Vasantha (Dead) Thr. Lr. v. Rajalakshmi @ Rajam (Dead) Thr.LRs.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 109; [2024] 2 S.C.R. 326
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Hrishikesh Roy, Justice Sanjay Karol
- Decided
- 13 Feb 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 3854/2014
- Sections
- 34, 27, 19, 119, 6, 126, 213, 57, 248, 42
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:23 am. Original source ↗
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* Author [2024] 2 S.C.R. 326 : 2024 INSC 109 Vasantha (Dead) Thr. Lr.
v.
Rajalakshmi @ Rajam (Dead) Thr.Lrs.
(Civil Appeal No. 3854 of 2014)
13 February 2024 [Hrishikesh Roy and Sanjay Karol*, JJ.] Issue for Consideration The action that set in motion the instant dispute was in the year 1947, when a mother ‘T’ transferred property by executing First Settlement Deed in one form to her two sons and in another, to her daughter. Some forty-odd years later, the daughter’s husband ‘G’ filed a suit in respect of such property, in 1993. The issues arise for consideration are (i) Whether G’s suit for declaration based on the First Settlement Deed, eventually filed in the year 1993 barred by limitation; (ii) Whether the suit for declaration simpliciter was maintainable in view of s.34 of the SRA, 1963.
Headnotes Limitation Act, 1963 – s.27, Arts.58 and 65 – Specific Relief Act, 1963 – s.34 – After First Settlement Deed, two sons of T executed a second settlement deed dated 31.07.1952 reverting the interest in properties back to their mother-T – Thereafter, T executed a third Settlement Deed dated 18.08.1952 bequeathing absolute interest in such properties only in favour of two sons – G filed a suit praying for a declaration as owner of the property as sole heir of T’s daughter in terms of First Settlement Deed – Trial Court held that G admitted execution of Second Settlement Deed and possession was handed over to T – The suit filed was barred by limitation – First Appellate Court confirmed the trial Court judgment – However, the High Court held that G was entitled to half share a property according to the First Settlement Deed – Propriety:
Held: If the period of limitation is to run from the date of the Second Settlement Deed, then the rights should be extinguished in 1964 – If the same were to run from either 1974 (when M, younger son [2024] 2 S.C.R. 327Vasantha (Dead) T h r . L r . v. Rajalakshmi @ Rajam (Dead) T h r .Lrs. of T executed settlement deed in favour of his adopted daughter V) or 1976 (when another deed was executed by M in favour of his wife P), then after 1986 or 1988 respectively, G had no right in the property on the plea of adverse possession – It is settled that a reversioner ordinarily must file a suit for possession within 12 years from the death of the limited heir or widow – That metric being applied to the instant facts, it is after the death of P, that the reversioner, or in this case the heir of the reversioner G ought to have filed the suit – The suit, the subject matter of appeal before this Court is a suit for declaration simpliciter and not possession – So, the possession still rests with heir of P – The 12 year period expired in 2016 with death of P in the year 2004 – Therefore, the suit filed in 1993 is barred by limitation – Also, Part III of the Schedule to the Limitation Act details the time period within which the declarations may be sought for – Art.58 of the Limitation Act governs the present dispute – In the instant case, the suit for declaration was filed in 1993 – This implies that the cause of action to seek any other declaration i.e. a declaration of G in the property, should have arisen only in the year 1990 – There is nothing on record to show any cause of action having arisen at this point in time, much less within the stipulated period of three years – As far as the maintainability of suit for declaration simpliciter in view of s.34 of SRA is concerned, in view of the proviso to s.34, the suit of the plaintiff-G could not have been decreed since the plaintiff sought for mere declaration without the consequential relief of recovery of possession – On a perusal of the plaint, it is evident that the plaintiff was aware that the appellant-V herein was in possession of the suit property and therefore it was incumbent upon him to seek the relief which follows – It is also noted that after the death of the life-estate holder-P in 2004, there was no attempt made by the original plaintiff to amend the plaint to seek the relief of recovery of possession – Thus, the impugned judgment fails on both limitation and maintainability of suit – Judgment of the trial Court and First Appellate Court restored. [Paras 16, 17, 23, 26, 33] Adverse Possession – Claim of:
Held: Person who claims adverse possession should show : (a) on what date he came into possession; (b) what was the nature of his possession; (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party; (d) how long his possession has continued; 328 [2024] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed – A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour – Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to prove his adverse possession. [Para 20] Limitation – Adverse Possession – Dependence on limitation: Held: Modern statutes of limitation operate, as a rule, not only to cut off one’s right to bring an action for the recovery of property that has been in the adverse possession of another for a specified time but also to vest the possessor with title – The intention of such statutes is not to punish one who neglects to assert rights but to protect those who have maintained the possession of property for the time specified by the statute under a claim of right or colour of title. [Para 21] Case Law Cited Bharat Barrel and Drum Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. ESI Corpn., [1972] 1 SCR 867 : (1971) 2 SCC 860; Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, [2012] 8 SCR 35 : (2012) 8 SCC 148 – relied on.
