1996) 3 SCC 709; Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, [1997]Suppl.6 SCR 717 : (1998) 2 SCC 1; Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, [2004] 3 SCR 982 : (2004) 4 SCC 311; Natural Resources Allocation, In Re Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, [2012]9 SCR 311 : (2012) 10 SCC 1; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978]2 SCR 621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248; Naviej Singh Johar v. Union of India, [2018]7 SCR 379 : (2018) 10 SCC 1; Joseph Shine v. Union of India, [2018]11 SCR 765 : (2019) 3 SCC 39; Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, [1959] SCR 629 : AIR 1958 SC 731; Binoy Viswam v. Union of India, [2017]7 SCR 1 : (2017) 7 SCC 59; Charanjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, 1950 SCC 833; In Re Dethi Laws Act 1912, 1951 SCC 568; Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg.
(Wvg.) Co. Lid. v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax and others, [1974]2 SCR 879 : (1974) 4 SCC 98; Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1990]1 SCR_ 909 : (1990) 3 SCC 223; Khoday Distilleries Ltd. V. State of Karnataka, [1995]Suppl.6 SCR 759 : (1996) 10 SCC 304; State of Tamil Nadu ५ P Krishnamurthy, [2006]3_ SCR 396 : (2006) 4 SCC 517; Kesavananda Bharati v.
State of Kerala, [1973]Suppl.1 SCR 1 : (1973) 4 SCC 225; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, [1978]2 SCR_ 405 : (1975) Supp SCC 1; Digvijay Mote v. Union of India, [1993] Suppl. 1 SCR 553 : (1993) 4 SCC 175; Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, [2006] Suppl. 5 SCR 1 : (2006) 7 SCC 1; People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, [2013]12 SCR 283 : (2013) 10 SCC 1; Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, [1978]2 SCR_ 272 : (1978) 1 SCC 405 - referred to.
FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 US 775 (1978); *Campbell v. MGM Limited, [2004] UKHL 22; Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S 310 - referred to.
442 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports In the Judgment of Sanjiv Khanna, J Swiss Ribbons (P.) Ltd. and Another ५ Union of India and Others, [2019]3 SCR 535 : (2019) 4 SCC 17;
Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure and Another v.
Union of India and Others, [2019]10 SCR 381 : (2019)
8 SCC 416 — held inapplicable.
Rojer Matthew v. South Indian Bank Ltd. And Ors., [2019] 16 SCR 1 : Civil Appeal No. 8588 of 2019; A.K. Garg v. Union of India and Others, [1982]1 SCR 947 : (1981)
4 SCC 675; Bhavesh D. Parish and Others v. Union of India and Others, [2000]Suppl.1 SCR 291 : (2000)
5 SCC 471; Directorate General of Foreign Trade and Others v. Kanak Exports and Another, [2015]15 SCR_ 287 : (2016) 2 SCC 226; Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms and Another, [2002]3 SCR 696 :
(2002) 5 SCC 294; People’s Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL) and Another v. Union of India and Another, [2003] 2 SCR 1136 : (2003) 4 SCC 399; Kanwar Lal Gupta v.
Amar Nath Chawla & Ors., [1975]2 SCR 259 : (1975)
3 SCC 646; K. S. Puttaswamy and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. [2017]10 SCR 569 : (2017) 10 SCC 1;
Modern Dental College & Research Centre and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, [2016]3 SCR_ 579 : (2016) 7 SCC 353; K. 5. Puttaswamy (Retired)
and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr., [2018]8 SCR 1:
(2019) 1 SCC 1; Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha and Another v. State of Gujarat, [2020]13 SCR 886 : (2020) 10 SCC 459; Ramesh Chandra Sharma and Others v. State of U.P. and Others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 162; Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India and Others, [2020]1 SCR 812 :
(2020) 3 SCC 637; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, [1970]3 SCR 530 : (1970) 1 SCC 248; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Another, [1978]2 SCR 621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248; Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, [2023]9 SCR 1 : (2023) 6 SCC 161; A.C.Poudyal v.
Union of India and Others, [1993]1 SCR 891 : (1994)
Supp 1 SCC 324; Shayara Bano v. Union of India, [2017] 9 SCR 797 : (2017) 9 SCC 1 — referred to.
Libman v. Quebec (A. G.), [1997]3 SCR 569; RJR- MacDonald Inc. ५ Canada (Attorney General), [1995] [2024] 2 S.C.R. 443 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 3 SCR 199; Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (A.G.), [1998]1 SCR 877; R. v. Sharpe, [2001]1 SCR 45; Harper ५ Canada (A.G.), [2004]1 SCR 827; R. v.
Bryan, [2007]1 SCR 527; Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015]1 SCR_ 3; Brown v. Socialist Workers Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982); Campbell v. MGM Limited, [2004]2 AC 457;
My Vote Counts NPC v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Ors., (2017) ZAWCHC 105, para 67; Jeffery Raymond McCloy and Others v. State of New South Wales and Another, (2015)HCA 34;
Bernstein and Ors. v. Bester NO and Others, (1996) _ ZACC 2; Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982);
Buckley v. R Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri, et al v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC et al, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); In re.S, [2005]1 AC 593; /n Re. W, [2005]EWHC 1564 (Fam);
R. v. Oakes, [1986]1 SCR 103; Canada (Attorney General) v. JTl-Macdonald Corp., [2007]2 S.C.R._ 610; Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, and [2009]2 S.C.R. 567; Clubb v. Edwards, (2019)
93 ALJR 448; Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation, (1948) 1 KB 223 referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited In the Judgment of Dr Dhananjaya ४ Chandrachud, Cul Gayatri Devi and Santha Rama Rau, A Princess remembers: The Memoirs of the Maharani of Jaipur, (Rupa Publications 1995) [801]; Michael A. Collins, Navigating Fiscal Constraints in “Costs of Democracy:
Political Finance in India” (edited by Devesh Kapur and Milan Vaishnav) OUP 2018; Neelanjan Sircar, Money in Elections: the Role of Personal Wealth in Election Outcomes in Costs of Democracy: Political Finance in India (ed. By Devesh Kapur and Milan Vaishnav) OUP 2018; Aradhya Sethia, “Where's the party?: towards a constitutional biography of political parties, Indian Law 444 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports Review, 3:1, 1-32 (2019); Law Commission of India, 770th Report on the Reform of the Electoral Laws (1999); Lok Sabha Debates, Companies Bill (16 May 1985); Santhanam Committee Report on Prevention of Corruption, 1964 — referred to.
John Hart Ely Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard University Press, 2002);
Conrad Foreman, Money in Politics: Campaign Finance and its Influence over the Political Process and Public Policy, 52 UIC J. Marshall L. Rev. 185 (2018); D Sunshine Hillygus, Campaign Effects on Vote Choice in “The Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behavior” (Ed. Jan E. Leighley 2010); David P. Baron, Electoral Competition with informed and uninformed voters, American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 1 March 1994; Dominik Hangartner, Nelson A Ruiz, Janne Tukiainen, Open or Closed? How List Type Affects Electoral Performance, Candidate Selection, and Campaign Effort, VAT Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 120 (2019); Ben Ansell and Jean Gingrich J (2021). Political Inequality. The IFS Deaton Review of Inequalities, London:
Institute for Fiscal Studies; Joshua L. Kalla and David E. Broockman, “Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment” (2016 60(3)) American Journal of Political Science; Philip N Howard and Daniel Kreiss, Political Parties and Voter privacy: Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and United States in Comparative Perspective, First Monday 15(12) 2010; Colin Bennet, The politics of privacy and privacy of politics: Parties, elections, and voter surveillance in Western Democracies. First Monday, 18(8) 2013; Hon’ble Mr Justice Andrew Cheung Pu, Conflict of fundamental rights and the double proportionality test, A lecture in the Common Law Lecture Series 2019 delivered at the University of Hong Kong (17 September 2019);
Report of the Committee on Prevention of Corruption, 1964 [11.5] — referred to.
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 445 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. In the Judgment of Sanjiv Khanna, J Suchindran Bhaskar Narayan and Lalit Panda, Money and Elections-Necessary Reforms in Electoral Finance, Vidhi 2018 at p. 19; Law Commission of India, Electoral Reforms, Report No. 255, March 2015 - referred to.
John Parkinson and Jane Mansbridge (eds), Deliberative Systems (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2012) 11; James S Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation (Oxford University Press 2011) 33- 34;
Aharon Barak, “Proportionality — Constitutional Rights and their Limitations”, Cambridge University Press, 2012; David Bilchitz, “Necessity and Proportionality:
Towards a Balance Approach?*, (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2016); Aparna Chandra, “Proportionality: A Bridge to Nowhere?”, (Oxford Human Rights Journal 2020); Jochen von Bernstroff, Proportionality Without Balancing: Why Judicial Ad Hoc Balancing is Unnecessary and Potentially Detrimental to Realisation of Collective and Individual Self Determination, Reasoning Rights-Comparative Judicial Engagement, (Ed. Liaora Lazarus); Bernhard Schlink, ‘Abwagung im Verfassungsrecht, Duncker & Humblot, 1976, and Francisco J. Urbina, ‘/s It Really That Easy? A Critique of Proportionality and Balancing as Reasoning’ Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 2014; Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Julian Rivers, trans. Oxford Univ. Press 2002); Cabinet Directive on Law-making in Guide to Making Federal Acts and Regulations (2nd edn, Government of Canada; Niels Petersen, ‘Proportionality and judicial Activism: Fundamental Rights Adjudication in Canada, Germany and South Africa, (CUP 2017); Yun-chien Chand & Peng-Hsiang Wang, The Empirical Foundation of Normative Arguments in Legal Reasoning (Univ. Chicago Coase-Sandor Inst. For L. & Econ., Res. Paper No.
745, 2016); Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, An Introduction to Empirical Legal Research 6 (2014);
Joshua B. Fischman, Reuniting “Is” and “Ought” in Empirical Legal Scholarship, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 117 446 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports (2013); Marilyn Strathern, /mproving Ratings: Audit in the British University System, European review, Vol.
5 Issue 3, pp. 305-321 (1997); Lord Neill of Bladen, QC, ‘Fifth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life: The Funding of Political Parties in the United Kingdom’, 1998 pp 61-62; Francisco J.
Urbina, A Critique of Proportionality, American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol 57, 2012; Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Bloomsbury 2013), pp 41- 42; Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (translated by Julian Rivers, first published 2002, OUP 2010), pp. 47-48; Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Julian Rivers, trans. Oxford Univ. Press 2002); David Bilchitz, Necessity and Proportionality: Towards a Balance Approach?, (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2016);
Adrienne Stone, Proportionality and its Alternatives, Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 848; John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles:
a Theory of Legal Certainty, Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 47 (2002); Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia;
Jennifer L. Greenblatt, Putting the Government to the (Heightened, Intermediate, or Strict) Scrutiny Test: Disparate Application Shows Not All Rights and Powers Are Created Equal, (2009) 10 Fla Coastal L Rev 421 — referred to.
Website In the Judgment of Dr Dhananjaya ४ Chandrachud, Cul Election Commission of India, Instructions to political parties on manifestos dated 24.04.2015, hitps:// www.eci.gov.in/election-manifestos/; Election Commission of India, Letter dated 26 May 2017, No. 56/PPEMS/Transparency/2017 — referred to.
In the Judgment of Sanjiv Khanna, J Charterpedia, Department of Justice, Government of Canada, available at: https://www.justice.
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 447 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. ५. Union of India & Ors. gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/rfc-dic/cerf-ccdl/check/art1.htm — referred to.
List of Acts In the Judgment of Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Cul Constitution of India; Finance Act, 2017; Companies Act, 1956; Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934; Representation of the People Act, 1951; Income Tax Act, 1961; Companies Act, 2013; Companies (Amendment) Act, 1960; Companies (Amendment) Act, 1969; Companies (Amendment) Act, 1985; Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1978; Evidence Act, 1872; Election and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2003;
Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968; Conduct of Election Rules, 1961.
In the Judgment of Sanjiv Khanna, J Constitution of India; Companies Act, 1956; Companies Act of 2013; Finance Act, 2017; Income Tax Act, 1961; Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934; Representation of the People Act, 1951; Foreign Contribution Regulation Act, 2010; Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
List of Keywords In the Judgment of Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Cul Electoral bond scheme, 2018; Electoral bond; Corporate contributions; Curbing black money; Transparency; Judicial review; Close association of politics and money; Nondisclosure of information on electoral financing; Right to information; Electoral process; Donor privacy; Informational privacy of financial contributions to political parties; Privacy vis-a-vis political party; Right to informational privacy; Judicial approach; Balancing fundamental rights; Double proportionality standard; Arbitrariness; Manifest arbitrariness; Indian jurisprudence; Anonymous financial contributions to political parties; Financial contributions to political parties; Financial 448 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports contributions; Election Commission of India; Transparency of political finance; Quid pro quo arrangements; Free and fair elections; Presumption of constitutionality; Corporate funding; Electoral campaigns; Excessive delegation; Principle of ‘one person-one vote’; Non-disclosure of funding by companies; Public domain; Corporate donations; Anonymity of donations to political parties; Judicial restraint; Symbols Order; Electoral democracy; Proportionality standard; Electoral Trusts; Political contribution; Electronic transfer other than electoral bonds; Right to informational privacy of political affiliation; Privacy; Political beliefs; Political affiliation; Privacy of political affiliation; Electoral franchise; Corrupt practices; Single proportionality standard; Plenary legislation; Subordinate legislation; Removal of contribution restrictions; Loss-making companies; Profitmaking companies.
In the Judgment of Sanjiv Khanna, J Electoral Bonds Scheme, 2018; Electoral bonds; Electoral process; Doctrine of proportionality; Corporate funding; Ban on contributions to political parties; Contributions by companies; Electronic Clearing System; Economic policy; Judicial review; Electoral democracy; Burden of proof; Doctrine of presumption of constitutionality; Test of proportionality; Structured proportionality; Right to vote; Right to know; Symbol allotted to political parties; Funding of political parties; Democratic legitimacy; Substantive balance; Diversity; Conscientiousness; Equal consideration; Donors of a political party; Informational privacy of donors; Black money in electoral finance; Retribution; Victimisation; Retaliation; Quid pro quo; Multiple donors; Double proportionality; Single proportionality standard; Principle of reasonableness; Right of privacy; Balancing prong of proportionality; Principle of /is pendens; Necessity test; Rational connection test; Standard based review; Rule based legal adjudication; Empirical deference; Transparency; Secrecy; Identities of donor;
Money laundering; Alternative measures; Electoral Trust [2024] 2 S.C.R. 449 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. Scheme; Fundamental rights; Complementary rights; Law Commission of India; Party wise donation; Test of manifest arbitrariness.
Case Arising From CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No.880 of 2017 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)
With Writ Petition (Civil) Nos.59 of 2018, 975 And 1132 of 2022 Appearances for Parties Kapil Sibal, Sr. Adv., Prashant Bhushan, Ms. Neha Rathi, Pranav Sachdeva, Ms. Alice Raj, Ms. Shivani Kapoor, Kamal Kishore, Ms. Kajal Giri, Varinder Kumar Sharma, Varun Thakur, Gautam Bhatia, Pradanns. S, Ms. Rupali Samuel, Ms. Aprajits Jamuel, Rishabh Parikh, Shsntanu Sharma, Ms. Deeksha Gaur, Y K Prasad, Shadan Farasat, Ms. Hrishika Jain, Aman Naqvi, Ms. Natasha Maheshwari, Rizwan, Ms. Sachi Chopra, Nizam Pasha, Javedur Rahman, Mudassir, Arif Ali, Ms. Aayushi Mishra, Advs. for the Petitioners.
नि Venkataramani, AG, Tushar Mehta, SG, R Balasubramanian, Sr. Adv., Raj Bahadur Yadav, Ms. Seema Bengani, Shyam Gopal, Ms. Chinmayee Chandra, Kanu Agrawal, Rajat Nair, Raman Yadav, Chitvan Singhal, Mrs. Shraddha Deshmukh, Ms. Sonali Jain, Abhishek Kumar Pandey, Kartikay Aggarwal, Rajan Kumar Chourasia, Ms. Shraddha Deshmukh, Ankur Talwar, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Amit Sharma, Dipesh Sinha, Ms. Pallavi Barua, Ms. Aparna Singh, Advs. for the Respondents.