Sultan Khan v. State of MP, 1991 MP LJ 81 – distinguished.
Yeswant Deorao Deshmukh v. Walchand Ramchand Kothari, [1950] 1 SCR 852; National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad, [2011] 14 SCR 472 : (2011) 12 SCC 695; Fateh Bibi v. Charan Dass, [1970] 3 SCR 953 : (1970) 1 SCC 658; M/s Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, [1978] 2 SCR 614 : (1978) 2 SCC 91; Ram Saran & Anr. v. Ganga Devi, (1973) 2 SCC 60; Vinay Krishna v. Keshav Chandra & Anr., (1993) Supp 3 SCC 129; UOI v. Ibrahim Uddin, [2012] 8 SCR 35 :
(2012) 8 SCC 148; Goplakrishna (Dead) Through LRs v. Narayanagowda(Dead) Through Lrs., [2019] 6 SCR 382 : (2019) 4 SCC 592; Harmath Kaur v. Inder Bahadur Singh, AIR 1922 PC 403; Mahadeo Prasad Singh, AIR 1931 PC 1989; Sreenivasa Pai v. Saraswathi Ammal, [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 122 : (1985) 4 SCC 85; Tribhuvan Shankar v. Amrutlal, [2013] 12 SCR 368 : (2014) 2 SCC [2024] 2 S.C.R. 329Vasantha (Dead) T h r . L r . v. Rajalakshmi @ Rajam (Dead) T h r .Lrs. 788; In Saroop Singh v. Banto, [2005] Suppl. 4 SCR 253 : (2005) 8 SCC 330; Karnataka Board of Wakf v.
Govt. of India, [2004] Suppl. 1 SCR 255 : (2004) 10 SCC 779; Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan, [2008] 13 SCR 818 : (2009) 16 SCC 517; P.T.
Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, [2007] 5 SCR 491 : (2007) 6 SCC 59; Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, [2020] 6 SCR 538 : (2020) 17 SCC 260; Vinay Krishna v. Keshav Chandra, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 129; Venkataraja and Ors. v. Vidyane Doureradjaperumal (Dead) thr. Lrs., [2013] 5 SCR 814 :
(2014) 14 SCC 502; Akkamma and Ors. v. Vemavathi and Ors., 2021 SCC Online SC 1146; Executive Officer, Arulmigu Chokkanatha Swamy Koil Trust, Virudhunagar v. Chandran and Others, [2017] 5 SCR 473 : (2017) 3 SCC 702; Harcharan v. State of Haryana, (1982) 3 SCC 408; Rajender Prasad v. Kayastha Pathshala, (1981)
Supp 1 SCC 56 – referred to.
List of Acts Limitation Act, 1963; Specific Relief Act, 1963.
List of Keywords Limitation; Extinguishment of right to property; Adverse possession; Title by adverse possession; Establishment of adverse possession; Claim of adverse possession; Adverse possession dependency on limitation; Modern statutes of limitation; Suit for declaration; Relief of possession; Discretion of Court as to declaration of status or right; Suit for mere declaration without consequential relief; Amendment of plaint for recovery of possession.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.3854 of 2014 From the Judgment and Order dated 27.09.2012 of the High Court of Madras in SA No.1926 of 2004 Appearances for Parties Dama Seshadri Naidu, Sr. Adv., G. Balaji, Advs. for the Appellant. V. Ramasubramanian, Adv. for the Respondents.
330 [2024] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Sanjay Karol, J.
1. The action that set in motion the instant dispute was in the year 1947, when a mother transferred property inherited at the death of her husband, in one form to her two sons and in another, to her daughter. Some forty-odd years later, the daughter’s husband filed a suit in respect of such property, in 1993. The Additional District Munsiff1 decided the matter in 1999. The Additional District and Session Judge2 returned a decision on the First Appeal in 2002. The Second Appeal was decided by the High Court3 in 2012. It is against this order and judgment in Second Appeal that the present civil appeal has been preferred.
BACKGROUND FACTS
2. It would be necessary to advert to the facts underlying the present dispute.
3. On 10 th July 1947, one Thayammal executed a settlement deed4 granting rights in her property to her two sons namely Raghavulu Naidu and Chinnakrishnan @ Munusamy Naidu 5 for their lives and thereafter to the former’s two daughters namely Saroja and Rajalakshmi (present Respondent now represented through LRs). Saroja pre-deceased Thayammal as also her father and uncle, in 1951.
3.1 Subsequently, Raghavulu and Munusamy executed a Settlement Deed dated 31 st July 19526 reverting the said interests in the properties back to their mother.
3.2 Thayamma, soon thereafter, executed a further Settlement Deed7 dated 18 th August 1952, bequeathing absolute interest 1 “Trial Court”
2 “First Appellate Court”
3 “Impugned judgment”
4 “First Settlement Deed”
5 “Munusamy”
6 “Second Settlement Deed”
7 “Third Settlement Deed”
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 331Vasantha (Dead) T h r . L r . v. Rajalakshmi @ Rajam (Dead) T h r .Lrs. in such properties only in favour of her two sons namely Raghavulu Naidu and Munusamy Naidu, with the consequence of extinguishing the rights, if any, of Saroja and Gopalakrishnan. 3.3 Munusamy had no children. His wife Pavunammal enjoyed life interest in the property bequeathed to her husband. They had an adopted daughter, Vasantha (present Appellant, now represented through LRs).
3.4 In 1993, during the lifetime of Pavunammal, Gopalakrishnan (Husband of Saroja) filed a suit, subject matter of the present lis, praying for a declaration as the owner of the properties since he was the sole heir of Saroja in terms of the First Settlement Deed.
4. It is in this brief background of facts that the dispute entered the courts.
It would be useful to have a summary of family relations forming the backdrop of, and parties to, the dispute by way of a chart, as immediately hereunder:- ● Pounamma is also referred to as Pavanuammal at some places, as was so done by the Courts below.
332 [2024] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
PROCEEDING BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
A. PLAINT
5. Plaintiff (Gopalakrishnan) filed a suit for declaration and to establish his vested rights and interest in the property.
5.1 It was urged that only the First Settlement Deed had legal sanctity. Accordingly, the wife of Munusamy is only entitled to possession and enjoyment till her lifetime. There is no right of transfer in her favour.
5.2 The Second Settlement Deed is only for the lifetime of Thayammal, and the same would not impact the vested right created in favour of deceased Saroja, inherited by Gopalakrishnan, as her husband and sole heir.
5.3 The adoption of Vasantha is illegal. Also, the vested right in favour of Saroja was created prior to such adoption and, therefore, would not affect the rights of Gopalakrishnan.
B. WRITTEN STATEMENT
6. The written statement is of denial of all claims made by Gopalakrishnan. 6.1 It is incorrect to state that the two sons Raghavulu and Munasamy, were in possession of suit properties according to the First Settlement Deed. No claim of any vested rights can be accepted.
6.2 The claim that Gopalakrishnan is the sole legal heir of Saroja, cannot be accepted as after her death in the year 1951, he has remarried and relocated to Pondicherry.
6.3 Even if the First Settlement Deed is accepted as genuine, then Pavanuammal alone would be the heir to such properties. 6.4 Munasamy had, during his lifetime, on 7 th October, 1976 executed a settlement deed in favour of Pavanuammal without any coercion. The patta of the said property was also transferred in her name.