Vijay Hansaria, Sanjay R Hegde, Sr. Advs. Ms. Sneha Kalita, Ms. Kavya Jhawar, K.S.bhati, Ms. Jessy Kurian, Ms. Sr. Leona, Pawanshree Agarwala, Suren Uppal, Aviral Kashyap, Shahrukh Ali, Sanjeev Menon, Ms. Stuti Srivastava, Ms. Vimal Sinha, Rajesh Kumar, P.B. Suresh, Prasanna S., Ms. Disha Wadekar, Ms. Deeksha Dwivedi, Ms. Swati Arya, Yuvraj Singh Rathore, Varun K Chopra, Mehul Sharma, Abhishek Kandwal, M/S. Vkc Law Offices, Kaleeswaram Raj, Ms. Thulasi K Raj, Ms. Aparna Menon, Mohammed Sadique T.A., Advs. for the Intervenors.
450 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJl* A. Background 4 I. Corporate Contributions .......................-------------------- 5 li. Curbing black MOMeY ..................-.---.----------०-००००००००००--- 10 जी. TPAMSPALONCY ........................---.----------००००००*******००५०५०५०*८- 11 iv. Objections of RBI and ECI to the Electoral BOnd SCNOME ...................-------००००००००००००००००००००००००००००००००८०० 13 v. Electoral Bond Scheme ...............------------------०००००००००००- 18 B. ISSUOS .................-----०००>ननललबट हट टटडट टट हट टटह हट हट हट ट हट टट हट टट ट टट हट हट ह हट ८०० 23 ८... 5प्र०79581075 ......................---------------००--०-००००००-०००००००००००००००००००-- 24 I. Submissions of petitioners ...................---------००-००------ 24 li. Submissions of Union of India ......................----------- 36 D. The Scope of Judicial RCVIOW ..........................--..----------- 40 E. The close association of politics and money ...............- 44 F. The challenge to non-disclosure of information ON ClectOral FINANCING ......................--------०००ललललजज हट न ट हट ०० 50 i. Infringement of the right to information of the voter.. 51 a. The scope of Article 19(1)(a): tracing the right to INFOPIMALION ...................---------------०------०--०००--००००----०--- 51 b. Right to information of a voter: exploring the judgments in ADR and PUCL .............................- 55 c. The focal point of the electoral process:
candidate or political party ................................---- 64 [2024] 2 S.C.R. 451 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. d. The essentiality of information about political funding for the effective exercise of the choice of 11/0)| [0 eee 73 li. Whether the infringement of the right to information of the voter is justified ........................- 78 a. Curbing Black money ...............................--.----------- 80
0. 2010 PrivaCy ..........................-----------------०००००००००००--- 95 I. Informational privacy of financial contributions to 96 POlitiCAl [21163 ..............................------------------------- Il. Privacy vis-a-vis political party ........................------- 103 Ill. Balancing the right to information and the right to informational PrivACy ..........................--.......------ 103 a) Judicial Approach towards balancing fundamental rights: establishing the double proportionality standard .................................- 103 b) Validity of the Electoral Bond Scheme, Section 11 of the Finance Act and Section 137 of the Finance ACt ..........................---------- 113 c. Validity of Section 154 of the Finance Act amending Section 182(3) to the Companies Acct ................... 120 G. Challenge to unlimited corporate fUNCING ....................- 124 i. The application of the principle of non-arbitrariness 127 a. Arbitrariness as a facet of Article 14 ....................- 127 b. Beyond Shayara Bano: entrenching manifest arbitrariness in Indian jurisprudence ....................- 131 li. Validity of Section 154 of the Finance Act 2017 omitting the first proviso to Section 182 of the Companies ACt ...............---------००००--००-०००००००००००००००००००००००००- 140 H. CONCIUSION ANd DITCCTIONS. ..........................-------------------- 149 452 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports The petitioners have instituted proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the constitutional validity of the Electoral Bond Scheme’ which introduced anonymous financial contributions to political parties. The petitioners have also challenged the provisions of the Finance Act 2017? which, among other things, amended the provisions of the Reserve Bank of India Act 1934°, the Representation of the People Act 19514, the Income Tax Act 1961°, and the Companies Act 20137, A. Background Section 31 of the RBI Act stipulates that only the RBI or the Central Government authorized by the RBI Act shall draw, accept, make, or issue any bill of exchange or promissory note for payment of money to the bearer of the note or bond. The Finance Act amended the RBI Act by including Section 31 (3) which permits the Central Government to authorize any scheduled bank to issue electoral bonds. To understand the context in which the legislative amendments were introduced, it is necessary to juxtapose the amendments with the regime on financial contributions to political parties. The law relating to financial contributions to political parties focusses on (a) contributions by corporate entities; (0) disclosure of information on contributions; and (c) income tax exemptions for donations. |. Corporate Contributions The Companies Act 1956 and the provisions of the RPA, when they were enacted did not regulate contributions to political parties by companies and individuals. The Companies (Amendment) Act 1960 included Section 293A’ to regulate contributions by companies. NO oO + WD = “Electoral Bond Scheme” or “Scheme”
“Finance Act”
Section 135 of the Finance Act 2017; “RBI Act”
Section 137 of the Finance Act 2017;“RPA”
Section 11 of the Finance Act 2017; “IT Act”
Section 154 of the Finance Act 2017; “Companies Act”
“293A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 293, neither a company in general meeting nor its Board of directors shall, after the commencement of the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1960, contribute-
(a) To any political party, or
(b) For any political purpose to any individual or body, any amount or amounts which or the aggregate of which will, in any financial year, exceed twenty-five thousand rupees or five per cent of its average net profits as determined in accordance with the provisions of sections 349 and 350 during [2024] 2 S.C.R. 453 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. The provision stipulated that companies cannot contribute to (a) any political party; and (b) to any individual or body for any political purpose, amounts exceeding twenty-five thousand rupees in a financial year or five percent of its average net profits during the three financial years immediately preceding the contribution, whichever is greater. Companies were also required to disclose the amount contributed in a financial year in their profit and loss accounts and furnish particulars of the total amount contributed and the name of the party, individual or entity to which or to whom such amount was contributed. Companies defaulting in complying with the disclosure requirement were punishable with a fine which could extend to rupees five thousand.
5. |The Companies (Amendment) Act 1969 amended Section 293A® so as to ban contributions to political parties and for political purposes. Companies acting in contravention of the prohibition were punishable with a fine which could extend to five thousand rupees, and every officer who defaulted was punishable with imprisonment which could extend to three years, besides being liable to fine.
6. The Companies (Amendment) Act 1985 amended Section 293A% to the three financial years immediately preceding, whichever is greater. Explanation- Where a portion of a financial year of the company falls before the commencement of the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1960, and a portion falls after such commencement, the latter portion shall be deemed to be a financial year within the meaning, and for the purposes, of this sub-section.
(2) Every company shall disclose in its profit and loss account any amount or amounts contributed by it under sub-section (1) to any political party or for any political purpose to any individual or body during the financial year to which the account relates, giving particulars of the total amount contributed and the name of the party, individual or body to which or to whom such amount has been contributed.
(3) If a company makes a default in complying with the provisions of sub-section (2), the company, and every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees.”
8 “Section 293A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, neither a company in general meeting nor its Board of directors shall, after the commencement of the Companies (Amendment) Act 1960 contribute any amount or amounts-
(a) To any political party or
(b) For any political purpose to an individual or body.
(2) If a company contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) then-
(i) | the company shall be punishable with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees; and
(ii) | every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine” 9 “293A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act-
(a) No Government company; and
(6) No other company which has been in existence for less than three financial years, shall contribute any amount or amounts, directly or indirectly, -
(i) To any political party; or
(ii) | For any political purpose to any person.
(2) A company, not being a company referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1), may 454 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports permit contributions to political parties and for political purposes once again. The explanation of the phrase “political purpose” included donations made to a person who in the knowledge of the donor is carrying out any activity at the time of donation which can be regarded as public support to a political party. Further, the direct or indirect expenditure by companies on advertisements by or on behalf of political parties or publications for the advantage of a political party were also regarded as contributions for political purposes. Three other restrictions, in addition to the earlier restriction prescribing a cap on contributions and disclosure requirement were included. First, the company (which is not a government company) should have been in existence for more than three years; second, contributions could only be made when a resolution authorizing the contributions had been passed at a meeting of the Board of Directors; and third, the penal consequences attached to the violations of the provision were contribute any amount or amounts directly or indirectly-
(a) 10 any political party,-
(b) for any political purpose to any person:
Provided that the amount or, as the case may be, the aggregate of the amounts which may be so contributed by a company in any financial year shall not exceed five percent of its average net profits determined in accordance with the provisions of sections 349 and 350 during the three preceding financial years.
Explanation.- Where a portion of a financial year of the company falls before the commencement of the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1985, and a portion falls after such commencement, the latter portion shall be deemed to be a financial year within the meaning, and for the purposes of this sub-section: Provided further that no such contribution shall be made by a company unless a resolution authorizing the making of such contribution is passed at a meeting of the Board of Directors and such resolution shall, subject to the other provisions of this section, be deemed to be justification in law for the making and the acceptance of the contribution authorized by it.
(3) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2)-
(a) 8 donation or subscription or payment caused to be given by a company on its behalf or on its account to a person who, to its knowledge, is carrying on any activity which, at the time at which such donation or subscription or payment was given or made, can reasonably be regarded as likely to effect public support for a political party shall also be deemed to be contribution of the amount of such donation, subscription or payment to such person for a political purpose;
(6b) the amount of expenditure incurred, directly or indirectly, by a company on advertisement in any publication (being a publication in the nature of a souvenir brochure, tract, pamphlet or the like) by or on behalf of a political party or for its advantage, shall also be deemed,-
(i) | where such publication is by or on behalf of a political party, to be a contribution of such amount to such political party, and
(ii) | where such publication is not by or on behalf of but for the advantage of a political party, to be a contribution for a political purpose to the publishing it.
(4) Every company shall disclose in its profit and loss account any amount or amounts contributed by it to any political party or for any political purpose to any person during the financial year to which that account relates, giving particulars of the total amount contributed and the name of the party or person to which or to whom such amount has been contributed.
(5) If a company makes any contribution in contravention of the provisions of this section-
(a) the company shall be punishable with fine which may extend to three times the amount so contributed; and
(b) every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. [2024] 2 S.C.R. 455 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. made more stringent. A fine extendable to three times the amount contributed could be imposed, and every officer of the company who was in default of the provision was punishable for a term which could extend to three years and be liable for fine.
Section 182 of the Companies Act 2013 substantively incorporated the provisions of Section 293-A of the 1956 Act, as amended in 1985. Section 182 enables a company to contribute any amount directly or indirectly to any political party. The provision bars a Government company and a company which has been in existence for less than three financial years from contributing to a political party. The provisos to the provision prescribe the following two conditions:
a. The aggregate of the amount contributed by the company in any financial year shall not exceed seven and a half per cent of its average net profits during the three immediately preceding financial years;’° and b. A contribution can be made only if the Board of Directors issues a resolution authorizing the contribution at a meeting. Such a resolution shall, subject to the other provisions of the Section, be deemed to be a justification in law for the making and acceptance of the contribution authorized by the Board." Sub-section (3) of Section 182 mandates every company to disclose in its profit and loss account any amount contributed by it to any political party during the financial year with specific particulars of the total amount contributed along with the name of the political party to which the contribution was made.
Section 182 of the Companies Act 2013 made two modifications from Section 293-A of the Companies Act 1956: (a) the cap on the contributions which can be made by companies was increased from 5 % to 7.5% of their average net profits; and (b) more stringent consequences for violation of were imposed. The fine was extendable to five times (instead of three times prescribed in the earlier provision) of the contribution.
Companies Act, First proviso to Section 182(1).
Companies Act, second proviso to Section 182(1)
10.
11.
[2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports The Finance Act 2017 made three changes to Section 182 of the Companies Act:
a. The first proviso to Section 182(1) which prescribed a cap on corporate funding was omitted;
b. Section 182(3) was amended to only require a disclosure of the total amount contributed to political parties by a company in a financial year and excluded the requirement to disclose the particulars of the amount contributed to each political party; and c. Sub-section 3A was introduced, by which a company could contribute to a political party only by a cheque, bank draft, or electronic clearing system. The proviso to the sub-section states that a company may also contribute through any instrument issued pursuant to any scheme notified under any law for the time being in force for contribution to political parties. ll. Curbing black money The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act 1978 included Section 13A to the IT Act exempting the income of political parties through financial contributions and investments from income tax. The objects and reasons of the Amending Act stipulated that tax exemption would increase disposable funds from “legitimate sources”. However, to secure the benefit of exemption, the following conditions prescribed in the proviso were required to be fulfilled:
a. The political party was required to keep and maintain books of account and other documents which would enable the Assessing Officer to properly deduce its income;'?
b. The political party had to maintain a record of voluntary contributions in excess of twenty thousand rupees"’, along with the name and address of the person who made such contributions;'* and IT Act, Proviso (a) to Section 13A It was ten thousand rupees when Section 13A was introduced. It was increased to twenty thousand rupees by the Election and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act 2003 IT Act, Proviso (0) to Section 13A [2024] 2 S.C.R. 457 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 12.
13.
14.
c. The accounts of the political party were required to be audited by an accountant.'® By the Election and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act 2003, Sections 80GGB" and 80GGC"’ were inserted in the IT Act making contributions made to political parties tax deductible. The speech of Mr Arun Jaitley, the then Minister of Law and Justice while moving the Bill indicates that contributions were made tax deductible to “incentivize contributions” through cheque and other banking channels. The Finance Act 2017 made the following amendments to Section 13A of the IT Act:
a. The political party was not required to maintain a record of contributions if the contribution was received by electoral bonds;'® and b. The political party must receive a donation in excess of two thousand rupees only by a cheque, bank draft, electronic clearing system or through an electoral bond.'?
ili. Transparency The Election and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act 2003 amended the provisions of the RPA. Section 29C of the RP Act was introduced for requiring each political party to declare the details of the contributions received. The treasurer of a political party or any other person authorized by the political party must in each financial year prepare a report in respect of the contributions in excess of twenty thousand rupees received by the party from a person or company IT Act, Proviso (c) to Section 13A 80GGB. “Deduction in respect of contributions made by companies to political parties-In computing the total income of an assessee, being an Indian company, there shall be deducted any sum contributed by it, in the previous year to any political party or an electoral trust: Provided that no deduction shall be allowed under this section in respect of any sum contributed by way of cash.”
80 GGC. “Deduction in respect of contributions made by any person to political parties- In computing the total income of an assessee, being any person, except local authority and every artificial juridical person wholly or partly funded by the Government, there shall be deducted any amount of contribution made by him, in the previous year, to a political party [or an electoral trust] : [Provided that no deduction shall be allowed under this section in respect of any sum contributed by way of cash.] Explanation.—For the purposes of sections 80GGB and 80GGC, “political party” means a political party registered under section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951).” IT Act, amendment to Proviso (b) to Section 13A IT Act, Proviso (d) to Section 13A 15.
16.
17.
[2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports other than Government companies in that financial year. The report prepared must be submitted to the Election Commission before the due date for furnishing a return of income of that financial year under the IT Act.”° A political party which fails to submit the report shall not be entitled to any tax relief as provided under the IT Act.?' The provision was amended by the Finance Act 2017 to include a proviso by which the political party was not required to disclose details of contributions received by electoral bonds.
Annexure | to this Judgment depicts in a tabular form the amendments to the provisions of the RP Act, the IT Act, the Companies Act, and the RBI Act by the Finance Act 2017.
The effect of the amendments introduced by the Finance Act to the above legislations is that:
a. Anew scheme for financial contribution to political parties is introduced in the form of electoral bonds;
b. The political parties need not disclose the contributions received through electoral bonds;
c. Companies are not required to disclose the details of contributions made in any form; and d. Unlimited corporate funding is permissible.
iv. Objections of RBI and ECI to the Electoral Bond Scheme On 2 January 2017, the RBI wrote a letter to the Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Finance on the proposal of the Government of India to enable Scheduled Banks to issue electoral bearer bonds for the purpose of donations to political parties before the Finance Act 2017 was enacted. The RBI objected to the proposal on the ground that: a. 16 amendment would enable multiple non-sovereign entities to issue bearer instruments. The proposal militated against RBI’s sole authority for issuing bearer instruments which has the potential of becoming currency. Electoral bonds can undermine the faith in banknotes issued by the Central Bank if the bonds are issued in sizable quantities;
RPA, Section 29C (3)
RPA, Section 29C (4)
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 459 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 18.
19.
Though the identity of the person or entity purchasing the bearer bond will be known because of the Know Your Customer requirement, the identities of the intervening persons/entities will not be known. This would impact the principles of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002; and The intention of introducing electoral bonds can be accomplished by cheque, demand draft, and electronic and digital payments. There is no special need for introducing a new bearer bond in the form of electoral bonds.
On 30 January 2017, the Finance Ministry responded to the observations of RBI and stated that:
a. RBI has not understood the core purpose of electoral bonds which is to keep the identity of the donor secret while at the same time ensuring that the donation is only made from tax paid money; and The fear that electoral bonds might be used as currency is unfounded because there is a time limit for redeeming the bonds. By a letter dated 4 August 2017, the Deputy Governor of the RBI stated that India can consider issuing the electoral bonds on a transitional basis through the RBI under the existing provisions of Section 31(1) of the RBI Act. The RBI recommended the incorporation of the following safeguards to minimize the inherent scope of misuse of the bonds for undesirable activities:
a.
b.
The electoral bonds may have a maximum tenure of fifteen days; The electoral bonds can be purchased for any value in multiples of a thousand, ten thousand, or a lakh of rupees;
The purchase of electoral bonds would be allowed from a KYC compliant bank account of the purchaser;
The electoral bonds can be redeemed only upon being deposited into the designated bank account of an eligible political party; The sale of electoral bonds will be open only for a limited period, may be twice a year for seven days each; and The electoral bonds will be issued only at RBI, Mumbai. 22 “KYC”
20.
21.
22.
[2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports The draft of the Electoral Bond Scheme was circulated to the RBI for its comments. The draft conferred notified scheduled commercial banks, apart from the RBI, with the power to issue electoral bonds. The RBI objected to the draft Scheme by a letter dated 14 September 2017. The RBI stated that permitting a commercial bank to issue bonds would “have an adverse impact on public perception about the Scheme, as also the credibility of India’s financial system in general and the central bank in particular.” The RBI again flagged the possibility of shell companies misusing bearer bonds for money laundering transactions. The RBI recommended that electoral bonds may be issued in electronic form because it would (a) reduce the risk of their being used for money laundering; (b) reduce the cost; and (c) be more secure. The Electoral Bond Scheme was placed for deliberation and guidance by the RBI before the Committee of the Central Board. The Committee conveyed serious reservations on the issuance of electoral bonds in the physical form. The reservations were communicated by the RBI to the Finance Minister by a letter dated 27 September 2017. The reservations are catalogued below:
a. Issuance of currency is a ‘monopolistic function’ of a central authority which is why Section 31 of the RBI Act bars any person other than the RBI from issuing bearer bonds;
b. Issuance of electoral bonds in the scrips will run the risk of money laundering since the consideration for transfer of scrips from the original subscriber to a transferee will be paid in cash. This will not leave any trail of transactions. While this would provide anonymity to the contributor, it will also provide anonymity to several others in the chain of transfer;
c. Issuance of electoral bonds in the scrip form could also expose it to the risk of forgery and cross-border counterfeiting besides offering a convenient vehicle for abuse by “aggregators”; and d. The electoral bond may not only be seen as facilitating money laundering but could also be projected (albeit wrongly) as enablingit.
On 26 May 2017, the Election Commission of India”? wrote to the Ministry of Law and Justice that the amendments to the IT Act, 23 “ECD [2024] 2 S.C.R. 461 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. RPA, and Companies Act introduced by the Finance Act 2017 will have a “serious impact on transparency of political finance/ funding of political parties.” The letter notes that the amendment to the RPA by which donations through electoral bonds were not required to be disclosed is a retrograde step towards transparency of donations:
“O(il) It is evident from the Amendment which has been made, that any donation received by a political party through electoral bond has been taken out of the ambit of reporting under the Contribution Report as prescribed under Section 29C of the Representation of the People Act 1951 and therefore, this is a retrograde step as far as transparency of donations is concerned and this proviso needs to be withdrawn.
(ili) Moreover, in a situation where contributions received through Electoral Bonds is not reported, on perusal of the Contribution reports of the political parties, it cannot be ascertained whether the political party has taken any donation in violation of provisions under Section 29B of the Representation of the People Act 1951 which prohibits the political parties from donations from Government Companies and Foreign sources.”
23. Referring to the deletion of the provision in the Companies Act requiring companies to disclose particulars of the amount contributed to specific political parties, the EC] recommended that companies contributing to political parties must declare party-wise contributions in the profit and loss account to maintain transparency in the financial funding of political parties. Further, the ECI also expressed its apprehension to the deletion of the first proviso to Section 182(1) by which the cap on corporate donations was removed. The ECI recommended that the earlier provision prescribing a cap on corporate funding be reintroduced because:
a. Unlimited corporate funding would increase the use of black money for political funding through shell companies; and b. Capped corporate funding ensured that only profitable companies with a proven track record could donate to political parties.
V.
[2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports Electoral Bond Scheme
24. On 2 January 2018, the Ministry of Finance in the Department of Economic Affairs notified the Electoral Bond Scheme 2018 in exercise of the power under Section 31(3) of the RBI Act. The Electoral Bond is a bond issued in the nature of promissory note which is a bearer banking instrument and does not carry the name of the buyer.”* The features of the Scheme are as follows:
a. The Bond may be purchased by a person who is (i) a citizen of India; or (ii) incorporated or established in India.” ‘Person’ includes (a) an individual; (0) a Hindu undivided family; (c) a company; (c) a firm; (d) an association of persons or a body of individuals, whether incorporated or not; (e) every artificial juridical person, not falling within any of the above categories; and (f) any agency, office, or branch owned or controlled by such a person. An individual can buy bonds either singly or jointly with other individuals;7° An Electoral Bond can only be encashed by an eligible political party.” A political party, to be eligible to receive an electoral bond, has to be registered under Section 29A of the RP Act, and ought to have secured not less than one per cent of the votes polled in the last general election to the House of the People or the Legislative Assembly of the State.”® An eligible political party can encash a bond only through a bank account with an authorised bank.?? The scheme has notified the State Bank of India as the bank authorised to issue and encash bonds;*° The instructions issued by the Reserve Bank of India regarding KYC apply to buyers of the bond. The authorised bank may call for additional KYC documents if necessary;*' Electoral Bond Scheme, Electoral Bond Scheme, Electoral Bond Scheme, Electoral Bond Scheme, Electoral Bond Scheme, Electoral Bond Scheme, Electoral Bond Scheme, Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 2(a)
Clause 3(1)
clause 3(3)
Clause 12 Clause 3(8)
Clause 3(4)
Clause 2(b)
Clause 4(2)
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 463 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. h.
Payments for the issuance of the bond are accepted in Indian rupees, through demand draft, cheque, Electronic Clearing System or direct debit to the buyer’s account. Where payment is made by cheque or demand draft, it must be drawn in favour of the issuing bank at the place of issue;*?
The bonds are issued in denominations of Rs 1000, 10,000, 1,00,000, 10,00,000 and 1,00,00,000;%° The bond is valid for fifteen days from the date of issue. No payment will be made to a political party if the bond is deposited after the expiry of fifteen 08५57. If the bond is not encashed within fifteen days, it will be deposited by the authorised bank with the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund;*5 A buyer who wishes to purchase electoral bond(s) can apply in the format specified in Annexure II of the Scheme.** The issuing branch shall issue the bond if all the requirements are fulfilled.” The application shall be rejected if the application is not KYC compliant or if the application does not meet the requirements of the scheme;*° The bond issued is non-refundable;*° The information furnished by the buyer is to be treated as confidential by the authorized bank. It shall be disclosed only when demanded by a competent court or upon the registration of criminal case by any law enforcement agency;*° The bond shall be available for purchase for a period of ten days on a quarterly basis, in the months of January, April, July, and October as specified by the Central Government.*’ Bonds will Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 11 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 5 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 6 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 12(2)
Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 7(1)
Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 7(3)
Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 7(4)
Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 7(6)
Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 7(4)
Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 8(1)
25.
26.
[2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports be available for an additional period of thirty days as specified by the Central Government in a year when General Elections to the House of People are to be held;*?
k. No interest is payable on the bond.** No commission, brokerage, or any other charges for issue of a bond shall be payable by the buyer against purchase of the bond;
The value of the bonds shall be considered as income by way of voluntary contributions received by an eligible political party for the purpose of exemption from Income Tax under Section 13A of the IT Act;*° and m. The bonds are not eligible for trading.* The petitioners instituted proceedings under Article 32 seeking a declaration that Electoral Bond Scheme and the following provisions be declared unconstitutional:
a. Section 135 of the Finance Act 2017 and the corresponding amendment in Section 31 of the RBI Act;
b. Section 137 of the Finance Act 2017 and the corresponding amendment in Section 29C of the RP Act;
c. Section 11 of the Finance Act 2017 and the corresponding amendment in Section 13A of the IT Act; and d. Section 154 of the Finance Act 2017 and the corresponding amendment to Section 182 of the Companies Act.
In its order dated 13 April 2019, this Court observed that the amendments which have been challenged give rise to weighty issues which have a bearing on the sanctity of the electoral process. This Court directed all political parties, in the interim to submit details of contributions received through electoral bonds (with particulars of the credit received against each bond, date of credit, and particulars of the bank account to which the amount Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 8(2)
Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 9 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 10 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 13 Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 14 [2024] 2 S.C.R. 465 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. ५. Union of India & Ors. 27.
28.
has been credited) to the ECI in a sealed cover. The prayer for interim relief was rejected by observing that the operations under the scheme are not placed behind “iron curtains incapable of being pierced”:
“25. The financial statements of companies registered under the Companies Act, 2013 which are filed with the Registrar of Companies, are accessible online on the website of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs for anyone. They can also be obtained in physical form from the Registrar of Companies upon payment of prescribed fee. Since the Scheme mandates political parties to file audited statement of accounts and also since the Companies Act requires financial statements of registered companies to be filed with the Registrar of Companies, the purchase as well as encashment of the bonds, happening only through banking channels, is always reflected in documents that eventually come to the public domain. All that is required is a little more effort to cull out such information from both sides (purchaser of bond and political party) and do some “match the following”. Therefore, it is not as though the operations under the Scheme are behind iron curtains incapable of being pierced.”
The petitioners have also challenged the introduction of the Finance Act as a Money Bill under Article 110 of the Constitution. The issue of the scope of Article 110 has been referred to a seven-Judge Bench and is pending adjudication.*’ The petitioners submitted that they would press the grounds of challenge to the Finance Act independent of the issue on Money Bills in view of the upcoming elections to Parliament.
By an order dated 31 October 2023, the batch of petitions was directed to be listed before a Bench of at least five-Judges in view of the provisions of Article 145(8) of the Constitution. It is in this background that the challenge to the Electoral Bond Scheme and the amendments is before the Constitution Bench.
47 Roger Mathew v. South Bank of India, CA No. 8588/2019 29.
30.
[2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports Issues The present batch of petitions gives rise to the following issues: a.
C.
Whether unlimited corporate funding to political parties, as envisaged by the amendment to Section 182(1) of the Companies Act infringes the principle of free and fair elections and violates Article 14 of the Constitution; and Whether the non-disclosure of information on voluntary contributions to political parties under the Electoral Bond Scheme and the amendments to Section 29C of the RPA, Section 182(3) of the Companies Act and Section 13A(b) of the IT Act are violative of the right to information of citizens under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
Submissions Submissions of petitioners Mr Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel made the following submissions:
a. There is no rational basis for the introduction of electoral bonds. The main objective of introducing the Electoral Bond Scheme as reflected in the article written by the then Finance Minister, Mr. Arun Jaitley was that it would enhance transparency in electoral funding since electoral bond transactions can only be made through legitimate banking channels. However, cash donations are still permitted even after the introduction of the Electoral Bond Scheme;
The Central Government ignored the objections which were raised by both the RBI and the ECI to the Electoral Bond Scheme; The statutory amendments and the Electoral Bond Scheme which mandates non-disclosure of information of electoral funding are unconstitutional because:
i. They defeat the purpose of introducing provisions mandating disclosure of information on political funding in the RPA and the Companies Act which was to enhance transparency in electoral funding;
ll. 169५ violate Article 19(1)(a) which guarantees to the voter the right to information concerning the affairs of the public [2024] 2 S.C.R. 467 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. and the government.* This includes the right to information about financial contributions to political parties because the Constitution through the Tenth Schedule recognizes that political parties have a decisive control over the formation of Government and voting by members of the Legislature in the Legislative Assembly;
iil. They violate Article 21 because the non-disclosure of information of political contributions promotes corruption” and quid pro quo arrangements. The available data indicates that more than ninety four percent of the total electoral bonds are purchased in denominations of rupees one crore. This indicates that bonds are purchased by corporates and not individuals. The limited disclosure clause in the Electoral Bond Scheme prevents investigating agencies such as the Central Bureau of Investigation and Enforcement Directorate from identifying corruption; and They violate the rights of shareholders of Companies who are donating money to political parties by preventing disclosure of information to them; and The statutory amendments and the Electoral Bond Scheme subvert democracy and interfere with free and fair elections because the huge difference in the funds received by ruling parties in the States and Centre vitiates a level playing field between different parties and between parties and independent candidates.
31. MrKapil Sibal, learned senior counsel made the following submissions: a. The amendments and the Electoral Bond Scheme skew free and fair elections by permitting unlimited contributions to political parties by corporate entities and removing the requirement of disclosure of information about political funding;
Freedom of a voter in the negative connotation refers to the freedom to cast their vote without interference and intimidation. Freedom in the positive connotation includes the freedom to 48 Relied on PUCL v. Union of India, [2003]2 SCR 1136 : (2003) 4 SCC 399; ADR v. Union of India, [2002] 3 SCR 696 : (2002) 5 SCC 294; Anjali Bhardwaj v. Union of India, [2019]2 SCR 199 : (2019) 18 SCC 246 49 Relied on Kanwar Lal Gupta ५ Amar Nath Chawla, [1975]2 SCR 259 : 1975 SCC (3) 646 h.
[2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports vote on the basis of complete and relevant information. This includes information about financial contributions to political parties;
The argument of the Union of India that Courts should show judicial restraint is erroneous because the amendments in question relate to the electoral process and do not pertain to economic policy;
The presumption of constitutionality should not apply to statutes which alter the ground rules of the electoral process. The principle underlying the presumption of constitutionality is that the legislature represents the will of the people and that it is validly constituted through free and fair elections. It would be paradoxical to accord a presumption of constitutionality to the very laws or rules that set the conditions under which the legislature comes into being*°;
Corporate funding per se is violative of the Constitution because corporate entities are not citizens and thus, are not entitled to rights under Article 19(1)(a);
The funds contributed to the Electoral Bond Scheme can be used in any manner and their use is not restricted to electoral campaigns;
The Electoral Bond Scheme severs the link between elections and representative democracy because those elected are inclined to fulfill the wishes of the contributors and not the voters. This could be through direct guid pro quo where an express promise is made to enact a policy in favour of the donor and indirect quid pro quo where there is an influence through access to policy makers;
The Scheme promotes information asymmetry where the information about political donations is not disclosed to voters but the Central Government is privy to such information through the State Bank of India which is the authorized bank under the Scheme. The information asymmetry will ensure that a larger portion of the donations would be made to the ruling party at the 50 ~—-Relied on Subash Chandra v. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board, [2009]12 SCR 978 : (2009)
15 SCC 458
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 469 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. m.
Centre. According to the data, the political party at the center has received fifty seven percent of the total contributions made through electoral bonds;
The Electoral Bond Scheme skews the principle of one person, one vote because it gives the corporates a greater opportunity to influence political parties and electoral outcomes;
The amendment to Section 182(3) permits: (i) loss making companies to contribute to political parties; (ii) unlimited contributions to political parties enabling significant policy influence; and (ili) non-disclosure of information on political funding to shareholders;
The amendments permitting non-disclosure of information on political funding are violative of the right to information under Article 19(1)(a). The right to information on funding of political parties is a natural consequence of the judgment of this Court in ADR (supra) and PUCL (supra) because the underlying principle in the judgments is that an informed voter is essential for a functioning democracy. Information about funding to political parties is necessary for an informed voter since the Symbols Order 1968 and the provisions of the Tenth Schedule allow political parties to influence legislative outcomes and policies; The infringement of the right to information does not satisfy the proportionality standard vis-a-vis the purpose of curbing black money. Even if the argument that the Electoral Bond Scheme fulfills the purpose is accepted, non-disclosure of information on political funding is not the least restrictive means to achieve the purpose; The infringement of the right to information does not satisfy the proportionality standard vis-a-vis the purpose of guaranteeing informational privacy because:
i. Protecting donor privacy is not a legitimate purpose. There is no legitimate expectation of informational privacy to political contributions. The argument that it lies at the heart of privacy conflates speech with money. Secrecy of voting cannot be equated to political donations because while the former is an expression of political equality, the latter is contrary to political equality because it depends on the economic capacity of the contributor;
32.
1.