6.5 Since Munasamy and Pavanuammal did not have any children, they adopted a child namely Vasantha. Pavanuammal of her own volition executed a settlement deed in favour of Vasantha on 19 th July, 1993. Any denial of the same cannot be accepted. [2024] 2 S.C.R. 333Vasantha (Dead) T h r . L r . v. Rajalakshmi @ Rajam (Dead) T h r .Lrs. 6.6 On 18 th August 1952, Thayammal had vide the Third Settlement Deed given exclusively, the suit properties to her two sons who have made separate and individual deeds in regards to their shares and sold portions thereof to other parties. The suit suffers from non-joinder of necessary parties.
C. FINDINGS
7. The Learned Additional District Munsif framed four following issues to be considered:
a) Whether the settlement deed suggested by the plaintiff is genuine?
b) Whether the plaintiff cannot claim any right in the suit property?
c) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the relief prayed in the plaint?
d) What are the relief for which plaintiff is entitled to? 7.1 Placing reliance upon the deposition of PW1 (Gopalakrishnan), the first issue was decided in favour of the plaintiff and the First Settlement Deed was upheld as genuine. Also, DW1 (Vasantha) in her deposition had not completely denied the execution and genuineness of First Settlement Deed. After considering both, the First and the Second Settlement Deeds, it held that Raghavulu Naidu and Munusamy Naidu must have executed the Second Settlement Deed in favour of Thayammal as the Second Settlement Deed could not be executed without the first deed having been in existence.
7.2 In regard to the second issue, it was observed that plaintiff himself has admitted the execution of Second Settlement Deed and that possession was handed over to Thayammal. Plaintiff has not taken any action in respect of the document executed in the year 1974 and filed the suit in the year 1993 and held that the suit is barred by Limitation and the rights of the plaintiff were abated. 7.3 The third and fourth issues were decided against the plaintiff since he cannot claim any rights in the suit property, therefore, the declaration cannot be made in respect of one-half of the defendant’s share in the suit property after her lifetime would come to the plaintiff.
334 [2024] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
PROCEEDING BEFORE THE FIRST APPELLATE COURT
8. Two following questions were considered by the First Appellate Court: a) Whether the plaintiff is the legal heir of Saroja Ammal? b) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the share in the suit property?
8.1 It was held that the plaintiff has never taken any steps to revoke various transactions that have taken place in regard to the suit properties. He was also unaware about the real possession of the properties in question. Further, it was observed that the plaintiff failed to prove dispossession within a period of twelve years, i.e. the time period within which the claim of adverse possession has to be made.
8.2 In the above terms, the judgment and decree of the Trial Court was confirmed and the appeal was dismissed.
PROCEEDING BEFORE THE HIGH COURT
9. The High Court under Second Appeal framed the following substantial questions of law:
a) Whether in law the courts below are right in failing to see that under Section 19 of the Transfer of Property Act, a vested interest is not defeated by the death of the transferee before the possession.
b) Whether in law the courts below are not wrong in omitting to see that the matter in issue would be squarely covered by the illustrations (i) and (iii) of Section 119 of the Indian Succession Act?
c) Whether in law the courts below are right in failing to see that a limited interest owner could not prescribe title by adverse possession as held in AIR 1961 SCC 1442?
9.1 Having taken note of various decisions, the learned Single Judge held that the interest vested in Saroja was full and not life interest. Therefore, upon her death,, the interest does not revert to the settlor. In other words, that Saroja died before her interest stood fructified, is an incorrect statement. It is only the [2024] 2 S.C.R. 335Vasantha (Dead) Thr. Lr. v. Rajalakshmi @ Rajam (Dead) Thr.Lrs. right of enjoyment that stood postponed till the life interest of Raghavulu Naidu and Munusamy Naidu.
9.2 On the question of limitation, it was observed that the documents executed between Thayammal, her sons and subsequently, Pavanummal and Vasantha, were only in respect of life interest i.e. a limited right. The other two deeds of settlement executed after the First Settlement Deed are against or beyond the competency of the executants and therefore, not binding on the plaintiff. That being the case the requirement of twelve years within which to initiate a suit, does not arise. Further, it was held that since, in the suit, the life estate holder has been impleaded in the suit and Gopalakrishnan had the option of filing the suit even after her lifetime, the same is not barred by limitation. 9.3 It was in such terms that it was held that according to the First Settlement Deed the plaintiff will be entitled to half share of the property after the lifetime of Vasantha, a life estate holder.