[2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports li. Political funding is made to influence public policy. They are public acts which are by their very nature subject to public scrutiny; and ili. Even if donor privacy is necessary, on a balance, the public interest in free and fair elections trumps the private interest in confidentiality. Further, this Court has to balance between the possibility of victimization on the disclosure of information and the infringement of the right to know; and The amendment to Section 31 of the RBI Act is unconstitutional because of excessive delegation since it does not set out the contours of the Scheme.
Mr Shadan Farasat, learned counsel made the following submissions: a. The Scheme does not effectively curb black money. Clause 14 of the Electoral Bond Scheme prohibits de jure trading of the bonds. However, trading is de facto permissible. Nothing prevents person A from purchasing the bond and trading it with person B who pays through cash;
The right to information on political funding which is traceable to Article 19(1)(a) can only be restricted on the grounds stipulated in Article 19(2). The purposes of curbing black money and recognizing donor privacy is not traceable to the grounds in Article 19(2);
Even if the purposes are traceable to Article 19(2), the Scheme is unreasonable and disproportionate to the purpose of “increasing political funding through banking channels and reducing political funding through non-banking channels” because:
i. The purpose is not satisfied: The regime still permits cash funding up to Rupees two thousand. The operation of the Scheme increases anonymous funding through electoral bonds at the cost of contributions through regular banking channels;
ii. There is no rational nexus between the means and the purpose;
iil. | Other less restrictive means of contributing through banking channels are available; and [2024] 2 S.C.R. 471 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. ५. Union of India & Ors. iv. The fifth prong of the proportionality analysis as laid down in Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. State of Gujarat®’ and Ramesh Chandra Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh”
that the legislation should have sufficient safeguard to prevent abuse has also not been satisfied.
The statutory amendments and the Scheme are manifestly arbitrary because (i) large scale corruption and quid pro quo arrangements would go unidentified due to the non-disclosure of information about political funding; (1) they enable capture of democracy by wealthy interests; and (1) they infringe the principle of ‘one person-one vote’ because a selected few overpower the voice of the masses because of their economic wealth;
The deletion of the limit on corporate contributions is manifestly arbitrary? because it (i) permits donations by loss making companies; (ii) removes the control of shareholders over the decisions of the Board; (ili) permits unlimited contribution by corporates and thereby abrogates democratic principles;
The provision permitting non-disclosure of funding by companies is violative of the shareholders’ rights under:
|. Article 25 which includes the right of the shareholder to know how the resources generated from their property are utilized. Once a shareholder comes to know that a company is financing a political party and their conscience does not permit it, as an exercise of the right to conscience, the shareholder should be entitled to sell those shares; and li. If the shareholder feels that the political contributions are not a sound business decision, they must be entitled to exit the business by selling the shares. The information that would enable the shareholder to make such a decision is not disclosed, thus, infringing upon their right under Article 19(1)(g).
[2020]13 SCR 886 : (2020) 10 SCC 459 [2023]2 SCR 422 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 162 Relied on Shayara Bano v. Union of India, [2017]9 SCR 797 : (2017) 9 SCC 1 472 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
33. Mr Nizam Pasha, learned counsel made the following submissions: 34.
a. The Electoral Bond Scheme and the amendments are arbitrary as they permit Indian registered companies to purchase electoral bonds without considering their ownership and control. This goes against foreign investment laws in India, treating companies owned or controlled by non-resident Indian citizens as ‘foreign owned or controlled companies,’ without rational justification; The Electoral Bond Scheme is arbitrary due to its discriminatory and non-transparent nature. It contradicts existing laws requiring transparency and verification of the beneficial ownership and source of funds; and The amendments to Section 29C of the RPA and Section 182 of the Companies Act serve no purpose other than perpetuating illegal ends, as they exempt companies’ purchase of electoral bonds from public disclosure. This fails to achieve the scheme’s stated objective of curbing cash donations.
Mr Vijay Hansaria, learned senior counsel made the following submissions:
a. The objects and reasons of the Election and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act 2003 which amended the Companies Act 1956, IT Act 1961, and the RPA indicates that the amendments were made to incentivize contributions through banking channels. Thus, the amendments to Section 13A of the Income Tax Act and Section 29C of the RPA are contrary to the object of inserting Section 138A and Section 80GGB and Section 80GGC of the Income Tax Act;
Since 1959, when companies were permitted to contribute to political parties, all companies were required to mandatorily disclose the total contributions made and the name of party to which they have contributed. Further, ceiling limits for total contribution by companies were prescribed. The Finance Act 2017 does away with these transparency requirements; and International perspectives on political funding regulations, including those from the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Singapore, emphasize the importance of transparency, disclosure, and reporting in political contributions. [2024] 2 S.C.R. 473 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. These examples underscore the global consensus on transparency in the political funding process.
35. Mr Sanjay R. Hegde, learned senior counsel made the following submissions:
36.
a. Public listed companies are subject to scrutiny since they raise funds from the public. Information pertaining to the company is essential to be brought to the public domain. This will enable informed debates and discussions regarding the use of money by such companies. Such information must particularly be made available to shareholders to enable them to make an informed choice with regard to trading of securities. Thus, the amendment to the Companies Act which removes the requirement of disclosure of information about political contributions is violative of the right to information of shareholders which flows from Article 19(1)(a);
Public listed companies should not be allowed to make contributions without the consent of the majority of the shareholders or the consent of three-fourths of shareholders; Non-disclosure of information about political funding denies shareholders the right to choice that flows from Article 21. Shareholders are incapacitated from making a choice about whether they wish to invest in shares of a company which has contributed to a political party whose ideology that shareholder does not agree with; and The amendment to Section 182(3) perpetuates the pre-existing inequality in power between shareholders and the Board/ Promoters/management and puts the shareholders in an even weaker position violating the right to substantive equality under Article 14.
Mr PB Suresh, learned counsel made the following submissions: a. The Scheme and amendments violate Articles 14 and 15 by disproportionately impacting regional political parties and political parties which represent marginalised and backward sections of the society. The representation of the backward classes is low in the corporate sector. Thus, the Scheme has a disparate impact on parties whose social base is derived from the SC/ STs and backward classes;
474 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports The presumption of constitutionality does not apply in full rigour to electoral laws because the incumbent legislators have a vested interest in shaping the laws that would make it easier for them to be re-elected;
The removal of the cap on corporate donations has strengthened the position of major political parties and created more barriers for the entry of new political parties; and Political parties have a right to know the funding sources of rival political parties to enable them to critique it before the public. Submissions of Union of India
37. Thelearned Attorney General for India made the following submissions: a. Political parties are an integral product of a free and open society and play an important role in the administration of the affairs of the community. Accordingly, they are entitled to receive all support, including financial contributions;
The Electoral Bond Scheme allows any person to transfer funds to political parties of their choice through legitimate banking channels instead of other unregulated ways such as direct transfer through cash;
The Scheme ensures confidentiality of the contributions made to political parties. The benefit of confidentiality to contributors ensures and promotes contribution of clean money to political parties;
Citizens do not have a general right to know regarding the funding of political parties. Right to know is not a general right available to citizens;
This Court has evolved the right to know for the specific purpose of enabling and furthering the voter’s choice of electing candidates free from blemish; and The influence of contributions by companies to political parties ought not to be examined by this Court. It is an issue of democratic significance and should be best left to the legislature.
38. The learned Solicitor General of India made the following submissions: a. The legal framework prior to the enactment of the Electoral Bond Scheme was mostly cash-based which incentivized infusion of [2024] 2 S.C.R. 475 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. ५. Union of India & Ors. black money into political parties, and consequently, into the electoral process in India. The Electoral Bond Scheme is an improvement on the prior legal framework;
Donors to a political party often apprehended retribution from other political parties. Such apprehension incentivized donors to contribute unaccounted money to political parties to avoid identification and victimization by other political parties. The Electoral Bond Scheme maintains the confidentiality of donors and thereby incentivizes them to contribute clean money to political parties;
In case the donor is a public company, they will have to declare the amount contributed in their books of account without disclosing the name of the political party. Similarly, the political parties will also have to disclose the total amount received through electoral bonds in their annual audited accounts filed before the Election Commission of India. This framework ensures a balance between clean money coming into the system as against the right to information of citizens;
The state has a positive obligation to safeguard the privacy of its citizens, which necessarily includes the citizens’ right to political affiliation. The right of a buyer to purchase electoral bonds without having to disclose their preference of political party secures the buyer’s right to privacy;
The Electoral Bond Scheme has been enacted in pursuance of a legitimate state interest - to shift from cash driven, unregulated and unaccounted cash based political donations to a regulated, digital and legal political donation framework. The provisions of the Electoral Bond Scheme have a specific object and purpose of curbing black money and protecting donor privacy:
|. Clause 3(3) imposes a pre-condition that only a registered political party which has secured at least 1 per cent of the votes polled in the last general election would be eligible to receive bonds. This provision ensures that ghost political parties are barred from seeking and receiving political funding;
h.
[2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports ll. Clause 4 requires a buyer of electoral bonds to meet the requisite KYC Norms. This ensures that only KYC compliant persons are entitled to buy electoral bonds;
iil. The limited validity period of fifteen days ensures that the bond is not used as a parallel currency;
iv. Clause 7(4) mandates the authorized bank to treat the information furnished by a buyer as confidential which shall not be disclosed to any authority, except when directed by a competent court or upon registration of criminal case by any law enforcement agency. This provision protects the privacy and personal details of the buyer vis-a-vis the state; and v. Clause 11 mandates that all payments for the purchase of electoral bonds shall be accepted through banking channels. This provision curbs the circulation of black money.
The right of a citizen to know how political parties are being funded must be balanced against the right of a person to maintain privacy of their political affiliations. Donating money to one’s preferred party is a form political self-expression, which lies at the heart of privacy;
Maintaining anonymity of donations to political parties is a part of the concept of secret ballot because it enables a person to make political choices without any fear of victimization or retaliation; The right to information only operates against information in the possession or in the knowledge of the state. It cannot operate for seeking information not in the knowledge or possession of the state;
The amendments to the RBI Act, RPA, and the IT Act are intended to curb donations made by way of cash and other means to political parties and secure the anonymity of donors; The amendment to Section 182 of the Companies Act removes the limitation of seven and a half percent of the net profits on the amount contributed by political parties. The removal of the contribution limit was intended to disincentivize creation of shell companies;
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 477 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 39.
AO.
41.
k. This Court has recognized that the legislature has a wide latitude in matters concerning economic policy. Further, the mere possibility that the law might be abused cannot be a ground for holding the provision procedurally or substantially unreasonable; and The fact that one party receives substantially more support through donations than other parties cannot in itself be a legal ground to challenge the validity of the Electoral Bond Scheme. D. The Scope of Judicial Review The Union of India submitted that this Court must exercise judicial restraint while deciding the challenge to the Electoral Bond Scheme and the statutory amendments because they relate to economic policy. For this purpose, the Union of India relied on a series of decisions where this Court has held that Courts must follow judicial restraint in matters concerning economic and financial policy.** It is a settled position of law that Courts must adopt a less stringent form of judicial review while adjudicating challenges to legislation and executive action which relate to economic policy as compared to laws relating to civil rights such as the freedom of speech or the freedom of religion.®° More recently, in Swiss Ribbons v. Union of India®, this Court while deciding a challenge to the constitutional validity of provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 observed that the legislature must be given “free play” in the joints to experiment with economic policy. This position was also followed in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Limited v. Union of India°’’, where amendments to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code were challenged.
The question is whether the amendments under challenge relate to economic policy. While deciding on a constitutional challenge, the Court does not rely on the ipse dixit of the government, that a Rustom Cavasjee Cooper ५. Union of India, [1970]3 SCR 530 : (1970) 1 SCC 248; R.K Garg ५. Union of India, [1982]1 SCR 947 : (1981) 4 SCC 675; Premium Granites v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1994]1 SCR 579 : (1994) 2 SCC 691; Peerless General Finance and Investment Co v. RBI, [1992]1 SCR 406 : (1992) 2 SCC 343, BALCO Employees Union v. Union of India, [2001] Suppl. 5 SCR 511 : (2002) 2 SCC 333. RK Garg v. Union of India, [1982]1 SCR 947 : (1981) 4 SCC 675 [8]; See Balco Employees Union v. Union of India, [2001] Suppl. 5 SCR 511 : (2002) 2 SCC 333; DG of Foreign Trade v. Kanak Exports,
(2016) 2 SCC 226
[2019]3 SCR 535 : (2019) 4 SCC 17 [2019]10 SCR 381 : (2019) 8 SCC 416 42.
43.
44.
[2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports legislation is an economic legislation. Courts before classifying the policy underlying a legislation as economic policy must undertake an analysis of the true nature of the law. The amendment to Section 31 of the RBI Act can be classified as a financial provision to the extent that it seeks to introduce a new form of a bearer banking instrument. However, any resemblance to an economic policy ends there. The amendments in question can be clubbed into two heads: first, provisions mandating non-disclosure of information on electoral financing; and second, provisions permitting unlimited corporate funding to political parties. Both these amendments relate to the electoral process.
In fact, it is evident from the correspondence between the Ministry of Finance and RBI (which have been summarized above) on the apprehensions of the Bonds being used as an alternative currency that the Bonds were introduced only to curb black money in the electoral process, and protect informational privacy of financial contributors to political parties. The Union of India has itself classified the amendments as an “electoral reform”. Thus, the submission of the Union of India that the amendments deal with economic policy cannot be accepted.
The second argument that this Court needs to address is to determine the scope of judicial review to decide this batch of petitions. The petitioners submitted that the presumption of constitutionality does not apply since the Scheme deals with the electoral process. The premise of the argument is that the presumption of constitutionality is based on the principle that the elected body must be trusted to make decisions and that principle should not be applied when the rules changing the electoral process are themselves in challenge.*® It was submitted that in such cases if a prima facie case of constitutional violation is made out, the State bears a heavy burden of justifying the law.
The presumption of constitutionality is based on two premises. First, it is based on democratic accountability, that is, legislators are elected representatives who are aware of the needs of the citizens and are 58 For this purpose, the petitioners referred to the representation-reinforcement model of judicial review propounded by John Hart Ely in his book Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard University Press, 2002) and the judgment of this Court in Subash Chandra v. Delhi Subordinate Service Selection Board, [2009]12 SCR 978 : (2009) 15 SCC 458 [2024] 2 S.C.R. 479 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. best placed to frame policies to resolve 18717, Second, legislators are privy to information necessary for policy making which the Courts as an adjudicating authority are not. However, the policy underlying the legislation must not violate the freedoms and rights which are entrenched in Part Ill of the Constitution and other constitutional provisions. It is for this reason that previous judgments of this Court have held that the presumption of constitutionality is rebutted when a prima facie case of violation of a fundamental right is established. The onus then shifts on the State to prove that the violation of the fundamental right is justified. In Dharam Dutt v. Union of India®, a two-Judge Bench of this Court elucidated the principle in the following terms:
“49. In spite of there being a general presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the legislation, in a challenge laid to the validity of any legislation allegedly violating any right or freedom guaranteed by clause (1) of Article 19 of the Constitution, on a prima facie case of such violation having been made out, the onus would shift upon the respondent State to show that the legislation comes within the permissible limits of the most relevant out of clauses
(2) to (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution, and that the restriction is reasonable. The Constitutional Court would expect the State to place before it sufficient material justifying the restriction and its reasonability. On the State succeeding in bringing the restriction within the scope of any of the permissible restrictions, such as, the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, decency or morality etc. the onus of showing that restriction is unreasonable would shift back to the petitioner. Where the restriction on its face appears to be unreasonable, nothing more would be required to substantiate the plea of unreasonability. Thus the onus of proof in such like cases is an ongoing shifting process to be consciously observed by the Court called upon to decide the constitutional validity of a legislation by reference to Article 19 of the Constitution.”
See State of Bombay v. FN Balsara, [1951]1 SCR 682 [2003]Supp. 6 SCR 151 : AIR 2004 SC 1295; Also see Ramlila Maidan Incident, In re, [2012]4 SCR 971 : (2012) 5 SCC 1; State of Bombay v. FN Balsara, [1951]1 SCR 682; Ameerunissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum, [1953]1 SCR 404 : (1952) 2 SCC 697 45.
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Digital Supreme Court Reports The broad argument of the petitioners that the presumption of constitutionality should not apply to a specific class of statutes, that is, laws which deal with electoral processes cannot be accepted. Courts cannot carve out an exception to the evidentiary principle which is available to the legislature based on the democratic legitimacy which it enjoys. In the challenge to electoral law, like all legislation, the petitioners would have to prima facie prove that the law infringes fundamental rights or constitutional provisions, upon which the onus would shift to the State to justify the infringement.
E. The close association of politics and money The law does not bar electoral financing by the public. Both corporates and individuals are permitted to contribute to political parties. The legal regime has not prescribed a cap on the financial contributions which can be received by a political party or a candidate contesting elections. However, Section 77 of the RPA read with Rule 90 of the Conduct of Election Rules 1961? prescribes a cap on the total expenditure which can be incurred by a candidate or their agent in connection with Parliamentary and Assembly elections between the date on which they are nominated and the date of the declaration of the result. The maximum limit for the expenditure in a Parliamentary constituency is between Rupees seventy five lakhs to ninety five lakhs depending on the size of the State and the Union Territory. The maximum limit of election expenses in an Assembly constituency varies between rupees twenty eight lakhs and forty lakhs depending on the size of the State.®* However, the law does not prescribe any limits for the expenditure by a political party. Explanation 1 to Section 77 stipulates that the expenditure incurred by “leaders of a political party” on account of travel for propagating the programme Section 77 of the RPA read with Section 169 provides the Central Government in consultation with the Election Commission, the power to prescribe the amount over which the total expenditure incurred by the candidate or their agent in connection with Parliamentary election and Assembly election shall not be exceeded. The total expenditure cap is prescribed in Rule 90 of the Conduct of Election Rules 1961 which is amended from time to time.
The expenditure limit is capped at seventy-five Lakhs for the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, and Sikkim, and the Union Territories of Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Chandigarh, Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu, Lakshadweep, Puducherry, and Ladakh. For the remaining States and Union Territories, the expenditure limit is capped at ninety-five Lakhs. For State Assembly elections, the expenditure is capped at twenty-eight lakhs for the States of Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura. Amongst the Union Territories, the expenditure is capped at twenty-eight Lakhs for Puducherry and forty Lakhs for Delhi and Jammu and Kashmir.
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 481 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 47.
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of the political party shall not be deemed to be election expenditure. Thus, there is an underlying dicohotomy in the legal regime. The law does not regulate contributions to candidates. It only regulates contributions to political parties. However, expenditure by the candidates and not the political party is regulated. Be that as it may, the underlying understanding of the legal regime regulating electoral finance is that finance is crucial for the sustenance and progression of electoral politics.
It is believed that money does not vote but people do. However, studies have revealed the direct and indirect influence of money on electoral politics.©* The primary way through which money directly influences politics is through its impact on electoral outcomes. One way in which money influences electoral outcomes is through vote buying. Another way in which money influences electoral outcomes is through incurring electoral expenditure for political campaigns. Campaigns have a measurable influence on voting behavior because of the impact of television advertisements, campaign events, and personal canvassing.® An informed voter is one who is assumed to be aware of the policy positions of the candidate or the party they represent and votes on a thorough analysis of the pros and cons of electing a candidate. On the other hand, an uninformed voter is assumed to not possess knowledge of the policy positions of the candidates.°® Campaigns have an effect on the voting behavior of both an informed and an uninformed voter. The impact of campaigns on an informed voter is supplementary because campaign activities enable an informed voter to be further informed about the policies and ideology of the political party and the candidate, and their views on specific issues. Electoral campaigns reduce the uncertainty about candidates for an informed voter. For an uninformed voter, electoral campaigns play a much more persuasive role in influencing electoral behavior because campaigns throw more light on candidates.
See Conrad Foreman, Money in Politics: Campaign Finance and its Influence over the Political Process and Public Policy, 52 UIC J. Marshall L. Rev. 185 (2018) See D Sunshine Hillygus, Campaign Effects on Vote Choice in “The Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behavior” (Ed. Jan E. Leighley 2010) See David P. Baron, Electoral Competition with informed and uninformed voters, American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 1 March 1994 49.
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Digital Supreme Court Reports Political parties use innovative techniques of campaigning by going beyond the traditional methods of advertisements, door-to-door campaigning and processions to increase outreach. For example, political parties sponsor religious festivals and community fairs, organize sporting matches and literary competitions where cash awards are given.®’ These outreach techniques leave a lasting impression on the minds of uninformed voters. Thus, enhanced campaign expenditure proportionately increases campaign outreach which influences the voting behavior of voters.
Money also creates entry-barriers to politics by limiting the kind of candidates and political parties which enter the electoral fray. Studies have shown that money influences the selection of candidates by political parties because parties would prefer fielding candidates who would be able to substantially self-finance their campaign without relying on the party for finance.® In this manner, candidates who belong to socio-economically weaker sections face added barriers because of the close association of money and politics. Money also excludes parties which are new to the electoral fray, and in particular, parties representing the cause of marginalized communities. Political parties which do not have enough finance have had to form electoral coalitions with other established political parties who would in exchange shoulder a lion’s share of the campaign expenditure of the newly established political party extending to costs related to coalition propaganda, print and digital advertising, vehicle and equipment hire, political rallies, food transportation, and daily expenditure for party cadres®. The compromises which newly formed political parties have to make lead to a dilution of the ideology of the party in exchange of its political sustenance. In this manner, money creates an exclusionary impact by reducing the democratic space for participation for both candidates and newer and smaller political parties.
The judgments of this Court have recognized the influence of money on politics. They take a critical view of the role played by Michael A. Collins, Navigating Fiscal Constraints in “Costs of Democracy: Political Finance in India” (edited by Devesh Kapur and Milan Vaishnav) OUP 2018 See Neelanjan Sircar, Money in Elections: the Role of Personal Wealth in Election Outcomes in Costs of Democracy: Political Finance in India (ed. By Devesh Kapur and Milan Vaishnav) OUP 2018 Michael A. Collins, Navigating Fiscal Constraints in “Costs of Democracy: Political Finance in India” (edited by Devesh Kapur and Milan Vaishnav) OUP 2018 [2024] 2 S.C.R. 483 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 53.
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big business and “big money” in the electoral process in India. The decision in Kanwar Lal Gupta v. Amar Nath Chawla,” notices that money serves as an asset for advertising and other forms of political solicitation that increases a candidate’s exposure to the public. The court observed that the availability of large funds allows a candidate or political party “significantly greater opportunity for the propagation of its programme?” in comparison to their political rivals. Such political disparity, it was observed, results in “serious discrimination between one political party or individual and another on the basis of money power and that in turn would mean that “some voters are denied an ‘equal’ voice and some candidates are denied an ‘equal chance”. In Vatal Nagaraj ५. R Dayanand Sagar,” Justice V R Krishna lyer noted that candidates often evade the legal ceiling on expenditure by using big money channelled by political parties. The court acknowledged that large monetary inputs are “necessary evils of modern elections”, which they hoped would be eradicated sooner rather than later. In P Nalla Thampy Terah v. Union of India,” a Constitution Bench of this Court was called upon to decide the validity of Explanation 1 to Section 77 of the RPA which allowed unlimited channelling of funds by political parties for the election of their candidates. While upholding the constitutional validity of the explanation, the Court noted that the petitioners were justified in criticizing the statute for “diluting the principle of free and fair elections.” In Common Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India,” this Court dwelt on the ostentatious use of money by political parties in elections to further the prospects of candidates set up by them. Justice Kuldip Singh described the role of money in the electoral process, which is relevant for contextualizing the issue: “18. ... [The General Elections] is an enormous exercise and amammoth venture in terms of money spent. Hundreds and thousands of vehicles of various kinds are pressed on to the roads in 543 parliamentary constituencies on behalf of thousands of aspirants to power, many days [1975]2 SCR 259 : (1975) 3 SCC 646 [1975]2 SCR 384 : (1975) 4 SCC 127 [1985]Supp. 1 SCR 622 : 1985 Supp SCC 189 [1996]3 SCR 1208 : (1996) 2 SCC 752 55.
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Digital Supreme Court Reports before the general elections are actually held. Millions of leaflets and many million posters are printed and distributed or pasted all over the country. Banners by the lakhs are hoisted. Flags go up, walls are painted, and hundreds of thousands of loudspeakers play out the loud exhortations and extravagant promises. VIPs and VVIPs come and go, some of them in helicopters and air-taxis. The political parties in their quest for power spend more than one thousand crore of rupees on the General Election (Parliament alone), yet nobody accounts for the bulk of money so spent and there is no accountability anywhere. Nobody discloses the source of the money. There are no proper accounts and no audit. From where does the money come from nobody knows. In a democracy where rule of law prevails this naked display of black money, by violating the mandatory provisions of law, cannot be permitted.”
The challenge to the statutory amendments and the Electoral Bond Scheme cannot be adjudicated in isolation without a reference to the actual impact of money on electoral politics. This Court has in numerous judgments held that the effect and not the object of the law on fundamental rights and other constitutional provisions must be determined while adjudicating its constitutional validity. The effect of provisions dealing with electoral finance cannot be determined without recognizing the influence of money on politics. Therefore, we must bear in mind the nexus between money and electoral democracy while deciding on the issues which are before us in this batch of petitions.
F. Thechallenge to non-disclosure of information on electoral financing Section 29C of the RPA as amended by the Finance Act 2017 stipulates that the political party need not disclose financial contributions received through electoral bonds. Similarly, Section 13A of the IT Act aS amended does not require the political party to maintain a record of contributions for contributions received through electoral bonds. Section 182 of the Companies Act 2013 as amended by the Finance Act 2017 by which the earlier requirement of disclosure of particulars of the amount contributed by companies to political parties in their profit and loss accounts was deleted. The company which has made [2024] 2 S.C.R. 485 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 57.
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financial contributions is now only required to disclose the total amount contributed to political parties without disclosing specific particulars about the political party to which the contribution was made. Maintaining the anonymity of the contributor is a crucial and primary characteristic of the Electoral Bond Scheme. The electoral bond is defined as a bearer banking instrument which does not carry the name of the buyer.”* The law mandates the authorized bank to not disclose the information furnished by the buyer except when demanded by a competent court or upon the registration of a criminal case by law enforcement agencies.”° The amendments introduced by the Finance Act 2017 and the Electoral Bond Scheme are challenged on the ground that the nondisclosure of information about electoral contributions is violative of the right to information of the voter which is traceable to Article 19(1)
(a) of the Constitution.
|. Infringement of the right to information of the voter This segment of the judgment will discuss whether the amendments and the Electoral Bond Scheme infringe the right to information of the voter. For this purpose, we will discuss the scope of the right to information, and whether the right extends to information on contributions to political parties.
a. The scope of Article 19(1)(a): tracing the right to information Article 19(1)(a) has been held to guarantee the right to information to citizens. The judgments of this Court on the right to information can be divided into two phases. In the first phase, this Court traced the right to information to the values of good governance, transparency and accountability. These judgments recognize that it is the role of citizens to hold the State accountable for its actions and inactions and they must possess information about State action for them to accomplish this role effectively.
In the first phase, this Court delineated the scope of the right to information in the context of deciding the disclosure of evidence relating to affairs of the State. Provisions of the Indian Evidence Act Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 2(a)
Electoral Bond Scheme, Clause 7(4)
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Digital Supreme Court Reports stipulate that evidence which is relevant and material to proceedings need not be disclosed to the party if the disclosure would violate public interest.”© In the 1960’s, this Court framed the issue of disclosure of documents related to the affairs of the State in terms of a conflict between public interest and private interest. This Court observed that the underlying principle in the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act bearing on the disclosure of evidence related to the affairs of the State is that if such disclosure is denied, it would violate the private interest of the party.’”” So, when a party seeks the disclosure of documents, and when such disclosure is denied on the ground that it would violate public interest, there is a conflict between private interest and public interest. In subsequent cases, the courts cast the principle underlying the provisions of disclosure in the Indian Evidence Act as a conflict between two conceptions of public interest. This Court held that disclosure of information aids the party to the proceedings. But beyond that, disclosure also serves the public interest in the administration of justice.”
In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain”, the respondent sought to summon documents in an election petition. The State made a claim of privilege from disclosure of documents. In his concurring opinion in the Constitution Bench, Justice KK Mathew observed that there is a public interest in the impartial administration of justice which can only be secured by the disclosure of relevant and material documents. The learned Judge reaffirmed this proposition by tracing the right to information to Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution:
“74. In a Government of responsibility like ours, where all the agents of the public must be responsible for their conduct, there can be but few secrets. The people of this country have a right to know every public act, everything that is done in a public way, by their public functionaries. They are entitled to know the particulars of every public transaction in all its bearing. The right to know, which is derived from the concept of freedom of speech, though not Indian Evidence Act 1872, Section 124 See State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, [1961]2 SCR 371 : (1961) 2 SCR 371 [13] See State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, [1961]2 SCR 371 : (1961) 2 SCR 371 [Subba Rao J] [1975]3 SCR 333 : (1975) 4 SCC 428 [2024] 2 S.C.R. 487 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 63.
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absolute, is a factor which should make one wary, when secrecy is claimed for transactions which can, at any rate, have no repercussion on public security.[...]”
This principle was further elucidated in SP Gupta v. Union of India®. The Union of India claimed immunity against the disclosure of the correspondence between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of the High Court of Delhi, and the Chief Justice of India on the reappointment of Additional Judges. Justice P N Bhagwati while discussing the position of law on claims of non-disclosure, observed that the Constitution guarantees the “right to know” which is necessary to secure “true facts” about the administration of the country. The opinion recognised accountability and transparency of governance as important features of democratic governance. Democratic governance, the learned Judge remarked, is not restricted to voting once in every five years but is a continuous process by which the citizens not merely choose the members to represent themselves but also hold the government accountable for their actions and inactions for which citizens need to possess information®"'.
Our discussion indicates that the first phase of the jurisprudence on the right to information in India focussed on the close relationship between the right and open governance. The judgments in this phase were premised on the principle that the citizens have a duty to hold the government of the day accountable for their actions and inactions, and they can effectively fulfil this duty only if the government is open and not clothed in secrecy.
In the second phase of the evolution of the jurisprudence on the right to information, this Court recognised the importance of information to form views on social, cultural and political issues, and participate in and contribute to discussions.®* Courts recognised that the relevance of information is to not only to hold the government accountable but also to discover the truth in a marketplace of ideas which would 1981 Supp SCC 87 Also see Dinesh Trivedi v. Union of India, [1997]3 SCR 93 : (1997) 4 SCC 306 where this Court observed that sunlight is the best disinfectant.
Secy., Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Govt. of India v. Cricket Assn. of Bengal, [1995]1 SCR 1036 : (1995) 2 SCC 161; Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India, [1985]2 SCR 287 : AIR 1986 SC 515 ; Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, [1950]1 SCR 594 : AIR 1950 SC 124 66.
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Digital Supreme Court Reports ultimately secure the goal of self-develooment.®? This Court also recognised that freedom of speech and expression includes the right to acquire information which would enable people to debate on social, moral and political issues. These debates would not only foster the spirit of representative democracy but would also curb the prevalence of misinformation and monopolies on information. Thus, in the second phase, the Court went beyond viewing the purpose of freedom of speech and expression through the lens of holding the government accountable, by recognising the inherent value in effective participation of the citizenry in democracy. This Court recognised that effective participation in democratic governance is not just a means to an end but is an end in itself. This interpretation of Article 19(1)(a) is in line with the now established position that fundamental freedoms and the Constitution as a whole seek to secure conditions for self-development at both an individual and group level.® A crucial aspect of the expansion of the right to information in the second phase is that right to information is not restricted to information about state affairs, that is, public information. It includes information which would be necessary to further participatory democracy in other forms and is not restricted to information about the functioning of public officials. The right to information has an instrumental exegesis, which recognizes the value of the right in facilitating the realization of democratic goals. But beyond that, the right to information has an intrinsic constitutional value; one that recognizes that it is not just a means to an end but an end in itself.
b. — Right to information of a voter: exploring the judgments in ADR and PUCL In Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms® (“ADR”), this Court traced the right of voters to have information about the antecedents, including the criminal past, of candidates contesting elections, to Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. In ADR (supra), proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution were instituted before the High Court of Delhi seeking a direction to implement the Law Commission’s recommendations to (a) debar candidates from DC Saxena v. Hon’ble The Chief Justice of India, [1996]Supp. 3 SCR 677 : (1996) 5 SCC 216 [29] See Supriyo v. Union of India, 2023 INSC 920 [213, 214] [2002]3 SCR 696 : (2002) 5 SCC 294.
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 489 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 67.
contesting elections if charges have been framed against them by a Court in respect of certain offences; and (b) ensure that candidates furnish details regarding criminal cases which are pending against them. The High Court held that the Court cannot direct Parliament to implement the recommendations of the Law Commission. However, the High Court directed the ECI to secure information relating to (a) the details of cases in which a candidate is accused of any offences punishable with imprisonment;(b) assets possessed by a candidate, their spouse and dependents; (c) facts bearing on the candidate’s competence, capacity, and suitability for representing the people; and (d) any other information which ECI considers necessary for judging the capacity of the candidate fielded by the political party. The Union of India appealed against the decision of the High Court before this Court. This Court held that voters have a right to be sufficiently informed about candidates so as to enable them to exercise their democratic will through elections in an intelligent manner. Such information was held to be necessary for elections to be conducted in a “free and fair manner”:
“34. ...the members of a democratic society should be sufficiently informed so that they may influence intelligently the decisions which may affect themselves and this would include their decision of casting votes in favour of a particular candidate. If there is a disclosure by a candidate as sought for then it would strengthen the voters in taking appropriate decision of casting their votes.