SUBMISSIONS
10. We have heard at length, Mr. Dama Seshadri Naidu, learned senior counsel for the Appellants and Mr. V. Ramasubramanian, learned counsel for the Respondents. The main contentions urged have been recorded as under:-
A. APPELLANTS
(i) It is submitted that all questions raised in this Appeal are pure questions of law and in accordance with Yeswant Deorao Deshmukh v. Walchand Ramchand Kothari (3-Judge Bench) 8 and National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad (2-Judge Bench) 9, a question of law can be raised at any stage.
(ii) It is urged that the original plaintiff (Gopalakrishnan) lacked a cause of action. Since the suit was filed while Pounammal was alive, even if his right is termed as ‘vested ’, the same does not become enforceable till her death. In other words, till 2004 no right stood accrued in favour of the plaintiff. Reference 8 [1950] 1 SCR 852 9 [2011] 14 SCR 472 : (2011) 12 SCC 695 336 [2024] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports was made to Fateh Bibi v. Char̥an Dass (3-Judge Bench)10. Further, upon such rights having accrued, no application to amend the plaint was filed. Any which way, if he had by amendment, sought the relief of possession, it would be as if an entirely new cause of action is sought to be introduced amounting to substitution, which ought not to be allowed. Reference was made to M/s Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram (2-Judge Bench) 11.
(iii) As per Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 196312 the declaration of a right or status is a matter of discretion. However, the proviso restricts the application of such discretion in terms that it is not to be exercised when the complainant seeks only a declaration of title when he is able to seek further relief. Reference is made to Ram Saran & Anr. v. Ganga Devi (3-Judge Bench)13, Vinay Krishna v. Keshav Chandra & Anr. (3-Judge Bench) 14 and UOI v. Ibrahim Uddin (2-Judge Bench) 15.
(iv) It is submitted that Article 65 Explanation (a) read with Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 hits the right of Gopalkrishnan. Succession to the estate only accrues on the death of the life estate holder which was in 2004. Till date, no suit stands filed. The learned senior counsel relied on Goplakrishna (Dead) Through LRs v. Narayanagowda(Dead) Through LRs(2- Judge Bench) 16.
(v) It is argued that the right of Saroja created as per the First Settlement Deed was in fact a contingent interest. It states that if Munusamy has a male heir then one half will belong to him and Saroja will get the other half after the life of Raghavulu and Munusamy. Therefore, on her death in 1951, her interest was spes successionis i.e. it did not achieve concrete form and is only an expectation of succeeding. The contingency 10 [1970] 3 SCR 953 : (1970) 1 SCC 658 11 [1978] 2 SCR 614 : (1978) 2 SCC 91 12 “SRA, 1963”
13 (1973) 2 SCC 60
14 (1993) Supp 3 SCC 129 15 [2012] 8 SCR 35 : (2012) 8 SCC 148 16 [2019] 6 SCR 382 : (2019) 4 SCC 592 [2024] 2 S.C.R. 337Vasantha (Dead) T h r . L r . v. Rajalakshmi @ Rajam (Dead) T h r .Lrs. upon which Saroja’s interest rests is two-fold; Munusamy either having or not having children. If he does, they would get half share; if he doesn’t then two eventualities exist: half of Munusamy’s share goes to Saroja upon his death, and the other half after the life interest of Pavunammal is exhausted, goes to Saroja, the remainder woman. Reliance is placed on Harmath Kaur v. Inder Bahadur Singh17. Further, reliance is placed on Mahadeo Prasad Singh18 to state that when there is an expectation simpliciter of succession, neither a transfer nor a contract to transfer is permissible.
B. RESPONDENTS
(i) The fact that the First Settlement Deed was acted upon i.e. the rights given to two sons of Thayammal were returned to her by a subsequent deed in 1952, shows that the first one gave rights in presenti. Therefore, in Saroja rests a ‘vested ’ right as per Section 19 of the Transfer of Property Act, 188219 , a vested right once accrued cannot be defeated by the death of the transferee prior to possession. Reference is made to Sreenivasa Pai v. Saraswathi Ammal (2-Judge Bench) 20.
(ii) The Second Settlement Deed reverting the life interest awarded to the two sons only gives Thayammal a life interest and therefore subsequent settlement deeds were non est in law and thus need not be challenged.
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