[...] we fail to understand why the right of a citizen/voter — a little man — to know about the antecedents of his candidate cannot be held to be a fundamental right under Article 19(1) (a). In our view, democracy cannot survive without free and fair election, without free and fairly informed voters. Votes cast by uninformed voters in favour of X or Y candidate would be meaningless. As stated in the aforesaid passage, one-sided information, disinformation, misinformation and non-information, all equally create an uninformed citizenry which makes democracy a farce. Therefore, casting of a vote by a misinformed and non-informed voter or a voter having one-sided information only is bound to affect the democracy seriously. Freedom of speech and expression 68.
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Digital Supreme Court Reports includes right to impart and receive information which includes freedom to hold opinions.”
This Court rejected the argument that information about a candidate contesting elections cannot be compelled to be disclosed because it is not “public information”. The three-Judge Bench held that information that candidates are required to disclose is only limited to aiding the voters in assessing whether they could cast their vote ina candidate’s favour. The Court observed that the criminal background of a candidate and assets of the candidate (through which it could be assessed if the candidate has amassed wealth through corruption when they were elected previously) would aid the voters to cast their vote in an informed manner. This Court directed the ECI to call for the following information on affidavit as a part of nomination: a. Whether the candidate has been convicted, acquitted or discharged of any criminal offence in the past and if convicted, whether they are punished with imprisonment or fine;
b. In the six months prior to the filling of nomination papers, whether the candidate was accused in any pending case for an offence punishable with imprisonment for two years or more, and in which a charge is framed or cognizance is taken by the court of law;
c. The assets (immovable, movable, bank balances and others) of a candidate and of his/her spouse and that of dependents; d. Liabilities, if any, particularly whether there are any over dues to any public financial institution or government dues; and e. The educational qualifications of the candidate.
This Court observed that the ECI can ask candidates to disclose information about the expenditure incurred by political parties to maintain the purity of elections.’ However, the operative portion of the judgment did not reflect this observation.
86 Paragraph 64(4): “To maintain the purity of elections and in particular to bring transparency in the process of election, the Commission can ask the candidates about the expenditure incurred by the political parties and this transparency in the process of election would include transparency of a candidate who seeks election or re-election. In a democracy, the electoral process has a strategic role. The little man of this country would have basic elementary right to know full particulars of a candidate who is to represent him in Parliament where laws to bind his liberty and property may be enacted.” [2024] 2 S.C.R. 491 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 70.
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Pursuant to the decision of this Court in ADR (supra), Parliament amended the RPA to incorporate some of the directions issued by this Court.” Section 33-B of RPA stipulated that the candidate need not disclose any other information (other than the information required by law) notwithstanding any judgment. In PUCL v. Union of India®*, proceedings were initiated before this Court under Article 32 for challenging Section 33-B of the RPA. Justice M B Shah, writing for the majority, noted that the decision of the three-Judge Bench in ADR (supra) tracing the right to know the antecedents of candidates contesting elections had attained finality and Section 33-B was unconstitutional because it had the effect of rendering the judgment of this Court inoperative. The learned Judge on an independent interpretation also held that the right to information of a voter is a facet of Article 19(1)(a).% Justice Venkatarama Reddi observed in his concurring opinion that there are two postulates which govern the right to vote : first, the formulation of an opinion about candidates, and second, the expression of choice based on the opinion formulated by casting votes in favour of a preferred candidate. A voter must possess relevant and essential information that would enable them to evaluate a candidate and form an opinion for the purpose of casting votes. The learned Judge observed that the Constitution recognises the right of a voter to know the antecedents of a candidate though the right to vote is a statutory right®' because the action of voting is a form of expression protected by Article 19(1)(a):
“Though the initial right cannot be placed on the pedestal of a fundamental right, but, at the stage when the voter goes to the polling booth and casts his vote, his freedom to express arises. The casting of vote in favour of one Section 33-A of the RPA required the candidate to furnish the following information:
(a) He is accused of any offence punishable with imprisonment for two years or more in a pending case in which a charge has been framed by the court of competent jurisdiction; and
(b) He has been convicted of an offence other than any offence referred to in sub-section (1) or subsection (2), or covered in sub-section (3), of Section 8 and sentenced to imprisonment for one year or more.
[2003]2 SCR 1136 : (2003) 4 SCC 399 [2003]2 SCR 1136 : (2003) 4 SCC 399 [18, 27] [2003]2 SCR 1136 : (2003) 4 SCC 399 [96] The right to vote is classified as a statutory vote because only citizens who fulfill certain conditions (such as the age) laid down in a statute can vote.
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Digital Supreme Court Reports or the other candidate tantamounts to expression of his opinion and preference and that final stage in the exercise of voting right marks the accomplishment of freedom of expression of the voter. That is where Article 19(1)(a) is attracted.”
In the context of the decision of this Court in ADR (supra), the learned Judge observed that the Court issued specific directions for the disclosure of certain information about candidates because of a legislative vacuum, and that the directions issued to the ECI will fill the vacuum until Parliament legislates on the subject. Thus, the five directions which were issued by this Court in ADR (supra) were not construed to be inflexible and immutable theorems. The learned Judge observed that though the voters have a fundamental right to know the antecedents of candidates, all the conceptions of this right formulated by this Court in ADR (supra) cannot be elevated to the realm of fundamental rights.
The majority was of the view that the voters have a fundamental right to all the information which was directed to be declared by this Court in ADR (supra). Justice Venkatarama Reddi disagreed. In the opinion of the learned Judge, only certain information directed to be disclosed in ADR (supra) is “crucial” and “essential” to the right to information of the voter:
“109. In my view, the points of disclosure spelt out by this Court in Assn. for Democratic Reforms case [Ed.: See full text at 2003 Current Central Legislation, Pt. Il, at p. 3] should serve as broad indicators or parameters in enacting the legislation for the purpose of securing the right to information about the candidate. The paradigms set by the Court, though pro tempore in nature as clarified supra, are entitled to due weight. If the legislature in utter disregard of the indicators enunciated by this Court proceeds to make a legislation providing only for a semblance or pittance of information or omits to provide for disclosure on certain essential points, the law would then fail to pass the muster of Article 19(1)(a). Though certain amount of deviation from the aspects of disclosure spelt out by this Court is not impermissible, a substantial departure cannot be countenanced. The legislative provision should be such as [2024] 2 S.C.R. 493 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. to promote the right to information to a reasonable extent, if not to the fullest extent on details of concern to the voters and citizens at large. While enacting the legislation, the legislature has to ensure that the fundamental right to know about the candidate is reasonably secured and information which is crucial, by any objective standards, is not denied. [...] The Court has to take a holistic view and adopt a balanced approach, keeping in view the twin principles that the citizens’ right to information to know about the personal details of a candidate is not an unlimited right and that at any rate, it has no fixed concept and the legislature has freedom to choose between two reasonable alternatives.
[...] But, | reiterate that the shape of the legislation need not be solely controlled by the directives issued to the Election Commission to meet an ad hoc situation. As | said earlier, the right to information cannot be placed in straitjacket formulae and the perceptions regarding the extent and amplitude of this right are bound to vary.”
74. Justice Reddi held that Section 33-B was unconstitutional because: a. Parliament cannot impose a blanket ban on the disclosure of information other than the disclosure of information required by the provisions of RPA. The scope of the fundamental right to information may be expanded in the future to respond to future exigencies and necessities. The provision had the effect of emasculating the freedom of speech and expression of which the right to information is a facet; and b. The provision failed to give effect to an essential aspect of the fundamental right, namely the disclosure of assets and liabilities of the candidates.
75. Justice Reddi then proceeded to juxtapose the directions for disclosure issued by this Court in ADR (supra) with the scope of the provisions of the RPA mandating disclosure. The learned judge observed that the extent of disclosure mandated in RPA is fairly adequate with respect to past criminal records but not with regard to pending cases.” 92 ADR required disclosure related to information of whether the candidate has been convicted/acquitted or discharged of any criminal offence in the past, and whether six months prior to the filing of the nomination paper, whether the candidate has been accused in any pending case for an offence punishable with 76.
7.
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Digital Supreme Court Reports With respect to assets and liabilities, the learned Judge observed that the disclosure of assets and liabilities is essential to the right to information of the voter because it would enable voters to form an opinion about whether the candidate, upon being elected in the past, had amassed wealth in their name or their family Additionally, information about dues which are payable by the candidate to public institutions would enable voters to know the candidate’s dealing with public money in the past.
Justice Reddi observed that the requirement to disclose assets of the candidate’s family was justified because of the prevalence of Benami transactions. Though mandating the disclosure of assets and liabilities would infringe the right to privacy of the candidate and their family, the learned Judge observed that disclosure which is in furtherance of the right to information would trump the former because it serves the larger public interest. Justice Reddi then observed that disclosure of the educational qualifications of a candidate is not an essential component of the right to information because educational qualifications do not serve any purpose for the voter to decide which candidate to cast a vote for since the characteristics of duty and concern of the people is not “monopolised by the educated”. A conclusion to the contrary, in the learned Judge’s opinion, would overlook the stark realities of the society.% The following principles can be deduced from the decisions of this Court in ADR (supra) and PUCL (supra):
a. The right to information of voters which is traced to Article 19(1)(a) is built upon the jurisprudence of both the first and the second phases in the evolution of the doctrine, identified above. The common thread of reasoning which runs through both the first and the second phases is that information which furthers democratic participation must be provided to citizens. imprisonment for more than two years and in which charge has been framed or cognizance is taken by the Court. With respect to the first direction, law created a distinction between serious and non-serious offences and mandates disclosure only if a candidate has been convicted of a serious offence. With respect to the second direction, the provision only mandated the disclosure of cases in which charge has been framed and excluded the disclosure of cases in which cognizance has been taken. The learned Judge held that while the non-disclosure of conviction in a serious offence is a reasonable balance which does not infringe the right to information, the non-disclosure of cases in which cognizance has been taken would seriously violate the right to information of the voter particularly because framing of charges gets delayed in a lot of cases.
[2003]2 SCR 1136 : (2003) 4 SCC 399 [122] [2024] 2 S.C.R. 495 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 78.
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Voters have a right to information which would enable them to cast their votes rationally and intelligently because voting is one of the foremost forms of democratic participation;
b. In ADR (supra), this Court observed that while the disclosure of information may violate the right to privacy of candidates and their families, such information must be disclosed because it furthers public interest.%* The opinion of Justice Venkatarama Reddi in PUCL (supra) also followed the same line of reasoning. Justice M B Shah writing for himself and Justice D M Dharmadhikari held that the right to privacy would not be infringed because information about whether a candidate is involved in a criminal case is a matter of public record. Similarly, the assets or income are normally required to be disclosed under the provisions of the Income Tax Act; and c. The voters have a right to the disclosure of information which is “essential” for choosing the candidate for whom a vote should be cast. The learned Judges in PUCL (supra) differed to the extent of what they considered “essential” information for exercising the choice of voting.
While relying on the judgments of this Court in ADR (supra) and PUCL (supra) the petitioners argue that non-disclosure of information on the funding of political parties is violative of the right to information under Article 19(1)(a). This Court needs to consider the following two issues to answer the question:
a. Whetherthe requirements of disclosure of information about “candidates” can be extended to “political parties”; and b. If the answer to (a) above is in the affirmative, whether information on the funding of political parties is “essential” for exercising choice on voting.
c. The focal point of the electoral process: candidate or political party The decisions in ADR (supra) and PUCL (supra) recognise the right to information of a voter about candidates, which enables them to 94 In ADR (supra), this Court notes that such information would enable voters to determine if the candidate is corrupt and would further openness in democracy. [Paragraph 41]. 80.
81.
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Digital Supreme Court Reports cast their vote in an effective manner. The relief which was granted by this Court in PUCL (supra) and ADR (supra) was restricted to the disclosure of information about candidates contesting the election because of the limited nature of the reliefs sought. The ratio decidendi of the two judgments of this Court is that voters have a right to receive information which is essential for them to cast their votes. This Court has to first analyse if the ‘political party’ is a relevant ‘political unit’ in the electoral process to answer the question whether funding details of political parties are essential information for the voter to possess.
The Constitution of India did not make a reference to political parties when it was adopted. Areference was made when the Tenth Schedule was included in the Constitution by the Constitution (Fifty-Second) Amendment Act 1985. However, even though the Constitution on its adoption did not make a reference to political parties, statutory provisions relating to elections accorded considerable importance to political parties, signifying that political parties have been the focal point of elections.
The ECI notified the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order 19689 in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 344 of the Constitution read with Section 29A of the RPA and Rules 5° and 10% of the Conduct of Election Rules 1961. In terms of the provisions of the Symbols Order, the ECI shall allot a symbol to every candidate contesting the election. The Symbols Order classifies political parties into recognised political parties and unrecognised political parties. The difference in the procedure under the Symbols Order for allotting symbols to recognised political parties, registered but unrecognised political parties and independent candidates indicates both the relevance and significance of political parties in elections in India.
“Symbols Order 1968”
Rule 5 provides the ECI the power to specify by notification, the symbols which may be chosen by candidates at elections in parliamentary or assembly constituencies. Rule 10 deals with the preparation of list of contesting candidates. Rule 10(5) states that the allotment of the returning officer of any symbol to a candidate shall be final except where it is inconsistent with the directions issued by the ECI, in which case the ECI may revise the allotment. Rule 10(6) states that every candidate shall be informed of the symbol allotted to the candidate. [2024] 2 S.C.R. 497 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.
82. A party is classified a National®® or a State recognised party” based on the total percentage of votes secured at the last general elections and (or) the number of candidates who have been returned to the Legislative Assembly. Symbols are reserved for allocation to recognised political parties.'°° All candidates who are being set up by a national or a State recognised party are to be allotted the symbol reserved for that party for the purpose of contesting elections.’
83. Symbols other than those reserved for recognised political parties shall be available for allotment to independent candidates and candidates set up by political parties which are not recognised political parties in terms of the Symbols Order.'” Candidates set up by a registered but unrecognised political party may also be allotted a common symbol if they fulfil certain conditions laid down in the Symbols Order.'®
84. Thus, the Symbols Order creates a demarcation between candidates set up by political parties and candidates contesting individually. Political parties are allotted a Symbol such that all candidates who are set up by that political party are allotted the Symbol of their political party while contesting elections. Even within candidates who are set up by political parties, the Symbols Order creates a distinction between unrecognised but registered political parties and recognised political parties. Recognised political parties shall continue to be allotted the same symbol for all General elections until the time these political parties fulfil the conditions for recognition under the Symbols Order.'“ The effect of the provisions of the Symbols Order is that the symbols of certain political parties, particularly those which have enjoyed the status of a recognised political party for long are entrenched in the minds of the voters that they associate the symbol with the political party.
98 Symbols Order 1968, Rule 6B 99 Symbols Order 1968, Rule 6A 100 Symbols Order 1968, Rule 5 101 Symbols Order 1968, Rule 8(1)
102 Ibid.
103 Symbols Order 1968, Rule 10B. The party is required to set up candidates in at least five percent of the assembly constituencies.
104 A recognised National or a State Party shall continue to be treated as a recognised party even if the political party does not fulfil the conditions at the next election to the General Assembly stipulated for recognition as a recognised political party. However, it shall continue to be treated as a recognised political party at the subsequent general election only if the party fulfils the conditions laid down. 85.
86.
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Digital Supreme Court Reports For unrecognised but registered political parties, though a common symbol is allotted for all candidates being set up by the political parties, the symbol is not “reserved” for the Party. The ECI could allot different symbols to that political party in each General election. The candidates of a registered but unrecognised political party may be represented by a common symbol but the people would not attach a specific symbol to the political party because the symbol by which it is represented may change with every election.
The purpose of allotting symbols to political parties is to aid voters in identifying and remembering the political party. The law recognises the inextricable link between a political party and the candidate though the vote is cast for a candidate. The literacy rate in India was 18.33 percent when the first General Election was held in 1951. Most of the voters identified a political party only with its symbol and this still continues to the day. In a few cases, the voters would not possess any knowledge of the candidate being set up by the political party. They would vote solely based on the symbol which is allotted to the political party; Knowledge of which they have obtained through campaigning activities or its sustained presence in the electoral fray. Gayatri Devi, the third Maharani consort of Jaipur who was later set up as a candidate by the Swatantra Party, recalls in her Autobiography that her team spent hours trying to persuade the voters that they had to vote for the Symbol Star (which was the symbol of the Swatantra Party) and not a symbol showing a horse and a rider because she also rode a horse:' “Since most of India is illiterate, at the polls people vote according to a visual symbol of their party. [...] The Swatantra Party had a star. Baby, all my other helpers and | spent endless frustrating hours trying to instruct the women about voting for the star. On the ballot sheet, we said, over and over again, this is where the Maharani’s name will appear and next to it will be a star. But it was not as simple as that. They noticed a symbol showing a horse and a rider, agree with each other that the Maharani rides so that must be her symbol. Repeatedly we said, 105 Gayatri Devi and Santha Rama Rau, A Princess remembers: The Memoirs of the Maharani of Jaipur, (Rupa Publications 1995) [301].
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 499 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 87.
88.
89.
“No, no, that’s not the right one.” Then they caught sight of the emblem of a flower. Ah, the flower of Jaipur — who else could it mean but the Maharani? “No, no, no, not the flower.” All right, the star. Yes, that seems appropriate for the Maharani, but look, here is the sun. If the Maharani is a star, then the sun must certainly mean the Maharaja. We'll vote for both. Immediately the vote would have been invalidated. Even up to the final day, Baby and | were far from sure that we had managed to get our point across.” Symbols also gain significance when the names of political parties sound similar. For example, political parties by the names of “Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam’, “All Indian Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam’, “Dravida Kazhagam”, “Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam’, “Makkal Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam’, “Kongu Desa Makkal Katchi’, “Kongunadu Makkal Desia Katchi’, and “Kongunadu Makkal Katchi” contest elections in Tamil Nadu. The names of all the political parties bear similarities due to the usage of the same words with certain additions or deletions. The allocation of Symbols to political parties would help voters identify and distinguish between political parties which have similar sounding names. It is precisely because of the close association of the symbol with the political party by voters that both factions of the party vie for the symbol that is allotted to the Party when there is a split in a recognised political party. India follows the open-list first past the post form of election in which votes are cast for a candidate and the candidate who secures the highest number of votes is chosen to represent the people of that constituency. It could be argued that this system of elections gives prominence to candidates and not political parties unlike the system of closed list of elections where the voters do not have any knowledge of the candidates that are set up by the Political Party.'°° However, it cannot be concluded that the decision of voting is solely based on the individual candidate’s capabilities and not the political party merely because the voter has knowledge of the candidate who has been set up by the political party. Such a conclusion cannot be 106 See Dominik Hangartner, Nelson A Ruiz, Janne Tukiainen, Open or Closed? How List Type Affects Electoral Performance, Candidate Selection, and Campaign Effort, VAT Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 120 (2019)
90.
91.
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Digital Supreme Court Reports definitively drawn particularly in view of the design of the electoral voting machine which has a list of the names of the candidates who are contesting the election from the constituency along with the symbol of the political party which is fielding the candidate. Voters casts their votes based on two considerations: the capability of the candidate as a representative and the ideology of the political party. Political parties publish electoral manifestos containing the ideology of the party, major policies of the political party, plans, programmes and other considerations of governance which would be implemented if they came to power.'*” While political manifestos do not necessarily always translate to policies when the party is elected to power, they throw light upon the integral nature of political parties in the electoral system. By publishing an election manifesto, a political party communicates to the voters that they must accord preference to the political party. Party manifestos prod voters to look away from a candidate centric and towards a party centric perception of elections. Lastly, the prominence of political parties as electoral units is further heightened by the form of government in India. India follows a Westminister system of government which confers prominence to political parties without strictly separating between the legislature and the executive. The time-honoured convention of the cabinet form of government is that the leader of the political party with absolute majority must be called to form the government.’ The Council of Ministers is appointed by the President on the aid and advice of the Prime Minister.’ Political parties are intrinsic to this form of government because of the very process of government formation. The recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission on the exercise of discretion by the Governor when no single political party commands an absolute majority, which has been given judicial recognition in RameshwarPrasad v. Union of India,"° also prioritises political parties making them central to the governance structure.™ Election Commission of India, Instructions to political parties on manifestos dated 24.04.2015, https:// www.eci.gov.in/election-manifestos/ Constitution of India 1950, Article 75. See, Aradhya Sethia, “Where’s the party?: towards a constitutional biography of political parties, Indian Law Review, 3:1, 1-32 (2019) Ibid.
[2006]1 SCR 562 : (2006) 2 SCC 1
65. “Para 4.11.04 of the Sarkaria Commission Report specifically deals with the situation where no single party obtains absolute majority and provides the order of preference the Governor should follow in [2024] 2 S.C.R. 501 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 92.
93.
The centrality of political parties in the electoral system is further accentuated by the inclusion of the Tenth Schedule. The Tenth Schedule deals with disqualification on the ground of defection from the political party which set up the elected individual as its candidate. Paragraph 2 provides the following grounds of defection: a. Voluntarily giving up membership of the political party; and b. Voting or abstaining from voting in the House contrary to direction issued by the political party without obtaining prior permission from the political party and when such voting has not been condoned by the political party.
The underlying principle of anti-defection law which has been recognised by a seven-Judge Bench of this Court in Kihoto Hollohonv. Zachillhu,"? is that a candidate set up by a political party is elected on the basis of the programme of that political party. In the course of years, while deciding disputes related to the Tenth Schedule, judgments of this Court have further strengthened the centrality of political parties in the electoral system. In Ravi S Naik v. Union of India’, this Court observed that voluntarily giving up membership of a political party has a wider connotation and includes not just resignation of the member from the party and an inference can also be drawn from the conduct of the member. In Subash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra,'* a Constitution Bench of this Court while interpreting the provisions of the Tenth Schedule held that the political party and not the legislature party (which consists of the members of the House belonging to a particular political party) appoints the Whip of a political party for the purposes of Paragraph 2(1)(b) of the Tenth Schedule."® selecting a Chief Minister. The order of preference suggested is: a. An alliance of parties that was formed prior to the elections. ; b. The largest single party staking a claim to form the Government with the support of others, including “independents”;
0. A post-electoral coalition of parties, with all the partners in the coalition joining the Government; d. A post-electoral alliance of parties, with some of the parties in the alliance forming a Government and the remaining parties, including “Independents” supporting the Government from outside.” [1992]1 SCR 686 : (1992) Supp (2) SCC 651 [4] [1994]1 SCR 754 : AIR 1994 SC 1558 WP (C) No. 493 of 2022 Subash Desai [113] 94.
95.
96.
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Digital Supreme Court Reports In summation, a ‘political party’ is a relevant political unit in the democratic electoral process in India for the following three reasons:
a. Voters associate voting with political parties because of the centrality of symbols in the electoral process;
b. The form of government where the executive is chosen from the legislature based on the political party or coalition of political parties which has secured the majority; and c. |The prominence accorded to political parties by the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution.
d. The essentiality of information about political funding for the effective exercise of the choice of voting In ADR (supra) and PUCL (supra), this Court held that a voter has a right to information which is essential for them to exercise their freedom to vote. In the previous section, we have concluded that political parties are a relevant political unit. Thus, the observations of this Court in PUCL (supra) and ADR (supra) on the right to information about a candidate contesting elections is also applicable to political parties. The issue whether information about the funding received by political parties is essential for an informed voter must be answered in the context of the core tenets of electoral democracy. The Preamble to the Constitution resolves to constitute a social, economic, and politically just society where there is equality of status and opportunity. The discourse which has emanated within and outside the Courts is often restricted to the ideals of social and economic justice and rarely includes political inequality.
Electoral democracy in India is premised on the principle of political equality which the Constitution guarantees in two ways. First, by guaranteeing the principle of “one person one vote” which assures equal representation in voting. The Constitution prescribes two conditions with respect to elections to seats in Parliament which guarantee the principle of “one person one vote” with respect to every voter and amongst every State:
a. Each State shall be divided into territorial constituencies in such a manner that the ratio between the population of each [2024] 2 S.C.R. 503 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 97.
98.
99.
constituency and the number of seats allotted to it shall be the same throughout the State;"® and b. The total number of seats allotted to each State in Parliament should be such that the ratio between the number of seats, and the population of the State is the same for all States.” Second, the Constitution ensures that socio-economic inequality does not perpetuate political inequality by mandating reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Parliament"® and State Assemblies."'?
The Constitution guarantees political equality by focusing on the ‘elector’ and the ‘elected’. These two constitutional precepts foster political equality in the following two ways. First, the Constitution mandates that the value of each vote is equal. This guarantee ensures formal political equality where every person’s vote is accorded equal weightage. Second, the Constitution ensures that members of socially marginalized groups are not excluded from the political process. This guarantee ensures (a) equality in representation; and (b) equality in influence over political decisions.
However, political inequality continues to persist in spite of the constitutional guarantees. One of the factors which contributes to the inequality is the difference in the ability of persons to influence political decisions because of economic inequality. In a politically equal society, the citizens must have an equal voice to influence the political process.'*° We have already in the preceding section elucidated the close association of money and politics where we explained the influence of money over electoral outcomes. However, the influence of money over electoral politics is not limited to its impact over electoral outcomes. It also spills over to governmental Constitution of India 1950, Article 81 (2)(b). Also see Constitution of India, Article 170(2) where the Constitution prescribes the same principle with respect to the composition of seats in Legislative Assemblies of State Constitution of India 1950, Article 81(2)(b)
Constitution of India 1950, Article 330 guarantees “as nearly as may be” proportional representation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Parliament.
Constitution of India 1950, Article 332 guarantees “as nearly as may be” proportional representation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Legislative Assemblies of the States. See Ben Ansell and Jean Gingrich J (2021). Political Inequality. The IFS Deaton Review of Inequalities, London: Institute for Fiscal Studies 100.
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Digital Supreme Court Reports decisions. It must be recalled here that the legal regime in India does not distinguish between campaign funding and electoral funding. The money which is donated to political parties is not used by the political party only for the purposes of electoral campaign. Party donations are also used, for instance, to build offices for the political party and pay party workers. Similarly, the window for contributions is not open for a limited period only prior to the elections. Money can be contributed to political parties throughout the year and the contributed money can be spent by the political party for reasons other than just election campaigning. It is in light of the nexus between economic inequality and political inequality, and the legal regime in India regulating party financing that the essentiality of the information on political financing for an informed voter must be analyzed.
Economic inequality leads to differing levels of political engagement because of the deep association between money and politics. At a primary level, political contributions give a “seat at the table” to the contributor. That is, it enhances access to legislators.'*' This access also translates into influence over policy-making. An economically affluent person has a higher ability to make financial contributions to political parties, and there is a legitimate possibility that financial contribution to a political party would lead to quid pro 4७० arrangements because of the close nexus between money and politics. Quid pro quo arrangements could be in the form of introducing a policy change, or granting a license to the contributor. The money that is contributed could not only influence electoral outcomes but also policies particularly because contributions are not merely limited to the campaign or pre-campaign period. Financial contributions could be made even after a political party or coalition of parties form Government. The possibility of a quid pro quo arrangement in such situations is even higher. Information about political funding would enable a voter to assess if there is a correlation between policy making and financial contributions.
121 See Joshua L. Kalla and David E. Broockman, “Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment” (2016 60(3)) American Journal of Political Science. A political organization conducted an experiment to determine if there is a link between political contributions and access to the policy makers. The Organization scheduled meetings between 191 Congressional offices and the organization’s members who were campaign donors. When the Congressional offices were informed that prospective attendees were political donor, policymakers made themselves available for the meeting three to four times more often.
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 505 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 101.
102.
103.
For the information on donor contributions to be relevant and essential, it is not necessary that voters have to take the initiative to peruse the list of contributors to find relevant information which would enable them to cast their vote effectively. Electronic and print media would present the information on contributions received by political parties, and the probable link between the contribution and the licenses which were given to the company in an accessible format. The responses to such information by the Government and political parties would go a long way in informing the voter.
However, to establish the argument of quid pro quo arrangements between the contributor and the political party, it is necessary that the political party has knowledge of the particulars of funding to its party. The political party to whom contributions are made cannot enter into a quid pro quo arrangements if It is unaware of the donor. The Scheme defines electoral bond “as a bond issued in the nature of promissory note which shall be a bearer banking instrument and shall not carry the name of the buyer or payee.”'*? The Scheme also stipulates that the information furnished by the buyer shall be treated as confidential which shall not be disclosed by any authority except when demanded by a competent court or by a law enforcement agency upon the registration of criminal 0958.
The submission of the Union of India is that the political party which receives the contribution does not know of identity of the contributor because neither the bond would have their name nor could the bank discloses such details to the political party. We do not agree with this submission. While it is true that the law prescribes anonymity as a central characteristic of electoral bonds, the de jure anonymity of the contributors does not translate to de facto anonymity. The Scheme is not fool-proof. There are sufficient gaps in the Scheme which enable political parties to know the particulars of the contributions made to them. Clause 12 of the Scheme states that the bond can be encashed only by the political party by depositing it in the designated bank account. The contributor could physically hand over the electoral bond to an office bearer of the political party or to the legislator belonging to the political party, or it could have been sent 122 Electoral Bond Scheme; Clause 2(a)
123 Electoral Bond Scheme; Clause 7(4)
506 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports to the office of the political party with the name of the contributor, or the contributor could after depositing the electoral bond disclose the particulars of the contribution to a member of the political party for them to cross-verify. Further, according to the data on contributions made through electoral bonds, ninety four percent of the contributions through electoral bonds have been made in the denomination of one crore. Electoral bonds provide economically resourced contributors who already have a seat at the table selective anonymity vis-a-vis the public and not the political party.
104. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the information about funding to a political party is essential for a voter to exercise their freedom to vote in an effective manner. The Electoral Bond Scheme and the impugned provisions to the extent that they infringe upon the right to information of the voter by anonymizing contributions through electoral bonds are violative of Article 19(1)(a). il. | Whether the infringement of the right to information of the voter is justified
105. The next issue which falls for analysis is whether the violation of the right to information is justified. This Court has laid down the proportionality standard to determine if the violation of the fundamental right is justified.'*4 The proportionality standard is as follows: a. The measure restricting a right must have a legitimate goal (legitimate goal stage);
b. |The measure must be a suitable means for furthering the goal (suitability or rational connection stage);
c. The measure must be least restrictive and equally effective (necessity stage); and d. The measure must not have a disproportionate impact on the right holder (balancing stage).
106. The legitimate goal stage requires this Court to analyze if the objective of introducing the law is a legitimate purpose for the infringement of rights. At this stage, the State is required to discharge two burdens. First, the State must demonstrate that the objective is legitimate. 124 Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2016]3 SCR 575 : (2016) 4
SCC 346
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 507 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 107.
108.
109.
110.
Second, the State must establish that the law is indeed in furtherance of the legitimate aim that is contended to be served.'*6 The then Finance Minister, Mr. Arun Jaitley encapsulated the objective of introducing the Electoral Bond Scheme thus:
a. An attempt was made in the past to incentivize donations to political party through banking channels. Both the donor and the donee were granted exemption from payment of tax if accounts of contributions were maintained and returns were filed. However, the situation had only marginally improved. Political parties continued to receive funds through anonymous sources; and b. Donors have been reluctant in donating through the banking channel because the disclosure of donor identity would entail adverse consequences.
In other words, Mr. Jaitley stated that the main purpose of the Scheme is to curb black money in electoral financing and this purpose could be achieved only if information about political donations is kept confidential. That is, donor privacy is a means to incentivize contributions through the banking channel. However, Mr. Tushar Mehta argued that protecting donor privacy is an end in itself. We will now proceed to determine if the infringement of the right to information of the voters is justified vis-a-vis the purposes of (a) curbing black money; and (b) protecting donor privacy.
a. Curbing Black money The petitioners argue that the infringement of the right to information which is traceable to Article 19(1)(a) can only be justified if the purpose of the restriction is traceable to the grounds stipulated in Article 19(2). They argue that the purpose of curbing of black money cannot be traced to any of the grounds in Article 19(2), and thus, is not a legitimate purpose for restricting the right to information. Article 19(2) stipulates that the right to freedom of speech and expression can only be restricted on the grounds of: (a) the sovereignty and integrity of India; (b) the security of the State; (c) friendly relations with foreign states, (d) public order; (e) decency 125 See Media One v. Union of India, Civil Appeal No. 8129 of 2022 [77-79] 111.
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Digital Supreme Court Reports or morality; (f) contempt of court; (g) defamation; and (h) incitement to an offence. The purpose of curbing black money is traceable to public interest. However, public interest is not one of the grounds stipulated in Article 19(2). Of the rights recognized under Article 19, only Article 19(1)(g) which guarantees the freedom to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business can be restricted on the ground of public interest.77 In Sakal Papers v. The Union of India’‘”’, the constitutional validity of the Newspaper (Price and Page) Act 1965 and the Daily Newspaper (Price and Page) Order 1960 which regulated the number of pages according to the price charged, prescribed the number of supplements to be published and regulated the area for advertisements in the newspapers was challenged on the ground that it violated the freedom of press under Article 19(1)(a). The Union of India submitted that the restriction on the freedom of press was justified because the purpose of the law was to prevent unfair competition which was in furtherance of public interest. It was argued that the restriction was justified because the activities carried out by newspapers were also traceable to the freedom to carry out a profession which could be restricted on the ground of public interest under Article 19(6). Justice JR Mudholkar writing for the Constitution Bench observed that the impugned legislation “directly and immediately” curtails the freedom of speech guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a), and the freedom cannot be restricted on any ground other than the grounds stipulated in Article 19(2).'°8 In ExpressNewspapersv. Union of India,’ a Constitution Bench while deciding the constitutional challenge to the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1955 held that a law violating Article 19(1)(a) would be unconstitutional unless the purpose of the law falls “squarely within the provisions of Article 19(2)”.'°° In Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Constitution of India 1950; Article 19(6)
[1962]3 SCR 842 : AIR 1962 SC 305 Ibid; Paragraph 36:”lf a law directly affecting it is challenged, it is no answer that the restriction enacted by it are justifiable under clauses (3) to (6). For the scheme of Article 19 is to enumerate different freedoms separately and then to specify the extent of restrictions to which they may be subjected and the objects for securing which this could be done.”
[1959]1 SCR 12 : AIR 1958 SC 578 Also see, Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt Limited v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 515;Sodhi Shamsher v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1954 SC 276; Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, [1950]1 SCR 594 [2024] 2 S.C.R. 509 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 112.
113.
Pradesh,"*' a Constitution Bench of this Court answered the issue whether the grounds stipulated in Article 19(1)(a) are exhaustive of the restrictions which can be placed on the right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a) affirmatively.
However, in the specific context of the right to information, this Court has observed that the right can be restricted on grounds not traceable to Article 19(1)(a). In PUCL (supra), one of the submissions was that dangerous consequences would follow if the right to information is culled out from Article 19(1)(a) because the grounds on which the right can be restricted as prescribed in Article 19(2) are very limited. Justice Reddi in his concurring opinion in PUCL (supra) observed that the right under Article 19(1)(a) can be restricted on grounds which are not “strictly within the confines of Article 19(2)”.'%* For this purpose, Justice Reddi referred to the observations of Justice Jeevan Reddy in The Secretary, Ministry of Information v. Cricket Associationof Bengal'*:
“99. [...] This raises the larger question whether apart from the heads of restriction envisaged by sub-article (2) of Article 19, certain inherent limitations should not be read into the article, if it becomes necessary to do so in national or societal interest. The discussion on this aspect finds its echo in the separate opinion of Jeevan Reddy, J. in Cricket Assn. case [(1975) 4 SCC 428] . The learned Judge was of the view that the freedom of speech and expression cannot be so exercised as to endanger the interest of the nation or the interest of the society, even if the expression “national interest” or “public interest” has not been used in Article 19(2). It was pointed out that such implied limitation has been read into the First Amendment of the US Constitution which guarantees the freedom of speech and expression in unqualified terms.”
In CricketAssociationof Bengal (supra), one of the submissions of the petitioner (Union of India) was that the right to broadcast can be restricted on grounds other than those stipulated in Article 19(2). 131 Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 113 of 2016 132 PUCL (supra), [111] 133 [1995]1 SCR 1036 : 1995 AIR 1236 510 [2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports Justice P B Sawant writing for himself and Justice S Mohan observed while summarizing the law on freedom of speech and expression that Article 19(1)(a) can only be restricted on the grounds mentioned in Article 19(2).'54 The learned Judge specifically refuted the argument that the right can be restricted on grounds other than those stipulated in Article 19(2). Such an argument, the learned Judge states, is to plead for unconstitutional measures. However, while observing so, Justice P B Sawant states that the right to telecast can be restricted on the grounds mentioned in Article 19(2) and the “dictates of public interest”:
“78. [...] lf the right to freedom of speech and expression includes the right to disseminate information to as wide a section of the population as is possible, the access which enables the right to be so exercised is also an integral part of the said right. The wider range of circulation of information or its greater impact cannot restrict the content of the right nor can it justify its denial. The virtues of the electronic media cannot become its enemies. It may warrant a greater regulation over licensing and control and vigilance on the content of the programme telecast. However, this control can only be exercised within the framework of Article 19(2) and the dictates of public interest.”
(emphasis supplied)
114. Justice Jeevan Reddy in the concurring opinion segregated the grounds stipulated in Article 19(2) into grounds in furtherance of “national interest’ and “societal interest’. The learned Judge observed that the grounds of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign State and public order are grounds referable to national interest, and the grounds of decency, morality, contempt of court, defamation and incitement of offence are referable to state interest. The learned Judge then referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States in FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting’, where it was held that a station license can be denied on the ground of public 134 Ibid; [45].
135 436 US 775 (1978)
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 511 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. interest. Justice Reddy observed that public interest is synonymous to state interest which is one of the grounds underlying Article 19(2): “189. Reference may also be made in this connection to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting [56 L Ed 2d 697 : 436 US 775 (1978)] referred to hereinbefore, where it has been held that “to deny a station licence because the public interest requires it is not a denial of free speech”. It is significant that this was so said with reference to First Amendment to the United States Constitution which guarantees the freedom of speech and expression in absolute terms. The reason is obvious. The right cannot rise above the national interest and the interest of society which is but another name for the interest of general public. It is true that Article 19(2) does not use the words “national interest’, “interest of society” or “public interest” but as pointed hereinabove, the several grounds mentioned in clause (2) are ultimately referable to the interests of the nation and of the society.”
(emphasis supplied)
115. The observations of Justice Sawant and the concurring opinion of Justice Jeevan Reddy in CricketAssociationof Bengal (supra) that the right under Article 19(1)(a) can be restricted on the ground of public interest even though it is not stipulated in Article 19(2) must be understood in the specific context of that case. Cricket Associationof Bengal (supra), dealt with the access to and use of a public good (that is, airwaves) for dissemination of information. The Court distinguished airways from other means of dissemination of information such as newsprint and held that since broadcasting involves the use of a public good, it must be utilized to advance free speech rights and plurality of opinion (that is, public interest).'°° The observations in CricketAssociationof Bengal (supra) cannot be interpreted to mean that other implied grounds of restrictions have been read into Article 19(2).
136 Cricket Association of Bengal [201 (1)(a) and 201(1)(b)] 116.
117.
118.
[2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports From the above discussion, it is clear that the right to information under Article 19(1)(a) can only be restricted based on the grounds stipulated in Article 19(2). It could be argued that curbing black money can be traced to the ground of “public order”. However, a Constitution Bench of this Court has interpreted the ground “public order” to mean “oublic safety and tranquility” and “disorder involving breaches of local significance in contradistinction to national upheavals, such as civil strife, war, affecting the security of the State.”"*” Thus, the purpose of curbing black money is not traceable to any of the grounds in Article 19(2).
We proceed to apply the subsequent prongs of the proportionality standard, even assuming that curbing black money is a legitimate purpose for restricting the right to information. The second prong of the proportionality analysis requires the State to assess whether the means used are rationally connected to the purpose. At this stage, the court is required to assess whether the means, if realised, would increase the likelihood of curbing black money. It is not necessary that the means chosen should be the only means capable of realising the purpose. It is sufficient if the means used constitute one of the many methods by which the purpose can be realised, even if it only partially gives effect to the purpose.'*® The respondents submit that before the introduction of the Electoral Bond Scheme, a major portion of the total contributions received by political parties was from “unknown sources”. For example, immediately preceding the financial year (2016-17) in which the Electoral Bond Scheme was introduced, eighty one percent of the contributions (Rupees 580.52 Crores) were received by political parties through voluntary contributions. Since the amount of voluntary contributions is not regulated, it allowed the circulation of black money. However, after the introduction of the Electoral Bond Scheme, fortyseven percent of the contributions were received through electoral bonds which is regulated money. The Union of India submitted that providing anonymity to the contributors incentivizes them to contribute through the banking channel. Assuming, for the purpose of hypothesis that the Union of India is right on this prong, what it 137 Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Dr Ram Manohar Lohia, [1960]2 SCR 821 : AIR 1960 SC 633 [18] 138 Media One (supra) [100] [2024] 2 S.C.R. 513 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 119.
120.
urges Is that non-disclosure of information about political expenditure has a rational nexus with the goal, that is, curbing black money or unregulated money.
The next stage of the proportionality standard is the least restrictive means stage. At this stage, this Court is required to determine if the means adopted (that is, anonymity of the contributor) is the least restrictive means to give effect to the purpose based on the following standard:'°9 a. | Whether there are other possible means which could have been adopted by the State;
b. Whether the alternative means identified realise the objective in a ‘real and substantial manner’;
c. Whether the alternative identified and the means used by the State impact fundamental rights differently; and d. Whether on an overall comparison (and balancing) of the measure and the alternative, the alternative is better suited considering the degree of realizing the government objective and the impact on fundamental rights.
Before we proceed to determine if the Electoral Bond Scheme is the least restrictive means to curb black money in electoral funding, it is important that we recall the regime on electoral funding. After the amendments introduced by the Finance Act 2017, donations to political parties exceeding rupees two thousand can only be made by an account payee cheque drawn on a bank, an account payee bank draft, the use of electronic clearing system through a bank account or through an electoral bond.'*° All contributions to political parties through cash cannot be assumed to be black money. For example, individuals who contribute to political parties in small donations during party rallies usually contribute through cash. On the other hand, contributions through the banking channel are certainly a form of accounted transaction. Restricting the contributions to political parties in cash to less than rupees two thousand and prescribing that contributions above the threshold amount must only be made 139 See Justice KS Puttaswamy (53) (supra) and Media One Broadcasting (supra) [103]; 140 IT Act, Section 13A(q)
121.
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Digital Supreme Court Reports through banking channels is itself intended to curb black money. Thus, the legal regime itself provides other alternatives to curb black money: contributions through cheques, bank draft, or electronic clearing system. The Union of India submits that though there are other alternatives through which circulation of black money in electoral financing can be curbed, these alternatives do not realize the objective in a “substantial manner” because most contributors resort to cash donations as they “fear consequences from political opponents” to whom donations were not made.
In addition to the alternatives identified above, the existing legal regime provides another alternative in the form of Electoral Trusts through which the objective of curbing black money in electoral financing can be achieved. Section 2(22AA) of the IT Act defines an Electoral Trust as a trust approved by the Board in accordance with the scheme made in this regard by the Central Government. Section 13B of the IT Act states that any voluntary contributions received by an electoral trust shall not be included in the total income of the previous year of such electoral trust if the it distributes ninety five percent of the aggregate donations received during the previous year. In terms of Rule 17CA of the IT Rules 1962, the features of an electoral trust are as follows:
a. An Electoral Trust may receive voluntary contribution from (i) an individual who is a citizen of India; (li) a company registered in India; (iii) a firm or Hindu undivided family or an Association of persons or a body of individuals residing in India;
b. When a contribution is made to an electoral trust, a receipt recording the following information shall, inter alia, be provided:
(i) Name and address of the contributor; (ii) Permanent account number of the contributor or the passport number if the contributor is not a resident of India; (iii) Amount contributed;
(iv) The mode of contribution including the name and branch of the bank and the date of receipt of such contribution; and
(v) PAN of the electoral trust;
c. Contributions to the electoral trust can only be made through cheque, bank draft and electronic transfer. Contributions made in cash shall not be accepted by the Electoral Trust;
d. The Electoral Trust shall spend five percent of the total contributions received in a year subject to a limit of Rupees five [2024] 2 S.C.R. 515 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 122.
123.
hundred thousand in the first year of incorporation and Rupees three hundred thousand in the second year.'*' The remaining money (that is, ninety five percent of the total contributions received in that financial year along with any surplus from the previous year) shall be distributed to political parties registered under Section 29A of the RP Act;'*° e. The political party to which the trust donated money shall provide a receipt indicating the name of the political party, the PAN and the amount of contribution received from the trust;'** f. |The trust shall also maintain a list of persons from whom contributions have been received and to whom they have been distributed;'** and g. The trust shall furnish a certified copy of the list of contributors and list of political parties to whom contributions have been made to the Commissioner of Income Tax along with the audit report.'45 In summary, an Electoral Trust is formed only for collecting political contributions from donors. An electoral trust can contribute to more than one party. To illustrate, if ten individuals and one company have contributed to an Electoral Trust and the donations are contributed to three political parties equally or unequally, the information about which of the individuals contributed to which of the political parties will not be disclosed. In this manner, the purpose of curbing black money in electoral financing will be met. At the same time, there would be no fear of consequences from political opponents because the information as to which political party were made is not disclosed. On 6 June 2014, the ECI circulated Guidelines for submission of contribution reports of Electoral Trusts mandating in the interest of transparency that all Electoral Trusts shall submit an Annual Report containing details of contributions received and disbursed by them to political parties. Pursuant to the Guidelines, Electoral Trusts submit IT Rules 1962, Rule 17CA(8)(i)
IT Rules 1962, Rule 17CA(7) and Rules 17CA(8)(ii)
IT Rules 1962, Rule 17CA(9)
IT Rules 1962, Rule 17CA(11)(ii)
IT Rules 1962, Rule 17CA(14)
124.
125.
[2024] 2 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports Annual Reports to the ECI every year. For example, according to the Annual Report of the Prudent Electoral Trust for the financial year 2021- 22, the Trust received contributions of a total of Rupees 4,64,83,00,116 from seventy contributors including individuals and companies. The contributions were unequally distributed to the Aam Aadmi Party, All India Congress Committee, Bharatiya Janata Party, Goa Congress Committee, Goa Forward Party, Indian National Congress, Punjab Lok Congress, Samajwadi Party, Shiromani Akali Dal, Telangana Rashtra Samiti, and YSR Congress. From the report, it cannot be discerned if contributor ‘A’ contributed to a particular political party. It can only be concluded that contributor ‘A’ could have contributed to the Party. Thus, even if the argument of the Union of India that the other alternative means such as the other modes of electronic transfer do not realize the objective of curbing black money substantially because contributors would resort to cash donations due to the fear of consequences is accepted, Electoral Trusts are an effective alternative. There will be a lesser degree of “political consequences” for contributions made to the Electoral Trust because the information about which of the contributors contributed to which of the parties will not be disclosed. It is only where the Electoral Trust contributes to one political party, would there be a possibility of political consequences and witch-hunting (assuming that there is a link between anonymity and contributions). However, in that case, it is a choice expressly made by the contributors. Additionally, the law mandates disclosure only of contributions made above twenty thousand in a financial year. So, for contributions less than twenty-five thousand, cheques and other modes of electronic transfer are an effective alternative. When these three methods of political contribution (electronic transfer other than electoral bonds, contribution to Electoral Trust, and Electoral Bonds) are placed on a continuum, transfer through electronic means (other than electoral bonds) would be placed on one end and Electoral Bonds would be placed on the other end. A voter would receive complete information about contributions made above twenty thousand to a political party in the case of electronic transfer made directly to a political party other than through electoral bonds.'“6 146 RPA; Section 29A [2024] 2 S.C.R. 517 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 126.
127.
128.
129.
With respect to contributions through electoral bonds, the voter would not receive any information about financial contributions in terms of Section 29C of RPA as amended by the Finance Act. This Court in the interim order dated 31 October 2023 in the specific context of contributions made by companies through electoral bonds prima facie observed the voter would be able to secure information about the funding by matching the information of the aggregate sum contributed by the Company (as required to be disclosed under Section 182(3) of the Companies Act as amended by the Finance Act) with the information disclosed by the political party. However, on a detailed analysis of the Scheme and the amendments we are of the opinion that such an exercise would not reveal the particulars of the donations because the Company under the provisions of Section 182 and the political party are only required to disclose the consolidated amount contributed and received through Electoral Bonds respectively. The particulars about the political party to which the contributions were made which is crucial to the right to information of political funding cannot be identified through the matching exercise.
With respect to contributions to an Electoral Trust, a voter receives partial information. The voter would know the total amount contributed by the donor and that the donor contributed to one of the political parties (in case the Electoral Trust has made contributions to multiple parties). But the donor would not be aware of the exact details of the contribution.
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